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SOUTHERN HISTORY OF THE WAR.

THE

LAST YEAR OF THE WAR.

BY

EDWARD A. POLLARD,

AUTHOR OF "FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD YEARS OF THE WAR."

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P R E F A C E .

THE author continues in this volume, and closes with it, his Popular Annals of the War. He is well aware that he has made but a rude compilation of events, in this hasty and unpretending work; but he hopes that in his four volumes of plain narrative, he has at least laid a foundation for an elaborate and well-digested History of the War, which he proposes to himself as the work of years, and entertains as the literary ambition of his life.

The writer may properly say here, with the completion of this volume of hasty narrative, that he designs now to betake himself to the composition of a fair and standard history of the War in America; of which so far he has constructed scarcely more than the skeleton. Resolved as he is by just and patient labors to rescue the truth from the peculiarly industrious misrepresentation of the Yankee, and ambitious thus to do a most important service to his countrymen of the South, and duly vindicate their name to posterity, he shall, in his large and new design, trust much to their aid—especially that of their military leaders and public men—in giving him the benefit of intelligent advice, and in collecting the ill-preserved and disject-ed historical testimony of the struggle of the Confederates.

The announcement of this new work will be shortly made in a more proper form, and with a fuller detail of the author's purposes and requests.

But one word more is not inappropriate here. It is to remind the people of the South that the very fact that the war has gone against them makes it more important that its records should not fall entirely to the pens of their enemies. All persons in the South who assist in gathering the true testimony of their unfortunate struggle, perform a last, but most important office of faithful love, and do a noble work in rescuing the name of a lost cause from the slanders of those who, having been our accusers and executioners in this present time, would also be our judges at the Bar of History.

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THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR.

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THE spirit of the Southern Confederacy was scarcely ever more buoyant than in the month of May, 1864. The confidence of its people in the ultimate accomplishment of their independence was so firm and universal, that any other conclusion was but seldom referred to in general conversation or in the prevision of one's private affairs; and in Richmond and elsewhere the hope was freely indulged that the campaign of 1864 was to be decisive of the war, and to crown the efforts of the South with peace and independence.

There had been abundant occasion for this revival of confidence in the public mind of the Confederacy. The winter just past had been one of a large aggregate of success to the Confederate arms. Several brilliant expeditions had been planned and accomplished by them; while on the enemy's side all the work he had cut out for the winter had come to grief, and every one of his elaborate enterprises in that season had failed,

with a concurrence of disaster most remarkable in the history of the war.

The invasion of Florida had been a shocking failure. Thomas had been repulsed in North Georgia, and was held completely in check there. Sherman's grand expedition in the Southwest and his famous experiment of "the strategic triangle" had come to the most absurd and disastrous conclusion—"Half of his army," said this chieftain, "went to Memphis and half went to h—ll." Banks's proposed conquest of the Trans-Mississippi had been to the Confederates the occasion of that celebrated Red River campaign, the most glorious in the pages of their history, in which they not only reclaimed the coast and frontier of the Trans-Mississippi, but left the Massachusetts hero scarcely more of Louisiana than was covered by his pickets. And there had been other positive successes on the Confederate side. Forrest, by long and rapid marches, had spread terror along the banks of the Mississippi, and cut a swath across the State of Kentucky; and on the eastern frontier the expeditions of Pickett and of Hoke had been brilliant events for the Confederacy, leaving the enemy only two places, Washington and Newbern, on the coast of North Carolina.

No wonder that the events of this winter were accepted by the Confederates as happy auguries for the ensuing campaign, and fresh occasions of hope and confidence. Their internal affairs, too, had improved along with this current of military success. The army had been replenished by an enlarged conscription; a happy revolution was already going on in the finances under the operation of the law which curtailed the currency thirty-three per cent.; supplies had been accumulated during the winter, and the storehouses of Richmond were filled to bursting with the subsistence that had been gathered, through the course of several months, for the great campaign in Virginia.

Such were the extraordinary prospects with which the Confederacy entered upon the summer campaign of 1864. A general opinion had taken possession of the public mind that the North would make its grand effort in this year for the conquest of the South; and that even negative results would be fatal to the enemy, as they would be insufficient to appease the growing popular impatience of the war in the North, or sustain any

new demand of the government at Washington for men and means.

This opinion was right, at least so far as it contemplated an extraordinary exertion on the part of the North. Two grand campaigns for the summer of 1864 had been elaborately planned at Washington. They were the parallel operations of Grant and Sherman in Virginia and in Georgia.

GRANT'S "ON TO RICHMOND."

General Ulysses S. Grant had hitherto been known in the North as the great general of the West, and the Yankee newspapers had entitled him the hero of Fort Donelson and Vicksburg. He was now to answer the eager expectation of the public by a campaign of unrivalled importance in Virginia. His elevation had been rapid. Four years ago the man who commanded all the armies of the North had been occupied with the obscure experiments of life in the successive callings of farmer, auctioneer, and tanner; and at the beginning of the war, having at first been refused an active military command by Governor Yates of Illinois, he was accidentally selected to lead a regiment of raw recruits.

The grade of lieutenant-general in the armies of the United States had been conferred by brevet only on General Scott, but as an actual rank in time of war had only been bestowed on General Washington. It was revived by the Federal Congress, and the commission conferred on General Grant, the hero of the West, who, despite the gap in his successes at Shiloh in 1862, and his narrow escape on that occasion from being consigned to obscurity by the ungenerous and characteristic changes in the fickle popular idolatry of the North, had had a long run of success, and was in advance of all his contemporaries in the coarse Yankee measure of greatness. The commission bore date March 2, 1864; and on the 9th of that month President Lincoln presented to Grant in person this commission, assuring him of his own cordial personal concurrence in the measure. General Halleck, hitherto general-in-chief, was relieved from duty, and made chief of staff to the army at Washington.

The armies put under the command of Grant presented one of the most imposing arrays in modern history. They dotted the country from the Potomac to the Rio Grande, and thence around and along the sea-coast, and back to the Chesapeake. It was said that the Yankee lines might be traced by the smoke of camp-fires through a zig-zag journey of five thousand miles.

A few words may be bestowed here upon the character of the man, the designation of whom as the military idol of the North was not extravagant. General Grant had but little education, and was a man of not much more than ordinary ability; but he had a Scotch pertinacity of character which was a constant and valuable assistance in his military campaigns. As a commander he possessed a rare faculty of combination. He was a man who gathered his forces, who could "afford to wait," who dealt deliberate and heavy strokes; but he lacked that quickness of perception which decides single fields and illustrates military genius. His heart was certainly not a bad one, and his disposition was above most of the little tricks of the Yankee. On particular occasions he did some noble things, as we shall see in other parts of this volume. He was one of the few Yankee notabilities who, without affectation and in sincerity, avoided sensations and displays, had a horror of being "lionized," and lived for history rather than for the gazette. He had an imperturbable good-humor. In his appearance and manners he was very plain; but it was not a plebeian plainness; it was the plainness of a man trained to habits of self-reliance, who never lost the dignity and self-poise which come from a consciousness of one's merits without vanity.

From the moment of receiving his commission as lieutenant-general, Grant had transferred his personal presence to the Army of the Potomac, leaving Sherman as his vicegerent to carry out the Western campaign. Warren, Sedgwick, and Hancock were made the corps commanders of this army, and Burnside was given a separate army corps. Butler, at Fortress Monroe, was reinforced by the Tenth Corps from Charleston under Gillmore, and the Eighteenth from the West under "Baldy" Smith. To the infamous hero of New Orleans was allotted the task of cutting off the city of Richmond from its southern lines of communication; while Sigel, operating in the Shenandoah Valley, was to cut the railroad which by way of

Gordonsville connected Lee's army with his principal base of supplies at Lynchburg.

Thus were the preparations completed for the most momentous campaign in American history. On Wednesday, May 4, eight weeks from the day Grant received his commission, his two grand columns were ready to move—the one well in hand on the north bank of the Rapidan, seventy miles north of Richmond; and the other at Fortress Monroe, one day's sail from Richmond on the James.

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS.

At dawn on the 5th of May, the Army of the Potomac, closely succeeded by that of Burnside, had crossed the Rapidan River; the Second Corps at Ely's, the Fifth and Sixth corps at Germania Ford. Having crossed the river, the first demonstration of the enemy was an attempt to turn the right flank of Lee's army between the Orange Courthouse pike and the river.

The enemy's attack on the line of the turnpike was sustained by the division of General Edward Johnson of Ewell's corps. After a brief struggle the enemy succeeded in forcing back part of Jones's brigade, which had been formed across the turnpike; but the gap in our lines was speedily closed by Stewart's brigade, and the Yankees driven back with the loss of some guns. In the mean time Gordon's gallant brigade of Georgians crushed through the enemy's first lines, and driving furiously on, struck back the Yankee front in confusion upon its supports. Another advance of the enemy upon Johnson's left flank was gallantly repulsed by Pegram's Virginians and Hays's Louisianians; and the day's work on the left witnessed the Confederates still holding their advanced lines.

Hill had been ordered to march from Lee's left, and with Heth's division in advance had moved along the plank-road in a direction somewhat parallel with the turnpike, eventually effecting a junction with Gordon's brigade, on Ewell's extreme right. The line of battle, thus completed, presented a front of six miles.

About 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the attack on Ewell having

been repulsed, the enemy commenced a more decided demonstration in front of Hill. Heth's division bore at first the whole brunt of the attack, but about four o'clock Wilcox's division was moved up from Ewell's right. For more than three hours the dreadful conflict continued, the enemy attempting to force his way rather by constant pressure than by dashing enterprise. Never was a more gallant spectacle than these two divisions of Confederates holding at bay the Yankee onslaught from three o'clock until half-past seven, firm and unbroken in all that long and dreadful monotony of conflict. Night closed upon the Confederate line in the position it had originally taken. That the day was an unsuccessful one for the Yankees even their own accounts did not hesitate to admit. "No cheer of victory," says a Northern correspondent, "swelled through the Wilderness that night."

During the day Hancock, Second Corps, had come up, and the Federal forces were concentrated. On the morning of the 6th their lines were consolidated and freshly posted; the three corps sustaining their respective positions—Warren in the centre, Sedgwick on the right, and Hancock on the left.

The attack was made by the Confederates, Hill and Longstreet's corps attacking both of Hancock's flanks with such fury that the whole line of command thus assaulted was broken in several places. The effort, however, of the Confederates to pierce the enemy's centre was stayed, the Yankees having secured their line of battle behind their intrenchments.

But with the expiration of the day was to occur a thrilling and critical conjuncture. Just at dusk (the Confederates' favorite hour of battle) a column of Lee's army attacked the enemy's left, captured Seymour and a large portion of his brigade, and excited a panic which put Grant's whole army on the verge of irretrievable rout. Unfortunately, the Confederates had no idea of the extent of their success, and could not imagine how fraught with vital issue were those few moments of encounter. The Yankee supply-trains were thought to be immediately threatened, and artillery was posted to bear upon the Confederate advance in that direction. But the Confederates did not press their advantage. As it was, Generals Shaler and Seymour, with the greater part of their commands, were taken prisoners.

Such had been the two days' battle of the Wilderness—a marked success for the Confederates, disputed by the Northern newspapers, of course, but manifest in the face of the facts. The enemy confessed to a loss of twelve thousand.* The immediate consequence of these engagements was, that Grant, being clearly out-generalled in his first design of reaching Lee's rear and compelling him to fight a battle with his communications cut off, which would be decisive of the campaign, was forced to change his plans, and with it his position; falling back to his intrenched line, between the Wilderness and Trigg's Mill, nearly coincident with the Brock road, leading from the Wilderness to Spottsylvania Courthouse.

On the 7th, with some desultory fighting, Grant continued his movement towards Fredericksburg, with the evident view of attempting the Fredericksburg road to Richmond. It was in consequence of this change of front that General Lee took up a new line on the Po. It will amuse the candid reader to find how this movement was interpreted by the mendacious press of the North; for in the newspapers of New York and Boston it was entitled, in flaming capitals, "A Waterloo Defeat of the Confederates," "The Retreat of Lee to Richmond," &c. For a few days the North was vocal with exultation, and for the hundredth time it had the rebellion "in a corner," to be conveniently strangled. But this imagination of easy conquest was to be dissipated as the many that had preceded it.

* A correspondent of the London *Herald*, who witnessed the two days' battle, writes: "The results to the enemy in some parts of the field cannot be described by any word less forcible than massacre. Eleven hundred and twenty-five Federal dead were buried in front of Ewell's line, lying to the left of the turnpike. Five hundred more were buried on the right of that road; and, in addition to about one hundred dead officers, whose bodies must have been removed, the number of corpses lying on the field, within range of the enemy's sharpshooters, is estimated at fully three hundred. The Federal killed in the struggle on the right may, therefore, be declared positively to number as many as two thousand. I have no data on which to estimate the breadth of the slaughter in the fierce conflicts of the right; but from the stubbornness and volume of these, feel quite confident that they must have added to the slain as awful an account as that rendered in front of Ewell. With three thousand prisoners and four thousand dead, the usual proportion of six or seven to one for the wounded, would show that the losses of Grant in the battle of the Wilderness cannot have been less than thirty thousand men."

THE BATTLES OF SPOTTSYAVANIA COURTHOUSE.

On the 8th of May two engagements were fought at Spottsylvania Courthouse, between Longstreet's corps, under Anderson (General Longstreet having been wounded in the battle of the 6th) and the Fifth Corps, under Warren, supported by cavalry. The enemy was repulsed, with heavy loss, in both instances.

On the 9th, which was marked by some skirmishing, General John Sedgwick, one of the most valuable corps commanders in the Yankee army, was killed, probably by a stray bullet. He had just been bantering his men about dodging and ducking their heads at the whistle of Confederate bullets in the distance. "Why," said he, "they couldn't hit an elephant at this distance." The next moment a ball entered his face, just below the left eye, and pierced his brain, causing instant death.

On Thursday, the 17th of May, occurred what may be entitled as the great battle of Spottsylvania Courthouse. The enemy had planned an attack on what was supposed to be a vital section of the Confederates, a salient angle of earthworks held by Johnson's division of Ewell's corps. The storming column advanced silently, and without firing a shot, up to the angle of the breastworks, over which they rushed, taking the forces within in flank, surrounding them, capturing nearly the entire division of Johnson's, with its commander, and also a brigade or two of other troops, Brigadier-General George H. Stuart in command.

But the surprise was only momentary. One of the most thrilling scenes of the war was to occur. In a moment when all was excitement, and when it could be easily seen that unless the Confederates could check the enemy's advance, the consequence would be disastrous in the extreme, General Lee rode forward in front of the Confederate line, his position being opposite at the time to the colors of the Forty-ninth regiment of Pegram's brigade. Not a word did he say. He simply took off his hat. "As he sat on his charger," says a near eyewitness of him, "I never saw a man look so noble or witnessed a spectacle so impressive."

At this interesting moment General Gordon, spurring his

foaming charger to the front, seized the reins of General Lee's horse, and turning him around, said, "General, these are Virginians! These men have never failed! They never will! Will you, boys?" Loud cries of "No, no!" "General Lee to the rear!" "Go back!" "Go back!" "General Lee to the rear!" burst from along the lines; and as one led the general's horse to the rear, General Gordon gave the command, "Forward, charge!" And with a shout and yell the brigades dashed on, through bog and swamp, and briers and undergrowth, to the breastworks. For long hours a battle raged over the intrenchments, the intense fury, heroism, and horror of which it is impossible to describe. From dawn to dusk the roar of guns was ceaseless; a tempest of shell shrieked through the forest and ploughed the field. Ewell's corps held the critical angle with a courage that nothing could subdue. General Hill moved down from the right, joined Ewell, and threw his divisions into the struggle. Longstreet came on from the extreme left of the Confederate line. Column after column of the enemy was stricken down, or repulsed and sent back like a broken wave. The ground in front of the Confederate lines was piled with his slain.

The works which the Yankees had captured in the morning contained an angle in the form of an A, with the point towards the enemy. At the close of the day the enemy maintained possession of about three hundred yards of our works in that quarter. The loss in Johnson's division was probably between 3,000 and 3,500, including over 2,000 prisoners. Our whole loss, during the day, amounted to between six and seven thousand. The enemy stated their loss at from 18,000 to 25,000. They captured twenty pieces of artillery. This was their "great victory."

The sixth day of heavy fighting had been ended. "It would," says an intelligent critic of this period, "not be impossible to match the results of any one day's battle with stories from the wars of the old world; but never, we should think, in the history of man were five such battles as these compressed into six days." Grant had been foiled; but his obstinacy was apparently untouched, and the fierce and brutal consumption of human life, another element of his generalship, and which had already obtained for him with his soldiers the

soubriquet of "the butcher," was still to continue. He telegraphed to Washington: "I propose to fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer."

But we must turn for a few moments from this dominant field of action and interest to notice other movements, which were parts of Grant's combination, and of the great military drama in Virginia.

While Grant was engaged on the Rapidan, a cavalry expedition of the enemy, commanded by General Sheridan, moved around Lee's right flank to the North Anna River; committed some damage at Beaver Dam; moved thence to the South Anna and Ashland Station, where the railroad was destroyed; and finally found its way to the James at Turkey Island, where it joined the forces of Butler. The damage inflicted by this raid was not very considerable; but it was the occasion of a severe fight, on the 10th of May, at Yellow Tavern, on the road to Richmond, where Sheridan encountered a Confederate cavalry force, in which engagement was lost the valuable life of General J. E. B. Stuart, the brilliant cavalry commander, who had so long made Virginia the theatre of his daring and chivalric exploits.

The column of Butler, the important correspondent to Grant's movement, intended to operate against Richmond on the south side, had raised the hopes of the North merely to dash them by a failure decisive in its character, and ridiculous in all its circumstances. On the 5th of May, Butler proceeded with his fleet of gunboats and transports, and the Tenth and Eighteenth army corps, up the James River, landing at Wilson's Wharf a regiment of Wild's negro troops, and two brigades of the same color at Fort Powhatan; thence up to City Point, where Hinks's division was landed; and at Bermuda Hundred, just below the mouth of the Appomattox, the entire army was disembarked.

On the 7th, five brigades, under General Brooks, struck for the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, and succeeded in destroying a bridge seven miles north of Petersburg. In the mean time, Butler, after intrenching himself, closed about the defences of Drury's Bluff. The Yankee general seemed confident that he could by a little fighting, in conjunction with the powerful flotilla upon the James, easily overcome the main

barrier to his approach to the rear of the Confederate capital, presented in the defences of Drury's Bluff. It was already announced to the credulous public of the North that Butler had cut Beauregard's army in twain; that he had carried two lines of the defences of Drury's Bluff; and that he held the keys to the back-door of Richmond.

On Monday, the 16th of May, General Beauregard fell upon the insolent enemy in a fog, drove Butler from his advanced positions back to his original earthworks, and inflicted upon him a loss of several thousand men in killed, wounded, and captured. He had fallen upon the right of the Yankee line of battle with the force of an avalanche, completely crushing it backward and turning Butler's flank. The action was decisive. No result but that of victory could be expected in Richmond when Butler was the combatant. The *Richmond Examiner* designated the fight as that of "the Buzzard and the Falcon." The day's operations resulted in Butler's entire army being ordered to return from its advanced position, within ten miles of Richmond, to the line of defence known as Bermuda Hundred, between the James and Appomattox rivers.

THE ENEMY'S OPERATIONS IN WESTERN VIRGINIA.

While Butler had thus come to grief, the failure of Sigel, who threatened the Valley of Virginia was no less complete.

Grant had made an extraordinary combination in Virginia. His plan of campaign was clearly not limited to the capture of Richmond. He might capture it without capturing the government machinery and without overthrowing Lee's army. In such event further operations were necessary; and these were already provided for in the ambitious and sweeping plan of the campaign.

The movement of Sigel up the Shenandoah Valley towards Staunton was designed with the view, first, of taking possession of the Virginia Central Railroad, and ultimately effecting a lodgment upon the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at Lynchburg. Averill was to move towards the same great railroad with a design of striking it at Salem. General Crook was to move with a strong force and large supplies from Charles-

town towards Dublin Depot; and a fourth movement—which, however, was not actively developed until the period, some weeks later, of the second combination of forces in this part of Virginia—was designed on the Virginia side of the Big Sandy towards Abingdon on the same railroad.

The invasion thus planned for Western Virginia comprehended a heavy aggregate of forces. There were the six thousand of Crook, which came from the Lower Kanawha. These last were joined by Averill, with twenty-five hundred cavalry, coming from Northwest Virginia; and there was the army of Sigel, whose strength was variously estimated, but was not less than twelve thousand. The design was that these different corps should strike the Lynchburg and Tennessee and the Central railroads simultaneously at Abingdon, Wytheville, Dublin Depot, and Staunton, and should afterwards unite, west of Lynchburg, and march against that city. Grant was strongly impressed with the importance of this city. In subsequent attempts against it, his orders were that it should be taken and held at any loss and at all hazards.

In pursuance of the plan of operations in Western Virginia, at the very moment that Grant crossed the Rapidan it was announced that Sigel was in motion upon Staunton, Crook upon Dublin Depot, and Averill upon Wytheville, with design, after destroying that town and the lead mines, to unite with Crook at Dublin for a march towards Lynchburg; but no news came of a movement at that early day of Major-General Burbridge upon Abingdon and Saltville. The sequel proved that we were poorly prepared to meet this concerted assault. Breckinridge had been ordered away from Dublin in a hurry, with all the troops he could collect at short notice, and sent down the Valley to confront Sigel, leaving nothing but a few scattered troops, afterwards collected together by McCausland, to oppose Crook at Dublin.

On the 15th of May, Sigel's column was encountered near Newmarket by General Breckinridge, who drove it across the Shenandoah, captured six pieces of artillery and nearly one thousand stand of small-arms, and inflicted upon it a heavy loss, Sigel abandoning his hospitals and destroying the larger portion of his train.

But while Breckinridge defeated Sigel, and drove him back

in dismay and rout, McCausland was left at Dublin with only 1,500 men to resist Crook's 6,000. He fought bravely, however, and so shattered Crook's army as to destroy his design of proceeding towards Lynchburg, and compel a retreat as far as Meadow Bluff, in Greenbrier, for the purpose of recruiting his disorganized army and repairing damages. Crook left several hundred prisoners and all his wounded, but succeeded, before leaving the region of the battle, in destroying the important bridge over New River.

It so happened that the Confederates had a larger force at that time in the extreme Southwest than anywhere else on the line of the Lynchburg and Tennessee Railroad. The fact was fortunate, for it enabled General W. E. Jones, then commanding there, to spare General Morgan's command for services further east. Thus it happened that General Morgan, making a forced march from Saltville, arrived at Wytheville with his mounted men in time to save that town from Averill, and to completely defeat that boasted cavalry officer, with a heavy loss of killed, wounded, prisoners, and horses. This defeat was very important, for it prevented Averill from joining Crook before the battle at Dublin, and before that general had found it necessary to fall back to Meadow Bluff. Averill arrived in Dublin two days after Crook had gone. It was still further fortunate that General Morgan, at the same time that he marched from Saltville with his mounted men against Averill, at Wytheville, was able to send his dismounted men by the railroad to Dublin, which force arrived there just in time to take part with McCausland in the fight which sent Crook back to Meadow Bluff.

These occurrences took place in the early part of May, simultaneously with Grant's operations in Spottsylvania. Morgan's fight at Wytheville, McCausland's at Dublin, and Breckinridge's at Newmarket, all occurred about the same time with each other, and simultaneously with the great battles of the Wilderness between Lee and Grant.

We left Grant defeated in the action of the 12th in front of Spottsylvania Courthouse. On the 14th he moved his lines by his left flank, taking position nearer the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad. On the 18th he attempted an assault on Ewell's line, which was easily repulsed. It was admitted

by the enemy that the object of this attack was to turn Lee's left flank, and that their line got no further than the abattis, when it was "*ordered*" back to its original position.

A new movement was now undertaken by Grant—to pass his army from the line of the Po, down the valley of the Rappahannock. It thus became necessary for General Lee to evacuate his strong position on the line of the Po; and by an admirable movement he had taken a new position between the North and South Anna, before Grant's army had arrived at the former stream. Having cut loose from Fredericksburg as a base and established depots on the lower Rappahannock, on the 21st Grant's forces occupied Milford Station and Bowling Green, and were moving on the well-known high roads to Richmond. But they were again intercepted; for Lee had planted himself between Grant and Richmond, near Hanover Junction.

On the 23d and on the 25th Grant made attempts on the Confederate lines, which were repulsed, and left him to the last alternative. Another flanking operation remained for him, by which he swung his army from the North Anna around and across the Pamunkey. On the 27th, Hanover town was reported to be occupied by the Yankee advance under General Sheridan; and on the 28th Grant's entire army was across the Pamunkey.

In the mean time, General Lee also reformed his line of battle, north and south, directly in front of the Virginia Central Railroad, and extending from Atlee's Station south to Shady Grove, ten miles north of Richmond. In this position he covered both the Virginia Central and the Fredericksburg and Richmond railroads, as well as all the roads leading to Richmond, west of and including the Mechanicsville pike.

The favorite tactics of Grant appear to have been to develop the left flank; and by this characteristic manœuvre he moved down the Hanover Courthouse road, and on the first day of June took a position near Cold Harbor.

Grant was now within a few miles of Richmond. The vulgar mind of the North readily seized upon the cheap circumstance of his proximity in miles to the Confederate capital, and exclaimed its triumph. The capture of Richmond was accounted as an event of the next week. The Yankee periodi-

cals were adorned with all those illustrations which brutal triumph could suggest ;—Grant drubbing Lee across his knee ; the genius of Yankee Liberty holding aloft an impersonation of the Southern Confederacy by the seat of the breeches, marked "Richmond ;" Jefferson Davis playing his last card, ornamented with a crown of death's heads, and with his legs well girt with snakes ; and a hundred other caricatures alike characteristic of the vulgar thought and fiendish temper of the Yankee. To such foolish extremity did this premature celebration go, that a meeting was called in New York to render the thanks of the nation to Grant, and twenty-five thousand persons completed the hasty apotheosis.

But for the candid and intelligent, the situation of Grant was one of sinister import to him, implied much of disaster, and was actually a consequence of his repeated disappointments. The true theory of it was defeat, not victory. He did nothing more than hold the same ground as that occupied by General McClellan in his first peninsular campaign. This position, had he come by another route, a day's sail from Washington, he could have occupied without the loss of a single man. But he had occupied it by a devious route ; with a loss variously estimated at from sixty to ninety thousand men ; with the consumption of most of his veteran troops, whom he had put in front ; with the disconcert and failure of those parts of the drama which Butler and Sigel were to enact ; and with that demoralization which must unavoidably obtain in an army put to the test of repeated defeats and forced marches.

What was represented by the enemy as the retreat of General Lee's army to Richmond was simply its movement from a position which its adversary had abandoned, to place itself full before him across the new road on which he had determined to travel. In this sense, it was Grant who was pursued. He had set out to accomplish Mr. Lincoln's plan of an overland march upon Richmond. Mr. Lincoln's scheme, as detailed by himself in his famous letter to General McClellan, was to march by the way of the Manassas Railroad. The first movement of General Grant was to give up that route, and fall back upon the line by which Generals Burnside and Hooker attempted to reach the Confederate capital—that is, the Fredericksburg and Richmond line. But, repulsed at Spottsylvania,

this route proved untenable, and General Grant was forced east and south, and adopted a new base at Port Royal and Tappahannock, on the Rappahannock River, which conformed in a measure to General McClellan's first plan of a march upon Richmond by way of Urbana. The next change Grant was compelled to make was, after finding how strong the Confederates were, as posted on the South Anna, to cross the Pamunkey and make his base at the White House, bearing thereafter still further east and south to the precise ground of McClellan's operations.

The significance of all these movements was, that Grant had utterly failed in his design of defeating Lee's army far from its base, and pushing the fragments before him down to Richmond, and had been forced to cover up his failure by adopting the derided scheme of McClellan. The event of the 12th of May at Spottsylvania Courthouse had settled the question whether he could beat Lee in the field and put him in a disastrous retreat. Unable to remove the obstacle on the threshold of his proposed campaign, nothing was left but to abandon it. Grant makes his way down the valley of the Rappahannock; turns aside to Hanover Junction, to find a repetition of Spottsylvania Courthouse; deflects to the head-waters of the York; and at last, by a monstrous circuit, reaches a point where he might have landed on the 1st of May, without loss or opposition. We may appreciate the amount of gaseous nonsense and truculent blackguardism of Yankee journals, when we find them declaring that these movements were a foot-race for Richmond, that Grant was across the last ditch, and that the end of the rebellion was immediately at hand.

CHAPTER II.

Grant essays the passage of the Chickahominy.—BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR.—A brilliant and extraordinary victory for the Confederates.—Grant's stock of expedients.—He decides to move to the south side of the James.—OPERATIONS IN WESTERN VIRGINIA.—Shocking improvidence of the Richmond authorities.—Hunter captures Staunton.—Death of General Jones.—Grant's new combination.—Hunter's part.—Sheridan's part.—THE BATTLES OF PETERSBURG.—Butler attempts to steal a march upon "the Cockade City."—Engagements of the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June.—Port Walthal Junction.—Defeat of Sheridan at Trevillian Station.—Defeat of Hunter near Lynchburg.—Morgan draws Burbridge into Kentucky.—Two affairs on the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad.—THE GREAT MINE EXPLOSION.—A scene of infernal horror.—Yankee comments on Grant's failures.—Great depression in the North.—Mr. Chase's declarations.—General Lee's sense of success.—His singular behavior.—THE SINKING OF THE PRIVATEER ALABAMA.—A Yankee trick of concealed armor.—The privateer service of the Confederates.—Interesting statistics.

WE return to the events on the Richmond lines. The position occupied by Grant, on Wednesday, June 1st, had been obtained after some fighting, and, by the enemy's own admission, had cost him two thousand men in killed and wounded. An important and critical struggle was now to ensue. Grant had secured a position, the importance of which was that it was the point of convergence of all the roads radiating, whether to Richmond, his objective point, or to White House, his base of supplies. He was now to essay the passage of the Chickahominy, and we were to have another decisive battle of Cold Harbor.

THE BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR.

There is good evidence that Grant's intention was to make it the decisive battle of the campaign. The movements of the preceding days, culminating in the possession of Cold Harbor—an important strategic point—had drawn the enemy's lines close in front of the Chickahominy, and reduced the military problem to the forcing of the passage of that river—a problem which, if solved in Grant's favor, would decide whether Richmond could be carried by a *coup de main*, if a decisive victory

should attend his arms, or, whether he should betake himself to siege operations or some other recourse.

Early on the morning of Friday, June 3d, the assault was made, Hancock commanding the left of the Yankee line of battle, and leading the attack. The first Confederate line was held by Breckinridge's troops, and was carried. The reverse was but momentary, for the troops of Milligan's brigade, and the Maryland battalion, soon dashed forward to retrieve the honors which the Yankees had snatched.

This engagement was on the right; Breckinridge's division, with Field's, constituting a part of Longstreet's corps. On the left, General Early engaged the enemy. On every part of the line the enemy was repulsed by the quick and decisive blows of the Confederates. Hancock's corps, the only portion of the Yankee army that had come in contact with the Confederate works, had been hurled back in a storm of fire; the Sixth Corps had not been able to get up further than within two hundred and fifty yards of the main works; while Warren and Burnside, on the enemy's right and right centre, were staggered on the lines of our rifle-pits. The decisive work of the day was done in a few minutes. Never were there such signal strokes of valor, such dispatch of victory. It was stated in the accounts of the Confederates, that fourteen distinct assaults of the enemy were repulsed, and that his loss was from six to seven thousand.* No wonder that the insolent assurance of the capture of Richmond was displaced in the Yankee newspapers by the ominous calculation, that Grant could not afford many such experiments on the intrenched line of the Chickahominy, and would have to make some other resort to victory.

The battle of Cold Harbor was sufficient to dispel the delusion of weakness and demoralization in Lee's army; for this derided army, almost in the time it takes to tell the story, had

* The lowest estimate of their own loss, in the Yankee newspapers, was five thousand; and the report of the adjutant-general at Washington stated the loss in three days' operations on the Chickahominy at seven thousand five hundred. Yet Grant dispatched to Washington: "Our loss was not severe, nor do I suppose the enemy to have lost heavily. We captured over three hundred prisoners, mostly from Breckinridge."

repulsed at every point the most determined assault of the enemy, and, in a few brief moments of a single morning, had achieved an unbroken circuit of victories. Grant and his friends were alike dismayed. The latter insisted that he should have half a million more of men to accomplish his work. "We should," said a Boston paper, "have a vigorous and overwhelming war, or else peace without further effusion of blood." A certain portion of the Yankee press maintained the unbroken lie, and told the story of an uninterrupted series of victories.

An object of most curious and constant interest in the war was the rivalry of the different routes to Richmond. McClellan had chosen the peninsular approach, while Mr. Lincoln dissented in favor of an advance from the Lower Rappahannock; Burnside had chosen Fredericksburg as his base; Hooker had acted on the same choice. Meade had selected the Rapidan, as Pope had done before him. Grant came to his command, unembarrassed and untrammelled by the precedents and comments of others. He had hunted up the roads to Richmond, through the Wilderness and Spottsylvania Court-house, and avowed his unchangeable purpose to adhere to that as his true line. He had now wandered around to McClellan's old base. But the battle of July 3d decided that Richmond could no longer be approached with advantage from the north, and the disconcerted, shifting commander, with his stock of expedients well-nigh exhausted, found nothing now left for him but to transfer his entire army to the south side of the James River.*

* A Richmond paper (the *Dispatch*) made the following estimate of Grant's enormous losses up to the time of crossing the James; still leaving him, however, a tremendous force in hand, compared with Lee's numbers: "Grant had had first his own original army, 150,000; second, 25,000 veteran reinforcements; third, 40,000 hundred days' men; fourth, 20,000 from Butler—total, 225,000 men, under his own eye. Of these, he had lost 125,000 before he left Cold Harbor. He crossed the river with 110,000 men, and there united his operations with those of Butler, who had with him about 20,000 men, besides those he had sent to Grant."

OPERATIONS IN WESTERN VIRGINIA.

We have already referred to the failure in May of the operations in Western Virginia. They were to be enlarged by the augmentation of the Yankee forces by several thousand troops, drawn from the extreme Northwestern States, and by the appointment of General Hunter, an officer of higher rank, to command—the same Hunter, by the by, who inaugurated negro enlistments and miscegenation in the department of Beaufort, South Carolina, as early as the first winter of the war.

This second combination in Western Virginia was imposing enough. Crook and Averill were refitting and preparing at Meadow Bluff for an advance on Staunton and Lynchburg; Hunter was organizing at Winchester heavy reinforcements for a second advance upon Lynchburg by way of Staunton; and Burbridge, in Kentucky, was getting ready to descend upon extreme Southwestern Virginia, so as to prevent any advance from that direction upon the rear of the combined armies about to move on Lynchburg.

It is almost incredible how inadequate the preparations of the Confederates were to meet these formidable enterprises of the enemy. Breckinridge, with the only army that could be called such, which we had west of the Blue Ridge, was ordered elsewhere, leaving nothing to confront some twenty-seven thousand troops but a few small brigades of inferior cavalry, about two regiments of infantry, and a small brigade (Vaughan's) of dismounted troops acting as infantry. To supply the place of Breckinridge, McCausland's little force, from Dublin, was sent to the front of Staunton, and General William E. Jones was ordered to take all the troops he could move from Southwestern Virginia to the same position in the lower valley. Accordingly, General Jones not only got together all the infantry west of the New River, but dismounted Vaughan's brigade of cavalry also, and took all to Staunton, leaving nothing in the extreme southwest but a few disjointed bodies of cavalry and Morgan's command to meet Burbridge, coming in from Kentucky.

On the 5th of June, Hunter had obtained a success at Piedmont, in Western Virginia, and had effected the capture of Staunton; the saddest circumstance of which affair was the loss of General Jones, one of the most distinguished cavalry commanders of the Confederacy.*

After occupying Staunton, Hunter had formed a junction with the combined forces of Crook and Averill, and on the 13th of June was reported to be moving with his whole command against Lynchburg. On the 7th, Sheridan had crossed the Pamunkey, and was moving eastward in the direction of the Gordonsville Railroad. The main movement of the new combination—that of Grant across the James—commenced Sunday night the 12th of June.

The first plan of the enemy had comprehended the advance of Sigel down the Shenandoah, and the capture of Petersburg, if nothing more, by Butler, while General Grant engaged Lee's army between the Rapidan and Richmond. That plan having signally failed, the second comprised the capture of Lynchburg by Hunter, of Gordonsville and Charlottesville by Sheridan, and of Petersburg by Meade. It was thus hoped to isolate the Confederate capital by cutting off its communications on every side.

It was, perhaps, not Grant's design to cross the river until he had made some attempt on the Central and New Market roads, leading into Richmond from the direction of Malvern

* A correspondent thus writes of this officer—whose eccentricities were almost as well-known to Virginians as those of Stonewall Jackson: "General Jones was a captain in the United States Army, ranking Stuart. A small, thin, black-eyed and whiskered man, he dressed very plainly, bordering on shabbiness; never shaved, never in uniform, no insignia of office. He had a fine, squeaking voice; was misanthropic, despising parade and every man that indulged in it; never courting any man's favor; never, perhaps, speaking to a congressman or the President, since the war commenced; fearing no man—reverencing no man; speaking freely, if not curtly, to and of everybody. He was a widower. When stationed in Texas he lost his wife, an accomplished lady, by shipwreck in Galveston Bay; since which he has never married again, and has seemed, if not to wish for death, at least to hold his life very cheaply. He was cool in a fight, and the bravest of the brave. With hat in hand, he was cheering his men when he fell, pierced through his head by a minnie ball. The enemy refused his body. Some citizens buried him in a neat coffin, and marked the spot."

Hill. On the 13th of June he caused a reconnoissance in force to be made from the Long Bridge towards the Quaker road, and in an affair, near the intersection of this road with the Charles City road, was repulsed, and drew off his force, well satisfied that the Confederates held, with heavy forces, all the roads by which Richmond could be reached from the southeast.

The Eighteenth Yankee corps had proceeded by water to Bermuda Hundred. The remaining corps had crossed the Chickahominy at James Bridge and Long Bridge; and after the reconnoissance of the 13th, proceeded down the James, and crossed it in the neighborhood of City Point.

THE BATTLES OF PETERSBURG.

Petersburg had already sustained a considerable attack of the enemy. An expedition from Butler's lines had essayed its capture on the 9th of June.

Approaching with nine regiments of infantry and cavalry, and at least four pieces of artillery, the enemy searched our lines a distance of nearly six miles. Hood's and Battles' battalions, the Forty-sixth Virginia, one company of the Twenty-third South Carolina, with Sturdevant's battery, and a few guns in position, and Talliaferro's cavalry, kept them at bay. The Yankees were twice repulsed, but succeeded, at last, in penetrating a gap in our line; when reinforcements coming up drove back the insolent foe from approaches which their footsteps for the first time polluted.

The fortunate issue of this first attack on Petersburg encouraged the raw troops and militia who had been put under arms for the defence of "the Cockade City." General Wise addressed the troops of his command in a memorable and thrilling order. "Petersburg," said he, "is to be, and shall be, defended on her outer walls, on her inner lines, at her corporation bounds, in every street, and around every temple of God and altar of man."

The resolution of the gallant city—with its defences reinforced by the fortunate Beauregard—was now to be put to a much more severe test, for it was to encounter the shock of the bulk of Grant's army.

Smith's corps, having disembarked at Bermuda Hundred on the 14th, moved rapidly upon Petersburg, and made an assault on the batteries covering the approaches to the city on the northeast. Having got possession of this line of works, held principally by Confederate militia, Smith waited the coming up of the Second Corps.

On the evening of the 16th an attack was ordered on the Confederate line of works in front of Petersburg, Smith's corps being on the right, on the Petersburg and City Point road, west of the railroad, the Second Corps in the centre, and Burnside on the left, reaching the Prince George Courthouse road. The assault was not only repulsed at every point, but our troops, assuming the aggressive, drove the Yankees from their breastworks at Howlett's House, captured some of their guns, and opened upon them an enfilading fire, under which they fled precipitately.

The most furious assault of the enemy had been made on General Hoke's front, whose division occupied a position facing batteries from Nine to Twelve inclusive. Three different charges were repulsed by these heroic troops. In the final repulse of the enemy, a large portion of a Yankee brigade, being exposed to an enfilading artillery fire from our guns, sought shelter in a ravine, and surrendered to the Sixty-fourth Georgia regiment.

On Friday, June 17th, fighting was renewed without result. The next day it was resolved by the enemy to make an assault along the whole line for the purpose of carrying the town. It was thus that the action of the 18th was designed to be decisive of operations in the present position.

Three different assaults were made by the enemy during the day—at four in the morning, at noon, and at four in the afternoon. Each one was repulsed. Hancock and Burnside in the centre suffered severely.

After severe losses on the part of all the Yankee corps, night found the Confederates still in possession of their works covering Petersburg.

The disaster of this day left Grant without hope of making any impression on the works in his front, and placed him under the necessity of yet another change of operations. The series of engagements before Petersburg had cost him at least ten

thousand men in killed and wounded, and had culminated in another decisive defeat.

The misfortune of the enemy appeared, indeed, to be overwhelming. Pickett's division had given him another lesson at Port Walthal Junction. It was here the heroes of Gettysburg repulsed a force under Gillmore engaged in destroying the railroad, took two lines of his breastworks, and put him to disastrous flight.

Nor was there any compensation to be found in the auxiliary parts of Grant's second grand combination. Sheridan had failed to perform his part. He was intercepted by Hampton's cavalry at Trevillian Station on the Gordonsville road, defeated in an engagement on the 10th, and compelled to withdraw his command across the North Anna. Hunter had come to similar grief, and his repulse at Lynchburg involved consequences of the gravest disaster to the enemy.

On the 18th of June, Hunter made an attack upon Lynchburg from the south side, which was repulsed by troops that had arrived from General Lee's lines. The next day, more reinforcements having come up, preparations were made to attack the enemy, when he retreated in confusion. The Confederates took thirteen of his guns, pursued him to Salem, and forced him to a line of retreat into the mountains of Western Virginia. The attempt of the Yankees to whitewash the infamous and cowardly *dénouement* was more than usually refreshing. Hunter officially announced that his expedition had been "extremely successful;" that he had left Lynchburg because "his ammunition was running short;" and that as to the singular line he had taken up, he was now "ready for a move in any direction."

In the mean time General Morgan had done his part in breaking up the enemy's combination in Western Virginia. General Jones being ordered from the extreme Southwest, together with all the troops he could transport, to Staunton at the very time that Southwest Virginia was about to be invaded by Burbridge, General Morgan held a brief and hasty conference with him on the eve of his departure, in which it was agreed by both generals that it would be in vain to meet Burbridge in front, and that, as the enemy had much more to lose in Kentucky than we had in Virginia, the only chance of

saving the Southwest was by Morgan's dashing boldly into the heart of Kentucky, and in that way drawing Burbridge away. This plan was carried into effect, and completely succeeded. Burbridge was lured back, his army scattered and crippled, Southwest Virginia saved for the time, and the discomfited general set to reorganizing his command,—a task which occupied him until the necessities of General Sherman rendered all available reinforcements from Kentucky needful at Chattanooga.

These latter movements all took place in the first part of June, after the date of the battle of Cold Harbor. They were designed by Grant as auxiliary to his own movement upon Petersburg, and were a material part of the comprehensive plan he had formed for completely isolating Richmond. When these important movements west of the Blue Ridge, which had their focus at Lynchburg, are considered in connection with Sheridan's great raid in the same central direction, and with the enterprises of Wilson and Kautz against the Danville and Weldon railroads, all of them auxiliary to Grant's attempt upon Petersburg, we are obliged to accord to the enemy's plan of campaign for June, the merit of unusual grasp and ability. Thanks to the miracles of Providence wrought for us on the west of the Blue Ridge, and to the valor of our soldiers and skill of our generals, so eminently displayed on the east, these formidable movements, to encircle and overwhelm the capital of the Confederacy and the State of Virginia, had completely failed.

And yet the measure of misfortune in Grant's distracted campaign appeared to be not yet full. On the 22d of June he made a movement on his left to get possession of the Weldon Railroad, but found the Confederates had extended their right to meet him. While the Second and the Sixth corps of Grant's army were attempting to communicate in this movement, the Confederates, under General Anderson, pierced the centre, captured a battery of four guns, and took prisoners one entire brigade, General Pearce's, and part of another.

Another attempt or raid on the railroad, by Wilson's and Kautz's divisions of cavalry, terminated in disaster. In the neighborhood of Spottswood River, twenty-five miles south of Petersburg, on the 28th, the expedition was attacked, cut in two, the greater part of its artillery abandoned, and its wagon-

trains left in the hands of the Confederates. The enemy had been encountered by Hampton's cavalry, and Finnegan's and Mahone's infantry brigades; and the results of the various conflicts were enumerated as one thousand prisoners, thirteen pieces of artillery, thirty wagons and ambulances, and many small-arms.

THE GREAT MINE EXPLOSION.

But some weeks later another remarkable and desperate attempt was to be made by Grant upon Petersburg, the artifice and elaboration of which were among the greatest curiosities of his campaign. A citizen of Petersburg had, early in July, printed what was supposed to be a crazy letter, stating that he had certain information, at which General Lee would probably laugh, and which he preferred to communicate to the more credulous quarter of the newspapers, to the effect that Grant designed to mine the city of Petersburg, blow it into the air, and thus accomplish its destruction.

Although the scheme of the Yankees was not quite so extensive, it was elaborate and formidable enough. For six weeks Grant had been preparing a mine on the slopes of Cemetery Hill, with the view of opening the way to an assault on the second line of works that crowned its crest. From day to day, by the aid of the shovel and the pick, the Yankee lines had been insidiously advanced by zigzags and covered ways, until the outlying pickets of both armies scarcely averaged 500 yards' distance between them. Along portions of the line, the interval between the rifle-pits was scarcely 150 yards. The crest of Cemetery Hill frowning with guns was not more than 800 yards distant from the advanced works of the Yankees, and its gently sloping sides were weltered with long rows of earthworks, pitted with redoubts and redans, and ridged with serried salients and curtains, and other skilful defences.

To draw off the attention of the Confederates from his real business, Grant had ordered the Second corps to cross to the north side of the James; and at the same time an empty train of four hundred wagons crossed the Appomattox in view of the Confederate signal stations.

It was appointed that the mine, which contained eight tons of powder, should be exploded at three o'clock in the morning of the 30th July, and that thereupon Burnside, who commanded the Yankee centre, should pierce the works in front of him. Simultaneously with the advance of the infantry, every piece of siege artillery posted along the line was ordered to open upon the Confederates; and all the field artillery which could be got into position, after the opening of the battle, was to advance, as opportunity offered, and bring their batteries into play. It was naturally expected that the shock of the explosion, and of the suddenness of this awful fire, would have a demoralizing effect, and so make the way of the infantry easier.

The mine was not exploded until half-past four o'clock in the morning. The earth was rent along the entire course of the excavation, exhibiting a yawning chasm; in some places it heaved slowly and majestically to the surface; in others, where the charge in the burrow was heaviest, immense masses of dull, red earth were thrown high in air, and human forms, and gun-carriages, and small-arms, might be seen shooting up in this fountain of horror.

But the explosion had only demolished a six-gun battery. It was followed immediately by such a thunder of artillery as had seldom been heard before. Ninety-five pieces niched in every hill-side, commanding the position of the Confederates, belched out their sheets of flame and milk-white smoke, while screeching and howling shell sped forward in their work of destruction. But the Confederates were not dismayed. In a few moments their own pieces were replying, and banks of angry smoke partially veiled the field from both sides.

In the midst of the shock of artillery, through the dense clouds of flying dust, the assaulting column of the Yankees passed through the crater, fifty feet in length, and half as many wide, in what was supposed to be the easy attempt of carrying the second line of Confederate works. But there were men there ready to receive them who had never flinched from death, and who were not to be alarmed by loud and furious noises. Some colored troops, under General White's command, were pushed forward, but the poor creatures, unwilling to be thus sacrificed, were soon panic-stricken and past control. They crushed into the ranks of the white troops and

broke through to the rear. The demoralization was rapid. The whole mass of Yankees, broken and shattered, swept back like a torrent into the crater, which was soon choked with the flying and the dead. An order was given to retreat to the old lines, but to do this an open space had to be traversed, and this again was closely dotted with Yankee dead.

The action was very brief, very terrible, very decisive. Nothing in the war exceeded it in point of severity, and probably no conflict had ever been attended with all the appointments of war displayed in such graphic prominence. The explosion of the mine, the tremendous peals of artillery and musketry, the effort of the attacking column, the carnage, and finally the retreat of the Yankees to their old lines, all composed a scene of terrible and thrilling interest.

The Yankee loss was quite five thousand; that of the Confederates was trivial in comparison. It was thus stated in detail: Mahone's division, four hundred and fifty; Elliot's South Carolina brigade, which was in the blown up fort, three hundred; Ransom, Clingman, and Wise, whose commands were under musketry and artillery firing for some time, three hundred.

The ghastly failure of this last of Grant's attempts upon Petersburg appeared to be almost sufficient to persuade the Yankee public that his whole campaign had been a failure. Some intelligent Yankee newspapers made peculiar comments upon it. The *Intelligencer*, published in Washington, said: "After a loss of more than five thousand men, the army has made no advance towards the capture of that city, which is itself only an outpost of the city of Richmond. The delay in springing the mine, the want of concert and promptitude in following up the explosion with a dash by our assaulting column, and the inaptitude which ordered that this assaulting column should be selected from the least trustworthy and homogeneous corps in the army, are a sufficient explanation perhaps of this calamity." The *New York Times* was yet more querulous and explicit. It said: "Under the most favorable circumstances, with the rebel force reduced by two great detachments, we failed to carry their lines. Will they not conclude that the twenty-five thousand men that held Grant in check are sufficient to garrison the works of Petersburg? Will they not conclude that, if they were able thus to

hold their own with the force of from eighteen to twenty thousand men sent to the north side of the James River neutralized, this force is available for active operations elsewhere?"

It was evident that the spirit of the North had commenced to stagger under this accumulation of disaster. Gold had already nearly touched three hundred. The uneasy whispers in Washington of another draft gave new suggestions to popular discontent. The Confederate Congress had adjourned, after the publication of an address referring to recent military events and the confirmed resolution of the South, and deprecating the enemy's continuance of the war. These declarations were eagerly seized upon by Northern journals, who insisted that no time should be lost in determining whether they might not possibly signify a willingness on the part of the South to make peace on the basis of new constitutional guaranties. The finances at Washington were becoming desperate. Mr. Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, had peremptorily resigned. His last words of official counsel were, that nothing could save the finances but a series of military successes of undoubted magnitude.

The brilliant and so far successful campaign of General Lee in Virginia added, if that were possible, to the popular confidence and devotion which were concentrated upon him more than any other man of the South. He had indulged in no terms of exultation. He had written the history of his great summer campaign of 1864, in brief telegrams in which there was never a stray word, and the fullest expressions of which were ascriptions of success to the providence of God. Now in the highest moments of Confederate confidence and expectation, when indeed the people of the South had reason to suppose that they stood on the threshold of peace, and were about to crown their hopes with triumph, General Lee was still the modest and reserved commander, never raising his voice in a note of triumph, or spending a comment upon the situation of affairs.

A newspaper printed in Virginia complained that "General Lee never speaks," and with playful but sagacious comment continued: "What does he think about? None of us can read the thoughts of that impenetrable bosom. It is appropriate that the hero of this story should not be garrulous; the sadness

of the time renders it fitting that the helmsman should guide the ship with few words spoken. Perhaps it is by his very reserve that General Lee has contributed, as much as by any other quality, to make the impression he has made on his fellow-citizens. He came before them at the beginning of the war by no means the American ideal of a great man. That personage was expected to appear with a hullabaloo; he was to descend in a shower of fireworks, and environed by a myriad of bursting lights and crackling explosions. For a quiet, undemonstrative gentleman to step upon the scenes was not at all to their liking; and therefore, in the beginning, General Lee was not popular."

"Here comes a man bred in the army. He had been reared a gentleman. He despised humbug. He loved order, and every thing and everybody in his place. He told the ladies at Culpepper Courthouse, in 1861, who came out to greet him, to 'go home.' In Richmond they said he had no manners; he attended to his business, and spoke little. They sent him to Western Virginia—a small theatre, when Beauregard was at Manassas and Johnston was at Winchester; he went, and made no comment. The campaign failed—they called him Turveydrop—he did not attempt to excuse himself. Soon we find him in a blaze of glory, the hero of the battles around Richmond. He is still silent. He marches to Manassas, and achieves another great victory. Not a word escapes him. He takes Winchester, is foiled at Sharpsburg for the want of men—defeats Burnside at Fredericksburg—Hooker at Chancellorsville—but he breaks not his silence. He has the terrible trial of Gettysburg—he only remarked, 'It was my fault'—and then in the present year he has conducted this greatest of all his campaigns—undoubtedly one of the finest in the war. Silent still. When will he speak? Has he nothing to say? What does he think of our affairs? Should he speak, how the country would hang upon every word that fell from him!"

THE SINKING OF THE PRIVATEER ALABAMA.

We must note here, as belonging to the period of Confederate successes we have narrated, an event of the war which considerably qualified the general exultation of the South.

While the general situation on land, especially in Virginia, was so advantageous for the Confederacy, and the grand events of the campaign of 1864 had so far been decided in its favor, there occurred an incident of disaster, which, though distant in point of space, and of but little real importance in the decision of the general fortune of the war, was yet the subject of keen and peculiar regret to the Confederates.

This incident was the loss of the famous privateer *Alabama*. She had eluded the Yankee naval vessels at the Cape of Good Hope and Straits of Sunda, and returning westward had proceeded to the French port of Cherbourg. Here Captain Semmes of the *Alabama* was strongly persuaded—probably by those who valued the *eclat* abroad of the Southern arms more than the substantial interests of the Confederacy, so unequally matched in the war, especially in point of naval power—to risk his vessel in a gratuitous fight with a Yankee steamer lying off the harbor—the *Kearsarge*. The only object of such a naval duel could be the desire of a certain glory on the part of Captain Semmes, for which he took the unwarrantable risk of sacrificing the only really formidable naval structure of the Confederates. It should have occurred to him that, even in the event of success, he would inflict no appreciable injury upon the enemy's naval power, and would secure nothing more than some of that idle glory which was already cheap with his countrymen.

The ships were about equal in match, the tonnage being about the same—the *Alabama* carrying one 7-inch Blakely rifled gun, one 8-inch smooth-bore pivot gun, and six 32-pounders, smooth-bore, in broadside; the *Kearsarge* carrying four broadside 32-pounders, two 11-inch and one 28-pound rifle. On the morning of the 19th of June, the *Alabama* steamed out of the harbor of Cherbourg, for the purpose of engaging the *Kearsarge*, which had been lying off-and-on the port for several days previously. She came up with the latter at a distance of about seven miles from the shore. The vessels were about one mile from each other, when the *Alabama* opened with solid shot upon the enemy, to which he replied in a few minutes.

To prevent passing each other too speedily, and to maintain their respective broadsides bearing, it became necessary to fight

in a circle, the two ships steaming around a common centre, and preserving a distance from each other of from a quarter to half a mile. The enemy's shot and shell began to tell upon the hull of the *Alabama*. Captain Semmes remarked that his shell, though apparently exploding against the sides of the *Kearsarge*, were doing her but little damage, and returned to solid shot firing, afterwards alternating with shot and shell.

In little more than an hour, the *Alabama* was ascertained to be in a sinking condition, the enemy's shell having exploded in her sides and between decks, opening large apertures, through which the water rushed with great rapidity. For some few minutes Captain Semmes had hopes of being able to reach the French coast, for which purpose he gave the ship all steam, and set such of the fore and aft sails as were available. The ship filled so rapidly, however, that before she had made much progress the fires were extinguished in the furnaces, and she was evidently on the point of sinking.

Captain Semmes hauled down his colors, when the *Kearsarge* was within four hundred yards of him. Yet the enemy fired upon the *Alabama* five times after her colors had been struck. "It is charitable to suppose," says Captain Semmes, "that a ship of war of a Christian nation could not have done this intentionally."

As the *Alabama* was on the point of settling, every man, in obedience to a previous order which had been given the crew, jumped overboard and endeavored to save himself. There was no appearance of any boat coming from the enemy after the *Alabama* went down. Fortunately, however, the steam-yacht *Deerhound*, owned by a gentleman of Lancashire, England, Mr. John Lancaster, who was himself on board, steamed up in the midst of the drowning men, and rescued a number of both officers and men from the water, among them Captain Semmes himself.

The loss of the *Alabama* in killed and wounded was thirty. There was no life lost on the *Kearsarge*; and although she had received thirteen or fourteen shots in and about the hull, and sixteen or seventeen about the masts and rigging, she was not materially damaged. In his official report of the fight, Captain Semmes said: "At the end of the engagement, it was discovered by those of our officers who went alongside the enemy's ship with

the wounded, that her midship section, on both sides, was thoroughly iron-coated; this having been done with chain constructed for the purpose, placed perpendicularly from the rail to the water's edge, the whole covered over by a thin outer planking, which gave no indication of the armor beneath. This planking had been ripped off in every direction by our shot and shell, the chain broken and indented in many places, and forced partly into the ship's side. She was most effectually guarded, however, in this section from penetration."

The loss of the Alabama was a most severe blow to the privateer service of the South. That service had already caused nearly a thousand Yankee vessels to be sold to foreign shipping merchants; and it was officially reported at Washington that 478,665 tons of American shipping were flying other flags. Such had been the terror inspired by Confederate privateers, of which the Alabama had been, by far, the most formidable. She alone had accomplished a work of destruction estimated at from eight to ten millions of dollars. It was reported that the news of her loss was received on the exchanges of New York and Boston with a joy far livelier than would have been conceived by these commercial patriots, if they had heard of a great victory over Lee's army in Virginia.

CHAPTER III.

Sherman's campaign in Georgia.—How parallel with that in Virginia.—The tasks of Grant and Sherman compared.—Numerical inferiority of General Johnston's forces.—His proposition to the Richmond authorities.—Pragmatism of President Davis and his secretary.—Engagement in Resaca Valley.—General Johnston's designs.—Why he retreated.—His disappointment of a battle at Cassville.—ENGAGEMENT AT NEW HOPE CHURCH.—True theory of the retrograde movement of Johnston.—BATTLE OF KENESAW MOUNTAIN.—Sherman's confession.—Sherman master of the Chattahoochee.—Johnston falls back to Atlanta.—The vexed question of Johnston's retreat.—What it surrendered.—What it secured.—Its strategic advantages.—The enemy's movements in Virginia and Georgia both in check.—Disappointment of the enemy.—Statistics of Yankee recruiting.—Another Confederate success.—Defeat of Sturgis.—“The Avengers of Fort Pillow.”—Barbarities of the enemy's summer campaign.—Augmentation of Yankee ferocity.—Its effect on the Confederates.—Offensive operation of the Confederates.—Three projects of invasion.—EARLY'S INVASION OF MARYLAND, &c.—Sigel's retreat.—BATTLE OF MONOCACY BRIDGE.—Early loses the great opportunity of 1864.—Results of his expedition.—Engagement at Kernstown.—MORGAN'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY.—His failure.—PRICE'S INVASION OF MISSOURI.—Pilot Knob.—General Ewing's retreat.—Price retires.

PARALLEL and concurrent with Grant's summer campaign in Virginia, was the more difficult but less deadly campaign of Sherman in Georgia. Grant's *point d'appui* was on the Rapidan, while Sherman's was at Chattanooga, in Tennessee. The Alleghany Mountains separated these grand movements; a thousand miles of distance intervened between them; communication between them was rare, and, to a certain extent, impossible. There is no doubt that Sherman had the more difficult task to accomplish. He had but a single line of railway to reach his objective point, Atlanta, and this traversed a wild and mountainous country. Grant could change his base at pleasure, or as circumstances required it; he had water communication with the North, and transports within hailing distance; he could run no danger from lack of subsistence or munitions of war. Again, Sherman, passing through a broken and intricate country, had to guard his flanks and rear, at every step, from cavalry. Grant had only to put an army of occupation in the Shenandoah Valley to close the single defile

between the great mountain ridges of Virginia, and thus securely protect his rear from even the possibility of danger.

It appears from the official report of General Sherman's operations, that he had estimated the force required to reach and capture Atlanta, at one hundred thousand men and two hundred and fifty pieces of artillery: he started with ninety-eight thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven men and two hundred and fifty-four guns. This force was divided as follows:—Army of the Cumberland, Major-General Thomas, sixty thousand seven hundred and seventy-three men, one hundred and thirty guns; Army of the Tennessee, Major-General McPherson, twenty-four thousand four hundred and sixty-five men, ninety-six guns; Army of the Ohio, Major-General Schofield, thirteen thousand five hundred and fifty-nine men, twenty-eight guns. Sherman's intention was to make these proportions fifty thousand, thirty-five thousand, and fifteen thousand, but that wretched *fiasco* known as the Red River Expedition kept back some of McPherson's troops, and, besides ruining itself, did as much as possible towards impeding Sherman. It will be seen he was furnished within twelve hundred of the number of men he asked for.

Here again we have the repetition of the story of fearful odds against the Confederates. General Joseph E. Johnston, who had taken command of the Army of Tennessee, had held the Confederate lines in North Georgia, during the winter, with thirty odd thousand men. On the 1st of December, 1864, he enumerated the effective total of the infantry and artillery of the army, including two brigades belonging to the department of Mississippi, as 36,826. The effective total of the cavalry, including Roddy's command at Tusculumbia, was 5,613.

In the last weeks of February, 1865, General Johnston had proposed to the government at Richmond an offensive movement against the enemy, on the just ground that he was increasing the disproportion of numbers, and would take the Confederates at greater disadvantage than if they were to essay at once a forward movement and try issues with him. The proposition lingered in the War Department from February to May. General Bragg and President Davis had their own plan of offensive operations. General Johnston in vain

telegraphed to Richmond: "I expressly accept taking the offensive; I only differ with you as to details." But "the details" dictated at Richmond were insisted upon; and when eventually, in the latter part of April, President Davis sent an officer to Georgia to explain his wishes to Johnston, the enemy had already prepared to make his long-meditated and formidable movement.

On the 1st of May, General Johnston reported the enemy ready to advance. The effective artillery and infantry of the Army of Tennessee amounted then to 40,900; the effective cavalry to about four thousand. With this force Johnston had to fight more than twice his numbers, and had no other prospect of compensation but in superior skill and strategy.

Sherman moved on Dalton in three columns; Thomas in front, Schofield from Cleveland on the northeast, while McPherson threw himself on the line of communication southwest at Resaca, fifteen miles south of Dalton. On the 7th of May Thomas occupied Tunnel Hill, ten miles northwest of Dalton, and took up a strong position at Buzzard's Roost. By the flank movement on Resaca, Johnston was forced to evacuate Dalton.

On the 14th the first important engagement of the campaign took place in Resaca valley. Two efforts were made to carry the breastworks of the Confederates, without success, when Johnston, in the afternoon, assumed the offensive, and drove the enemy some distance, with a loss which his own bulletins stated to be two thousand.

On the 15th there was desultory fighting, and on the 16th General Johnston took up, at leisure, his line of retrograde movement in the direction of the Etowah River, passing through Kingston and Cassville.

It was clear, in General Johnston's mind, that the great numerical superiority of the Yankee army made it expedient to risk battle only when position, or some blunder of the enemy, might give him counter-balancing advantages. He therefore determined to fall back slowly, until circumstances should put the chances of battle in his favor, keeping so near the Yankee army as to prevent its sending reinforcements to Grant, and hoping, by taking advantage of positions and opportunities, to reduce the odds against him by partial engagements. He also

expected it to be materially reduced, before the end of June, by the expiration of the terms of service of many of the regiments which had not re-enlisted. In this way he fell back to Cassville in two marches.

Expecting to be attacked, Johnston had drawn up his troops in an excellent position on a bold ridge immediately in rear of Cassville, with an open valley before it. But there appears to have been some doubts among his officers as to the value of the position. Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hood together expressed the opinion, very decidedly, that the Yankee artillery would drive them, the next day, from their positions, and urged General Johnston to abandon the ground immediately, and cross the Etowah. Lieutenant-General Hardee was confident that he could hold his position. Of this dilemma, General Johnston writes in his official report: "The other two officers, however, were so earnest and unwilling to depend on the ability of their corps to defend the ground, that I yielded, and the army crossed the Etowah on the 20th of May, *a step which I have regretted ever since.*"

ENGAGEMENT AT NEW HOPE CHURCH.

On the 25th the enemy was found to be intrenched near and east of Dallas. Hood's corps was placed with its centre near New Hope Church, and Polk's and Hardee's ordered between it and the Atlanta road, which Hardee's left was to cover. An hour before sunset Stewart's division, at New Hope Church, was fiercely attacked by Hooker's corps, which it repulsed after a hot engagement of two hours. Skirmishing was kept up on the 26th and 27th. At half past five, P. M., on the 27th, Howard's corps assailed Cleburne's division, and was driven back, about dark, with great slaughter. In these two actions the Confederates were not intrenched. Their loss in each was about four hundred and fifty in killed and wounded. On the 27th the enemy's dead, except those borne off, were counted six hundred, and a reasonable estimate of their entire loss may, therefore, be stated as certainly not less than three thousand.

So far, the retrograde movement of Johnston was, in some respects, a success. It had been attended with at least two

considerable victories—Resaca and New Hope; it had been executed deliberately, being scarcely ever under the immediate pressure of the enemy's advance; and it had now nearly approached the decisive line of the Chattahoochee, or whatever other line he, who was supposed to be the great strategist of the Confederacy, should select for the cover of Atlanta. The events of the campaign, so far, were recounted with characteristic modesty by General Johnston. On the 1st of June he telegraphed to Richmond of his army: "In partial engagements it has had great advantages, and the sum of all the combats amounts to a battle."

The two armies continued to manœuvre for position. Skirmishing was kept up until the 4th of June, the enemy gradually extending his intrenched line towards the railroad and Ackworth. On the morning of the 5th the army was formed with its left at Lost Mountain, its centre near Gilgath Church, and its right near the railroad. On the 7th, the right, covered by Noonday Creek, was extended across the Ackworth and Marietta road. The enemy approached under cover of successive lines of intrenchments. On the 19th a new line was taken by Johnston; Hood's corps with its right on the Marietta and Canton road, Loring's on the Kenesaw Mountain, and Hardee's with its left extending across the Lost Mountain and Marietta road. The enemy approached, as usual, under cover of intrenchment. In this position there was incessant fighting and skirmishing until July 3d, the enemy gradually extending his intrenched right towards Atlanta.

BATTLE OF KENESAW MOUNTAIN.

On the 27th of June, General Sherman directed an attack on Johnston's position at Kenesaw Mountain. This mountain was the apex of Johnston's lines. Both armies were in strong works, the opposite salients being so near, in some places, that skirmishers could not be thrown out. The assault of the enemy was made in three columns, about eight o'clock in the morning. It was repulsed on every part of the Confederate line. The assaults were most vigorous on Cheatham's and Cleburne's divisions of Hardee's corps, and French's and

Featherstone's of Loring's. Lieutenant-General Hardee reported that Cheatham's division lost in killed, wounded, and missing, one hundred and ninety-five. The enemy opposed to it, by the statement of staff-officers subsequently captured, lost two thousand. The loss of Cleburne's division was eleven, that of the enemy in his front, one thousand; and Major-General Loring reported two hundred and thirty-six of his corps killed, wounded, and missing. The loss of the enemy, by their own estimates, was between twenty-five hundred and three thousand. Of this affair General Sherman wrote, with rare candor, or with peculiar recklessness, that it *was* a failure; but that it demonstrated to General Johnston the enemy's courage—that it “would assault, and that boldly.”

Sherman, on the failure of the Kenesaw assault, again resorted to manœuvring. McPherson's whole army was thrown rapidly to the Chattahoochee. On the 22d of July, Johnston finding the enemy's right nearer to Atlanta, by several miles, than our left, the army fell back, during the night, to Smyrna Church. On the 4th, Major-General Smith reported that he should be compelled to withdraw, on the morning of the 5th, to the line of intrenchments covering the railroad bridge and Turner's Ferry. The army was, therefore, ordered to retire at the same time to that line, to secure our bridges. The cavalry crossed the Chattahoochee—Wheeler observing it for some twenty miles above, and Jackson as far below.

Sherman was left master of the Chattahoochee, and Atlanta lay but eight miles distant. Peach-tree Creek, and the river below its mouth, was now taken by Johnston for his line of defence. A position on the high ground south of the creek was selected for the army, from which to attack the enemy while crossing. The engineer officers, with a large force of negroes, were set to work to strengthen the fortifications of Atlanta; and the two armies confronted each other in what was unmistakably the crisis of the Georgia campaign.

We can easily state the just and historical merits of that question so much discussed in Confederate prints—the retreat of Johnston to Atlanta. Something may always be said on both sides of a question which has divided the public mind, and been a topic of a certain censure as well as of approbation.

It is true that, in some respects, Johnston's retreat to At-

lanta was a sore disappointment to the Confederate public ; for it had given up to the Yankees half of Georgia, abandoned one of the finest wheat districts of the Confederacy, almost ripe for harvest ; and at Rome and on the Etowah River, had surrendered to the enemy iron-rolling mills, and government works of great value.

In other respects, however, the retreat had been a masterpiece of strategy, and a solid as well as a splendid success. The loss of our infantry and artillery, from the 5th of May, had been about ten thousand in killed and wounded, and four thousand seven hundred from all other causes. According to the opinions of our most experienced officers, daily reports of prisoners, and statements of Northern papers, the enemy's loss in action could not have been less than five times as great as ours.

The strategic advantages which Johnston had secured in his retreat were indisputable. "At Dalton," writes Johnston, "the great numerical superiority of the enemy made the chances of battle much against us ; and, even if beaten, they had a safe refuge behind the fortified pass of Ringgold and in the fortress of Chattanooga. Our refuge, in case of defeat, was in Atlanta, one hundred miles off, with three rivers intervening. Therefore, victory for us could have been decisive, while defeat would have been utterly disastrous. Between Dalton and the Chattahoochee we could have given battle only by attacking the enemy intrenched, or so near intrenchments that the only result of success to us would have been his falling back into them ; while defeat would have been our ruin. In the course pursued, our troops, always fighting under cover, had very trifling losses, compared with those they inflicted ; so that the enemy's numerical superiority was reduced daily and rapidly, and we could reasonably have expected to cope with the Federal army on equal ground by the time the Chattahoochee was passed. Defeat on this side of the river would have been its destruction. We, if beaten, had a place of refuge in Atlanta, too strong to be assaulted, and too extensive to be invested."

It was clear, in the month of July, that a pause had been given to the parallel operations of the enemy in Virginia and Georgia ; aimed, the one at Richmond, which the Yankees

entitled the heart and brains of the Confederacy; and the other at Atlanta, the centre of important manufacturing enterprises, and the door to the great granary of the Gulf States. Both movements were for the time unmistakably in check; and the interlude of indecision afforded a curious commentary on the boastful confidence that had recorded the fall of Richmond and the capture of Atlanta as the expectations of each twenty-four hours.

There was reason, indeed, for the North to be depressed. The disappointment of the Yankees was with particular reference to the campaign of Grant in Virginia. The advance from the Rapidan, which we have followed to its recoil before Petersburg, had been made under conditions of success which had attended no other movement of the enemy. It was made after eight months' deliberate preparation. In the Congress at Washington it was stated that, in these eight months, the Government had actually raised seven hundred thousand men, an extent of preparation which indicated an intention to overwhelm and crush the Confederacy by a resistless combined attack. Nor was this all. One hundred thousand three months' men were accepted from Ohio and other States, for defensive service, in order that General Grant might avail himself of the whole force of trained soldiers. The result of the campaign, so far, did not justify the expectations on which it had been planned. The Yankee Government which, since the commencement of the war, had called for a grand total of twenty-three hundred thousand men, and had actually raised eighteen hundred thousand men, of an average term of service of three years, to crush the Confederacy, saw, in the fourth year of the war, the Confederacy erect and defiant, and Richmond shielded by an army which had so far set at naught the largest preparations and most tremendous exertions of the North.

There had been successes, too, in other parts of the Confederacy than Virginia and Georgia. While the movements we have just been relating were taking place in Georgia, an important event had taken place in the Southwest—the defeat of the Yankee expedition under Sturgis on its way from Memphis to operate in Sherman's rear. In this action, at Guntown (13th June), Sturgis lost most of his infantry and all

of his artillery and trains, and the Confederates, under Forrest, achieved a victory that had an important influence on the campaign in Georgia. Forrest took two thousand prisoners, and killed and wounded an equal number.

This expedition, so severely punished, was one of peculiar atrocity. Its crimes were enough to sicken the ear. It flourished the title of the "Avengers of Fort Pillow." "Before the battle," says a correspondent, "fugitives from the counties through which Sturgis and his troops were advancing came into camp, detailing incidents which made men shudder, who are accustomed to scenes of violence and bloodshed. I cannot relate the stories of these poor frightened people. Rude unlettered men, who had fought at Shiloh, and in many subsequent battles, wept like children when they heard of the enormities to which their mothers, sisters, and wives had been subjected by the negro mercenaries of Sturgis."

Indeed, we may state here, that the enemy's summer campaign in Virginia and in the West was, more than any other, marked by the barbarities of the enemy. These barbarities had, by regular augmentation, become more atrocious as the war had progressed. In this year, they exceeded all that was already known of the brutality of our enraged enemy.

General Sherman illustrated the campaign in the West by a letter of instructions to General Burbridge, commanding in the Department of Kentucky, charging him to treat all partisans of the Confederates in that State as "*wild beasts*." It was the invariable and convenient practice of the Yankees to designate as "guerillas" whatever troops of the Confederates were particularly troublesome to them; and the opprobrious term was made, by General Sherman, to include the regularly commissioned soldiers of General Morgan's command, and whatever bodies of Confederate cavalry chose to roam over territory which the enemy disputed.*

* Burbridge was not slow to carry out the suggestions or instructions of his masters. The following is a copy of a section of one of his orders.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT KENTUCKY,
FIFTH DIVISION, TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS,
Lexington, Kentucky, July 16, 1864.

Rebel sympathizers living within five miles of any scene of outrage committed by armed men, not recognized as public enemies by the rules and

Some expressions in the orders referred to were characteristic of the Yankee, and indicated those notions of constitutional law which had rapidly demoralized the North. General Sherman declared that he had already recommended to Governor Bramlette of Kentucky, "at one dash to arrest every man in the country who was dangerous to it." "The fact is," said this military Solomon, "in our country personal liberty has been so well secured, that public safety is lost sight of in our laws and institutions; and the fact is, we are thrown back one hundred years in civilization, laws, and every thing else, and will go right straight to anarchy and the devil, if somebody don't arrest our downward progress. We, the military, must do it, and we have right and law on our side. . . . Under this law, everybody can be made to stay at home and mind his or her own business, and, if they won't do that, can be sent away." These sage remarks on American liberty were concluded with the recommendation that all males and females, in sympathy with so-called "guerillas," should be arrested and sent down the Mississippi to some foreign land, where they should be doomed to perpetual exile.

As Sherman advanced into the interior of Georgia he laid waste the country, fired the houses, and even did not hesitate at the infamous expedient of destroying the agricultural implements of all those who produced from the soil subsistence for man. He declared to the persecuted people that this time he would have their property, but, if the war continued, next year he would have their lives. Four hundred factory girls whom he captured in Georgia he bundled into army wagons,

usages of war, will be arrested and sent beyond the limits of the United States.

In accordance with instructions from the major-general commanding the military district of the Mississippi, so much of the property of rebel sympathizers as may be necessary to indemnify the Government or loyal citizens for losses incurred by the acts of such lawless men, will be seized and appropriated for this purpose.

Whenever an unarmed Union citizen is murdered, four guerillas will be selected from the prisoners in the hands of the military authorities, and publicly shot to death in the most convenient place near the scene of outrage. By command of

Brevet Major-General S. G. BURRIDGE.

J. B. DICKSON, Captain and A. A. General.

and ordered them to be transported beyond the Ohio, where the poor girls were put adrift, far from home and friends, in a strange land.*

From Chattanooga to Marietta there was presented to the eye one vast scene of misery. The fugitives from ruined villages or deserted fields sought shelter in the mountains. Cities were sacked, towns burnt, populations decimated. All along the roads were great wheat-fields, and crops sufficient to feed all New England, which were to be lost for want of laborers. The country had been one of the most beautiful of the Confederacy. One looked upon the gentle undulations of the valleys, terminating in the windings of the rivers, and flanked by the majestic barriers of the mountains. This beautiful country had been trodden over by both armies. In every town the more public buildings and the more conspicuous residences had been devoured by fire, or riddled with shot and shell. Every house used as headquarters, or for Confederate commissary stores, or occupied by prominent citizens, had been singled out by the enemy for destruction. In some instances churches

* The following announcement appeared in the Louisville newspapers :

“ARRIVAL OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN FROM THE SOUTH.—The train which arrived from Nashville last evening brought up from the South two hundred and forty-nine women and children, who are sent here by order of General Sherman, to be transferred north of the Ohio River, there to remain during the war. We understand that there are now at Nashville fifteen hundred women and children, who are in a very destitute condition, and who are to be sent to this place to be sent North. A number of them were engaged in the manufactories at Sweet Water at the time that place was captured by our forces. These people are mostly in a destitute condition, having no means to provide for themselves a support. Why they should be sent here to be transferred North is more than we can understand.”

It was also stated in these same papers that, when these women and children arrived at Louisville, they were detained there and advertised to be hired out as servants, to take the place of the large number of negroes who had been liberated by the military authorities and were now gathered in large camps throughout Kentucky, where they were fed and supported in idleness and viciousness at the expense of the loyal taxpayers. Thus, while these negro women were rioting and luxuriating in the Federal camps, on the bounty of the Government, the white women and children of the South were arrested at their homes, and sent off as prisoners to a distant country, to be sold in bondage, as the following advertisement fully attests :

“NOTICE.—Families residing in the city or the country, wishing seamstresses or servants, can be suited by applying at the refugee quarters on Broadway, between Ninth and Tenth. This is sanctioned by Captain Jones, provost-marshal.”

had not escaped. They had been stripped for fire-wood or converted into barracks and hospitals. Fences were demolished, and here and there a lordly mansion stood an unsightly ruin.

The vandalism of Hunter in Virginia drew upon him the censure of the few journals in the North which made any pretension to the decencies of humanity. At Lexington, he had burned the Virginia Military Institute with its valuable library, philosophical and chemical apparatus, relics and geological specimens; sacked Washington College, and burned the house of ex-Governor Letcher, giving his wife only ten minutes to save a few articles of clothing.

Such enormities were monstrous enough; they shocked the moral sentiment of the age; yet they did not affright the soul of the South. The outrages practised upon helpless women, more helpless old age, and hopeless poverty, assured the people of the Confederacy of the character of their enemies, and the designs of the war, and awakened resolution to oppose to the last extremity the mob of murderers and lawless miscreants who desecrated their soil and invaded their homes.

We turn from the dominant and controlling events of the campaign of 1864, in Virginia and Georgia, to other fields of the war, which were within, or close upon the period which our narrative so far has traversed.

There properly belonged to the campaign of the summer and early fall of 1864 three projects of the Confederate invasion of the territory held or disputed by the enemy. These were Early's invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania, Morgan's invasion of Kentucky, and Price's invasion of Missouri. Their results were small; opportunities were badly used; in brief, the Confederate attempts of 1864 at invasion did not differ from the former weak experiments of the kind.

EARLY'S INVASION OF MARYLAND, ETC.

The Confederates had planned a series of offensive operations on a small scale, the object of which was to interrupt the main campaigns in the East and West. This line of operations began with Early's invasion of Maryland. About the same time the enemy was startled by the news of an invasion

of Kentucky by a considerable body of Confederates, moving into that State through Pound Gap. But Early's movement was the superior one, and commands attention first.

After the engagement at Lynchburg, June 18, Hunter found no way of escape so convenient as through the Blue Ridge to Gauley. This left the way open for Early to move up the valley. He did so, accompanied by a cavalry force under Ransom, and reached the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, July 3, at a point just above Harper's Ferry, threatening Martinsburg. Sigel, holding the latter place, fell back towards Sharpsburg. The Confederates immediately occupied Martinsburg, where they captured valuable stores. The same day a fight occurred at Leetown, south of the railroad, in which General Mulligan, covering Sigel's retreat, was finally forced back to Sharpsburg, where he joined Sigel, and another engagement occurred. The Yankee forces being overpowered, fell back to Maryland Heights. Max Weber, evacuating Harper's Ferry, joined Sigel. In the mean time, General E. B. Tyler, protecting the railroad from Baltimore to the Monocacy, prepared for resisting the Confederates and to reinforce Sigel. General Lew Wallace joined him on the afternoon of the 3d.

On Saturday, July 9, the Confederates disappeared from Greencastle, Hagerstown, and from other points threatened; but this was only for the purpose of concentration. The Yankee forces had evacuated Frederick the previous night, and fallen back to Monocacy Bridge.

BATTLE OF MONOCACY BRIDGE.

The bridge is four miles from Frederick City. The river runs due north and south. The railroad and national road cross the river at very nearly the same point. As our troops advanced towards the river from Frederick it became apparent that some forces of the enemy, supposed at the time to be cavalry, were holding the east bank. A couple of our batteries opened on them from the front, while our cavalry were ordered to go up the stream and cross over the bridge. At the same time a considerable force of our infantry moved down the

stream, and crossing south of the bridge, formed in a piece of woods on the high ground. It was still believed that the enemy had nothing but cavalry on the ground, but our infantry being ordered forward, emerged into an open field and discovered the enemy's infantry drawn up in line of battle along the railroad at the further end of the field. The railroad being several feet lower than the field, the enemy had all the advantages of an intrenched position. Evans's brigade charged across this field under a heavy fire of musketry. When within fifty yards of the enemy's position, another body of the enemy emerged from the woods on our right and attacked the brigade in flank, and rendered its position critical; but other of our forces coming up, the enemy's flank movement was counteracted. A simultaneous charge was then made by our whole line, when the enemy broke and fled, leaving between a thousand and twelve hundred dead and wounded, and seven hundred prisoners in our hands. The enemy left the railroad and national pike and fled north in the direction of Gettysburg.

In this action, which lasted about two hours from the time of firing the first shot, we lost in killed and wounded between five and six hundred men and some valuable officers.

Our forces did not follow the enemy, but proceeded directly towards Washington and Baltimore, making rapid marches, but collecting cattle and horses along the route.

The Yankee capital was in imminent peril, and the whisper ran through the North that it was already lost or surely doomed. General Early might have taken it by assault. There were only a few regiments to man its defences, and the advance of the Confederates was waited hourly by a population thrown into pitiable consternation. But General Early did not seize the great opportunity of 1864. He passed the time in which he might have struck the decisive blow in weak hesitation; he reconnoitred the defences of Washington; he scattered his forces into expeditions to destroy telegraphs and intercept trains; but he could not make up his mind to attack the Yankee capital, and with that characteristic Confederate stupidity which never completed its victories, and was easily pleased with half-way successes, he was satisfied with the results of a raid, where, with more enterprise and persistence, he might have achieved the most decisive and brilliant success of

the war—marched into Washington, and made his name as illustrious as that of Stonewall Jackson.

About the middle of July the Confederates began to disappear across the Potomac fords, carrying with them many of the fruits of their expedition. It was reported by General Early that he brought south of the Potomac five thousand horses and twenty-five hundred beef-cattle. Besides this, his cavalry and artillery were all supplied with new and valuable horses. He had also created a useful diversion, and compelled Grant to weaken his army materially before Petersburg. But it must be confessed that the results of his expedition fell below public expectation in the South, and that he was justly charged with not having made full use of his opportunities.

After crossing the Potomac, General Early had occasion to give another sharp lesson to the enemy. He turned back upon Crook, who was pursuing him with about 15,000 infantry and cavalry. The fight commenced between Bartonsville and Kernestown, about five miles from Winchester. Our forces ran the enemy to Bunker's Hill, twelve miles beyond Winchester, and thoroughly routed them. General Crook confessed to a loss of one thousand in killed and wounded. Our entire loss was sixty. After this General Early occupied Martinsburg, and a pause ensued in the campaign in the Valley; nothing of any importance occurring for some weeks, except the raid of a few hundred Confederate cavalry to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, who burned a considerable portion of the town.

MORGAN'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY.

General John Morgan's expedition into Kentucky was, on the whole, a failure. In the early part of June, with some 2,500 men, he entered Kentucky by Pound Gap, and by swift movements got possession of Paris, Geergetown, Cynthia, Williamstown, Mount Sterling, and other towns. A passenger train on the Louisville and Lexington Railroad, near Smithfield, was attacked, and two passenger cars and a baggage car burned. Other trains were attacked, and railroad communication was for some days interrupted. On the 9th of June, General Burbridge, who followed Morgan from Pound Gap.

came up with him at Mount Sterling, and had an indecisive engagement. A portion of Morgan's command entered Lexington at two o'clock the next morning, burned the Kentucky Central Railroad depot, and left at ten o'clock, in the direction of Georgetown and Frankfort. Part of the town of Cynthia was also burned. Two Ohio regiments stationed there were captured. On the 12th June, General Burbridge fell upon Morgan's forces while at breakfast near Cynthia, and after an hour's hard fighting defeated him, killing three hundred, wounding nearly as many, and capturing nearly four hundred, besides recapturing nearly one hundred of the Ohio troops, and over one thousand horses.

PRICE'S INVASION OF MISSOURI.

It was late in September when offensive operations were essayed in the distant and obscure country west of the Mississippi. In that month, General Price moved into Missouri with a force estimated at from ten to twenty thousand men. A great excitement was produced, and it was thought that a raid was contemplated on St. Louis.

Price's main army moved against the village of Pilot Knob, 86 miles south of St. Louis, the terminus of the railroad, and the depot for supply of the lower outposts. Several desperate assaults were made on this strongly fortified position of the enemy. Under cover of the night, General Ewing, the Yankee in command, evacuated Pilot Knob, and effected a disastrous retreat to Rolla. In his official report he said: "The refugees, men, women, and children, white and black, who clung to the command, nearly sacrificed it by their panics. I had to throw out the available fighting force, infantry and cavalry, as advance and rear guards and flankers, leaving in the body of the column the affrighted non-combatants and two sections of artillery, not often brought into action on the retreat. Repeated and stubborn efforts were made to bring us to a stand, and could they have forced a halt of an hour they would have enveloped and taken us; but our halts, though frequent, were brief, and were only to unlimber the artillery, stagger the pursuers with a few rounds, and move on."

General Price stopped short of Rolla. For some cause—probably the demoralization of his army and their disappointment of active sympathy in the country they had penetrated—he seems to have abandoned at this stage the original designs of his expedition. He subsequently went into winter-quarters in the vicinity of Washington. He collected but few supplies, and his men were reported to be in worse plight than when they left Arkansas.

CHAPTER IV.

Great revulsion in the public mind of the North in the summer of 1864.—A general outcry for peace.—Spirit of Yankee newspapers.—The Niagara Falls "Commission."—The Jacques-Gilmore Affair.—Sorry figure of the Confederacy in these negotiations.—The question of peace negotiations in the Confederacy.—True method of peace.—Manifesto of the Confederate Congress.—Position of President Davis.—His letter to Governor Vance, of North Carolina.—The CHICAGO CONVENTION, etc.—Speeches, etc.—The real programme of the Democratic party.—Why it broke down.—No virtue in public opinion in the North.—The true peace men of the North.—Their Convention at Cincinnati.—A reaffirmation of Jeffersonian Democracy.—A masterpiece of statesmanship.—The Presidential campaign of 1864.—THE RIVAL ADMINISTRATIONS AT RICHMOND AND WASHINGTON.—A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF NORTHERN DESPOTISM.—The conscription and impressment laws of the Confederacy.—The offerings of Southern patriotism.—The Yankee record in the matter of slavery.—"Military necessity."—The Yankee record in the matter of civil liberty.—An outrage upon history.

GRANT's complete failure in the Virginia campaign, and Sherman's dead-lock at Atlanta—the first marked by the most frightful slaughter—had produced an evident and great revulsion in the public mind of the North. The masses in that country appeared to have become at last thoroughly aroused to a true sense of their condition. On every side arose the demand for peace. Popular demonstrations had already taken place in several localities, showing that the people of the North were growing tired of the war, and demanded that it should be stopped. Yankee newspapers, that were at one time earnest advocates for a vigorous prosecution of the war, were now still more earnestly in favor of a vigorous prosecution of peace. They no longer spoke with bated breath and whispering humbleness. They said what they meant.*

* As a most interesting evidence of the extent of this disposition to peace in the Northern mind, we collate the following extracts from "the peace press," as well as from papers that had given a *quasi* support to the war:

From the New York Tribune.

We feel certain that two-thirds of the American people on either side of the dividing line anxiously, absorbingly, *desire peace*, and are ready to make all needful sacrifices to insure it. Then why shall it be long withheld? Let us

In the summer of 1864 there were certain movements looking to a special negotiation for peace, which drew no little of the public attention. These movements were fruitless—in some respects they were unworthy and absurd; but they are interesting as indicating, at the time they took place, a general popular disposition to peace, proceeding from the Northern despondency on the one hand, and the consequent hopes of the South.

know, as soon as may be, the most that the rebel chiefs will do to secure peace; let us know what is the "ultimatum" on our side. We have no sympathy with the shuddering dread that our Government may, by listening to propositions from the rebels, virtually acknowledge their independence. Etiquette is the disease of little minds, great souls are never troubled by it.

Washington Constitutional Union.

*The cry for peace is rung into our ears from every section of the country—from all divisions and parties. Even the fanatics have cooled down, in measure, from their fury for blood, have lost the vampire instincts; and, horrified at the tales of slaughter they read, and shocked at the sights of hospital suffering, and of the maimed and crippled crawling about our streets, they even wish the termination of strife which, unprocreative of benefit to either party, even to the *medius terminus*, the negro, is crushing the vital and social existence of both. Physical calamity constantly displayed before their vision, and high prices crushing out the means of comfortable subsistence, has at length softened the heart of the hardened abolitionist into a lurking yearning for the cessation of arms.*

Dayton (Ohio) Daily Empire.

We can have no peace so long as the men are allowed to prescribe its terms. Let the people, in their sovereign might, command that this cruel war be ended, and all differences between the States be submitted to the arbitrament of a convention.

Troy Daily Press.

To-day, the people of the "loyal" and seceded States would be able to agree upon conditions of peace and stop the war. And it is the duty of the hour to hasten an opportunity for this, by shoving aside extreme men and placing in power those who believe that, in a government like ours, concession, conciliation and compromise, are better remedies for differences than eternal strife and war.

Chicago Times.

The necessity for peace upon honorable terms is too imperative to permit its sacrifice to a blind, selfish, or corrupt partnership. The alternatives now presented to the nation are peace with honor, and war with dishonor; peace with preservation of life, and war with its extended and murderous conflicts; peace with national and individual solvency, and war with national and individual bankruptcy.

From the World.

The new President, to be nominated at Chicago, and elected in November, must be a man ready and willing to meet any and every overture for peace, a

In the month of July the whole Northern public was aroused by a sudden statement in the newspapers, that Messrs. C. C. Clay and Jacob Thompson, Southern Commissioners to negotiate a peace, and who had associated with them George Saunders, and also obtained the intermediate services of Horace Greeley, were at Niagara Falls soliciting a safe conduct to Washington, and that "terms of peace were already passing over the wires."

There was the usual Yankee exaggeration in this news. Messrs. Clay and Thompson had sought a safe conduct to Washington, for an informal conference to ascertain if there was any possible common ground on which negotiations for peace might be initiated; and they had been unmercifully snubbed by the authorities, after the usual Yankee fashion of treating all the humble and begging attempts of the Confederates to reach the back-door of Washington. Mr. Lincoln dispatched a reply, addressed "*To whom it may concern,*" declaring that the Union, with the additional and positive condition of the abandonment of slavery, was the *sine qua non* of peace.

Almost contemporary with the Niagara Falls affair there was an incident in Richmond, which put in striking contrast the sturdy indifference of Mr. Lincoln, and the simplicity and pliancy of the Confederate authorities.

In the same month of July a letter was received from General Grant, asking permission of the Confederate authorities for Colonel Jacques, of the 73d Illinois infantry, and one J. R. Gilmore, to meet Colonel Ould, the Confederate Commissioner of Exchange, between the lines of the two armies. Ould brought the two Yankees to Richmond for the purpose of seeing President Davis. It appeared that they came with the knowledge and approval of President Lincoln, and under his

man who shall represent truly the dignity and power of the nation, and who will not be unwilling even to tender an armistice suggesting a National Convention of all the States.

From the New York News.

The peace Democracy will indorse a nomination that faithfully represents the sentiments herein stated. They are willing to trust to the good sense and patriotism of the people for the realization of a definite peace as the sequel of an armistice and National Convention.

pass ; and, while they disclaimed the character of authorized commissioners, they professed to be directly acquainted with the views of the Washington authorities, and plainly hinted that their business was to pave the way for a meeting of formal commissioners authorized to negotiate for peace.

These two obscure Yankees were treated with silly distinction in Richmond. They were admitted to a personal interview with President Davis, who "grasped the hand of one of them with effusion," and entertained them with a long disquisition on State Rights, Secession, etc. There was, of course, some Yankee dramatization in the interview. Jacques had arrived in Richmond attired in a large linen duster ; but no sooner had he confronted the Confederate President than he threw off the garment, disclosing the military uniform and insignia of a Yankee colonel.

It appears that these parties had not a single definite proposition to make, and that they sounded Mr. Davis thoroughly, and, easily approaching his vanity, induced him to make a very elaborate and rhetorical exposition of his views and designs. They carried a long story back to the Yankee newspapers, and made no little capital out of their visit to Richmond by "sensations" in the Northern pictorials and itinerant "lectures" at twenty-five cents a head.

The more intelligent and worthy portion of the Confederate public were greatly wounded in their pride by the behavior of their authorities on the peace question. Many of these persons had, since the very commencement of the war, insisted on the futility and impropriety of essaying to open any special negotiations with the enemy on peace. There were the many distinct avowals of the purpose of the war on our side, in the declarations and acts of the Government, invariably protesting our simple desire "to be let alone," which were already a clear and standing tender of peace. The issues could not be made more distinct or more urgent than in the official record. Why, they argued, should we go beyond it by attempts at kitchen conferences, which might not only be insolently rebuffed by the enemy, to the damage of our self-respect, but which, as our experiences had so far shown, were invariably misinterpreted, and not without plausibility, as signs of decadence and weakness in our military affairs. True, the proud and intelligent persons in

the Confederacy were as anxious for peace as those who were constantly professing their devotion to this end. But they considered that the honor and self-respect of their countrymen had been lowered by devious and unworthy attempts at negotiation. Having once announced the terms of peace sufficiently, they judged they would do right, while awaiting the overtures of the enemy, not to betray their anxiety, or open any unnecessary discussions on the subject. And there could be no doubt of the sufficiency of these announcements.

A few weeks before the Jacques-Gilmore "mission" the Confederate Congress had published a manifesto naming the terms of peace, sufficiently explaining to the enemy the demands of the Richmond Government, and certainly leaving no occasion for discussing the matter with Yankee intermeddlers, who might choose to visit the Confederate capital on the errands of curiosity, or perhaps in the office of spies. The principles, sentiments, and purposes by which these States had been actuated, were set forth in that paper with all the authority due to the solemn declaration of the legislative and executive departments of the Government, and with a clearness which left no room for comment or explanation. In a few sentences it was pointed out that all we asked was immunity from interference with our internal peace and prosperity, "and to be left in the undisturbed enjoyment of those inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, which our common ancestors declared to be the equal heritage of all parties to the social compact. Let them forbear aggressions upon us, and the war is at an end. If there be questions which require adjustment by negotiation, we have ever been willing, and are still willing, to enter into communication with our adversaries, in a spirit of peace, of equity, and manly frankness."

President Davis himself had even more explicitly indicated the methods of peace, excluded special efforts at negotiation with the enemy, and taken a position to which his conduct a few months subsequently was absurdly and inexplicably opposite.

Governor Vance of North Carolina had written to him, referring to certain political discontent in that State, and proposing an effort at negotiation with the enemy, which would

appease the malcontents, and, if unsuccessful, would strengthen and intensify the war feeling.

On the 8th of January, 1864, President Davis wrote a long letter in reply. Some passages of this letter are of sufficient interest to be reproduced by the side of the events of the summer of the same year. The President wrote :

“ We have made three distinct efforts to communicate with the authorities at Washington, and have been invariably unsuccessful. Commissioners were sent before hostilities were begun, and the Washington Government refused to receive them or hear what they had to say. A second time I sent a military officer with a communication addressed by myself to President Lincoln. The letter was received by General Scott, who did not permit the officer to see Mr. Lincoln, but promised that an answer would be sent. No answer has ever been received. The third time, a few months ago, a gentleman was sent, whose position, character, and reputation were such as to insure his reception, if the enemy were not determined to receive no proposals whatever from the Government. Vice-President Stephens made a patriotic tender of his services, in the hope of being able to promote the cause of humanity ; and although little belief was entertained of his success, I cheerfully yielded to his suggestion, that the experiment should be tried. The enemy refused to let him pass through their lines or to hold any conference with them. He was stopped before he reached Fortress Monroe, on his way to Washington. To attempt again (in the face of these repeated rejections of all conference with us) to send commissioners or agents to propose peace, is to invite insult and contumely, and to subject ourselves to indignity without the slightest chance of being listened to. . . .

“ I cannot recall at this time one instance in which I have failed to announce that our only desire was peace, and the only terms which formed a *sine qua non* were precisely those that you suggested, namely, ‘ a demand only to be let alone.’ But suppose it were practicable to obtain a conference through commissioners with the Government of President Lincoln, is it at this moment that we are to consider it desirable, or even at all admissible? Have we not just been apprized by that despot that we can only expect his gracious pardon by emancipating all our slaves, swearing allegiance and obedience to

him and his proclamation, and becoming in point of fact the slaves of our own negroes?"

But the peace movements in the North, to which we have referred, were to take a more practical direction, in view of the approaching Presidential election in that country.

THE CHICAGO CONVENTION, ETC.

The Democratic National Convention met at Chicago on the 29th of August. The Convention was called to order by Mr. August Belmont, who said that "four years of misrule by a sectional, fanatical, and corrupt party had brought our country to the verge of ruin. The past and present are sufficient warnings of the disastrous consequences which would befall us if Mr. Lincoln's re-election should be made possible by our want of patriotism and unity."

Mr. Bigler, formerly Governor of Pennsylvania, and Senator in Congress, was chosen as temporary chairman. He said: "The termination of democratic rule in this country was the end of the peaceful relations between the States and the people. The men now in authority, through a feud which they have long maintained with violent and unwise men at the South, because of a blind fanaticism about an institution in some of the States, in relation to which they have no duties to perform and no responsibilities to bear, are utterly incapable of adopting the proper means to rescue our country from its present lamentable condition."

The Convention was permanently organized by appointing as chairman, Horatio Seymour, the Governor of New York. In his speech, upon assuming the chair, he inveighed bitterly against the Lincoln Administration and the party in power. "They were," he said, "animated by intolerance and fanaticism, and blinded by an ignorance of the spirit of our institutions, the character of our people, and the condition of our land. Step by step they have marched on to results from which at the onset they would have shrunk with horror; and even now, when war has desolated our land, has laid its heavy burdens upon labor, and, when bankruptcy and ruin overhang us, they will not have the Union restored unless upon condi-

tions unknown to the Constitution. They will not let the shedding of blood cease, even for a little time, to see if Christian clarity, or the wisdom of statesmanship, may not work out a method to save our country. They will not even listen to a proposal for peace which does not offer what this Government has no right to ask. This Administration cannot now save the country if it would. It has placed obstacles in its pathway which it cannot overcome. It has hampered its own freedom of action by unconstitutionality." "The failure of the policy of the Administration," he said, "was not due to any want of courage or devotion on the part of the soldiers: they had done all that arms could do; and had wise statesmanship secured the fruits of their victories, there would to-day have been peace in the land." "This Administration," he continued, "cannot save the Union. We can. We demand no conditions for the restoration of the Union. We are shackled with no hates, no prejudices, no passions. We wish for fraternal relations with the people of the South. We demand for them what we demand for ourselves, the full recognition of the rights of the States."

The platform of the Convention consisted of a series of six resolutions drawn up by a committee appointed for that purpose, consisting of one member from each State, chosen by the respective delegations. The two most important resolutions were as follows:

"Resolved, That this Convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, during which, under the pretence of a military necessity, or war power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private right alike trodden down, and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired, justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of all the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that, at the earliest practicable moment, peace may be restored on the basis of the federal Union of the States."

"Resolved, That the aim and object of the Democratic party is to preserve the Federal Union and the rights of the States unimpaired, and they hereby declare that they consider the administrative usurpation of extraordinary and dangerous powers not granted by the Constitution, the subversion of the civil by military law in States not in insurrection, the arbitrary military arrest, imprisonment, trial, and sentence of American citizens in States where civil law exists in full force, the suppression of freedom of speech and of the press, the

denial of the right of asylum, the open and avowed disregard of State rights, the employment of unusual test-oaths, and the interference with and denial of the right of the people to bear arms, as calculated to prevent a restoration of the Union, and the perpetuation of a government deriving its just powers from the consent of the governed."

The platform was adopted with but four dissenting votes.

On the 31st the Convention proceeded to ballot for candidates. Governor Seymour, of New York, peremptorily refused to allow his name to be used. The vote at first stood one hundred and sixty-two for McClellan, and sixty-four for all others. Several delegations then changed their votes, and the result was two hundred and two and a half for George B. McClellan, and twenty-three and a half for Thomas H. Seymour. Delaware and Maryland voted for Seymour, who also received nearly half the votes of Ohio, Indiana, and Missouri. The remaining eighteen States voted unanimously for McClellan, whose nomination, on motion of Mr. Vallandigham, was made unanimous.

Despite the protestations of attachment to the Union by the Chicago Convention, there is but little doubt that the real programme of its operations had, for its final conclusion, the acknowledgment of the independence of the Confederate States.

It was proposed, perhaps, to get to this conclusion by distinct and successive steps, so as not to alarm too much the Union sentiment of the country. The first step was to be the proposition of the "Union as it was," in a convention of the States; if that was voted down, then the proposition of a new principle of federation, limited to the foreign relations and to the revenue; if that was rejected, then the proposition of an Inter-Confederate Union, to preserve, as far as possible, by an extraordinary league, the American prestige; and, if all these propositions, intended as successive tests of the spirit of the South, were to fail, then, at last, the independence of the Confederate States, made the *sine qua non*, was to be conceded by the Democratic party of the North, as the last resort of pacification, and the one of two alternatives where their choice could no longer hesitate. In short, it appeared to be the design of the Democratic party to get the North on the naked issue of war and separation.

Why this programme broke down is explained almost in a

word. The military events which took place between the date of the Chicago Convention and election-day put upon the war a more encouraging aspect for the North, and with these changes the Democratic party abandoned ground which they took professedly on principle, but really on the mean considerations of expediency and time-serving. The fact was that all party changes in the North, since the war, might be said to be constantly accommodating themselves to the course of military events; so little was there of virtue or of principle in the public opinion of the Yankee. After the Chicago Convention, the peace party moved inversely with the scale of military success; and, as that mounted in Northern opinion, it fell until, as we shall see months later, it almost approached zero.

It was to be expected, by those acquainted with the true springs of action in Yankee politics, that the changes in the military situation, during the fall months of 1864, to the advantage of the North, would induce the Democratic party and their candidate, McClellan, to swerve from the resolutions of the Chicago Convention, and to adopt shifting and equivocal grounds with reference to the war. This shameful departure from the former professions and recorded principles of the so-called Democratic party of the North was the occasion of the secession of that portion of it which, declaring for peace on principle and disdaining time-serving, attempted the organization of a peace party upon "State Rights Jeffersonian Democratic principles." A convention of the true "peace men" was called at Cincinnati on the 18th of October. It nominated no candidates; its actual political influence had become very small; but it had the merit of placing on record one of the most perspicuous and complete expositions of the American system of government that had ever come from any modern pen. As a reaffirmation of the old and true doctrine of that once great organization in America known as the Democratic party, applied to the conduct of the existing war, the platform of the Cincinnati Convention has a noble and permanent interest; it deserves to be studied, both as a declaration of statesmanship and as a piece of history. There was scarcely any thing that could exceed in luminous, compact, and forcible style the two following resolutions of this body:

"1. *Resolved*, That the several States composing the United

States are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their General Government, but that by a compact, under the style and title of a Constitution for the United States, and of amendments thereto, they constituted a General Government for special purposes—delegated to the Government certain definite powers, reserving each State to itself the residuary mass of right to their self-government; and that whenever the General Government assumes undelegated power, its acts are unauthorized, void, and of no force; that to this compact each State acceded as a State, and as an integral party, its co-States forming, as to itself, the other party; that the Government created by this compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself, since that would have made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, as in all other cases of compact among powers having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress.

“2. *Resolved*, That as Jefferson made the rugged issue of doctrine with Adams, so must we make it with the Federal Administration, if we would resist effectually the infinitely greater dangers which surround us. We do, consequently, declare THE WAR WHOLLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and on that ground we hold it should be stopped. If a majority of the copartnership States can retain a member by force, they may expel one by force, which has not yet been pretended by anybody. The Federal agency at Washington, backed up by a majority of the States in Congress, without right, in the vain attempt to subjugate the minority of the States, is destroying their liberty, and crushing the federal system to atoms by thus attacking the Constitution. The Administration, and that majority, are the real enemies of the Union, which cannot and ought not to exist after its conditions are destroyed. The Chicago platform, and General McClellan and his war-record letter, which he has laid over it, must all be repudiated by Democrats for the same reason. If we admit that the war is constitutional, we must not murmur at the monstrous abuses which attend it, for they all naturally grow out of the original atrocity.

“The evils of paper money, of a protective tariff, of the public debt; the military draft; the military governors; the arbitrary

arrests ; the provost-marshals ; the fifteen bastiles ; the drum-head courts-martial ; the bayonet elections ; the padlocked lips ; the fettered press ; the wholesale confiscation ; the constructive treason ; our immense armies and navies, are mere incidents of the war itself ; and so are President Lincoln's futile proclamations of slave emancipation, and his general amnesties. Half truths and narrow issues have been the bane of Democracy for many years, and they have so contracted the minds and hearts of Democrats, that all sense of justice, and all knowledge of constitutional law which sat there so long enthroned, have departed, and left us an easy prey to the violence of President Lincoln's Administration, and to corrupt managers of our own party in State and national conventions."

We shall not undertake here to follow the course, or enumerate the details of the Presidential campaign of 1864. We may anticipate our narrative generally to say, that that campaign resulted in the signal triumph of fanaticism and violence in the North, and in the election of Abraham Lincoln by the vote of every Northern State except Delaware, Kentucky, and New Jersey.

THE RIVAL ADMINISTRATIONS AT RICHMOND AND WASHINGTON.— A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF NORTHERN DESPOTISM.

While on political subjects in the war, it will not be amiss here to put in comparison the internal administrations of the rival governments at Washington and Richmond. We have, on other occasions, developed some points of this comparison. It is fruitful of many considerations ; it is after all the most interesting inquiry in the war ; and it comes up naturally and conveniently for another review at the date of the Northern election which approved Mr. Lincoln's policy, and bestowed upon him a second term of office.

There were many persons to be found in the North, who, admitting the rapid decline, since the commencement of the war, of their government to despotism, attempted a consolation by the assertion that a similar lapse of liberty had taken place in the Confederate States. This opinion obtained to a remarkable extent, even among those who were not unfriendly to the South, and certainly were not disposed to do her in-

justice. It is to be largely ascribed to the very prevalent ignorance in the North, even among men otherwise well informed and intelligent, of the internal policy of the Confederate States, and of the true spirit of their peculiar legislation with reference to the war. It was not only the Black Republican party that circulated the idea of an iron-handed tyranny in the Confederate States; but that idea was admitted to a large extent in the minds of those who were disposed to think well of the Southern experiment, but were not proof against the impressions derived from such peremptory laws as required men to take up arms in mass, to devote certain property to the government, and to hold themselves, generally, in subjection to the necessities of the war. These measures wore the appearance of the machinery of despotism to them, simply because they did not understand their true nature; while they added to their ignorance the mistake of viewing them from a stand-point which put the North and the South in the same circumstances.

It is quite true that the conscription and impressment laws of the Confederacy were apparently harsh measures. Yet there is something to be said of them beyond the justification of necessity; and this is, that they were really nothing more than the organized expressions of the *popular devotion* of the South in the war; intended only to give effect and uniformity to it. They were not instances of violent legislation imposed upon the people; they were merely the formulas of willing and patriotic contributions of men and means to a war, in which not only a nation fought for its very existence, but each individual for the practical stake of his own fortune. It was difficult to make Northern men understand this: that, while they had a mortal terror of the draft and other demands of the war, the people of the South were cheerfully willing to take up arms, and to devote their substance to the government. It is thus that the conscription and impressment laws, which, in the North, would have been the essence of despotism, were really in the South not edicts of violence, but mere conventionalisms of the war, through which the patriotism of the people acted with effect and regularity.

But, beyond these laws, even the *appearance* of despotism stopped in the Southern Confederacy. We have only to com-

pare the established routine there with what was constantly observed in the North, to show how divergent, since the first gun was fired at Fort Sumter, had been the histories of the belligerents on all questions affecting political and civil liberty. There were no military governors in the Confederacy; there was no martial law there; there was, properly called, no political police there—the police establishment being limited to a mere detective force to apprehend, in the communities in which they were placed, spies and emissaries of the enemy. At no time in the war had soldiers ever been placed at a polling-place in the Confederacy; at no time had newspapers ever been suppressed; and at no time had a single instance of arbitrary arrest, or of imprisonment without distinct charges and the opportunity to reply, occurred within the Confederate jurisdiction. These are facts which carry their own comment on the base reflection that in the war the South had declined, along with the North, in its civil administration, and had kept company with it on its road to despotism.

When we speak of the *despotism* at Washington, we do not design a figure or an exaggeration of rhetoric. We merely name a clearly defined species of human government, as we would any other fact in history. The Presidential election of 1864 gave occasion for a full review of the acts of the Washington authorities. We may sum up that review in some brief paragraphs, dividing it into two branches: First, Mr. Lincoln's unconstitutional course on the rights of the States on the slavery question; second, his course on the rights of his own people in all matters of civil liberty;—these two classes of outrage being a convenient division of his Administration, viewed both as to its intentions upon the South and its effects upon the North.

As to the slavery question, it is only necessary to state the record.

1. The convention which nominated Abraham Lincoln President of the United States in 1860, passed a resolution affirming “the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and *especially the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively.*”

2. Mr. Lincoln, in his inaugural of March, 1861, inserted this resolution at length, and declared that to him it would be

“a law,” and added, “I now reiterate these sentiments;” and “in doing so, I only press upon the public attention the most *conclusive evidence of which the case is susceptible, that the property, peace, and security of no section are not to be in any-wise endangered by the now in-coming administration.*” In the same State paper he had before said, quoting approvingly from one of his own speeches, “I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it now exists;” and subjoined, “*I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.*”

3. In Secretary Seward's famous letter to the minister of the United States, resident at Paris, designed as a diplomatic circular to the European courts, and written “by direction of the President,” occurs the following paragraph: “The condition of slavery in the several States will remain just the same, whether it (‘the rebellion’) succeeds or fails. The rights of the States, and the condition of every human being in them, will remain subject to exactly the same laws and forms of administration, whether the revolution shall succeed, or whether it shall fail. Their constitutions, and laws, and customs, habits and institutions, in either case, will remain the same. It is hardly necessary to add, to this incontestable statement, the further fact that the new President, as well as the citizens through whose suffrages he has come into the administration, has always repudiated all designs whatever, and wherever imputed to him and them, of *disturbing the system of slavery as it is existing under the Constitution and the laws.* The case, however, would not be fully presented were I to omit to say that any such effort on his part would be *unconstitutional*, and all his acts in that direction would be prevented by the judicial authorities, even though they were assented to by Congress and the people.”

4. In his message to Congress of the 6th of March, 1862, known as his emancipation message, after recommending to that body that they should pass a resolution that the United States ought to co-operate with the States by means of pecuniary aid in effecting the gradual abolishment of slavery, Mr. Lincoln expressly disavowed, for the Government, any authority over the subject, except with State assent. His language was, that his proposition “sets up no claim of a right, by Fed-

eral authority, to interfere with slavery within State limits, referring, as it does, the absolute control of the subject in each case to the State, and its people immediately interested."

5. The act of Congress of the 6th of August, 1861, emancipated only the slaves of "rebels" employed in the "rebellion," and submitted the decision of such cases exclusively to the courts. Major-General Fremont, on the 30th of that month, being then in command in Missouri, by proclamation declared free all the slaves within the State. This, as soon as it came to Mr. Lincoln's knowledge, he disapproved, and declared it, in a formal order of 11th of September, to be void as far as it transcended the provisions of the act of Congress. And in a letter of Mr. Joseph Holt to President Lincoln, of the 22d of the month, that person, being alarmed for the effect of Fremont's order, stated that "the act of Congress was believed to embody the conservative policy of your administration." This statement Mr. Lincoln never denied.

6. On the 9th of May, 1862, Major-General Hunter, military commander of the department of the South, embracing Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, by an order of that date, declared all slaves within such States free. On the 19th of the month, even before he was officially advised of the measure, Mr. Lincoln, by proclamation, declared the same "whether genuine or false," to be "altogether void." In neither of these instances was there the slightest intimation of a change of opinion by Mr. Lincoln, either on the question of policy or of power. As to both, he then entertained the same opinion that he had announced in his inaugural.

7. On the 22d of July, 1862, Mr. Crittenden proposed, in the House of Representatives at Washington, a resolution which, after stating that the war was "forced upon the country by the disunionists" of the Southern States, declared that it "is not waged, on our part, in any spirit of oppression, or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights of the established institution of these States (the seceded), but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and the rights of the several States unimpaired; and that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease." In the House only two votes were cast against it, and in the Senate but one Republican

vote, and it was at once and without hesitation approved by the President. No pretence was here suggested that slavery was to be abolished, or that any of the rights of the States in regard to it were to be interfered with.

Yet, in the face of all this accumulation of precedents, we find *Emancipation* proclamations put forward under the claim of executive power—the first on the 22d of September, 1862, and the second on the first day of the succeeding year. In the last, all slaves in certain States or parts of States were declared free; it mattered not whether the territory or the slaves should fall within the military occupation of the United States or not.

But it has been said that the emancipation proclamation was a *military measure*, and to be justified as such from necessities outside of the Constitution. It is difficult to find patience to reply to such nonsense. The plea is the most absurd stuff that was ever put in the mouth of fool or knave, to brazen out against the good sense and conscience of the world his fraud and outrage. Absurd, because we know, and all the world knows, that it was at the dictation and under the influence of a purely political party that the emancipation proclamation was issued by Mr. Lincoln. Absurd, because we knew, and had had recent assurance from Mr. Lincoln himself, that he did not intend emancipation of the negro to end with the war, which it would do *ipso facto* if a mere military measure, but had made the abandonment or extirpation of slavery the preliminary condition for peace, and thus, therefore, a primary object of the war.

It was this same dogma of “military necessity,” applied to the slavery question, that Mr. Lincoln had used to fasten upon the necks of the white citizens of the North a heavy yoke of intolerance. It was only necessary to look upon what was every day passing before the eyes.

There was seen this despotism in the unreasonable searches and seizures of persons and papers, in direct violation of the Constitution.

It was seen in arrests of obnoxious individuals, and their imprisonment without warrant or charges preferred, and in some instances cut off from all communication with family, friends, or counsel.

It was seen in the suppression of newspapers, and wanton arrest of editors.

It was seen in the assumption, by the President, of the power to regulate the right of suffrage in the States, and establish minority and *aristocratic* governments under the pretext of guaranteeing *republican* governments.

These are not fancy sketches, or the exaggerations of a narrative written with passion. It was notorious that such things had occurred in Missouri, Indiana, West Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and New York; and yet even to question their legality was deemed disloyal, and men who maintained their inherited freedom in doing so, were designated by scurrilous abuse, and threatened with the penalties of a despot's all-powerful displeasure.

To compare the falsehoods and crimes of the Washington record with that rigor of measures in the Confederacy, which was really nothing more than the logical incident and the proper expression of resolute patriotism, is an outrage upon history. The noble memorials of self-sacrificing patriotism are very different from the scarlet record of ruthless despotism.

CHAPTER V.

The business of blockade-running.—Its risks.—Interesting statistics.—Value of the port of Mobile.—NAVAL FIGHT AND CAPTURE OF THE FORTS IN MOBILE BAY.—A frightful disparity of force.—Heroic fight of the ram *Tennessee*.—Absurd boasts of the Yankees.—Surrender of Fort Gaines.—Fall of Fort Morgan.—THE GEORGIA CAMPAIGN.—Its importance.—Johnston's situation at Atlanta.—His removal by President Davis.—A fatal error.—Lieutenant-General Hood.—THE BATTLES OF ATLANTA.—THE FALL OF "THE GATE CITY."—Reckless and desperate fighting—Yankee raid on the Macon road.—Hood's "magnificent advance."—Bombardment of Atlanta.—Hood's fatal mistake.—Sherman's new movement.—He "cuts the Confederates in two."—The Yankees in Atlanta.—Sherman's cruelties.—His depopulation of Atlanta.—Enormity of the order.—Sherman as a pacificator.—Governor Brown's letter.—Position of Vice-President Stephens.—Effects of the fall of Atlanta.—President Davis's Macon speech.—Its swollen tone.—CAPTURE OF THE CONFEDERATE PRIVATEER *FLORIDA*.—Its cowardice and outrage.—Yankee idea of glory.—THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CONFEDERATE RAM *ALBEMARLE*.—Yankee estimation of the exploit.—The North Carolina Sounds.—THE ST. ALBANS RAID.—Stories of the savage vengeance of the Confederates.—How much truth there was in them.

A LARGE capital in the Confederacy was engaged in running the blockade. The risks of this business were by no means so great as generally supposed; and it had made a steady and valuable contribution to the war. The London insurance offices had been in the habit of charging sixty per cent. premium for policies on vessels and goods running the blockade. This was a rate adopted at the beginning of the war, before any facts had been developed to establish the real average of risk. But persons engaged in the business soon found that the real risk was by no means commensurate with the nominal risk as established by the London offices, and they consequently ceased to insure; or, in other words, adopted the plan of being their own insurers. This is naturally the case when the true risk is much below the nominal risk. That such was the case in the blockade-running business was clear from the fact that those engaged in it no longer insured.

A correspondent of the London *Index* gave a list of vessels employed in running the blockade from the port of Nassau, between November, 1861, and March 10, 1864. The list com-

prised eighty-four vessels. Of these, thirty-seven had been captured, twenty-five had been lost or beached, one foundered at sea, one condemned, two converted into Confederate gunboats, and the rest were supposed to be still in the business or laid up. The total number of losses which can be ascribed to causes connected with blockade-running was sixty-two. The number of successful round trips made by these vessels was two hundred and fourteen. Thus the risk to the vessels on the round trip was twenty-nine per cent. The percentage on goods was not by any means so great. If the risks out and in had been equal, it would have been fourteen and a half per cent. each way. But the inward risk was much greater than the outward. We are perhaps justified in assuming, on the whole, that the real risk on goods imported into the Confederacy through the blockade was not higher than twenty per cent.

Mobile was one of the principal ports for the blockade-running trade. It was guarded at its entrance by two imposing fortifications; it was difficult to blockade; it was a nursery of the Confederate navy; and vessels were already being constructed there with a view of raising the blockade. It had been the steady purpose of the Yankees to get possession of Mobile Bay as soon as operations on the Mississippi would permit the detachment of a sufficient co-operating military force for the expedition.

NAVAL FIGHT AND CAPTURE OF THE FORTS IN MOBILE BAY.

In the early part of August, Admiral Farragut, who commanded the Yankee fleet off Mobile, secured the military co-operation of General Canby for attacking and investing the forts in the harbor of Mobile. On the morning of the 5th of August, the Yankee fleet, numbering fourteen steamers and four monitors, carrying in all more than two hundred guns, and manned by twenty-eight hundred men, made their *entrée* into Mobile Bay. The entire Confederate naval force that was to encounter this huge armada was composed of *one iron-clad and three wooden vessels*. Such was the frightful disparity of force in a fight which the Yankees afterwards claimed to take rank with the victories of Nelson!

In the early light of the morning the attacking fleet moved steadily up the main ship-channel, when Fort Morgan opened upon them, and was replied to by a gun from the Brooklyn. A moment later, and the Yankee iron-clad *Tecumseh*, struck by a torpedo, disappeared instantaneously beneath the waves, carrying with her her commander, T. A. M. Craven, and nearly all her crew. The Yankee flag-ship *Hartford* now took the lead, and had scarcely passed the fort, when the Confederate ram *Tennessee* dashed out at her. The three Confederate gunboats, the *Morgan*, the *Gaines*, and the *Selma*, were ahead. After a desperate struggle between the fleets, the *Gaines* retired to Fort Morgan in a sinking condition; the *Selma*, cut off, surrendered; and the *Morgan* escaped to Fort Morgan.

Having passed the forts and dispersed the gunboats, Farragut ordered most of the vessels to anchor, when about nine o'clock he perceived the Confederate ram *Tennessee* standing up for the *Hartford*. He immediately ordered all the Yankee monitors, and such of his wooden ships as were adapted for the purpose, to attack the ram, not only with their guns, but bows on at full speed. And then began one of the most remarkable naval conflicts of the war. A single vessel was beset by a whole fleet. She was struck three times, and as the *Hartford*, the third vessel which struck her, rasped along her side, the Yankee poured a whole broadside of nine-inch solid shot within ten feet of her casement. The *Chickasaw* was pounding away at her stern; the *Hartford* and three others of the fleet were again heaving down upon her, determined upon her destruction; her smoke-stack had been shot away, her steering chains were gone, and she lay at the mercy of the enemy. It was not until resistance was hopeless that Admiral Buchanan, himself wounded on the *Tennessee*, surrendered the vessel, and ordered the white flag to be hoisted just as she was about being struck by the vessels converging upon her, and when she was already disabled, and her crew almost in a smothering condition.

Such was the naval fight in Mobile Bay, which the Yankees ranked among their most brilliant victories; exalting Farragut above Nelson; apostrophizing their hero after the modern New York fashion of big dinners, and having hired poets to recite to him in public "masterly ballads." The Confederates

had a very different and very plain estimation of the affair. Their loss in killed and wounded had been only twenty-two. That of the enemy was near three hundred, not including the one hundred and twenty-three who went down in the *Tenunseh*. The Richmond *Examiner* gave a list of the twenty-eight Yankee vessels engaged, having two hundred and twelve guns, with the four Confederates having twenty-two guns. It said: "It was a most unequal contest in which our gallant little navy was engaged; and we lost the battle, but our ensign went down in a blaze of glory."

But although our little fleet in the bay of Mobile had been destroyed or dispersed, the forts were still held, and the Yankee success was incomplete. The fall of these, however, was to follow unexpectedly to the South, and not without some circumstances of humiliation.

On the 6th of August, one of the Yankee iron-clads commenced shelling Fort Gaines. This was a powerful work; it was provisioned for six months, and had a garrison of 600 men. Colonel Anderson, in command, communicated with the enemy's fleet by flag of truce, without the sanction of General Page, who was in command at Fort Morgan. General Page inquired by signals what his purpose was, but received no answer. His attention was attracted by signal-guns. General Page repeatedly telegraphed, "Hold on to your fort." The same night he visited Fort Gaines, and found Anderson on board the Yankee fleet, arranging terms of capitulation. He left peremptory orders for Anderson, on his return, not to surrender the fort, and relieved him of his command. Fort Morgan signalled the next morning, but no answer was received, except the hoisting of the Yankee flag over the ramparts of Fort Gaines.

From this time onward, movements of the enemy were in progress for capturing Fort Morgan; and on the 22d of August, at day-dawn, a bombardment was opened from the shore batteries, the monitors and ships inside, and the vessels outside the bay. At 6 A. M. of the 23d, a white flag was displayed by the Confederates, and at 2 o'clock P. M. the fort was surrendered.

Fort Powell had been already attacked on the night of the 5th, and blown up, the guns falling into the enemy's hands.

The capture of Forts Powell, Gaines, and Morgan, and the destruction of the Confederate fleet, gave the Yankees possession of the bay, and closed the port to all ingress or egress of blockade-runners. The city of Mobile was still in possession of the Confederates, and months were to elapse before the enemy were to make any demonstration upon it, and then only with the co-operation of a land force. The Yankee success, so far, although the occasion of a brief blaze of excitement in the North, was not of any great importance; and it had been dearly purchased.

THE GEORGIA CAMPAIGN.

We return to more important events—those of the Georgia campaign—which indeed were to put a new aspect on the war; to annihilate the peace party in the North; to give a new hope and impetus to the enemy; and to date the serious and rapid decline of the fortunes of the Confederacy.

When we last left off the story of this campaign, Johnston was holding Atlanta, and busied in strengthening its defences.* His position in Atlanta was not less secure than that of Lee in Petersburg; and judging prospective by past events, it was impossible to doubt that he would have held Sherman as well as Lee held Grant. He could at least have done that; and if he succeeded in destroying his land communications—very much more easy to reach than that of Grant over water—he might have forced the enemy into disastrous retreat on Tennessee.

At midsummer, therefore, the two campaigns, for which the enemy had surrendered the Trans-Mississippi and North Carolina, were both failures. That military success which would

* In an official report, General Johnston said: "The proofs that I intended to hold Atlanta are, the fact that under my orders the work of strengthening its defences was going on vigorously, the communication on the subject made by me to General Hood, and the fact that my family was in the town. That the public workshops were removed, and no large supplies deposited in the town, as alleged by General Bragg, were measures of common prudence, and no more indicated the intention to abandon the place than the sending the wagons of an army to the rear, on a day of battle, proves a foregone determination to abandon the field."

alone bring him money, and by which alone could the Lincoln government retain power, was not forthcoming, or even dimly visible in the future. Had the campaign of Georgia pursued its parallel with that of Virginia, McClellan or some other man capable of negotiation would have been elected, and perhaps an honorable peace could have been attained. If no peace, at least the invasion would have lost its venom with its hope—the enemy would be a bankrupt, his army impotent, and his people indisposed to further exactions.

These bright prospects were changed in a day. President Davis, moved not so much by popular clamor as by a persistent personal dislike of Johnston, who resented his catechising interference with his campaign, took occasion to remove from the command of what had become the most important army in the Confederacy a first-rate military man, who had never lost a battle or a regiment in his whole career; who was executing the masterpiece of his professional life with a perfection of design and detail which delighted his own troops and filled his adversary with involuntary admiration; who had done the wonderful thing of conducting an army in retreat over three hundred miles of intricate country, absolutely without any loss in material or prisoners. Johnston was removed, and Lieutenant-General Hood put in command of the army—President Davis declaring that if the people wanted “a fighting general” they should have such in this man, who was brave, headstrong, incompetent; who had the heart of a lion, but, unfortunately, with it a head of wood.

THE BATTLES OF ATLANTA.—THE FALL OF “THE GATE CITY.”

The effective force which General Johnston transferred to General Hood was about forty-one thousand infantry and artillery, and ten thousand cavalry. It constituted one of the largest armies the Confederacy had ever put in a single field, and was only a little less numerous than that with which General Lee had fought the campaign of the Rapidan.

On the 20th of July, Hood attacked the enemy's right on Peach-tree Creek, near the Chattahoochee, gaining some temporary advantage, and capturing colors and prisoners.

It was one of the most reckless, massive, and headlong charges of the war. A little past three in the evening, and with the celerity of lightning, the bulk of Hood's army massed in enormous columns against Newton's division, came on without skirmishing, and with yells whose volume exceeded any battle-shout that had yet been heard. It was the aim of Hood to take advantage of a gap between Newton's division and another division of Palmer's corps, to strike the enemy at a vital point, and to destroy his forces on the right. The charge was gallantly led by Walker's and Bates' divisions of Hardee's corps. The column poured down an open but rocky series of fields towards Newton's left, evidently aiming at his bridges. At this point, however, the enemy succeeded, with admirable quickness, in massing their artillery, and pouring a terrible fire upon the Confederates. The Yankee gunners worked with frantic energy; the Confederate columns slackened pace, and began to waver and lose their careful arrangement; and in less than half an hour the attack was drawn off in good order, but having plainly and unquestionably failed to accomplish its object.

On the 22d of July, Hood's army shifted its position, forming on Peach-tree Creek, and Stewart's and Cheatham's corps formed line of battle around the city. Hardee's corps made a night march, and attacked the enemy's extreme left at one o'clock on the 22d, and drove him from his works, capturing sixteen pieces of artillery and five stands of colors. Cheatham attacked the enemy at four o'clock in the afternoon with a portion of his command, and drove the enemy, capturing six pieces of artillery. During the engagement we captured about two thousand prisoners.

After the battle of the 22d, Sherman's army was transferred from its position on the east side of Atlanta to the extreme right of Hood's army, on the west side, threatening the Macon road. He slowly and gradually drew his lines about Atlanta, feeling for the railroads which supplied Hood's army and made Atlanta a place of importance.

It remained to break the Macon road. For this purpose Stoneman was sent with five thousand cavalry, and McCook with four thousand men, to meet on the railroad near Lovejoy's and to tear it up, and also to attack and drive Wheeler. Stone

man did not go to Lovejoy's. He tore up much of the railroad, and got down in front of Macon; and on his retreat was hemmed in by Iverson, and was himself captured, together with one thousand of his men and two guns, besides losing many in killed and wounded. McCook cut his way out, losing about five hundred men as prisoners. "On the whole," Sherman reported, "the cavalry raid is not deemed a success."

On the 28th of July, Hood made another grand attack on Sherman. Coming out of Atlanta by the Bell's Ferry road, he advanced in parallel lines directly against the Fifteenth Corps, expecting to catch that flank in air. Of this movement General Sherman said: "His advance was magnificent, but founded on an error that cost him sadly; for our men coolly and deliberately cut down his men, and, spite of the efforts of the rebel officers, his ranks broke and fled. But they were rallied again and again, as often as six times at some points; and a few of the rebel officers and men reached our lines of rail-piles only to be killed or hauled over as prisoners." The Yankee accounts claimed a loss on the Confederate side in this engagement of six thousand men. General Hood stated his loss at fifteen hundred killed and wounded. The excellent intrenchments of the Yankees and the skilful formation of their lines saved them from any considerable loss, and secured them the fortune of the day.

General Sherman now extended his lines southwestward towards East Point, in the hope of drawing the Confederates out, from the fear of having their communications severed; but Hood extended his fortified line accordingly, and refused to abandon his works. For several weeks Sherman continued the siege of Atlanta, bombarding it with but little effect. He had satisfied himself that to take Atlanta he must resort to new means, and had concluded to plant his armies away below on the Macon road, Hood's main line of supply. The grand movement was assigned for the 18th of August.

But at this time Hood made the fatal mistake. He sent off Wheeler and his entire cavalry to raid on Sherman's line of communications. "At last," wrote Sherman, "he made the mistake we had waited for so long, and sent his cavalry to our rear, far beyond the reach of recall."



GEN HARDEL

Instantly the Yankee cavalry was on the Macon road. Sherman followed quickly with his principal army. On the 31st of August, Howard, on the right, had reached Jonesboro'; Thomas, in the centre, was at Couch's; and Schofield, on the left, was near Rough and Ready.

The Confederate forces were at this time in a most singular position. They had been divided into two main armies, separated by an interval of twenty-two miles. One part of the army was intrenched at Atlanta, and the other was at Jonesboro', under General Hardee, and was also intrenched. The cause of this separation of the forces arose from the fact that Hood had found out, by Kilpatrick's raid, that it was necessary he should protect his communications at that point by a large force. Sherman's army was therefore between Hood's forces, and had literally divided the Confederates in two.

On the evening of the 30th of August, the enemy made a lodgment across Flint River, near Jonesboro'. The Confederates attacked them there on the evening of the 31st, with two corps, but failed to dislodge them. Of this event, General Hood telegraphed to Richmond: "This made it necessary to abandon Atlanta, which was done on the night of the 1st of September."

On the evening of the 1st of September, General Hardee's corps, in position at Jonesboro', was assaulted by a superior force of the enemy; and being outflanked, was compelled to withdraw during the night, with the loss of eight guns.

The sum of Hood's disasters was now complete. He had remained in Atlanta to find that he was outflanked, his line of supply cut off, and the Yankee troops between him and a large portion of his army. In order to save that portion of his command then with him, he determined to evacuate the fortified city; and on the night of September 1st he blew up his magazines, destroyed all his supplies that he could not remove, consisting of seven locomotives and eighty-one cars loaded with ammunition, small-arms, and stores, and left the place by the turnpike roads.

Sherman dispatched to Washington: "Atlanta is ours, and fairly won. Since the 5th of May we have been in one continued battle or skirmish, and need rest." The pause in military operations afforded him the opportunity of launching

measures of the most extraordinary cruelty against the non-combatant people of Atlanta. He ordered the entire depopulation of the city, and proceeded to drive from their homes thousands of helpless women and children. General Hood protested against the measure as "unprecedented, studied, and ungenerous cruelty." Sherman wrote diffuse replies to him and to the Mayor of Atlanta. This Yankee general wrote a sort of tangled English, interlarded with slang phrases, which the North accepted as a model of forcible and elegant style. He replied to Hood, "Talk thus *to the marines*, and not to me;" and gave to the mayor this bit of military philosophy: "War is cruelty, and *you cannot refine it.*" He continued: "You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable; and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home is to stop this war."

It appears that the Yankee general had shut his eyes to every element and law of civilization in war. He ordered into exile the whole population of a city, drove men, women, and children from their homes at the point of the bayonet, under the plea that it was to the interest of his Government, and on the claim that it was an act of "kindness to these families of Atlanta." Butler only banished from New Orleans the registered enemies of his Government, and acknowledged that he did it as a punishment. Sherman issued a sweeping edict covering all the inhabitants of a city, and added insult to the injury heaped upon the defenceless by assuming that he had done them a kindness.

Shortly after the fall of Atlanta, it was affirmed that many of the leading men of Georgia, including Governor Brown and Alexander H. Stephens, were in favor of that State withdrawing from the Confederacy and making a separate peace; and that negotiations to that effect had been opened with General Sherman. The facts were these: A Mr. King had brought to Governor Brown a message to the effect that he would be pleased to confer with him and others upon the state of the country, with a view to a settlement of the difficulties, and would give him a pass through the Federal lines, going and returning, for that purpose. To this the governor replied, that he, as governor of a State, and General Sherman, as a com-

mander of an army in the field, had no authority to enter upon negotiations for peace. Georgia might perhaps be overrun, but could not be subjugated, and would never treat with a conqueror upon her soil. That while Georgia possessed the sovereign power to act separately, her faith had been pledged by implication to her Southern sisters, and she would not exercise this power without their consent and co-operation. She had entered into the contest knowing all the responsibilities which it involved, and would never withdraw from it with dishonor. "She will never," he says, "make separate terms with the enemy, which may free her territory from invasion and leave her confederates in the lurch. Whatever may be the opinion of her people as to the injustice done her by the Confederate Administration, she will triumph with her confederate sisters, or she will sink with them in common ruin. . . The independent expression of condemnation of the measures of the Administration is one thing, and disloyalty to our sacred cause is another and quite a different thing." "If Mr. Lincoln would stop the war, let him," said Governor Brown, "recognize the sovereignty of the States, and leave to each to determine for herself whether she will return to the old Union or remain in her present league."

About the same time Vice-President Stephens explained his own position in an elaborate letter, in which he declared that the only solution for present and prospective troubles was "the simple recognition of the fundamental principle and truth upon which all American constitutional liberty is founded, and upon the maintenance of which alone it can be preserved—that is, the sovereignty—the ultimate, absolute sovereignty—of the States." He concluded: "All questions of boundaries, confederacies, and union or unions would naturally and easily adjust themselves, according to the interests of parties and the exigencies of the times. Herein lies the true law of balance of the power and the harmony of States."

The fall of Atlanta was a serious blow to the Confederacy. "On that day," said the *Richmond Examiner*, "McClellan's nomination fell still-born, and an heir was born to the Abolition dynasty. On that day, peace waved those 'white wings,' and fled to the ends of the morning. On that day, calculations of the war's duration ceased to be the amusements even of the idle."

The catastrophe moved President Davis in Richmond. Towards the close of September, he made a journey to Georgia. He delivered an elaborate and ill-tempered speech at Macon. He said that it would have gladdened his heart to have met his auditors in prosperity instead of adversity. Still, though misfortune had befallen the Confederates from Decatur to Jonesboro', the cause was not lost. Sooner or later Sherman must retreat, and then he would meet the fate that befell Napoleon in the retreat from Moscow. He knew the deep disgrace felt by Georgia at the army falling back from Dalton to the interior of the State; but he was not one who felt that Atlanta was lost when the army crossed the Chattahoochee, and he had put a man at the head of the army who would strike a manly blow for the city. It did not become him to revert to disaster. Hood's army must be replenished. He had been asked to send reinforcements from Virginia to Georgia, but the disparity in numbers was as great in Virginia as in Georgia. The army under Early had been sent to the valley of the Shenandoah, instead of to Georgia, because the enemy had penetrated to Lynchburg; and now, if Early was withdrawn, there was nothing to prevent the Federal troops from putting a complete cordon of men around Richmond. He had counselled with General Lee upon all these points; his mind had roamed over the whole field, and his conclusion was, that "if one-half of the men now absent from the field would return to duty, we can defeat the enemy. With that hope, I am now going to the front. I may not realize this hope, but I know that there are men there who have looked death too often in the face to despond now."

The swollen tone of the Confederate President was not without effect upon the public mind. Confidence was in a measure revived; and expectation stood on tiptoe for the results of that wonderful strategy which President Davis had counselled with Hood, and which he promised his Macon audience was to recover Atlanta, and bring Sherman to a grief unparalleled in the war. The President's vivid hint of such a campaign was the occasion of new hopes with some people of the Confederacy. But they had forgotten of what ill omen had been his former visits to the Western army; how disaster had followed on his heels; and how his former plans of campaign in this depart-

ment, attended with like vapors, had turned out to be the veriest clap-traps in military science. But the sequel of the Macon speech belongs to another period of time, and must be reserved for another chapter.

We turn here, at this period, to the narration of some naval and military incidents which belong to it, and which, although of no great importance in themselves, are of considerable interest, either on account of the principles they involved or the spirit they illustrated.

CAPTURE OF THE CONFEDERATE PRIVATEER FLORIDA.

The Florida had originally sailed from England under the name of Oreto, and under that name she was, on reaching Nassau, brought before the court through the efforts of the Yankee consul. The neutral authorities decided in favor of the vessel, which was permitted to proceed. Leaving Nassau she went to Green Bay, where she received on board her armament, ran into Mobile, changed her name to that of Florida, and had since carried on an effective war on Yankee commerce.

In February, 1864, availing herself of a dark night, she escaped from Brest, eluding the Kearsarge, which was off that port. In June, she visited the neutral port of St. Georges, Bermuda, and remained there nine days. Leaving St. Georges on the 27th of that month, she remained outside, but in sight, for three or four days, boarding all vessels that approached the island. On the 10th of July she captured the Electric Spark, near the coast, while several vessels were cruising for her; but she escaped, and was next heard from at Teneriffe, on the 4th of August. Subsequently she entered the bay of San Salvador, Brazil.

While the Florida was at her anchorage in this neutral port, and a portion of her crew, with her commander, were ashore, not dreaming of danger, Captain Napoleon Collins, of the Yankee steamer Wachusett, had conceived the extraordinary and outrageous design of stealing upon the Confederate vessel, and destroying or capturing her by a cowardly stratagem in a neutral port.

About three o'clock in the morning of the 7th of October, the cables were slipped, and the Wachusett bore down upon the Confederate vessel under a full head of steam. So little expectation was there of such a proceeding, that one-half the officers and crew of the Florida, seventy in number, and including Captain Morris, were on shore. The Florida's officer on deck supposed the collision, which he saw to be imminent, to be merely accidental, and cried out: "You will run into us if you don't look out." The design of Captain Collins was to strike the Florida amidships, with full steam on, crushing her side, and send her at once to the bottom. The Wachusett, however, did not strike her adversary fairly, but hit her in the stern, carrying away the mizen-mast and main-yard. The Florida was not seriously injured by the collision; but the broken spar fell across the awning over her hatchway in such a manner as to prevent her crew from getting on deck from below. The recoil which followed the shock carried the Wachusett back several yards. In the confusion which ensued, several pistol shots were fired from both vessels, chiefly at random and entirely without effect. Two of the guns of the Wachusett were also discharged, but the shots did not strike the Florida.

Captain Collins, of the Wachusett, immediately called out: "Surrender, or I will blow you out of the water!" The lieutenant in charge of the Florida replied: "Under the circumstances, I surrender." Without the delay of an instant, dozens of Yankee sailors boarded the prize, and made fast a hawser, connecting her with their own vessel, and the Wachusett turned her course seaward, moving at the top of her speed, and towing the Florida in her wake.

The fleet of Brazilian vessels was so situated, that the two steamers were obliged to pass under the stern of one of the largest in order to penetrate their line. The Wachusett was challenged, but did not deign a word of reply, and the Florida, when hailed and commanded to halt a moment after, replied that a pause was impossible, as she was towed by the vessel in front. The Brazilians soon divined the state of affairs, and in another moment or two the heavy guns of the fort, under the muzzles of which the capture had been made, opened fire on the Wachusett as she disappeared in the darkness. Three

shots were fired after her, all passing harmlessly far above her pennant and striking the water.

To those familiar with the Yankee disposition to misrepresent and boast, it will not appear strange that this stroke of Napoleon Collins' genius—a piece of cowardice and outrage for which Mr. Seward was afterwards compelled to apologize to the Brazilian government—should have been generally thought, in the North, very commendable and admirable. But what shall be said of this sentiment in a New York newspaper: "*Certainly no page of history can show a more daring achievement, or one executed with more brilliant rapidity or more complete success!*"

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CONFEDERATE RAM ALBEMARLE.

A few weeks later, and another naval exploit of the Yankees was heralded to the public. This was the destruction of the formidable ram Albemarle, in the Roanoke River. With fourteen officers and men, Lieutenant Cushing, of the Yankee navy, on the night of the 27th October, ascended the Roanoke to Plymouth, in a torpedo boat, crept upon the ram at her wharf, and sunk her by the explosion of the torpedo.

The exploit was a most dastardly one—a rare exhibition of cowardice; for no sooner had the Yankees exploded the Albemarle than, instead of making fight, they cried out, "We surrender!" and while the vessel was sinking, called for quarter from those upon whom they had stolen under the cover of darkness.

The Confederates would have been justifiable in dispatching these men on the spot. The Yankees had, in more than one instance, executed in cold blood members of the torpedo corps of the Confederate States; and when Butler ascended the James River, in May, 1864, the story was grimly told in the New York papers, that certain torpedo-men captured on that occasion "would never give any more trouble." But in the case of the Albemarle, the Confederates, with characteristic softness and simplicity of heart, took and treated as prisoners of war the dastardly creatures, whose enterprise had been of no more peril than that of the assassin who stabs in the back, and, as

his victim turns to revenge himself, throws up his hands for merey.

It is a peculiarity of the Yankee that the success of an ingenious device of cowardice is more highly extolled than any exhibition of real courage. No wonder, then, that the affair of the Albemarle was exploited as one of the sensations of the day; and that Lieutenant Cushing, the commander of the Yankee party, was dubbed "hero," and his physiognomy recorded on the first pages of the New York pictorials.

The destruction of the Albemarle removed the reliable defence of Plymouth. On the 31st of October the Yankees took possession of the place, capturing some prisoners and cannon, and re-establishing their supremacy in the sounds of North Carolina.

THE ST. ALBANS RAID.

In the month of October, a great and undue excitement was created in the North by an expedition of twenty-five Confederates from the Canadian frontier into the town of St. Albans, Vermont. The raid occurred on the 18th of October. The banks were robbed of over one hundred thousand dollars, and a citizen was shot; the raiders declaring that they "intended retaliation for Sherman's cruelties in Atlanta." They escaped across the frontier, but were arrested by the Canadian authorities. The raid was followed by great excitement, and in a few hours the whole frontier was under arms.

The apparent complicity of the Confederate authorities in the St. Albans raid furnished the Yankees with the occasion of connecting the Government at Richmond with all sorts of real and pretended schemes, concocted on the Canadian frontier, to execute savage justice upon the North. These stories are familiar to the world. It was declared on affidavit, on different occasions, that Confederate agents, on neutral territory, had plotted the burning of Northern cities, the conflagration of hotels, the destruction of railroad trains, the infection of the Northern people with pestilence, and all manner of savage and inhuman retribution.

The slight element of truth in these libels is easily indicated. No human creature is more ingenious and industrious in mis-

representation than the Yankee; and his unscrupulous and busy attempt to hand down the Confederates to history as a savage foe, is to be constantly met in the history of the war.

It is true that President Davis was a credulous man, and very accessible to the claims of foreign adventurers, to the propositions of "blowers," and the game of "confidence-men." It is quite possible that he may have given countenance to some of these plausible creatures, who afterwards exceeded their instructions; and having been designated for legitimate "secret service," assumed, on their own account, the part of highwaymen and incendiaries. But it is an incontestable fact in history, that the Confederates, so far from being savage avengers, were deficient in the policy and tame in the spirit of retaliation; that they moderated their warfare with an excess of chivalry and sentimentalism that was more than once laughed at by the enemy, or seriously censured by the more intelligent and just persons of the South; and that in their general temper in the war, and its well-attested facts of history, they give the conclusive and unmistakable contradiction to the multitudinous Yankee stories of "rebel barbarities" in the episodes of the war.

CHAPTER VI.

The Richmond lines.—THE FALL OF FORT HARRISON, ETC.—The attempt to retake it.—Why it failed.—ENGAGEMENT ON THE CHARLES CITY ROAD.—Death of General Gregg.—ENGAGEMENT ON THE WILLIAMSBURG AND BOYDTON ROADS.—ANOTHER GRAND ATTEMPT ON RICHMOND.—A shameful failure.—The “electoral necessity” at Washington.—THE CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA.—Early’s mission in the Valley;—How a part of the combination to protect Richmond.—Sheridan’s command.—His strategy.—BATTLE NEAR WINCHESTER.—A critical moment.—The enemy’s centre broken.—He recovers.—Misconduct of the Confederate cavalry.—Early retreats to Fisher’s Hill.—THE BATTLE OF FISHER’S HILL.—A most unexpected reverse to the Confederates.—Misgivings and alarm in Richmond.—The capture of Staunton.—Sheridan’s devastations of the Valley.—“Barn-burning.”—An affair of Rosser’s cavalry.—“The Saviour of the Valley.”—BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK.—Two-thirds of Sheridan’s army completely routed.—Early’s awkward pause.—Plunder of the Yankee camp.—The enemy regains the day.—Shameful rout of the Confederates.—The Valley campaign virtually ended.—SOUTHWESTERN VIRGINIA.—Breckinridge’s campaign.—The Yankees capture the salt-works at Saltville.—Destruction of the works.

THE events on the Richmond lines in the fall months of 1864 were not without importance.

THE FALL OF FORT HARRISON, ETC.

Early on the night of the 28th of September it was discovered that the enemy was crossing a force to the north side of the James, at Deep Bottom, and in a few hours developed the fact that he was crossing infantry, cavalry, and artillery in heavy columns. General Gregg, who was in command at that point, after notifying General Ewell of the situation, placed two brigades of Field’s division in readiness to meet an attack.

At daybreak on the 29th, our pickets were driven in at several points, showing that a formidable advance was being made, and that the force to oppose it was inadequate to cover all the ground threatened. The best disposition possible, however, was made of the small force present. The first determined assault was made near the Phillips House, on both sides of the Four Mile Run. The Texas brigade was hastened in double-

quick to that point, and placed in position just in time to repel the attack. The enemy, in very heavy force, had reached the abattis, thirty or forty yards in front, but were there met by a most terrific and galling fire, which mowed them down with terrible slaughter. The white troops fled in great confusion, but, the entangled brush greatly impeding their speed, many of them fell under the fire of the well-aimed rifles of the Texans.

The negroes, who were driven up at the point of the bayonet, lay flat upon the ground, just in rear of the abattis, hoping thereby to shield themselves from the sad havoc in their ranks, but the Texans, mounting the works, shot them like sheep led to the shambles. The *New York Herald* said one hundred and ninety-four negroes were buried upon that spot. Counting the wounded at five times as great, which is a low estimate, at least twelve hundred killed and wounded cumbered the ground in front of that little brigade.

Beaten back at this point, the enemy immediately hurled another column of white troops against General Geary, near the Drill House, on New Market Heights, and met a like bloody repulse.

Beaten back with terrible slaughter from the heights of New Market, the Yankees determined to accomplish, by flank movements and overwhelming numbers, what their courage failed to do.

A heavy column moved up the river for the purpose of attacking the works on Chaffin's farm, while others moved up the Darbytown and New Market roads. A force of Confederates was hastened off in double-quick to reinforce Fort Harrison and adjacent works; but before they could reach them the enemy assaulted the fort, which, after a very feeble resistance on the part of the artillery and a portion of Colonel Maury's command, was abandoned to the enemy. This fort occupied a commanding position below Drury's Bluff, and constituted the main defence at that point.

In the mean time the force that moved up New Market road had massed in a ravine on Taylor's farm, northwest of Fort Gilmer, and were moving in two heavy columns upon it and the works to the left. Law's brigade of Field's division (under Colonel Bowls), which had just arrived, opened a destructive

fire on the line advancing upon the works to the left and repulsed them. The whole force was then hurled, with great impetuosity, against Fort Gilmer.

The open plateau in front gave the Confederates, in and to the left of the fort, an opportunity to pour a galling and destructive fire into the enemy's front and flank for several hundred yards before they could reach the goal at which they aimed. The negroes, as usual, were in front, and rushed forward frantically, under dread of the bayonets at their backs, shooting but seldom, and wide of their mark. Their only object seemed to be to gain the ditch, and save themselves from slaughter. The white soldiers never reached the ditch. They were repulsed, and fell back in confusion.

The total sum of the day's labor was six battle-flags, two guidons, and about five hundred prisoners, besides at least seven hundred of the enemy killed, and three thousand five hundred wounded.

General Field arrived just prior to the assault upon Fort Gilmer, and, after a careful survey of the situation, favored an attack upon Fort Harrison that evening, before the enemy could strengthen the position. But his superior officers thought it best to defer it until the next day. The sequel shows that General Field was right. Twenty-four hours elapsed, during which time the enemy greatly improved and strengthened his position. The plan determined upon was to attack at two o'clock on the evening of the 30th. Generals Anderson's, Bratton's, and Law's brigades, of Field's division, were to make the assault in front, while Hoke attacked at the same time the side next to the Bluff. By means of a ravine the latter was enabled to form within two or three hundred yards of the fort, while Field was probably three times that distance. At the expiration of a certain time, after a given signal, the assault was to commence. As soon as General Field's line moved up, on a line opposite to General Hoke, he was to advance, and the attack was to be made simultaneous. In accordance with this arrangement, the assaulting columns were put in readiness, and the signal given. In order to cause no delay, and to make sure of getting all the men out of the trenches, a short while before the time expired, General Field ordered General Anderson to move his brigade in front

of the works he then occupied, adjust his line, and make the men lie down until the other two brigades could form upon it. General Anderson failing to give his men the necessary instruction as to his object, as soon as they leaped the breast-works they rushed forward with a yell, and he was unable to control them. This necessitated rapid movement on the part of the other brigades. General Hoke, awaiting the expiration of the time, did not move forward as was designed, in concert with the brigades of Field's division, and thus the enemy was enabled to concentrate his fire upon both assaults.

The troops did not attack with their usual impetuosity. Law's brigade accomplished its object, in sweeping up the old works, retaking a redan to the left of the fort, and thus protecting our left flank. But the main attack failed. Hoke met a like repulse. Had General Field's plan to attack the evening before been adopted, in all human probability the fort would have been recaptured, and the enemy driven back across the river.

ENGAGEMENT ON THE CHARLES CITY ROAD.

On the morning of the 6th of October, the Yankee host, forty thousand strong, lay encamped on the north side of James River, the main body in the neighborhood of Fort Harrison, ten miles southeast of Richmond, the Tenth (Birney's) army corps and Kautz's cavalry being five and a half miles nearer the city, and in position between the Darbytown and Charles City roads.

With the first early light, General Geary's brigade of cavalry and a considerable force of our infantry struck the enemy's right, resting on the Charles City road, at a point from four and a half to five miles from the city. The Yankees were completely surprised, and with little resistance fled into their intrenchments, a short distance in their rear. Here they were in strong force, and prepared for a desperate resistance; but our troops, following up their first blow with great impetuosity, carried the works and drove the Yankees out, capturing nine pieces of cannon, one hundred artillery horses, and several hundred prisoners.

General Geary, by this time, had Kautz on the run, and was driving him ahead of the infantry.

Our infantry continued to press the Tenth Corps back. Our troops then pressed forward towards a second line of the enemy's intrenchments, which were carried after a sharp contest, and the enemy routed and pursued some distance towards Fort Harrison, when our men were withdrawn from the pursuit to the enemy's line of intrenchments just taken.

The enemy, in the course of an hour or two, having been rapidly reinforced from the grand army at Fort Harrison, advanced with confidence to the recapture of their former position. They were, after a long and desperate fight, repulsed with great slaughter, and as night closed in we held all the ground we had taken.

In this fight the brave and chivalrous General Gregg, commanding the Texan brigade, fell at the head of his troops, pierced through the neck by a minie ball.

ENGAGEMENT ON THE WILLIAMSBURG AND BOYDTON ROADS—
ANOTHER GRAND ATTEMPT ON RICHMOND.

On the 27th of October, General Grant moved against the Confederate right and left flank. An interval of a month had occurred since his capture of Fort Harrison, and the extension of his right to the Darbytown road. The armies of the James and the Potomac moved simultaneously.

It was soon ascertained that the Eighteenth Corps had made a detour around White Oak swamp, and was advancing in heavy columns up the Williamsburg and Nine Mile roads. The object of this movement was to find, and if possible turn, Lee's left flank. General Longstreet at once ordered General Field to take position on the Nine Mile road.

He moved the division with great celerity, and gained the Williamsburg road just in time to repel an assault and save the fort and guns immediately on the road.

On his arrival, he found that the enemy's heaviest force was massed upon that road, and that would be the point of main attack.

Two or three brigades of negroes had been sent up the Nine

Mile road, and had charged and carried the works, and captured one piece of artillery, just as the Hampton Legion, of Geary's cavalry, was going into position. But the Twenty-fourth Virginia cavalry coming up, they, in conjunction with the legion, charged and regained the works and artillery, and drove the negroes back with heavy slaughter.

Severe skirmishing and artillery duels were being waged on the Darbytown and Charles City roads; and one or two determined assaults had been made upon Hoke's line, but had been handsomely repulsed.

In the mean time, the enemy had planted two heavy field-batteries near the Williamsburg road, and were shelling our works most furiously. Their artillery was handled with great skill and precision. Our batteries did not respond, because they desired to hold their fire for the advance of the infantry. Their silence misled the enemy. Soon a line of battle debouched from the woods on the left of the Williamsburg road, evidently bent upon the capture of the fort. This time the negroes were in the rear, perhaps because the white soldiers, believing that the fort and its guns were but feebly manned, expected to make easy and quick work of it, and get all the glory. In this they were disastrously deceived. They had to advance through an open and level field for half a mile. The fort opened upon them with grape and canister; and when within five hundred yards, Anderson's, the Texas, and Bratton's brigades poured terrible volleys of minies from their Enfield rifles into their wavering ranks; and by the time they arrived within two hundred yards, the fire from the artillery and musketry had become so destructive that they broke in every direction, and were charged by our skirmishers. The result, in addition to one hundred dead and many wounded, was the capture of 500 prisoners.

On the Boydton plank-road the day had been no less decisive. The main attack of the enemy here was directed against the Southside Railroad. The enemy was encountered here by three brigades under General Mahone in front, and General Hampton in the rear. Mahone captured four hundred prisoners, three stand of colors, and six pieces of artillery. The latter could not be brought off, the enemy having possession of the bridge.

In the attack subsequently made by the enemy, General Mahone broke three lines of battle, and during the night the enemy retreated from the Boydton road, leaving his wounded and more than two hundred and fifty dead on the field.*

Thus failed, almost shamefully, Grant's ambitious movement of October. It had been easily repulsed at all points. There is no doubt that Grant had designed, at this season, an "On to Richmond," which was to electrify the North and carry for Lincoln the approaching Presidential election, only a few days distant. But he had utterly failed to respond to the "electoral necessity" at Washington; although it must be admitted that events, to which we shall presently refer, in other parts of Virginia, had amply supplied it, and adorned the Yankee arms with no mean success.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA.

These Yankee successes were to occur in a quarter where they were least expected—in the Valley of Virginia, a district heretofore illuminated by brilliant Confederate victories, and associated with heroic names.

Early's army in the Valley, first designed to threaten Washington, and to do a not less important service in saving the harvests of the Shenandoah, had become, in other respects, a most necessary part of General Lee's combination to protect Richmond.

Of the four railroads which enter Richmond, two—the Fredericksburg and the York River railroads—had become of but little account; they drained a country already exhausted. But the Gordonsville road, connecting Richmond with the fertile

* In the series of engagements on the Richmond lines just narrated, Field's division had borne a conspicuous part, and deserves a distinct mention. A correspondent wrote: "For thirty days this division has stood at the gates of the capital against overwhelming odds; and, almost unaided, has beaten back, with sad havoc, five of Grant's grand 'Ons to Richmond.' It has lost, in killed, wounded, and missing, about twelve hundred men; and yet is stronger to-day than it was a month ago. It has killed more than one thousand of the enemy, wounded five times that number, captured over 1,200 prisoners, several hundred stands of arms, five guidons, and fifteen battle-flags."

Valley of the Shenandoah, was of great importance. It was a part of Early's mission to guard this communication, but a more important part of that mission was to cover the approach to Lynchburg. After the occupation of the Weldon road by Grant, the safety of Lynchburg became absolutely essential to the maintenance by Lee of any defensive position in Virginia. For Lynchburg was then the key to all the communications left to his army; and if once captured by the Yankee forces and made a military station, it could be held by a small army, and made the centre of a new system of operations on the west side of Richmond.

On the 8th of August, General Sheridan was placed in command of what was called the Middle Military Division, superseding General Hunter, his force consisting at that time of the Sixth, Eighth, and Nineteenth Corps, together with Crook's, Averill's, and Kelly's commands. On receiving his command, Sheridan established his headquarters at Harper's Ferry.

Concentrating his troops at once along the Potomac, in the immediate vicinity of the Shenandoah Valley, whither General Early, now in command of the Confederate forces, had withdrawn, Sheridan gradually advanced upon the important positions of Martinsburg, Williamsport, etc., garrisoning these as fast as they were relinquished, and establishing complete and prompt communications between his headquarters and the advanced posts. Early fell back gradually, for the purpose of luring Sheridan on. As Early retired, Sheridan took the opportunity of seizing and securing Winchester on the 12th of August, throwing out a cavalry detachment to Front Royal. This accomplished, he fell back in turn, abandoning Winchester, and awaiting at Harper's Ferry and its vicinity the concentration of his forces.

On the 18th of September, General Early, with comparatively a small force, was confronting Sheridan north of Winchester. Sheridan attacked him on Opequan Creek, and captured fifty men belonging to the Eighth South Carolina regiment, who were on picket. Immediately Sheridan telegraphed to Stanton, "I have captured one entire regiment, officers included."

BATTLE NEAR WINCHESTER.

On the morning of the 19th of September, the enemy advanced upon Winchester, near which place General Early met his attack. About daylight the enemy advanced, by the Berryville road, on Ramseur, who was posted at the Spout Spring, on the same road, some four miles east of Winchester. General Gordon was at Bunker Hill, twelve miles from Winchester, and ten miles from Martinsburg, on a reconnoissance. General Rhodes was at Hopewell Church, near Whitehall, to the left of the Martinsburg road, and about eight miles below Winchester. Gordon commenced moving back to the point of attack about daylight, and Rhodes moved in the same direction about seven o'clock. Wharton, meanwhile, remained on the extreme left, on the Martinsburg road, a short distance below Winchester. Between ten and eleven o'clock all of our troops were in position on the field, our line facing towards the east, the enemy's towards the west. The situation was as follows: Ramseur's troops stretched from Abraham Creek to the Berryville pike; Rhodes had taken position between Ramseur and Gordon; and Wharton, as above stated, held the left. The battle now raged heavily, and bore strongly towards our left. It was about half-past twelve when General Rhodes, while placing a battery in the gap between himself and Gordon, was struck in the head by a ball, and borne from the field. He was carried to Winchester, where he died in about half an hour after reaching the place.

In some battles there is a marked crisis, when the fortune of the day is visibly and instantly decided. As the enemy pressed forward in the attack, a brigade, in Grover's division of the Nineteenth Corps, was forced to retire; another was thrown into confusion, and the entire left of the division subsequently gave way. A Confederate battery opened upon the flying troops. Their shells, descending among the broken columns of Grover, demoralized and shattered them still more. The entire infantry of the Confederates charged in turn, pouring in severe and rapid volleys towards the point of breakage.

"The moment," says a Yankee correspondent, "was a fearful

one. Such a sight rarely occurs more than once in any battle, as was presented on the open space between two pieces of woodland, into which the cheering enemy poured, in their eagerness. Their whole line, reckless of bullets, reckless even of the shells of our batteries, constantly advanced. Captain Steven's battery, posted immediately in their front, poured its fire unflinchingly into their columns to the last. The men of the battery kept it at work in the face of the foe, who advanced at least within two hundred yards of the muzzles of the guns. General Rickett's division, pressed heavily in flank, gradually broke, and commenced falling back. General Getty's division, on the left, partially fell back likewise. The day, had such a situation been suffered to continue fifteen minutes longer, would certainly have been lost to us."

The enemy ordered up his reserves in the rear of his broken centre. His columns were gradually reformed, and the battle raged with renewed fury.

The Yankees now continued to push their line around our left, and about four o'clock in the afternoon, their cavalry, on the extreme right, made a charge upon our cavalry, completely routing it. Up to this time the battle had been progressing very favorably; but the stampede of our cavalry enabled the enemy to pass on our flank and in our rear, and made it necessary for our infantry to fall back, which it did, reaching Winchester about sundown. The same evening our whole army retired to Newtown, and the next morning to Fisher's Hill. This position, pronounced by military men to be the strongest in the Valley, was eighteen miles from Winchester, and seventy-two from Staunton. It was overlooked, from the east, by the Massanutton Mountain, from which it was separated by the north branch of the Shenandoah River, while on the west it was protected by the North Mountain, and along its front base flowed a small branch called Cumberland Run.

The disaster of this defeat was painfully recognized by the Confederate public. In the fight, General Early lost three thousand men, from all causes, and three cannon. The misbehavior of our cavalry was an especial subject of mortification. It had undoubtedly lost the day. Though outnumbered four to one our troops had met the attack nobly, and actually beat Sheridan's infantry, and were driving them back at all points,

when our cavalry, who were relied upon to protect our flanks, gave way on our right. The enemy's cavalry immediately assaulted the right of our victorious columns, and the fortunes of the day were changed, and a defeat of the Confederates ensued. Yet it was at least hoped that Early would be able to hold the immensely strong position of Fisher's Hill against all comers, and that there the tide of disaster would be stayed. But in this the Confederate public was to be infinitely disappointed.

THE BATTLE OF FISHER'S HILL.

On the 22d of September, Sheridan brought up his entire force to assault the strong position of the Confederates on Fisher's Hill. The works were too formidable to be carried by an attack in front alone, and therefore, while keeping up a feint of a front attack, the Eighth Corps was sent far to the right, and, sweeping about Early's left, flanked him, and attacked him in the rear, driving him out of his intrenchments; while the Sixth Corps attacked at the same time in the centre, front, and the Nineteenth Corps on the left. Confused and disorganized by attacks at so many different points, the Confederates broke at the centre, and fled, in disorganization, towards Woodstock. Artillery, horses, wagons, rifles, knapsacks, and canteens were abandoned, and strewn along the road. Several hundred prisoners and twelve pieces of artillery were captured. The pursuit was continued until the 25th, and did not conclude until Early had been driven below Port Republic.

This second most unexpected reverse of Early was the occasion of no little despondency in Richmond. The total of his losses in men and material was considerable; and although the story of the Yankees, that in one week ten thousand of his men had been put out of combat, was absurdly false, enough was known in Richmond of the extent of the disaster to occasion the most serious misgivings and alarm. The harvests of the Shenandoah Valley had been lost; the most productive districts of Virginia were opened to the waste of the enemy; and the second capture of Staunton, that was to ensue, was to be the signal of another alarm for the safety of Lynchburg.

While Sheridan made his headquarters at Port Republic, he sent his cavalry, under Torbert, forward to Staunton; which place they captured, and destroyed all the storehouses, machine-shops, and other buildings, owned or occupied by the Confederate government, and also the saddles, small-arms, hard-bread, and other military stores found in the place. They then proceeded to Waynesboro', also on the Virginia Central Railroad; tore up seven miles of the railroad track, destroyed the depot, the iron bridge over the Shenandoah, a government tannery, and other stores. General Sheridan also improved the time of holding possession of the Shenandoah Valley to destroy all the grain, hay and forage to be found there, excepting what was necessary for the subsistence of his own army. The whole valley being thus devastated, General Sheridan moved leisurely northward, and on the 6th of October made his headquarters at Woodstock. South of this point over two thousand barns filled with wheat and hay, and over seventy mills stocked with wheat and flour had been destroyed; and a vast herd of stock, and more than three thousand sheep had been reserved for the supply of the army. The Luray Valley, as well as the Little Fort Valley, were subjected to the same devastation. In the marauding expedition into the former valley, sixty-five hundred head of cattle, and five hundred horses were captured, and thirty-two large flouring mills, thirty distilleries, four blast-furnaces, and over fifty barns were destroyed.

The horror and crime of this devastation was remarkable even in Yankee warfare. They impoverished a whole population; they reduced women and children to beggary and starvation; they left the black monuments of Yankee atrocity all the way from the Blue Ridge to the North Mountain. It is remarkable that the worst of Yankee atrocities were always done in the intoxication of unexpected success, when no longer the fears of previous disasters held in check their cruel cowardice, and intimidated their native ferocity.

On the 9th of October, Sheridan had an affair with Rosser's cavalry, which had hung on his rear. One division of the Yankee cavalry charged along the Strasburg pike, while another, moving by a back road, took Rosser in flank. Sheridan claimed in this affair to have taken eleven pieces of artillery, and over three hundred prisoners. He wrote to the

War Department, at Washington, a dispatch in which profanity and slang marked his lively sense of victory. He had "finished 'the Savior of the Valley,'" and the worsted Confederates he had pursued "*on the jump*" for twenty-six miles.

THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK.

The most important battle of the campaign in the Valley was yet to take place.

On the 18th of October, Early lay at Fisher's Hill with two corps of Sheridan's army in his front, on the north side of Cedar Creek. Another corps, the Sixth, was between Middletown and Newtown. Sheridan himself was at Winchester, and his cavalry a little withdrawn from the front. The two corps on Cedar Creek were heavily fortified on the left (looking towards Middletown) of the turnpike, but their works on the right of the road were complete.

This being the situation, Early determined to attack and, if possible, to surprise the force at Cedar Creek. Accordingly, at nightfall of the 18th, he marched out of his works at Fisher's Hill to the stone bridge which crosses the little stream at the foot of the hill. Here his army was divided, the larger column moving to the right of the turnpike, the lesser to the left—the object being simultaneous attack on both flanks of the enemy. In order to flank the enemy's works on the right of the road, it was necessary to move the larger column through a narrow pass in the mountains, where two men could not walk abreast. Thus, marching in single file, the whole night was consumed before the large column found itself in a proper position to make the attack. Seven miles of rugged country was to be marched along the mountain side, and down hills so steep that horses could hardly travel, the men holding by bushes, and moving in single rank. The Shenandoah had to be crossed twice, the last time in the face of the enemy's pickets. Canteens had been left at camp, and the men required to keep silent.

Everybody was up to time; every thing ready. Payne charged across the river, driving in the pickets at a gallop, and pressing in the direction of Sheridan's headquarters, and

towards Middletown. The infantry was then rushed across, Gordon's division in front, next Ramseur's—Pegram's in reserve. Nothing was to be done but close up ranks, face to the front, and fight *rapidly*. The firing began at all points, Kershaw charging in front, and with great success.

The enemy was struck by a fatal and terrible surprise. The Eighth and Nineteenth Corps were entirely routed. Great numbers of the Yankees were slain in their camps. Eighteen pieces of artillery were captured, fifteen hundred prisoners, small arms without number, wagons and camps, every thing on the ground. Two-thirds of Sheridan's army was routed; nothing was left to cover their disorderly retreat but the Sixth Corps and their cavalry, which had not as yet been brought into action. It was now ten in the morning. Had our victorious forces pressed on in hot and vigorous pursuit and struck the Sixth Corps, they would have involved the whole of Sheridan's army in complete rout, and achieved one of the most magnificent successes of the war.

But our troops stopped. There was no more rushing, no more charging. They had betaken themselves to plundering the enemy's camp; demoralization was fast ensuing; the fire and flush of their victorious charge was quenched; the fighting was now at long range; the infantry was pushed forward at a snail's pace; there was no longer any ardor or enthusiasm.

For four or five hours there was comparative quiet; the Confederates ranging the camps of the enemy for plunder, and taking no further notice of his forces in the distance, beyond some skirmishing and desultory firing.

The enemy, in the mean time, were not idle. Sheridan had slept at Winchester the previous night, but, hearing the cannonade in the morning, he took his horse and pushed on towards Strasburg at full gallop, arriving on the field at ten o'clock A. M., just as the army had taken up its position north of Middletown. On his way he had met the throng of wounded and stragglers. He immediately ordered a new line of battle: the Nineteenth Corps on the right, the Sixth in the centre, and the recovered Eighth Corps on the left. Custer's cavalry was on the extreme right, and Merritt's on the left. At three o'clock Sheridan assumed the offensive, and attacked with vigor.

Gordon's division, notwithstanding his efforts, soon broke. Kershaw's and Ramseur's divisions were fighting well, but soon followed the example of Gordon's division. Five or six guns in the rear were immediately driven back when the line broke, and placed on a high hill, where, with no aid from the infantry, who were flying in every direction, they kept the enemy at bay for an hour or more. Having exhausted their ammunition, they were compelled to withdraw.

By this time Wharton's and Pegram's men had caught the panic, and the field became covered with flying men. The artillery retired, firing slowly, and sustained only by Pegram's old brigade and Evans' brigade. After the creek was crossed, Pegram's and Evans' brigades participated in the demoralization—the road was filled with fugitives. The enemy's cavalry charged again in the rear of our train, and not a gun was fired in its defence. Many ordnance and medical stores, and twenty-three pieces of artillery, besides those taken by us in the morning, were captured.

It was a shameful rout. Our troops behaved as they never behaved before. Our loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was, perhaps, not greater than three thousand; but the route of the retreat was strewn with abandoned wagons, ambulances, and small arms thrown away by the panic-stricken fugitives. Early had lost nearly all of his artillery. He had, in fact, received a stunning defeat from which his army never recovered.*

* The following address of General Early to his troops, on the occasion of this disaster, testifies to its causes, and is one of the most candid and memorable papers of the war :

HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT, October 22, 1864.

Soldiers of the Army of the Valley :

I had hoped to have congratulated you on the splendid victory won by you on the morning of the 19th, at Belle Grove, on Cedar Creek, when you surprised and routed two corps of Sheridan's army, and drove back several miles the remaining corps, capturing eighteen pieces of artillery, one thousand five hundred prisoners, a number of colors, a large quantity of small arms, and many wagons and ambulances, with the entire camps of the two routed corps; but I have the mortification of announcing to you that, by your subsequent misconduct, all the benefits of that victory were lost, and a serious disaster incurred. Had you remained steadfast to your duty and your colors, the vic-

From this point the Valley campaign ceased to engage much of the public attention ; and with the withdrawal of the bulk of the opposing forces to the Richmond lines, the interest in military events was again transferred to that quarter.

For six weeks after the battle of Cedar Creek, there were occasional skirmishes of greater or less severity between Tor-

tory would have been one of the most brilliant and decisive of the war ; you would have gloriously retrieved the reverses at Winchester and Fisher's Hill, and entitled yourselves to the admiration and gratitude of your country. But many of you, including some commissioned officers, yielding to a disgraceful propensity for plunder, deserted your colors to appropriate to yourselves the abandoned property of the enemy ; and, subsequently, those who had previously remained at their posts, seeing their ranks thinned by the absence of the plunderers, when the enemy, late in the afternoon, with his shattered columns, made but a feeble effort to retrieve the fortunes of the day, yielded to a needless panic, and fled the field in confusion, thereby converting a splendid victory into a disaster.

Had any respectable number of you listened to the appeals made to you, and made a stand, even at the last moment, the disaster would have been averted, and the substantial fruits of victory secured. But under the insane dread of being flanked, and a panic-stricken terror of the enemy's cavalry, you would listen to no appeal, threat, or order, and allowed a small body of cavalry to penetrate to our train, and carry off a number of pieces of artillery and wagons which your disorder left unprotected. You have thus obscured the glorious fame won in conjunction with the gallant men of the Army of Northern Virginia, who still remain proudly defiant in the trenches around Richmond and Petersburg. Before you can again claim them as comrades, you will have to erase from your escutcheons the blemishes which now obscure them. And this you can do if you will but be true to your former reputation, your country, and your homes. You who have fought at Manassas, Richmond, Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and from the Wilderness to the banks of James River ; and especially you who were with the immortal Jackson in all his triumphs are capable of better things.

Arouse yourselves, then, to a sense of your manhood, and appreciation of the sacred cause in which you are engaged ! Yield to the mandates of discipline ; resolve to stand by your colors in future at all hazards, and you can yet retrieve your reputation, and strike effective blows for your country and the cause. Let every man spurn from him the vile plunder gathered on the field of the 19th ; and let no man, whatever his rank, whether combatant or non-combatant, dare exhibit his spoils of that day. They will be badges of his dishonor ; the insignia of his disgrace. The officer who pauses in the career of victory to place a guard over a sutler's wagon, for his private use, is as bad as the soldier who halts to secure for himself the abandoned clothing or money of a flying foe ; and they both soil the honor of the army, and the blood of their country for a paltry price. He who follows his colors into the ranks of the enemy in pursuit of victory, disdaining the miserable passion for gathering booty, comes out of the battle with his honor untarnished ; and though bare-

bert's cavalry, or some portion of it, and the Confederate cavalry officers Rosser and Lomax; but Early, though moving uneasily up and down the Valley from Mount Jackson or New Market to Fisher's Hill, carefully avoided any thing like a general engagement, and in December sent a part of his forces to strengthen General Lee.

SOUTHWESTERN VIRGINIA.

In Southwestern Virginia, during the period we have traversed and the early winter of 1864, there was a desultory campaign, to which we should briefly refer.

footed and ragged, is far more to be envied than he that is laden with rich spoils gathered in the trail of his victorious comrades. There were some exceptions to the general misconduct on the afternoon of the 19th, but it would be difficult to specify them all. Let those who did their duty be satisfied with the consciousness of having done it, and mourn that their efforts were paralyzed by the misbehavior of others. Let them be consoled, to some extent, by the reflection that the enemy has nothing to boast of on his part.

The artillery and wagons taken were not won by his valor. His camps were destroyed; his army terribly shattered and demoralized; his losses far heavier than ours, even in proportion to the relative strength of the armies; his plans materially impeded; and he was unable to pursue by reason of his crippled condition. Soldiers of the Army of the Valley, I do not speak to you in anger; I wish to speak in kindness, though in sorrow. My purpose is to show you the cause of our late misfortune, and point out the way to avoid similar ones in future, and insure success to our arms. Success can only be secured by the enforcement and observance of the most rigid discipline. Officers, whatever their rank, must not only give orders, but set the example of obeying them, and the men must follow that example.

Fellow-soldiers, I am ready to lead you again in defence of our common cause; and I appeal to you by the remembrance of the glorious career in which you have formerly participated, by the woes of your bleeding country, the ruined homes and devastated fields you see around you, the cries of anguish which come up from the widows and orphans of your dead comrades, the horrors which await you and all that is yours in the future, if your country is subjugated, and your hopes of freedom for yourselves and your posterity, to render a cheerful and willing obedience to the rules of discipline, and to shoulder your musket again with the determination never more to turn your backs upon the foe, but to do battle like men and soldiers until the last vestige of the footsteps of our barbarous and cruel enemies is erased from the soil they desecrate, and the independence of our country is firmly established. If you will do this, and rely upon the protecting care of a just and merciful God, all will be well; you will again be what you once were, and I will be proud to lead you once more to battle.

J. A. EARLY, Lieutenant-General.

On the 2d of October, General Breckinridge, who had relieved Echols in Southwestern Virginia, encountered Burbridge, who was advancing on the salt-works at Saltville, Virginia, and on the banks of the Holtston River defeated him, giving him a severe lesson. In November, Breckinridge, having joined Vaughn in East Tennessee, defeated the Yankee General Gillem, at Morristown, taking four hundred prisoners; and on the 18th of the month, engaged and defeated the enemy again at Strawberry Plains.

On the 20th of December, the salt-works at Saltville were captured by the Yankees, who in the early part of the month had been raiding on the Tennessee road. Our forces there were attacked by the whole force of Burbridge, numbering about five thousand. The fight was kept up all the evening, mainly with artillery, our forces being commanded by Colonel Preston, and numbering, it is said, not more than three hundred and fifty. When night fell they still held their own; but, under cover of the darkness, the Yankees succeeded in reaching Fort Breckinridge, one of the main defences of the place, in overpowering numbers, and captured it. Colonel Preston, deeming it impracticable to hold the works longer, then ordered the evacuation. The works were fired the next morning. The Yankees did not remain long, and left for East Tennessee. At Abingdon, they destroyed two entire blocks of buildings.

CHAPTER VII.

Mr. Lincoln's extraordinary triumph.—Reassembling of the Richmond Congress.—President Davis' review of the situation.—A memorable boast.—New demands of the Confederate conscription.—Military resources of the North and South compared.—Plethoric wealth of the North.—“Twenty against one.”—Two advantages the South had in the war.—Its conditions of success.—The value of *endurance* on the part of the South.—THE HOOD-SHERMAN CAMPAIGN.—Speeches at headquarters.—Hood commences his march.—Capture of Dalton.—Sherman follows as far as Gaylesville.—He turns back.—Georgia and South Carolina “at his mercy.”—An extraordinary campaign.—Hood and Sherman marching away from each other.—Hood crosses into Tennessee.—The Yankee retreat to Franklin.—THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN.—Great loss in Confederate officers.—The enemy retreats to Nashville.—BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.—The giving way of Bates' division.—A shameful stampede.—Hood's losses.—The whole scheme of Confederate defence west of the Alleghanies broken down.—The errors of Hood's campaign.

WE have already stated that the military successes of the two or three preceding months secured the re-election of President Lincoln on the 5th of November. His re-election was singularly triumphant. General McClellan received only the electoral vote of Delaware (3), Kentucky (11), and New Jersey (7), 21 in all. Mr. Lincoln received that of the remaining 22 States, 213 in all. Mr. Lincoln had the vote of all the States which he received in 1860, with the exception of the half vote of New Jersey, which was cast for him in consequence of a division in the opposition party. Besides these, he received the 7 electoral votes of Maryland, which in 1860 were cast for Mr. Breckinridge; the 11 votes of Missouri, cast for Douglas; and the 11 votes of the new States of Kansas, West Virginia, and Nevada. In the States which voted at this election, there was in 1860 a popular majority of about 100,000 against Mr. Lincoln; the popular majority in his favor now was about 300,000.

A few days before this election, the Confederate Congress had reassembled in Richmond. The message of President Davis opened with an ingenious review of the campaign of 1864. “At the beginning of the year,” he said, “Texas was partially in the possession of the enemy; now no Federal soldiers

were in the State, except as prisoners. In Northwestern Louisiana, a large Federal army and fleet had been defeated, and had only escaped with a loss of one-third of its numbers, and a large part of its munitions and vessels. Arkansas had been nearly recovered; and the Confederate forces had penetrated into Missouri. On the east of the Mississippi, in spite of some reverses, the Confederates had been on the whole successful; Northern and Western Mississippi, Northern Alabama, and Western Tennessee were in their possession. On the seacoast, the successes of the Federals had been confined to the capture of the outer defences of Mobile Bay. Their armies had been defeated in different parts of Virginia; and after a series of defeats around Richmond, they were still engaged in the effort, commenced four months before, to capture Petersburg. The army of Sherman, though it had captured Atlanta, had gained no real advantage beyond the possession of a few fortified points which could be held only by large garrisons, and were menaced with recapture."

President Davis concluded his review with a memorable boast. "The Confederacy," he declared, "*had no vital points*. If Richmond, and Wilmington, and Charleston, and Savannah, and Mobile were all captured, the Confederacy would remain as defiant as ever, and no peace would be made which did not recognize its independence."

The Confederate President, while professing to see no cause for despondency in the military situation, took occasion to recommend the repeal of all laws granting exemption from military service. He said that "no position or pursuit should relieve any one who is able to do active duty from the enrolment in the army," unless he could be more useful in another sphere, and this could not be the case with entire classes. The military authorities should have the power to exempt individuals only, whose services may be more valuable in than out of the army. In regard to the question of the employment of slaves in the army, Mr. Davis recommended that slaves to the number of 40,000 should be "acquired" by the general government, who should be employed not merely as ordinary laborers, cooks, and teamsters, but as engineer and pioneer laborers. He recommended that these slaves should be liberated on their discharge, after faithful service, rather than that

they should be manumitted at once, or retained in servitude. He was opposed, under present circumstances, to arming the slaves; but he added: "The subject is to be viewed solely in the light of policy and our social economy. Should the alternative ever be presented of subjugation or of the employment of the slave as a soldier, there seems to be no reason to doubt what then should be our decision."

We have, at different periods in the history of the war, instituted a comparison between the material resources of the belligerents. They were terribly unequal at this period. Mr. Lincoln, in his message to Congress, referred to a fact which could not be denied: that the steady expansion of population, improvement, and governmental institutions over the new and unoccupied portion of the North had scarcely been checked, much less impeded or destroyed by the war. New and immense resources had been recently developed by the enemy; and it seemed, indeed, that providential circumstances had come to his aid in the war. The discovery and development of petroleum had added immensely to the national wealth, and it was calculated that in a few years it would become an article of export to the extent of one hundred and fifty millions of dollars. Mineral resources, almost fabulous, had been brought to light. What once seemed a barren and uninhabitable waste, between the Atlantic States and those which had grown up on the Pacific Ocean, had proved a new El Dorado. It was estimated that the products of the mines of gold, silver, and cinnabar in that region had, in the past year, exceeded one hundred millions of dollars. It was discovered that a vast belt of some one or two hundred miles in width and eight or nine hundred in length, embracing portions of Idaho, Nevada, and Arizona, was rich in silver ore. The North had become suddenly plethoric with wealth; and for men and material for the purposes of war, it had the whole world to draw upon.

A Yankee newspaper said: "We have now over twenty-six millions of people within the Union lines, against less than five millions (over one-half negro slaves) within the lines of Davis. All things considered, the actual, positive available strength of Lincoln against Davis is more than twenty against one. The war, then, should be, at the furthest, brought to an end

within six months, and with becoming energy on the part of the administration it might be finished in three."

But there was one element which the newspaper did not take into its calculation; and which, despite the almost appalling disparity of resources between the belligerents, insured, *on certain conditions*, the final success of the South. It was the vast extent of territory which the North proposed to subjugate, and which never yet, in the history of wars, was brought to such a fate, on the single condition that its people remained firm in their resolution and purpose. Against the inequality of resources between the North and the South, we may put these considerations, in which the latter had immense advantages: that the South was fighting on the defensive, and had, therefore, no need of positive victories; that she only sought a negative conclusion, and might win by endurance; and that her territory was so extensive that it would take several millions of men to garrison it, as long as its people were firmly disposed to dispute the authority of the invaders.

With reflecting persons in the North, the real question touching the war had come to be the measure of Southern endurance; and this virtue had obtained a new and vital value in the stages through which the war was now passing. It was fashionable for Yankees to laugh at Confederate expectations of political revolutions or financial rupture in the North; they concluded that the time was past when the Confederates could expect to win their independence by a grand military *coup* or force of military successes. All these calculations were lightly or insolently regarded by Northern men. Their real anxiety was, the measure of endurance on the part of the South. The great curiosity of Northern politicians was as to the real spirit of the South, and the questions of thinking men among them invariably went to the point of the probable term of Southern endurance. This quality had assumed a new value in Northern eyes. It had become morally certain that by force of it alone the South would obtain her independence. Such was the silent but general concession of the Northern mind. There was but one condition to assure the independence of the South: that the spirit of the people and the army would not break by some unworthy impatience, or not be deliberately broken down by

insane persistence in folly on the part of Davis and his clique of toadies and encouragers.

There were two parties in the North, perhaps equally intelligent, and each claiming to draw their opinions from Southern sources of information, which differed as to the real spirit of the South: one claiming that it was resolute, and even in the last necessity desperate; the other contending that it was fast being broken by reverses, and would end in submission. One found this question in every circle in the North. Reliable information upon it was far more valuable to the Washington Government than maps of all the fortifications in the Confederate States. To convince the North of the spirit of the Southern people was more important than half-a-dozen victories; for it was to convince them of the hopelessness of war, and to put before their eyes the immediate necessity of conscription.

President Davis said rightly that the Confederacy "had no vital points;" but the declaration implied *the condition that the spirit of the people, despite of temporary disasters, was to remain erect and unbroken*. And a period of the war was now approaching when precisely that condition was to be tested, and the spirit of the people of the Confederacy was to be tried, as it had never before been, by the fire and sword of the invader. To the events of this remarkable period we must now draw the attention of the reader.

THE HOOD-SHERMAN CAMPAIGN.

The public did not have long to wait for the development of that curious strategy which President Davis had planned with Hood for the compensation of the loss of Atlanta. Indeed, no secret was made of its general movement and designs.

On the 18th of September, President Davis arrived at General Hood's headquarters, and the following day reviewed the whole army. In the evening, the President addressed the soldiers in hopeful and encouraging tones. Turning to Cheatam's division of Tennesseans, he said: "Be of good cheer, for within a short while your faces will be turned homeward, and your feet pressing Tennessee soil."

General Hood was enthusiastically called for. He said:

"Soldiers, it is not my province to make speeches : I was not born for such work ; that I leave to other men. Within a few days I expect to give the command 'Forward !' and I believe you are, like myself, willing to go forward, even if we live on parched corn and beef. I am ready to give the command 'Forward !' this very night. Good-night."

On the 29th of September, Hood began his march, getting well in the rear of Sherman, and next day encamping near the old battle-ground of New Hope Church. His first movement attracted but little attention. The incautious language of President Davis first led the enemy to suppose that this movement was preliminary to something more extensive, and General Sherman's suspicions also were apparently aroused by it ; for we find him about this time sending his spare forces to the rear, under General Thomas, and distributing strong detachments, under Newton, Corse, and Schofield, at different points immediately in the rear of Atlanta. He also ordered frequent reconnoissances of the enemy in his position near Newnan. The Yankee cavalry reported, on September 27, further movements of Hood towards the Chattahoochee. On October 1, Generals Fuller and Ransom made a reconnoissance towards Newnan, and discovered that the Confederates had crossed the Chattahoochee River on September 29 and 30, and had concentrated in the vicinity of Powder Springs, Ga. On the 3d of October, General Sherman, with the bulk of his army, moved in pursuit, vowing his intention to destroy Hood.

On the 5th of October, when Hood's advance assaulted Allatoona, Sherman was on Kenesaw Mountain, signalling to the garrison at Allatoona, over the heads of the Confederates, to hold out until he relieved them. Hood moved westward, and crossing the Etowah and Oostanaula rivers by forced marches, attacked Dalton on the 12th, which was surrendered.

After obstructing Snake Creek Gap as much as possible, in order to delay Sherman, who continued to press him, Hood moved west, passing through the gap of Pigeon Mountain, and entered Lafayette on the 15th of October. He had now advanced as far north as it was thought possible to do without fighting, and a battle appeared to be imminent in the vicinity of the old battle field of Chickamauga. But Hood, after holding the gaps of Pigeon Mountain as long as possible, suddenly

moved south from Lafayette to Gadsden, Alabama, closely followed as far as Gaylesville by General Sherman. This movement was looked upon as a retreat, and as the end of the great raid of which Hood and Davis had promised and boasted so much. But it soon became apparent that Hood was not yet at the end of his strategy, and that the campaign was only about to begin in earnest.

On October 23, Hood moved from Gadsden, through Look-out Mountain, towards Gunter's Landing and Decatur, on the Tennessee River, near the last of which places he formed a junction with a portion of General Dick Taylor's army, which had meantime quietly moved up the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to Corinth, and thence to Tusculumbia, the new base of supplies. He thus placed himself far in General Sherman's rear before that officer could take steps to transfer his army to the new front of the Confederates on the Tennessee. Hood's advance had probably reached the Tennessee before Sherman positively knew that he had abandoned Gadsden. Undoubtedly it was much to his surprise when, on October 25, he tried the gap and found it abandoned by Hood. The position was certainly startling. He dared not follow, thus abandoning his line of supplies to venture in a mountainous country, through which a large army had just passed. It was impossible to transfer his entire army to Hood's front in time to meet him and thus hold his communications intact. The position demanded resolution and action.

General Sherman seems here to have comprehended Hood's designs. On the junction of Taylor's army with him, he reasoned that the two would strike a blow for the recovery of Middle Tennessee; and, if successful, then for East Tennessee also. But he calculated that Tennessee would be safe in charge of General Thomas, to whom he could assign a force sufficient to grapple with Hood, Taylor, or Beauregard; while for himself he had projected another campaign. Turning eastward, then, from Gaylesville, he announced to his army that he should follow Hood no longer, but let him go north as far as he pleased. "If he will go to the river," he said, "I will give him his rations." Giving his instructions to General Thomas, and dividing his army so as to spare him a part of the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio, he moved

southeast towards Atlanta by the 1st of November, causing the railroad track to be removed from Atlanta to Chattanooga, and sent to the latter city. On the 4th of November, he began his preparations for his new movement; and the same day telegraphed his intentions to Washington, in the following words: "Hood has crossed the Tennessee. Thomas will take care of him and Nashville, while Schofield will not let him into Chattanooga or Knoxville. Georgia and South Carolina are at my mercy—and I shall strike. Do not be anxious about me. I am all right." The campaign he had projected was neither more nor less than this: with the four corps, and the cavalry force still under his immediate command, an army of not far from sixty thousand infantry and artillery, and about five thousand cavalry, he purposed, cutting loose from all bases, and constituting a strictly movable column, with thirty or forty days' rations, and his train reduced to the smallest possible dimensions, to move southeastward, through the heart of the country, upon Savannah; and thence, should circumstances favor, northward through South Carolina and North Carolina, to compel the surrender or evacuation of Richmond.

And now commenced one of the most extraordinary campaigns of any war—presenting the singular spectacle of two great antagonistic chieftains *both* at once acting on the offensive, day after day marching away from each other, and moving diametrically apart.

On the 20th of November, General Hood commenced to move his army from Northern Alabama to Tennessee. His line of march from Florence followed two parallel roads to the chief town of Wayne County, in Tennessee—Waynesboro'. Simultaneously with this advance, the Yankees evacuated or surrendered Decatur and Huntsville. The Fourth Army Corps, under General Stanley, two divisions of the Twenty-third Corps, under General Schofield, and an aggregation of fort-garrisons from the surrounding country, under General Richard W. Johnson, concentrated at Pulaski. Hood, immediately after his arrival at Waynesboro', changed front to the northwest; and, while marching directly upon Columbia, threatened, with Forrest's cavalry, to cut off the Yankee retreat from Pulaski. That position, about to be flanked, was at once abandoned. Schofield, with the force that had been con-

centrated there, retreated on the 23d ; and, while his cavalry were being pressed in upon his rear by those of Hood, attempted, by a forced march, to reach Columbia. Forrest had, however, fallen upon the Yankee base, and, having forced them back rapidly, had advanced within four miles of Columbia. Schofield's infantry had, however, come up in time to save the place from capture, and to hold back the Confederates until the works covering the place had been made impassable by a *chevaux de frize* of Yankee bayonets.

Hood's infantry marched on. On the 25th, they had commenced a movement for flanking Columbia on the eastward, in conjunction with an attempt of Forrest to cut that place off from railroad communication with Nashville. Under heavy skirmishing and cannonading, Forrest succeeded in extending his flank to Duck River, and in throwing a large force of his cavalry to the opposite bank. The Confederate infantry, filing at the same time around the place on the east, the state of affairs became critical, and compelled Schofield to fall back hurriedly, with a loss of stores, on the night of the 26th.

The retreat to Franklin was one of constant fighting. Skirmishing of the very heaviest and deadliest character was maintained all the way. Forrest hung like a raging tiger upon the rear, and occasionally pressing Wilson back, brought face to face the retreating and the pursuing infantry. On the 29th, General Cox, commanding Schofield's rear, was brought to bay at Spring Hill, midway between Columbia and Franklin, and, after a struggle to delay the advance, retreated successfully to the main body at Franklin.

The Confederates pressed on, Forrest leading, Stewart next, and Cheatham following. Lee was still in the rear, but coming up. The enemy were closely pushed, retreated rapidly, and left evidences of their haste on every side ; wagons half burned or with wheels cut, and animals, weltering in their own fresh blood, were strewn along the road. After travelling in this manner for about seven miles, Stewart sent word to the rear that he had brought the Yankees to bay, and they were two miles in his front, in line of battle, occupying a ridge of hills.

By the time a disposition of our forces was made for an assault, the Yankee columns broke into marching order, and moved on as before. A short distance ahead the Yankees

again made a stand. The Confederates prepared, as before, to attack. No sooner were the preparations complete, however, than the Yankees resumed their march, and thus gained time for their wagon trains and artillery. On reaching the last bridge on which the enemy had halted, Hood saw before him the town of Franklin, and in front of it three strong lines of battle, in three heavy series of breastworks.

THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN.

It was late in the evening of the 30th of November, when the Confederate army approached Franklin. General Hood resolved to attack at once. Had he waited till the next morning, a new and formidable line of works would have confronted him, and the second and inner line would have been so greatly strengthened, that it would have been madness to have attacked. General Hood knew that Thomas would endeavor to hold the old line of Nashville, Murfreesboro', and Franklin; and he felt that if he could fight the battle of Nashville at Franklin, and be successful, that Nashville would fall, Tennessee be given up, and the war transferred to the Ohio.

Stewart and Forrest made a detour to the right, and by five o'clock had struck the enemy a stunning blow on his left flank. Cheatham now moved up, and joining his right, as near as practicable, to Stewart's left, the battle was joined, and waged with fierceness on both sides.

Thousands of our soldiers were standing once more on their own native soil, and some in sight of their own homes; and they fought with every incentive in their hearts that can urge manhood to noble deeds. The enthusiasm of the troops was glorious; the country a vast, unbroken plain, as level as a table; and the sight of those long dark lines, fringed with fire and smoke, with twenty thousand rifles mingling their sharp notes with the deeper thunders of the artillery, was well calculated to inspire the heroism which impelled our army on to victory. Major-generals, brigadiers, and colonels rode in front of their commands, waving hats, and urging on the troops. Men fell wounded and dead—great rents were torn—but, with

the steadiness of veterans, the gaps were filled by the living, and the column moved on.

The first line of breastworks was swept clean. Our loss had been great. General Pat. Cleburne, the "Stonewall Jackson" of the West, fell, shot through the head with four balls, and died on the ramparts. General Gist, previously wounded in the leg, had refused to leave the field, limping along on foot, cheering his men, and finally received a ball through the breast, killing him instantly. Brown, Manigault, Johnson, Strahl, and scores of field and staff officers, who had exposed themselves at the head of their troops, were either killed or wounded. Still our men faltered not. Dashing on, they reached the second line. The Yankees were stubborn. On the right they had charged Bates' division, and gained a momentary advantage; but recovering, that gallant officer was again at the front, and, with his brave Tennesseans, doing splendid service.

For a time the Yankees held their breastworks, and the fighting was hand to hand between those in the ditch on the outside, and those behind the intrenchments. But the struggle was not long, and again the foe was flying across the field. It was night, however, and the difficulties of continuing the battle so great, that at two o'clock A. M., save the occasional spattering of musketry, the grand chorus of battle was at an end. The next morning it was discovered that the Yankees had evacuated the position, and were in full retreat to Nashville. It was likewise discovered that Thomas had been largely reinforced, and thus enabled to make the stubborn resistance which had not been anticipated by General Hood.

Just before the battle of Franklin had been joined, Hood had ridden along the lines of his army, telling his men that the Yankee lines were weak, and that once broken, the army would be driven out of Tennessee. He had been extravagant in his promises. The Yankee General Thomas lay at Nashville with his main force.

Hood now advanced upon Nashville, and laid siege to it on the 2d of December, closely investing it for a fortnight.

THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.

While Hood was intrenching before Nashville, Thomas was preparing for an assault on the Confederate position. Reinforcements were received from several sources, until by the 12th the Yankee ranks were swelled to an extent which warranted Thomas to advance to the attack whenever his arrangements were completed. A consultation of the Yankee commanders was held on the 12th, and it was determined to attack the Confederate lines on the following day. This plan was frustrated by Hood, who fell back to a stronger position, two miles south of that held by him on the 12th. Another council was held on the 14th, and all things being in readiness, it was agreed to make the attack next morning.

On the morning of the 15th of October, the enemy attacked both flanks of Hood's army. They were repulsed on the right with heavy loss; but towards evening they drove in the Confederate infantry outposts on the left flank.

The next day the enemy made a general attack on Hood's entire line. The battle raged furiously from dawn till dark. Thomas' overwhelming numbers enabled him to throw heavy columns against Hood's left and centre. All the enemy's assaults were repulsed until about half-past three o'clock in the afternoon. When it was supposed by General Hood that he had in his grasp a splendid victory, a stampede suddenly took place in one of his divisions, and the day was lost in a moment.

Bates' division was to the left of the Confederate centre. It had repulsed the enemy in the morning. He advanced again late in the evening, and was repulsed again from the other points of the line fronting Bates' division, but rushed over this point, and by sheer force of numbers beat down and run over, killing, wounding, and capturing, in the ditches, nearly every man holding them. Support had been asked for by General Bates and General Walthall, as is understood; both of them were within forty yards of this point all the day. Instead of getting support at this, the only salient point in the whole Confederate line, one brigade was taken from the right and another from the left of this point, to save the extreme left of

the line. When this was done, so confident was General Bates of the coming disaster, that he ordered his artillery back on the Franklin pike, which was then its only exit.

The break in Bates' division was the signal for a general panic in Hood's army. The moment a small break was made in his lines, the whole of two corps unaccountably and instantly fled from their ditches, most of them without firing a gun. It was a disgraceful retreat. Fifty pieces of artillery and nearly all of Hood's ordnance wagons were left to the enemy. Our loss in killed and wounded was disgracefully small; and it was only through want of vigor in Thomas' pursuit that Hood's shattered and demoralized army effected its retreat.

He finally made his escape across the Tennessee River with the remnant of his army, having lost from various causes more than ten thousand men, half of his generals, and nearly all of his artillery. Such was the disastrous issue of the Tennessee campaign, which put out of existence, as it were, the splendid army that Johnston had given up at Atlanta, and terminated forever the whole scheme of Confederate defence west of the Alleghanies.

General Hood recrossed the Tennessee at Florence, General Forrest covering his retreat, and was at Tupelo on the 6th of January, 1865, where, on the 23d, he took leave of the army in the following order:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
TUPELO, Miss., Jan. 23, 1865.

"SOLDIERS—At my request, I have this day been relieved from the command of the army. In taking leave of you, accept my thanks for the patience with which you have endured your hardships during the recent campaign. I am alone responsible for its conception, and strove hard to do my duty in its execution. I urge upon you the importance of giving your entire support to the distinguished soldier who now assumes command, and shall look with deep interest on all your future operations, and rejoice at your success.

"J. B. HOOD."

The complete and disastrous failure of General Hood was freely acknowledged in the Confederacy; and the glaring



GEN. HOOD.

errors in his campaign did not escape the savage criticisms of the Richmond newspapers. It was said, with obvious justice, that his greatest mistake had been at Nashville. He had sat down before that city for a fortnight, and proceeded to invest it on the south. Had he struck boldly across the Cumberland, and settled himself on the Yankee communications, he would have forced Thomas to evacuate Nashville and fall back towards Kentucky. But he adopted another plan, and paid the penalty of his error in defeat and heavy loss.

While at one end of the line of the Tennessee-Georgia campaign the Confederates had thus come to grief, at the other end, stretching towards the sea, there were other more important disasters and occasions of peculiar trial, such as the spirit of the Confederacy had never before experienced. The effect of Sherman's march to the sea on the *morale* of the Confederacy dates the first chapter of its subjugation.

CHAPTER VIII.

Sherman's march from the mountains to the sea.—Yankee boasts.—Easy nature of Sherman's enterprise.—"Grand" mistake of the Confederates.—The burning of Atlanta.—Five thousand houses in ruins.—Sherman's route to Milledgeville.—Second stage of the march to Millen.—Last stage of the march.—Wheeler's cavalry.—THE FALL OF SAVANNAH.—Capture of Fort McAllister.—Probable surprise of Hardee.—The Confederates evacuate Savannah.—Sherman's *Christmas-gift* to Mr. Lincoln.—The true value of Sherman's exploit.—His own estimation of it.—Despondency in the South.—Depletion of the Confederate armies.—THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS, etc.—Bad faith of the Yankees.—Their misrepresentations.—The question of recaptured slaves.—A Yankee calculation.—The Washington Government responsible for the sufferings of Yankee prisoners.—How capital was made out of their sufferings.—A game with "sick" prisoners.—How "rebel barbarities" were manufactured.—Noble conduct of General Grant.—Its commentary on the Washington cabinet.—His "victory" over that body.

THERE was scarcely a Yankee newspaper that did not find more or less frequent occupation in extolling the genius of the march which Sherman had undertaken from the mountains of Georgia to the sea, and placing it above the achievements of Hannibal, Napoleon, and Marlborough. But the simple fact was, that the Davis-Hood strategy was a grand mistake, and Sherman's advantage of it proportionally grand. By this strategy Georgia was uncovered, and Sherman had plain marching to the sea. There was no considerable force to oppose him. The whole plan, which had originated in the brain of President Davis, to compensate for the enemy's offensive movement in Georgia by penetrating Tennessee was outrageously foolish, from the simple consideration that the two invasions were necessarily unequal: for that into the enemy's country could not seriously affect his superabundant resources, while that into the Southern interior went right into the heart of the Confederacy; and having once passed the frontiers, on which the South had necessarily thrown out all its resources in men, was destined to realize General Grant's assertion, that the Confederacy was merely a shell.

Before undertaking his great campaign towards Savannah,

Sherman ordered the destruction of most of the inhabitable part of Atlanta. He destroyed, in all, nearly five thousand houses here, and left behind him a picture of ruin and desolation, such as is seldom to be found in the ravages of war.*

On the 15th day of November, Sherman began his march to the sea. He moved forward in two columns, General Howard commanding the right and General Slocum the left, while his cavalry covered his flanks. General Howard's column moved through East Point, Rough-and-Ready, Griffin, Jonesboro',

* An agent of Governor Brown, of Georgia, made the following official report of the extent of the destruction done by the enemy in Atlanta: "The property of the State was destroyed by fire, yet a vast deal of valuable material remains in the ruins. Three-fourths of the bricks are good, and will be suitable for rebuilding if placed under shelter before freezing weather. There is a quantity of brass in the journals of burned cars, and in the ruins of the various machinery of the extensive railroad shops; also, a valuable amount of copper from the guttering of the State depot, the flue pipes of destroyed engines, stop cocks of machinery, etc., etc.

The car-wheels that were uninjured by fire were rendered useless by breaking the flanges. In short, every species of machinery that was not destroyed by fire, was most ingeniously broken and made worthless in its original form—the large steam-boilers, the switches, the frogs, etc. Nothing has escaped. The fire-engines, except Tallulah No. 3, were sent North. Tallulah has been overhauled, and a new fire-company organized. Nos. 1 and 2 fire-engine houses were saved. All the city pumps were destroyed, except one on Marietta-street. The car-sheds, the depots, machine shops, foundries, rolling mills, merchant mills, arsenal, laboratory, armory, etc., were all burned.

In the angle between Hunter-street, commencing at the City Hall, running east, and McDonough-street, running south, all houses were destroyed. The jail and calaboose were burned. All business houses, except those on Alabama-street, commencing with the Gate City Hotel, running east to Lloyd-street, were burned. All the hotels, except the Gate City, were burned. By referring to my map you will find about four hundred houses standing. The scale of the map is four hundred feet to one inch. Taking the car-shed for the centre, describe a circle, the diameter of which is twelve inches, and you will perceive that the circle contains about three hundred squares. Then, at a low estimate, allow three houses to every four hundred feet; and we will have thirty-six hundred houses in the circle. Subtract the number of houses indicated on the map as standing, and you will see by this estimate the enemy have destroyed thirty-two hundred houses. Refer to the exterior of the circle, and you will discover that it is more than half a mile to the city limits in every direction, which was thickly populated, say nothing of the houses beyond, and you will see that the enemy have destroyed from four to five thousand houses. Two-thirds of the shade-trees in the park and city, and of the timber in the suburbs have been destroyed. The suburbs present to the eye one vast, naked, ruined, deserted camp."

McDonough, Forsythe, Hillsboro', Monticello, and bridging the Ocmulgee entered Milledgeville on the 20th of November. Here General Sherman made his headquarters for a few days, while Howard moved on through Saundersville, Griswold, towards Louisville, the point of rendezvous, with the left wing. That wing, under the command of General Slocum, had meantime passed through Decatur, Covington, Social Circle, Madison; made a feint of an attack upon Macon; passed through Buckhead and Queensboro', and, dividing one detachment, moved towards Augusta, and the other to Eatonton and Sparta. The second stage of Sherman's march may be taken as from Milledgeville to Millen. The distance was about seventy-five miles, and the time occupied in the march eight days, from November 24th to December 2d.

The Yankee troops left Milledgeville admirably clothed and equipped. Each man had eighty rounds of ammunition: while their wagons contained fixed material without stint. Rations for forty days had been prepared, and they suffered for nothing. The Yankee cavalry, with the left wing, on crossing the Oconee, had visited Sparta, which is on a line between Warrenton and Milledgeville, about equi-distant from both. On the evening of the 24th, General Slocum's advance encamped at Devereux, seven miles west of Sparta, and the cavalry scoured the whole country, one of the most fertile and thickly settled in the whole State, and vast quantities of forage and provisions, many horses, and mules were obtained, and much cotton burned. For several days the Yankees raided through the entire country between the two railroads in the vicinity last described. Abundance of food and forage was secured, and every thing was destroyed which could be useful to the enemy. The march was leisurely—Sherman evidently finding himself master of the situation. He did not start directly for the seaboard until he had all the provisions he desired.

Sherman was now ready to enter upon the third and last stage of his march. Behind him the Georgia Central Railroad lay destroyed for more than a hundred miles, and the Georgia road for full sixty. The railroad-bridge over the Oconee and the Ogeechee, on the Georgia Central, had been destroyed, and also those over Brier Creek and Buckhead Creek, on the

Waynesboro' Branch connecting Augusta with Millen. Incalculable damage had been done. It only remained to move down to the Atlantic, and crown the campaign in the capture of Savannah.

From Millen, then, on the 2d of December, the Yankee army swung southerly down on the final stage of its journey to Savannah, in half a dozen columns, moving over as many different roads for the sake of convenience and speed. The Confederate forces, massed at Augusta, were left hopelessly in Sherman's rear. The army was protected on either flank by a large river, and cavalry formed the vanguard and rear-guard. Its mission, as a curtain for the concealment of infantry operations, had now been accomplished. The country traversed was covered with pine forests, cut up by numerous creeks, and intersected by wide stretches of swamps; and further on the coastwise, swamps and the low rice-fields became the prevalent character of the region.

So far General Sherman's march had been almost without opposition. It had had one or two small conflicts with Wheeler's cavalry; and some few militiamen and conscripts, hastily assembled and badly organized, were easily brushed from his path. Ten miles from Savannah, where his left wing struck the Charleston Railroad, he encountered Confederate skirmishers posted in a swamp near by, which indicated the presence of the Confederate forces under Hardee for the first time.

THE FALL OF SAVANNAH.

On the 10th of December, Sherman lay in line of battle, confronting the outer works of Savannah, about five miles distant from the city. It was easy for him to see that his first task was to open communication with the fleet.

That part of the coast of Georgia, at the mouth of the Savannah, is of that amphibious character which marks so much of the Southern coast in general—the ravelled and unfinished ends of nature's web, where sea and land join. The ocean breaks in between Great Wassaw and Ossabaw Islands, forming Ossabaw Sound, and into this estuary flow the Great and Little Ogeechee and the Vernon rivers. The land, or rather

the marsh on each side of the Ogeechee, was almost *à fleur d'eau*, certainly hardly rising a foot above the level of the river, while at times it is entirely submerged. For miles and miles on every hand there was nothing to be seen but these low and level islands and islets, covered with reeds and rank grasses, save where a lustier vegetation had pushed up in occasional clumps of trees called "hummocks."

About six miles from the mouth of Ossabaw Sound, near where the Savannah, Albany, and Gulf Railroad crosses the Ogeechee, the river jets out into a promontory named Point Genesis, covered by one of these hummocks of more than ordinary size. Behind this, hidden from the river, lay Fort McAllister, an earthwork of considerable strength, erected by the Confederates early in the war. Its batteries completely commanded the river.

On the 12th of December, Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps was selected for the important work of carrying Fort McAllister. At half-past four o'clock of the 13th, the division went forward to the assault, another division supporting it, over an open space of more than five hundred yards. The Yankees rushed on at the double-quick. The fort was approached and stormed from all sides. Resistance was useless, as by a singular improvidence the fort was garrisoned by not more than two or three hundred Confederates; and there is no doubt that General Hardee had been surprised by the quickness and decision of the enemy.

Sherman himself had ordered the assault, and witnessed the execution of the order from the top of a house not far distant; and as soon as he saw the men on the parapets, he exclaimed to his staff, "The fort is ours! Order me a boat—I am going down to the fleet."

The possession of Fort McAllister opened Ossabaw Sound, effected communication with Dahlgren's fleet, and made the capture of Savannah, where Hardee had allowed himself to be shut up with fifteen thousand men, but a question of time. In fact Sherman had now invested the city on all but the eastern side. His right held King's Bridge, far in the rear of Savannah, and controlled the Ogeechee, whence his lines stretched across the Savannah River, his left being about three miles above the city. He had cut off all the railroad supplies of

Savannah. On the south, he had struck the Savannah, Albany, and Gulf Railroad, which formerly had transported large supplies of cattle and provisions from Florida to Savannah. The railroads from Augusta and Macon were thoroughly broken. Foster's batteries had gotten within shelling distance of the Charleston Railroad, and prevented the passage of trains. It only remained to move regularly upon the city by systematic approaches. It could not hope for outside succor of any kind; Sherman's prompt seizure of Fort McAllister having prevented reinforcements down the Charleston road, and cut off General G. W. Smith, who, with several thousand Confederates, was on the other side of the Ogeechee.

From the 10th to the 16th of December heavy artillery firing and skirmishing went on all along the lines, but no regular engagement occurred. On the 16th, Sherman formally demanded the surrender of the city from its commander, Hardee, who declined next day to accede to the demand. Sherman instantly hurried more heavy siege-guns upon his lines, and on the 20th was prepared to bombard the city and assault its works. But Hardee had already taken the alarm. Finding that only the eastern exit was open to him, and that on that Sherman was already cannonading, and soon might capture it by assault, Hardee resolved to evacuate Savannah. On the afternoon of the 20th, his iron-clads and batteries opened a tremendous fire, lasting into the night, and, under cover of the demonstration, the Confederate general crossed his fifteen thousand men and his large force of negro laborers upon a pontoon bridge, laid below his rear batteries, to the South Carolina side, and marched them off towards Charleston on the Union causeway. The night was exceedingly favorable for such a movement, it being very dark, with a west wind blowing. Next morning, at break of day, the pickets of Geary's division crept forward, advanced still farther, and went over the works; and Geary himself, marching into Savannah, received, on the morning of the 21st December, 1864, its formal surrender at the hands of its mayor. The troops were gone. The navy-yard, two iron-clads, many smaller vessels, and a vast amount of ammunition, ordnance stores, and supplies had been destroyed before the evacuation, but all the rest of the uninjured city fell into the hands of the Yankees.

Sherman sent a characteristic dispatch to Washington. He wrote to President Lincoln: "I beg to present you, *as a Christmas gift*, the city of Savannah, with one hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, and also about twenty-five thousand bales of cotton."

And so ended Sherman's famous march to the sea—an exploit which Yankee newspapers declared had not been excelled since William of Normandy crossed the English Channel and burned his boats on the shore; and since Hernando Cortez plunged into Mexico, on the most astounding of expeditions, and stranded his ships at Vera Cruz. But Sherman himself had a much juster and more modest estimation of his exploit. On receiving the congratulations of the President and also of his personal friends, on account of his success, and seeing himself greatly praised in the public journals at home and abroad, he wrote: "I am now a great favorite because I have been successful; but if Thomas had not whipped Hood at Nashville, six hundred miles away, my plans would have failed, and I would have been denounced the world over." In his special congratulatory orders, he said: "The armies serving in Georgia and Tennessee, as well as the local garrisons of Decatur, Bridgeport, Chattanooga, and Murfreesboro', are alike entitled to the common honor, and each regiment may inscribe on its colors at pleasure the words 'Savannah' or 'Nashville.'"

The fall of Savannah was the occasion, whether duly or not, of great despondency in the South. The single disaster was not very considerable; but the march through Georgia that had led to it had afforded a painful exhibition of the decay of the spirit of the Confederates, and the moral effect of this exhibition was far worse than any disaster the South had ever yet suffered in the field. It suggested a general review of the situation of the Confederacy; the people commenced to calculate the cost and sacrifices of the war, and to estimate the terrible depletion that had taken place in the armies of the Confederacy during the campaign of 1864.

That depletion had ensued from various causes. The Yankees had encouraged desertion to an extent never known before, and they had managed to keep in captivity nearly every prisoner they had taken west of the Mississippi since the battle of Gettysburg. The history of Yankee *finesse* in this matter deserves

a distinct place in the records of the war, and may properly be reviewed here at the close of the year 1864.

THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS, ETC.

It may be truly and emphatically said that on no subject had the enemy shown such bad faith as on that of the exchange of prisoners. During the year 1864, the Confederate authorities had, at different times, put forth every exertion to obtain an exchange of prisoners; but such exertion to this end was met by some new pretence of the Yankees, who had resolved to avoid a general exchange, and to coin a certain advantage out of the sufferings of their own men in Southern prisons.

The Confederate authorities had at first insisted upon the release of all prisoners, the excess to be on parole. The enemy refused to comply with this plain requirement of the cartel, and demanded, when a delivery of prisoners was made, an equal number in return. Seeing a persistent purpose on the part of the Yankee Government to violate its agreement, our authorities, moved by the sufferings of the brave men who were so unjustly held in the Northern prisons, determined to abate their just demands. On the 10th of August, 1864, Colonel Ould, the Confederate commissioner, offered to exchange the prisoners respectively held by the two belligerents, officer for officer and man for man. Although this offer was substantially what had often been proposed by the Yankee authorities, and would have left in their hands whatever excess of prisoners they might have had, yet it was not accepted.

Another pretence put forth by the Yankees for declining a general exchange of prisoners was, that the Confederates had refused to include in the cartel negro soldiers. This was a misrepresentation. The extent of the claim of the Confederates on this point was simply that they would not return to the enemy *recaptured slaves*; for to do this the Confederate Government would stultify itself, ignore the law of its social system, and be a party to an outrage on the rights of property in its own citizens.

But this proper position of the Confederate authorities involved the disposition of only a few hundred persons; and it is

not reasonable to suppose that a punctilious care for them really stood in the way of the duties of humanity to forty or fifty thousand white captives. This professed care for two or three hundred black slaves, which was made to weigh down all considerations of humanity in behalf of thousands of white men pining in prison, was plainly nothing more than a pretence, a new ground of frivolous excuse, to refuse a general exchange. In November, Colonel Ould wrote to the Confederate secretary of war:

“My own firm conviction is, that even if we were to agree to the unjust demands of the enemy in this respect, we would not secure a general exchange. * * * I think it very doubtful whether they would agree to a general exchange, even if we consented to treat recaptured slaves as prisoners of war, and delivered those whose term of service had not expired. I am satisfied their course is the result of a conviction forced upon them by the events of the war, that a Confederate soldier is more valuable than a Federal. The miseries of tens of thousands of their own people are as nothing when weighed against a calculation.”

Here was the true secret of the game which the North played on the subject of exchange. Men were scarce in the South; the Confederate soldier was superior in prowess to the Yankee; and thus the Government at Washington was convinced that any exchange, man for man, would be to its disadvantage, and deliberately adopted the remorseless and inhuman policy of enforcing the captivity, with all its attendant sufferings, of the prisoners on both sides during the war. This policy of the Yankees exhibited to the unhappy victims from their army an amount of ingratitude that was to the last degree monstrous. General Sherman had not hesitated to avow, with utter disregard of the claims of his captive soldiers on his consideration and protection, that as the terms of service of many had expired, they were not to be regarded as subjects of general exchange.

But the Washington Government was not satisfied, for considerations of certain advantage, to consign its soldiers to the extraordinary sufferings of imprisonment incident to the scant supplies in the South, which indeed it was daily endeavoring to diminish by blockade and devastation. It went a step

further. It paraded these very sufferings, for which it was responsible, which indeed its own malignity had produced, to raise a clamor about the cruelty of the Confederates, and thus engage the sympathies of the world.

It is almost impossible to sound the depths of Yankee cruelty in this subject of exchange.

At one time, in the fall of 1864, the Yankees refused to exchange any prisoners but those who were *sick*; and then to accuse the inhumanity of the Confederates, the poor, wasted victims of prison diseases were paraded through the country, and had their photographs taken for pictorials, as fair specimens of the results of life in Confederate prisons. The calculation that could have prompted such an exhibition appears indeed to partake of an ingenuity of beings other than man.*

* The following *exposé* was made in a Richmond paper. It refers to an exchange of sick prisoners made in the fall of 1864:

"The mortality among our unfortunate prisoners sent by sea to Savannah to be exchanged was very remarkable. We have published a list of one hundred and seventeen who died on the passage to Savannah; also a list of thirty-two who died within a few days after being landed. Distressing as is this mortality, the Confederate newspapers have not been so inconsiderate as to impute it to a wrong cause. Revolting at the shocking inhumanity which limits exchanges to the sick, the feeble, and the dying, we have received home our brethren, emaciated as they are with long-protracted disease, and we have wondered, not that so many died, but that so many, travelling in such a condition, should live.

"We have sent to the truce-boat a similar class of the Federal prisoners in our hands; it is for these only that the Yankees have bargained. When the poor creatures reach them, worn and wasted by sickness, and evidencing, in their appearance, that they should be in the hospitals instead of travelling, in place of the sense of shame which the Yankee authorities and people should feel at the consequences of their inhuman policy, with such audacious hypocrisy as a Yankee only can manifest, they seize the occasion to calumniate the Confederates, a reluctant party to a commerce worse than 'the middle passage,' and only better than protracted imprisonment. They pretend to consider the returned men as samples of those who have been left behind; they charge their weakness and emaciation to starvation, and not to sickness; they clamor like so many howling dervishes; and with an effrontery that the world beside cannot equal, they extract self-glorification out of their own crime, and heap reproaches on us who are its victims!

"We know that their treatment of our prisoners is horrible enough. But, much as we execrate such conduct, and the people who can practise it, we respect ourselves too much to slander them. We do not pretend that the sick men who are sent home to us are samples of the rest. We are not so false as to represent their emaciation as due to starvation and not to disease. Multi-

In connection with the history of the prisons of the war, there is something of tribute to be paid to the conduct of General Grant. This high officer, however profuse of the lives of his men in battle, had certainly an unaffected sympathy and interest for the imprisoned soldier. It was through his offices that, in the later months of 1864, an agreement, first proposed by General Lee, was concluded, to the effect that, without releasing either Government from the obligation of affording due provision to its captives, each should have the right of furnishing to its own prisoners, in the possession of the other, under the direction of officers among them, to be paroled for the purpose, such additional supplies of necessary articles as it might deem expedient to send. It is, indeed, indicative of the remorseless policy of the Yankee Government that such concessions to the claims of humanity should have been made sooner by the stern soldier in the field than by their statesmen in the cabinet.

We may add here, in advance of the order of our narrative, that General Grant, having been subsequently empowered with the duties of exchanging prisoners, and put in a position to overrule the behests of such men as Stanton and Butler, did himself immortal honor in instantly authorizing a general exchange, and breaking by a stroke of the pen all the tissues of falsehood and cunning in which this matter had been so long entangled. This act has done more for his reputation in just and humane history than any victory of his in the field. But the benefit of it came too late for the South, and only a few thousand Confederate prisoners reached home in time to witness the catastrophe of the spring of 1865.

tudes of the poor sufferers die, as we have seen, on their way to our lines. Many die before we can take them to our arms. Many die before we can get them into our hospitals; and many there languish and die without a sight of the home for which they risked the travel. In all our distress at this mortality, we are candid enough to recognize the cause, and to tell the truth amid our resentments. Not so the Yankees."

CHAPTER IX.

The blockade at Wilmington.—How ineffective.—FIRST EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER.—Butler's powder-ship.—The two days' bombardment.—Landing of Butler's troops.—Butler decides not to attack.—His sudden departure.—He is removed from command.—SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER.—FALL OF WILMINGTON.—Landing of Terry's command.—Movements of General Hoke.—The assault on the fort.—A *feu d'enfer*.—Desperate fighting.—The Confederates overpowered.—Surrender of Fort Fisher.—Evacuation of Fort Anderson.—Yankee occupation of Wilmington.—How a part of General Sherman's campaign in the Carolinas.—SHERMAN'S SIXTY DAYS IN THE CAROLINAS.—Direction of his march.—Crossing the Savannah River.—Mismanagement of the Confederate troops.—Sherman at Branchville.—THE FALL OF CHARLESTON.—Hardee joins Beauregard.—Conflagration in Charleston.—Explosion at the railroad depot.—A scarred city.—Charleston as seen through Yankee eyes.—CAPTURE AND BURNING OF COLUMBIA.—Wild and savage scenes of pillage.—The city on fire.—Four thousand citizens homeless.—Sherman's march northward.—His organization of "bummers."—The column of smoke.—The Yankees at Winnsboro'.—More of the enemy's atrocities.—Sherman's feint upon Charlotte.—His occupation of Fayetteville.—Hampton attacks Kilpatrick.—Sherman's appointment of a rendezvous with Schofield.—Hardee's fight near Averysboro'.—What he did with half a corps of Confederates.—THE BATTLE OF BENTONVILLE.—Success of the Confederates.—No decisive results.—Sherman's move towards Goldsboro'.—Schofield's movement.—Sherman's success.—His congratulatory order.—A military conference at City Point, Virginia.

WILMINGTON had long been a thorn in the enemy's side. Mr. Welles, the Yankee secretary of the navy, had declared, in his last official report, that Wilmington, owing to the peculiarity of its situation, could not be absolutely closed to blockade-runners, without the co-operation of the army; for the forts which protected it were in such shoal water that the heavily armed ships could not get at them. Fifty fast Yankee steamers had been unable to close this port.

FIRST EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER.

At the close of the summer of 1864, an expedition had been planned against Fort Fisher, according to Mr. Welles' suggestion of the co-operation of a land force. It was delayed, for various reasons, until the winter. Vice-Admiral Farragut was

selected by the Yankee Government to take charge of the naval force, but was unable to assume that duty on account of ill health. Rear-Admiral Porter was then transferred from the command of the Mississippi squadron to the command of the North-Atlantic blockading squadron. The most powerful fleet ever known in American history was assembled at Hampton Roads, under command of Admiral Porter. The land force consisted of six thousand five hundred infantry, two batteries of artillery, and a few cavalry. On the 13th and 14th of December the expedition started, General Butler with the army transports proceeding to a place twenty-five miles off New Inlet. Admiral Porter, with his fleet, proceeded to Beaufort to complete taking on his ammunition and supplies, including some powder for a vessel proposed to be exploded before Fort Fisher, and some ammunition for the monitors, which were towed light from Fortress Monroe to Beaufort.

Wilmington was then but feebly garrisoned. A number of Confederate troops there had been sent to increase the forces opposed to Sherman in his march across the State of Georgia. General Butler had supposed that he would find an easy conquest there; and, in fact, he had foisted himself upon the expedition to get what he supposed would be a cheap glory, for the command of it had been given to General Weitzel, and Butler had insisted upon accompanying him, for the reason that the scene of operations was within his department, and the troops from his command.

A novel feature was introduced into the expedition against Fort Fisher, viz., a vessel loaded with a large quantity of powder to be exploded as near the fort as possible. The idea appears to have originated with General Butler, in consequence of reading of the terrible effects of the explosion of a large quantity of gunpowder at Erith, England, some time before. He suggested it to the departments at Washington, and they submitted it to their engineer and ordnance officers for examination and report. Those officers, while not anticipating any very wonderful results from this new experiment, still deemed it of such importance as to recommend its trial.

On Friday, 23d of December, Admiral Porter gave orders that the powder vessel be sent in as near Fort Fisher as possible, and exploded that night at one o'clock. Information of

what he proposed to do was sent to General Butler at Beaufort, but did not reach him until Saturday morning, when he immediately started for Fort Fisher, ordering the transports to follow as rapidly as possible. The powder-boat was exploded a little before two o'clock on Saturday morning, and the Yankee navy commenced their bombardment about noon of that day.

The explosion of the powder-boat was a ridiculous failure, and attracted such little attention in the fort that General Whiting, who was in command there, supposed it to be nothing more than the bursting of one of the enemy's guns. The bombardment of the fort continued for two days. It was probably the heaviest which had ever occurred in the annals of naval warfare. The huge frigates of Porter's fleet led the way; then the grim ugly Ironsides; then the monitors and the great line of smaller vessels, stretching away out, almost as far as the eye could reach. From every vessel could be seen the white curl of smoke, and high up in the air hundreds of smoky rings were formed from the explosion of guns. Thick flew the shell; loud sounded the thunder of artillery; lurid were the flashes of great guns as they vomited forth their missiles of death and destruction. Nobly stood the Confederates to their guns. From Shephard's battery to the mound, they stood unquailing and defiant, loading and firing coolly and calmly; the gunners sighting their guns as if they were practising at a target.

After the arrival of General Butler a conference was had with Admiral Porter as to operations next day. It was arranged that General Weitzel should land with some two or three thousand troops, and reconnoitre the fort with the view of assaulting it.

The expectation of the garrison that they would have a night-fight was not realized. The night was spent in watching and in repairing the slight damage sustained by the fight. As the morning dawned, the fleet could be discerned in the distance getting ready to renew the attack; but it was not expected that operations would commence before high tide, which would be about half-past twelve o'clock. However, every man was at his post, ready, at any moment, to again engage the fleet. About ten o'clock the fleet commenced moving in—their extreme right resting near Gatlin's battery, about six miles up the beach, and their left extending down to the

fort. The Ironsides led the attack, the frigates resting on her right and left, and the monitors to the right of the frigates. There were counted fifty-two vessels in all—one Ironsides three or four monitors, four frigates, and forty-seven other vessels. They steamed in very slowly, two of the frigates going round to the sea front of the fort, and the iron-clads and monitors lying abreast of the centre front. The Ironsides and monitors came up within a mile; the rest of the fleet remained out about one and a-half miles. At half-past ten A. M. the first gun was fired by the Ironsides, followed by the rest of the fleet—firing very slowly and deliberately for the while. The fort reserved its fire, thinking that the wooden fleet would be tempted to come in closer range. Finding, however, that they would not come closer, it opened, also firing very slowly.

About noon the fleet commenced firing with great rapidity. The dull, heavy, thumping sounds of the enemy's guns, as they were fired, could be heard first, and then the whistling, shrieking sound of the shells as they came whizzing and buzzing through the air. Their explosion and the myriad fragments that went rattling by, thick almost as hail, were terrible to listen to. The air was hot with fire; the earth shook; there was no interval of quiet; all was noise—crash, bang, and crash all the time.

A shell whistled close to General Whiting. It buried itself, exploding, and covering him all over with the wet sand. He did not even move, not even take his pipe from his mouth, and only remarked coolly, "Well, it spattered me."

While the bombardment was at its height, it was discovered that the enemy had succeeded in landing a force at Anderson and Holland batteries, and that their line of skirmishers were advancing on the fort. All was excitement now. The infantry man the parapets, and the sharp crack of the rifle is heard instead of the heavy booming of guns. The lull was of short duration—the most terrific bombardment now commenced; the fleet had seen their land forces, and they opened with greater fury than ever to keep the Confederates from engaging the skirmishers.

But there was to be no battle on land. Weitzel had reported to Butler that it was not advisable to attack; and that commander had very promptly desisted from the enterprise.

His troops (more than two thousand had been landed) were ordered back to the transports; and his whole force, consisting of sixty-five hundred men, was summarily withdrawn from the expedition, and with such singular celerity that the next day they were on the way back to Fortress Monroe.

As night came on the fire of the fleet fell off. The fort had made a gallant and complete defence; and the success of the Confederates could no longer be disputed. The enemy's attack the first day lasted five hours; on the second day, seven hours; firing altogether over twenty thousand shots from fifty odd vessels.

The Confederates responded with six hundred and sixty-two shots the first day, and six hundred the second. Their loss was only three killed and fifty-five wounded.

The ground in front and rear of the fort was covered with shells, and was torn in deep pits. But the damage to the works was not considerable. Two guns in the fort burst, two were dismounted by the Confederates, and two by the enemy's fire; but the fort was unhurt.

The failure of the expedition against Fort Fisher, the outpost of the defences of Wilmington, was the occasion of some sharp recrimination between Admiral Porter and General Butler. It is very certain that the latter officer, who had boasted that he would eat his Christmas dinner at Wilmington, was generally considered to have retired from the scene of action in disgrace, and that a few days thereafter he was made to pay the penalty of his failure by an order from Washington, removing him from the Army of the James, and sending him to his home in Massachusetts.*

* General Grant testified as follows before a committee of the Yankee Congress, appointed to inquire into Butler's conduct:

Question—The expectation was to surprise the fort?

Answer—Yes, sir; and my instructions were very clear, and if they effected a landing there above Fort Fisher, that in itself was to be considered a success; and if the fort did not fall immediately upon their landing, then they were to intrench themselves, and remain there and co-operate with the navy until the fort did fall. In my instructions I provided for a bold dash for the capture of Wilmington, in case Fort Fisher did fall immediately upon the landing of the troops. If it did not fall, then they were to intrench, enter upon a siege of the place, and remain there until it did fall. And the capture of Wilmington would thus become a matter for future consideration. General Butler came away from Fort Fisher in violation of the instructions which I gave him.

SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER.—FALL OF WILMINGTON.

Neither General Grant nor the Washington authorities were satisfied with Butler's conclusion that Fort Fisher was impregnable. The naval force remained in the vicinity during some very stormy weather, while a second military force was organized under command of General Terry. This force consisted of some eight thousand five hundred men, with siege guns and intrenching tools. On the 13th of January, the troops were landed on the beach above Fort Fisher, and proceeded to throw up intrenchments.

The enemy landed, under cover of his fleet, near Battery Gatlin, about nine miles from Fort Fisher. While he was landing, General Hoke appeared and drew up in line parallel, to watch his movements, and intercept them when possible to do so. It was not possible to prevent the landing, owing to the situation of the point chosen. The enemy landed on the banks, just above the neck of the sound, thus interposing a small surface of water between them and an attacking force; or compelling such force to circle around the lower extreme of the sound—either of which movements would have to be done under the fire of the whole fleet.

When General Hoke found this to be the situation, he established a line facing the sea, and threw out cavalry on his right flank, towards Battery Anderson, which was down the beach towards Fort Fisher, about four miles. The intervening country here was broken; and the low places were grown up with thick bushes, and were marshy. The purpose of the cavalry was to observe the movements, and give the signal of the first advance of the enemy towards establishing a line across the neck of land to the river, it being the order and purpose of General Bragg to have General Hoke attack him as soon as he advanced. During the night, however, the enemy, passing between the cavalry, and threading their way through the thick, marshy undergrowth, made their way to the river, and next morning General Hoke found an intrenched line on his right flank, extending across the peninsula, from the sea to, or near to the river. He succeeded, however, in maintaining his base at Sugarloaf, immediately changed his line, and

informed General Bragg of the situation. Then General Bragg gave the order to charge the enemy in their works. In the mean time, General Hoke had made a close reconnoissance, under the fire of the enemy, and discovered the strength of their force and position. On receiving the order to charge he communicated the result of his observations, and asked General Bragg to reconnoitre in person, which he did; and both of these officers concurred that it was not proper to assault the lines. It was then determined to re-enforce the fort. By this time the enemy, four thousand strong, were secure behind their works; and the fleet proceeded to bombard Fort Fisher, which was done uninterruptedly until Sunday, the 15th of January, about six o'clock in the evening.

At this time the column of assault, numbering about four thousand, moved from the enemy's lines, and as they advanced, they were plainly visible from Fort Fisher. But the beleaguered garrison was kept close confined within the bomb-proofs by the concentrated and continued fire of seven hundred guns pouring torrents of shell and missiles on every spot. On the land side of Fort Fisher the Confederates had seventeen guns—sufficient, could they have been used, to make it impossible that any force could have advanced under their fire. But, as the line of assailants got nearer to the fort, the whole fleet concentrated the fire, in ricochet shot, on the land side, and speedily dismounted every gun; and this unintermittent *feu d'enfer* was kept up until the enemy's line was within sixty yards of the works. Then it ceased, and with a rush and yell the charge was made. Captain Braddy commanded the company guarding the sally-port. On him the hope of the garrison hung to keep the assailants out until the men and officers, who had been packed in the bomb-proofs for fifty-six hours, could get out and make ready. This officer and his command, it is said, surrendered, and the enemy entered the open gate. The Confederates were benumbed and exhausted, and the thing was the work of a moment. They were obliged to fall back in order to rally. Colonel Lamb brought his men into line near headquarters, General Whiting being present, encouraging and cheering on the troops and creating enthusiasm by his ardent heroism. Under these inspiring influences the men were brought to the charge. The numbers were against

them in the proportion of four thousand, aided by two thousand marines, to two thousand, but they forced the enemy back to the mound, and a hand-to-hand fight, of unmitigated desperation and fury, ensued, continuing from seven to about ten o'clock, when bravery, endurance, and devotion failed to overcome numbers. The Confederates were overpowered, and the work of assault was accomplished; but not until the enemy had paid dearly for his prize. He had not lost a man until he entered the fort.

Thus fell Fort Fisher after a heroic defence. About midnight, General Whiting surrendered himself and his men to General Terry as prisoners of war, numbering over eighteen hundred, the remainder of his force being killed or wounded. The enemy confessed a loss of seven or eight hundred in killed and wounded. General Whiting received three wounds in the thigh, and thus wounded was fated to languish and die in a Yankee prison.

The fall of Fort Fisher did not clear the way to Wilmington. Yet it was decisive of the fate of that city. On the 19th of February, Fort Anderson, higher up the river, was evacuated under a heavy fire from Porter's fleet, with a co-operating Yankee force eight thousand strong, which Schofield had moved up from Smithville. The troops were pushed for Wilmington, while at the same time Porter's vessels passed the obstructions and steamed up the river. Wilmington was occupied without resistance. The eight or ten thousand Confederate troops there, under the command of General Bragg, had been withdrawn towards what was now the dominant theatre of the war in the interior of the Carolinas.

The capture of Wilmington, indeed, had been an arranged parallel of Sherman's grand expedition through the Carolinas; it was intended to open still another base of operations towards Richmond; and it proved, in fact, a great element of success in that extraordinary march that carried the Yankee banners from Savannah to Goldsboro'. To that movement attention must now be directed in the logical order of our narrative.

SHERMAN'S SIXTY DAYS IN THE CAROLINAS.

About the 16th of January, hardly a month from his entry into Savannah, Sherman had reviewed and reorganized his command, but only partially refitted it, owing to delays in forwarding the necessary supplies. Appreciating the value of time, he hurried forward his preparations, and dispatching Howard's wing by water to Beaufort, from whence it penetrated up the Pocotaligo, deceived the Confederates into the belief that this force was the advance of his army moving upon Charleston. The interval between the embarkation of Howard at Savannah and his arrival in front of the Branchville and Charleston Railroad was well employed by Sherman, who marched Slocum's wing towards Augusta, Davis' corps on the Georgia side, and William's on the Carolina side of the Savannah River, to Sister's Ferry.

The laborious duty of the campaign commenced with the crossing of the Savannah River. The Confederate forces to oppose Sherman were scattered all the way from Augusta to Charleston; the design being to guard all the approaches to the railway that connected Charleston with the interior. This want of concentration was the secret of Sherman's success.

Early in February, Sherman struck the railroad between Branchville and Charleston, compelled the Confederates to evacuate Branchville on the 11th of February, and broke up the South Carolina Railroad for sixty or seventy miles, thus preventing any reinforcements from the west. The left wing, by rapid marches of eighteen miles per day, had made a détour far to the left, within thirty miles of Augusta, gained a lodgment upon the road, and severed communications. Here was a dangerous position for the Confederates; Sherman's whole force of cavalry, militia, and veterans at Branchville, and Augusta open to capture by a sudden swoop of Kilpatrick's cavalry. That city, with its arsenals, laboratories, machine-shops, rolling stock, and cotton, was too valuable to be neglected; and Cheatham's corps of Hood's army, was marched night and day to its relief, arriving there in time to find that Sherman had turned the cold shoulder upon Augusta,

and by a dexterous movement thrown his left wing between Hill and the main force in his front.

Continuing his march north, Sherman entered Orangeburg on the 16th of February ; and General Beauregard, who, owing to the extraordinary dispersion of the Confederate plan of defence, had certainly not more than ten thousand men at Columbia, was already preparing to evacuate the capital of South Carolina.

THE FALL OF CHARLESTON.

In the mean time, the movement of Sherman had already been decisive of the fate of Charleston. General Hardee finding himself flanked at Charleston, and appreciating the instant necessity of effecting a junction with Beauregard and Cheatham, and concentrating all available forces in Sherman's path, resolved to evacuate this city, so famous in the war and so long coveted by the Yankees. But he was resolved to leave as little as possible for the enemy's rapacity.

At an early hour of the morning, before the retirement of General Hardee's troops, every building, warehouse, or shed, stored with cotton, was fired by a guard detailed for the purpose. The engines were brought out, but with the small force at the disposal of the fire department, very little else could be done than to keep the surrounding buildings from igniting. On the western side of the city the conflagration raged with great fury.

The horrors of the conflagration were heightened by a terrible catastrophe. It appears some boys had discovered a quantity of powder at the depot of the Northwestern Railroad, and amused themselves by flinging handfuls of it upon the masses of burning cotton in the streets. It was not long before the powder running from their hands formed a train upon the ground leading from the fire to the main supplies of powder in the depot. The result is easily conjectured. A spark ignited the powder in the train, there was a leaping, running fire along the ground, and then an explosion which shook the city to its very foundation from one end to the other. The building was, in a second, a whirling mass of ruins, in a tremendous

volume of flame and smoke. About two hundred lives were lost by the explosion, and not less than one hundred and fifty bodies were found charred in that fiery furnace.

From the depot the fire spread rapidly, and communicating with the adjoining buildings, threatened destruction to that part of the town. Four squares, embracing the area bounded by Chapel, Alexander, Charlotte, and Washington-streets, were consumed before the conflagration was subdued.

The destruction of public property in Charleston had been as complete as General Hardee could make it. He burned the cotton warehouses, arsenals, quartermaster's stores, railroad bridges, two iron-clads, and some vessels in the ship-yard.

Among the captured property were two hundred pieces of artillery, spiked and temporarily disabled, as they could not be brought off.

The Yankees occupied Charleston on the 18th of February. A scarred city, blackened by fire, with evidences of destruction and ruin wrought by the enemy at almost every step, had at last come into their possession; but not until a heroic defence running through nearly four years, and at last only by the stratagem of a march many miles away from it. The appearance of the city was eloquent of the sacrifice and heroism of its people. A Yankee correspondent who had joined in the triumphal entry into Charleston thus described the scene before his eyes: "Not a building for blocks here that is exempt from the marks of shot and shell. All have suffered more or less. Here is a fine brown-stone bank building, vacant and deserted, with great gaping holes in the sides and roof, through which the sun shines and the rain pours, windows and sashes blown out by exploding shell within, plastering knocked down, counters torn up, floors crushed in, and fragments of mosaic pavement, broken and crushed, lying around on the floor, mingled with bits of statuary, stained glass, and broken parts of chandeliers. Ruin within and without, and its neighbor in no better plight. The churches, St. Michael's and St. Philip's, have not escaped the storms of our projectiles. Their roofs are perforated, their walls wounded, their pillars demolished, and within the pews filled with plastering. From Bay-street, studded with batteries, to Calhoun-street, our shells have carried destruction and desolation, and often death with them."

CAPTURE AND BURNING OF COLUMBIA.

While the Yankees were making a triumphal entry into the burning city of Charleston, a scene yet more terrible and dramatic was taking place in the capital of South Carolina. General Beauregard had evacuated Columbia in haste. Sherman entered it on the 18th of February. A white flag displayed from the steeple of the City Hall announced the surrender of the town. With bands playing, drum-corps beating, flags flying, and their men in step, the Yankee army marched down Main-street to the Capitol square.

No sooner had the enemy entered Columbia than a wild and savage scene of pillage commenced. Stragglers, "bummers," pontoon men, and the riffraff of the army were to be met in every street and almost every house. If they wanted a pair of boots they took them from one's feet. Watches were in constant demand—in several instances being snatched from the persons of ladies. Ear and finger-rings were taken by force, and, in isolated cases, the dresses of ladies were torn from their bodies by villains who expected to find jewels or plate concealed. Search for silver and provisions was made in every conceivable place. Ramrods were used as probes to indicate where boxes were buried; and gardens, outhouses, cellars, garrets, chimneys, and nooks, never thought of by anybody but a thief in search of plunder, were turned, so to speak, inside out. Rev. Mr. Shand, the Episcopalian clergyman, while conveying a trunk containing the communion service of silver from the church to the South Carolina College, was accosted by a Yankee and a negro, who compelled him, under threat of death, to give it up.

The conflagration which destroyed the city commenced about dusk. The fire started near the rear of the jail. A high wind prevailed, and in a short time the flames were in full and unconquerable progress, spreading rapidly in three directions—up and down Main-street and eastwardly. From ten until three o'clock in the morning the scene was appalling. The sky was one broad sheet of flame, above which, amid the lurid smoke, drifted in eddying circles a myriad of sparks. These falling scattered the conflagration on every side. The

monotone of the roaring, leaping, hissing tongues of flame, as they careered on their wild course, alone filled hearts with dismay. The air was like that of a furnace. Many of the streets were impassable. Frightened men, women, and children ran in all directions, some only to flee again from the fresh attacks of the destroying element. Property thrown out of houses was either burned or stolen. Many of the Federal soldiers, maddened by liquor, dashed through the city with lighted torches to inflame the dwellings yet untouched. Morning revealed to some extent the broad sweep of destruction. Four thousand or more citizens were houseless and homeless. From the State-house to Cotton Town, and an average of two or three squares on each side of Main-street, nothing but blackened ruins remained. Every vestige of the once busy street was gone.

After having completed, as far as possible, the destruction of Columbia, Sherman continued his march northward. The Seventeenth and Twentieth corps moved in two columns upon Winnsboro', thirty miles north, on the Columbia and Charlotte Railroad; the Seventeenth destroying the railroad, and twisting the rails so that they could not be used again. From Winnsboro', where they found many of the refugees from Charleston and Columbia, General Sherman sent Kilpatrick's cavalry still northward towards Chesterville, to keep up the delusion that he was moving on Charlotte, but Sherman himself with his main army moved directly eastward, crossing the Catawba or Wateree nearly east of Winnsboro', and moving his left wing directly towards Cheraw, while the right threatened Florence.

After leaving Columbia, the rapidly increasing mass of refugees, black and white, who followed the army, were organized into an emigrant train, and put under the charge of the officers and men who had escaped from the Confederate prisons at Salisbury and elsewhere on the route. Under the direction of their escort they foraged for themselves, and being supplied liberally with horses and mules, wagons and other vehicles, of which large numbers were taken along the route, they moved on with very little expense or trouble to the army. This organization, known as that of "Sherman's bummers," often mixed up with the regular troops of the army, carried devastation, ruin, and horror along the march. It was said, indeed,

that Sherman's march through the Carolinas was tracked by a column of smoke, and that stragglers never found any difficulty in rejoining the command, when this ghastly evidence of its march stood constantly in the sky.

At Winnsboro', private dwellings were entered ruthlessly; all kind of necessities and luxuries of life were stolen, and, in some cases, helpless women were cursed and threatened to be shot if they did not deliver up keys of apartments. This town was also fired. Charred ruins met the eye, where once the busy feet of men passed in the daily pursuits of life. Wedding-rings and mementos of deceased husbands or parents were stolen as ruthlessly as gold coin would have been; watches and jewelry were cut from the persons of ladies, and, in some instances, their shoes removed on the pretence of searching for rings.

Leaving this town, the enemy took their line of march on the State road leading to Blackstocks. On the route their road could be easily distinguished by tall chimneys standing solitary and alone, and blackened embers, as it were, laying at their feet. Every fine residence, all corn-cribs, smoke-houses, cotton-gins—all that could give comfort to man—were committed to the flames; dead animals—horses, mules, cows, calves, and hogs—slain by the enemy, were scattered along the road. The railroad track from Winnsboro' to about four hundred yards on the other side of Blackstocks was in one mass of ruins. Horses and mules that were hid in dense forests were found and taken. Corn, fodder, and shucks that the enemy could not use were burned; gentlemen were robbed of what funds they had about their person; watches were jerked from the pockets of both male and female; in truth every indignity and every insult that could be offered to citizens was perpetrated.*

* The following are extracts from some private letters giving some account of Sherman's pillagers in the Carolinas :

"MY DEAR — : Sherman has gone, and terrible has been the storm that has swept over us with his coming and going. They deliberately shot two of our citizens—murdered them in cold blood—one of them a Mr. Murphy, a wounded soldier, Confederate States Army. They hung up three others and one lady, merely letting them down just in time to save life, in order to make them tell where their valuables were concealed. There was no place, no chamber, trunk, drawer, desk, garret, closet, or cellar that was private to their unholy

On the 3d of March Sherman occupied Cheraw. The feint upon Charlotte was intended to uncover Fayetteville to Sherman and Goldsboro' to Schofield, who, with a large and victorious army, was sweeping up from the coast with reinforce-

eyes. Their rude hands spared nothing but our lives, and those they would have taken but they knew that therein they would only accomplish the death of a few helpless women and children—they would not in the least degree break or bend the spirit of our people. Squad after squad unceasingly came and went and tramped through the halls and rooms of our house day and night during the entire stay of the army.

"At our house they killed every chicken, goose, turkey, cow, calf, and every living thing, even to our pet dog. They carried off our wagons, carriages, and horses, and broke up our buggy, wheelbarrow, garden implements, axes, hatchets, hammers, saws, etc., and burned the fences. Our smoke-houses and pantry—that a few days ago were well stored with bacon, lard, flour, dried fruit, meal, pickles, preserves, etc.—now contain nothing whatever, except a few pounds of meal and flour, and five pounds of bacon. They took from old men, women, and children alike, every garment of wearing apparel save what we had on, not even sparing the napkins of infants! Blankets, sheets, quilts, etc., such as did not suit them to take away, they tore to pieces before our eyes. After destroying every thing we had, and taking from us every morsel of food (save the pittance I have mentioned), one of these barbarians had to add insult to injury by asking me 'what you (I) would live upon now?' I replied, 'Upon patriotism; I will exist upon the love of my country as long as life will last, and then I will die as firm in that love as the everlasting hills.'"

A lady residing in South Carolina, who was in the enemy's lines for five days, writes her experience to a friend in Augusta as follows:

"Pauline came rushing up to me saying the Yankees had come, A hasty glance from the window confirmed her words, and we instantly retreated to aunt's room. This being on the first floor, was speedily filled with armed men. At first I very politely unlocked several trunks, assuring them that they only contained ladies' apparel, but as the number increased we gladly retreated to the sitting-room, where the whole family soon collected. There we remained from twelve to six o'clock, while this band of one hundred and fifty men ransacked every nook and corner; breaking open trunks and boxes, singing, whistling, swearing. Many passed through the room in which we were. At first none addressed us. At last one young villain came in, fastened the door, demanded our watches, and using the most profane language and terrible threats, ordered us to confess where our gold and silver was buried; laid his hands on Pauline's shoulder and mine, while we obediently emptied our pockets. They then marched Dr. ——— into the entry, stripped the poor old gentleman to the waist, robbing him of the one thousand dollars he had succeeded in bringing from his own house, which meanwhile has been laid in ashes—so he is homeless. We have lost in silver, china, and glass. All our blankets, quilts, bowls, and all the pillow-cases were used as bags to remove provisions. Great destruction in clothing, dresses torn up, etc. Hardly a handkerchief in the house."

ments for Sherman, establishing a line of supplies as he moved.

On the afternoon and night of the 6th of March, the Yankee army crossed the Great Pedee River in safety, and swept forward the next day—the main army, in four columns, moving on Laurel Hill and Montpelier, North Carolina, and the cavalry, under Kilpatrick, guarding the extreme left, and approaching Rockingham, North Carolina, where they came in contact with Butler's division of Wade Hampton's cavalry, with which they had some desultory skirmishing. A long and heavy rain delayed somewhat the Yankee approach to Fayetteville, but that place was reached on the 11th of March.

Some more severe and important fighting than Sherman had yet experienced since he and Johnston parted at Atlanta was now to take place; the latter general having been put in command of the Confederate forces in the Carolinas.

On the 10th of March General Wade Hampton approached before daylight Kilpatrick's headquarters, at Monroe's plantation, and administered to him a severe lesson, taking guns and prisoners.

At Fayetteville Sherman communicated with Schofield at Wilmington. He had fixed upon the vicinity of Goldsboro' as the place where he would form a junction with Schofield, and the 22d of March as the time—before leaving Savannah—and having brought his army thus far in time, he was disposed to move slowly to allow Schofield time to reach the rendezvous.

On the 16th of March General Hardee, with about half a corps (Rhett's and Elliot's brigades), was intrenched between Black Creek and Cape Fear River, at no great distance from the confluence of these streams. This small detachment of Confederate force was attacked here by two corps of Sherman's veterans, under Slocum, together with Kilpatrick's cavalry. The Confederates held their ground with the most determined valor. Three different charges of the enemy were repulsed. At last, to prevent being flanked, General Hardee had to fall back with the loss of two guns. This engagement took place at Averysboro', on the Cape Fear River, about half-way between Raleigh and Fayetteville. The loss of the enemy was out of all proportion to our own. General Johnston tele-

graphed to Richmond that the total Confederate loss was four hundred and fifty ; that of the Yankees *thirty-three hundred*.

THE BATTLE OF BENTONVILLE.

On the 19th of March a yet more important engagement was to occur. It was Johnston's purpose to cripple Sherman, if possible, before he could effect a junction with Schofield ; and, accordingly, he brought what troops he had in hand by a forced march into position at Bentonville, intending to fling them upon Sherman's left wing, commanded by Slocum.

About nine o'clock in the morning the fight commenced. On the right, Bate's and Cleburne's division charged and carried two lines of breastworks, driving the enemy two miles. Hill, commanding Lee's corps, and Loring, commanding Stewart's corps, did similarly on the left. The Confederates fought gallantly. Three guns were taken from the enemy, and his whole line pushed back.

A mile in rear the enemy rallied upon fresh troops, but was forced back slowly, until six o'clock p. m., when, receiving more troops, he apparently assumed the offensive, which movement was resisted without difficulty until dark.

During the night the enemy threw up heavy intrenchments, and the next morning General Johnston did not think it advisable to renew the attack. The engagement had been a very severe one. The total loss of the Confederates was about twenty-five hundred. Although they had achieved a success, Johnston appears to have been well convinced that he had not force sufficient to cope with Sherman and resist his junction with Schofield. On the night of the 20th the enemy abandoned their works and moved towards Goldsboro'. General Johnston then withdrew towards Raleigh.

In the mean time, Schofield, from Newbern, had entered and occupied Goldsboro', and Terry, from Wilmington, had secured Cox's bridge crossing, and laid a pontoon bridge across the Neuse River. Sherman was thus in the position he had planned more than two months ago in Savannah ; he had brought up every part of the combination in perfect order ; and so far had achieved a success at once brilliant and com-

plete. On the 22d of March he published in Goldsboro' a congratulatory address to his troops. He said: "After a march of the most extraordinary character, nearly five hundred miles, over swamps and rivers deemed impassable to others, at the most inclement season of the year, and drawing our chief supplies from a poor and wasted country, we reach our destination in good health and condition."

We must leave Sherman at Goldsboro'—the proper termination of his campaign in the Carolinas. The position was critical enough for the Confederates. Between Sherman's army, augmented by the corps of Schofield and Terry, and the army of Grant, the Confederacy was in danger of being crushed. The two armies were separated by only one hundred and fifty miles, and a railroad, which could be rapidly put in order, connected them. No sooner had Sherman disposed his army in camp at Goldsboro' than he hastened to City Point, Virginia, for an interview with General Grant and President Lincoln. The results of that conference were soon to be known to the Confederacy, and meant any thing else than that "peace negotiation" into which some lively imaginations in Richmond construed this collection of distinguished persons.

CHAPTER X.

The date of distrust in the Southern mind.—Observation of General Lee.—A peculiar moral condition of the Confederacy.—Want of confidence in President Davis' administration.—Impatience of the prolongation of the war.—Davis' unpopularity.—Weak attempts in Congress at a counter-revolution.—General Lee made commander-in chief.—The title a nominal one.—The Virginia delegation and the President.—Mr. Seddon's resignation.—President Davis' defiance to Congress.—The Davis-Johnston imbroglio.—Senator Wigfall's speeches.—Johnston's restoration.—President Davis' opinion of homeopathy.—Sullen and indifferent disposition of the Southern people.—How they might have accomplished their independence.—Review of the military situation.—Analysis of the peace feeling in the North.—How it was likely to be developed by a long war.—The Union not the enemy's *sine qua non*.—Two contingencies that limited the war.—The worthless title of Yankee invasion.—"Cob-web" occupation of the Confederacy.—*Note*: an address in the Richmond newspapers.—The two fatal facts in the condition of the Confederacy.—THE FORTRESS MONROE COMMISSION.—How it was brought about.—The Yankee ultimatum.—Official narrative of the Confederate commissioners.—A new attempt to rally the spirit of the South.—The meeting at the African church in Richmond.—President Davis' boasts.—His noble allusion to history.—How the cause of the Confederacy was in danger.—PROPOSITION TO ARM THE SLAVES OF THE SOUTH.—Indicative of a desperate condition of the public mind.—General Lee's opinion.—The slaveholding interest.—Its selfishness and insolence.—A weak conclusion of the matter.—"Catching at straws" in the Confederate Congress.—Character of this body.

IN the winter of 1864-5, intelligent minds in the Confederacy became, for the first time, impressed with the idea that its victory and independence were no longer certain conclusions, and conceived a painful distrust as to the issues of the war.

General Lee, a man who used few words, and had the faculty of going directly to the point of a discussion, and putting sagacious judgments in plain phrases, once said of the conduct of the people of the Confederacy in the war, that "they were only half in earnest." But this remark, unlike most of Lee's judgments, was only half true. No one can doubt that the Confederates had been thoroughly and terribly in earnest in the first periods of the war; and if, in its later periods, they appeared to lack earnestness, the truth was they did not lack it so much as they did confidence in their rulers, and a dispo-

sition to continue the war under an administration, whose squanderings and make-shifts turned all the sacrifices of the people to naught. In the later periods of the terrible conflict through which the Confederacy had passed, its moral condition was peculiar. All confidence in the administration at Richmond was gone; the people were heart-broken; they had been cheated too often by the highly colored prophesies of President Davis, and those boastful predictions, which are unfailing characteristics of the weak mind; they saw that their sacrifices were squandered, and their most patriotic efforts misapplied; they were so far demoralized by want of confidence in their authorities, and, in some instances, by positive antipathy to them, that it may be said that in the last periods of the war, a majority of the people of the Confederacy actually deprecated any single success, and did not desire a victory to their arms which might give a new occasion of prolongation of the war—for having already taken it for granted as hopeless, they prayed in their hearts that it would be closed at the earliest moment. They did not desire the delay of any mere fluctuations of fortune, which they were sure was to be adverse at the last. "If failure was to ensue, then the sooner the better." Such was the phrase of the vulgar judgment which everywhere in the Confederacy assailed the ears of nobler and more resolute men.

Whatever share the maladministration at Richmond may have had in producing this public demoralization, it is not to be excused entirely on this account. It involved with it much that was shameful, for which the people had themselves to blame, and to charge to the account of their own disposition to let the war lapse to its final conclusions of defeat and ruin.

For months Mr. Davis had been a President, with nothing at his back but a clique of office-holders. The people had become thoroughly estranged from him. If all did not speak of him in terms of derision or hate, there were but few who named him without expressions of distrust. But although the country was thus thoroughly dissatisfied with Mr. Davis' administration, there was not nerve enough in it, not courage enough among its public men, to overthrow his rule, or put it under a severe and effective check.

In the first months of 1865 there were introduced in Congress some partial but remarkable measures to correct the

administration. They indicated public sentiment; but they failed and utterly broke down in their execution, and left Davis the defiant and angry master of the field.

The first of these was an act of the Confederate Congress making General Lee commander-in-chief of the armies. The intention of this law was never executed. Lee was unwilling to accept practically its trust; he was unwilling, too, to break a personal friendship with the President; and so he remained in immediate command of the Army of Northern Virginia, and Davis continued in the practical control of the armies at large, without any diminution of his power or insolence.

In January, 1865, the Virginia delegation in the House of Representatives, headed by Mr. Bocoek, the speaker of the House, addressed to the President an earnest, but most respectful paper, expressing their want of confidence in the capacity and services of his cabinet, the members of which for four years had been mere figure-heads in Richmond. Mr. Davis resented the address as impertinent. Mr. Seddon, the secretary of war, a citizen of Virginia, recognizing the censure as coming from Virginians, and, therefore, as peculiarly applicable to himself, and conscious of the excessive unpopularity he had incurred in the administration of his office—an ugly little circumstance of which had recently come to light, namely, that while he had been impressing the grain of the Virginia farmers at nominal prices, he had sold his own crop of wheat to the Government at forty dollars a bushel—insisted upon resigning, and thus appeasing the public indignation against himself. Mr. Davis opposed this action of his secretary, sought to dissuade him from it; and when Mr. Seddon did resign, the President went out of his way to declare in a letter, published in the newspapers, that the event of this resignation would in no manner change the policy or course of his administration, and thus, in words not to be mistaken, threw down his defiance to Congress and the country.

Another point which Congress made with the President was the restoration of General Joseph E. Johnston to command. For weeks in the Confederate Senate, Mr. Wigfall, of Texas—a course, heavy man, of large brain, who, under an unsentimental exterior, possessed more of the courage and fire of the orator than any other man in the South—dealt his sledge-ham-

mer blows on the President, who, he declared, not satisfied with persecuting Johnston, was trying to make him the scape-goat for his own sins. The debate in the Johnston-Davis imbroglio was a memorable one in the dreary annals of the Confederate Congress. The fierce impatience of Mr. Wigfall more than once caused him to launch into philippics against the President, which most of the Richmond newspapers did not dare to report. The President was denounced without mercy. "He was," said Mr. Wigfall, summing up on one occasion his points of indictment, "an amalgam of malice and mediocrity."

The President did restore Johnston; but under circumstances which made it no concession to the public. To an intimate friend he remarked with grim humor, that "if the people wanted to try homœopathic treatment—*similia similibus curantur*—he would give them another dose of Johnston." He restored this commander, as he well knew, to the conduct of a campaign that was already lost; he put him in command of a broken and disorganized force that Sherman had already swept before him through two States into the forests of North Carolina; and Johnston was right when some weeks before he wrote to a private friend that he was quite sure that if the authorities at Richmond restored him to command, they were resolved not to act towards him in good faith and with proper support, but to put him in circumstances where defeat was inevitable, and thus confirm to the populace the military judgment of President Davis.

The people of the Confederacy, towards the final periods of the war, may be said to have looked with folded arms upon the sins of its Government, and to have regarded its general tendency to disaster and ruin with a sullen disposition to let matters take their own course, or with weak and blank despair. These sins were not only the fruit of Mr. Davis' violent and imperious animosities; they covered the whole conduct of his administration, and involved as much the want of capacity as that of official candor and personal impartiality. Everywhere the military establishment was falling to decay, and although the Confederacy was still full of fighting men and war material, there was nothing but the dregs of its resources at the practical command of the Government.

The most remarkable fact in the later days of the Confed-

eracy was, that while the country was really capable of fighting the war indefinitely, and accomplishing its independence, if by nothing more, yet surely by the virtue of endurance, it had in active employment but the smallest portion of its resources, and was loitering on the brink of destruction at a time when victory, *with proper efforts*, was never more surely in its grasp.

To understand this great and melancholy fact in the history of the war—that the Confederates, with an abler government and a more resolute spirit, might have accomplished their independence—we have only to review, with candor, the situation as it existed in the opening of the memorable year of 1865.

In the summer of 1864 everywhere the thought of the North was peace; not so much in the newspapers, whose office, especially with the Yankees, was rather to disguise public sentiment than to express or apply it; but in every circle of conversation, and every quarter where men dared to unmask their minds and to substitute their true convictions for the stereotypes of affectation, there was to be found a real desire for peace, which had almost ripened into a popular demand, ready to define its terms and resolved to insist upon its concession. The Chicago Convention meant peace; this and that man, least suspected of generosity to the Confederacy or of deference to truth, privately confessed the war to be a failure; even Republicans of Mr. Lincoln's school, seizing upon certain amiable expressions in the Confederate Congress of the summer of 1864, wanted to know if they might not mean some accommodation of the question of the war, and replied to them with those affectations of generosity with which the dexterous cowardice of the Yankee is always ready to cover his sense of defeat.

This disposition of the public mind in the North was easily accounted for, when it was closely observed. It was clearly not the fruit of any decisive disasters to the Northern arms in the summer campaign of 1864. But that campaign had been negative. Atlanta had not fallen. All the engagements in Northern Georgia had not amounted, as Johnston said, to the sum of more than one battle, and it was yet doubtful on which side to strike the average of success. Richmond was erect and

defiant; and Lee's army had given new and conspicuous proofs of fortitude at Cold Harbour and Petersburg. Nowhere, then, could the enemy find any prospect of the speedy termination of the war; and though he had searched every link of the armor of the Confederacy he had been unable to plant anywhere a serious wound. It was simply because the enemy's campaign was negative; simply in prospect of a prolongation of the war that, in midsummer of 1864, the Yankee public halted in its opinions and seriously meditated a proposition of peace.

The great lesson which the South was to learn of public opinion in the North was this: that the prospect of a long war was quite as sure to obtain the success and independence of the Confederacy, as the positive victories of her arms. It might not have been so in the first periods of the war, when the resolution of the enemy was fresh and patient, and the Union was then really the apple of his eye. But it was when patience had been worn threadbare by promises—when expectation had stood on tip-toe until it had ached; when the sentiment of Union had lost all its original inspiration; when “the Union as it was” had become more and more impossible to the hopes of the intelligent, and the attempt to realize it had fallen from the resolution of a sovereign necessity to a mere preference of alternatives—that we find the enemy quite as likely to be defeated by the prospect of a prolonged war, as by the dint of positive disaster, and, in fact, meditating more anxiously the question of Southern endurance, than the immediate fortunes of any military campaign.

It was a great mistake to suppose that in these later years of the war, the North was fighting for the Union as the *sine qua non*, the indispensable thing. That was the clack of Yankee newspapers and the drone of demagogues. But the facts were to the contrary. It was to be admitted that the North, in the development of her resources in the war, and the discovery contemporary with it of an almost fabulous wealth in her oil regions and mines, and new fields of enterprise opened along the entire slope of the Rocky Mountains, had obtained a confidence which had assured her, among other things, that, even apart from the South, she had in herself the elements of a great national existence. It was this swollen wealth—some

of it the windfalls of a mysterious Providence—which had appeased much of that avarice which formed so large a share in the Northern desire for the Union. Again, as the war had progressed, it had become more and more obvious to countless intelligent persons in the North, that it had wasted what was most desirable in the Union; destroyed its *esprit*; left nothing to be recovered but its shadow, and that along with such paltry recovery of a mere name, were to be taken the consequences of such despotic government as would be necessary to hold two hostile countries under a common rule. It was thus that the sentiment of the Union had lost much of its power in the North. The first fervors of the war were scarcely now to be discovered among a people who had chosen to carry on hostilities by the mercenary hands of foreigners and negroes, and had devised a system of substitution—a vicarious warfare—to an extent that was absolutely without parallel in the history of any modern nation.

All persons in the North, with the exception of some hundreds, professed that they preferred the Union; it was a universal desire spoken everywhere; but spoken only as a preference and desire, and no longer as a passion that insisted upon an object which it considered death and ruin to dispense with. Of all who declared for the Union, but few were ready to testify sincerely that they were for it at all hazards and consequences. Whatever might be the convenient language or the fulsome protestation of public opinion in the North, two things were certain.

First, that the North would not insist upon the Union in plain prospect of a war indefinitely prolonged.

And second, that the North would never fight the war beyond that moderate point of success on the part of the South, where she would be disposed to accommodate the enemy with certain treaty favors which might stand in lieu of the old Union, and where she would not be quite confident enough in her position to insist upon a severe independence.

It was thus that the war, on the part of the North, was limited by contingencies, which were very far short of decisive results one way or the other, and which might transpire even without any very signal successes of the Confederate arms.

What had been said of the peace movement in the North

in the summer of 1864, before the fall of Atlanta, has its application to the times of which we are now writing. That movement was simply the result of a conviction, not that the South was about to accomplish a positive triumph, but that she was able to endure the war much longer than had been expected, and yet had not reached that point of confidence where she would not be likely to make valuable concessions to the North for the early and graceful acknowledgment of her independence. That acknowledgment the North was then on the eve of making under certain disguises, it is true, of party convenience, but none the less certainly because it sought decent excuse for the act. The Democratic party was then well nigh a unit on the subject of peace. "Burn my letter," wrote a distinguished politician of New England to a Confederate then in New York; "but when you get to Richmond, hasten to President Davis, and tell him the Chicago Convention means peace, and nothing but peace." It was the military events which followed that interrupted this resolution, and showed how little there was of principle or of virtuous intention in Yankee parties; and with the fall of Atlanta, Savannah, Wilmington, and Charleston, and Sherman's campaign of magnificent distances, the Northern mind had again become inflamed with the fervor of new hopes, and clamored for unconditional war, when it thought that it was in the last stages of success.

Yet in face of this clamor it was plain enough that if the Confederates could ever regain substantially nothing more than the *status quo* of seven months ago; if they could ever present to the North the same prospect of a long war as they did then, and put before them the weary task of overcoming the fortitude of a brave people, they would have peace and independence in their grasp. It was a vulgar mistake that to accomplish our success in this war we had to retrieve all of the past and recover by arms all the separate pieces of our territory. It was to be remembered that we were fighting on the defensive, and had only to convince the enemy that we were able to protect the vital points of our country to compel him to a peace in which all was surrendered that he had overrun, and all the country that he held by the worthless title of invasion, would fall from him as by the law of gravitation.

It may be said briefly that if the Confederates could only regain the situation of the last summer, or even if they would only give a proof to the enemy that they were not at the extremity of their resources, or at the last limits of resolution—that they were able and determined to fight the war indefinitely—they had then accomplished the important and vital conditions of peace. Nor was the first impossible—to recover substantially, in all important respects, the losses of the past few months, and even add to the *status quo* of last summer new elements of advantage for us. To defeat Sherman at any stage short of Richmond would be to reopen and recover all the country he had overrun. If the enemy was left in possession of the seaports, these had but little value to us as ports of entry, and were but picket-posts in our system of defences. Sherman's campaign clearly came to naught if he could not reach Grant—nothing left of it but the brilliant zig-zag of a raid vanishing as heat lightning in the skies. The consequences of Sherman's misadventure would be obvious enough. Grant's army, without the looked-for aid from the Carolinas, was by no means certain of the capture of Richmond. It was true that Grant was within a few miles of the Confederate capital, when the same time last year he was on the Rapidan. But that was a fool's measure of danger, for in each case we had the same army shielding Richmond, and whether that shield was broken ten or one hundred miles away was of no importance to the interest it covered.

There was nothing really desperate in the military situation of the Confederacy, unless to fools and cowards who drew lines on paper to show how the Yankees were at this place and at that place, and thought that this cob-web occupation of the country, where the enemy had no garrisons and no footholds, indicated the extent of Yankee conquest and gave the true measure of the remnant of the Confederacy! And yet this was too much the popular fashion of the time in estimating the military situation. Men were drawing for themselves pictures of despair out of what were, to those who thought profoundly and bravely, no more important than the passages of the hour. It is not to be disguised that the condition of the Confederacy was demoralized in the extreme, and that it was difficult to reorganize, as the patriots of 1861, men who were now exclaim-

ing everywhere their despair, and counselling embassies of submission.*

Briefly, if the fatal facts in the condition of the Confede-

* In March, 1865, the author printed an address in the Richmond newspapers, of which the following was the concluding portion. The occasion and spirit of this address are significant enough of what was taking place in Richmond at that time :

"I am determined to express the truth, no matter how painful to myself or unwelcome to others. In the first period of this war who was not proud of the Confederacy and its heroic figure in history! Yet now it is to be confessed that a large portion of our people have fallen below the standards of history, and hold no honorable comparison with other nations that have fought and struggled for independence. It is easy for the tongue of the demagogue to trip with flattery on the theme of the war; but when we come to the counsels of the intelligent the truth must be told. We are no longer responding to the lessons and aspirations of history. You speak of the scarcity of subsistence. But Prussia, in her wars, drained her supplies until black bread was the only thing eat in the king's palace; and yet, under Frederick, she won not only her independence, but a position among the five great powers of Europe. You speak of the scarcity of men. Yet with a force not greater than that with which we have only to hold an invaded country and maintain the defensive, Napoleon fought his splendid career, and completed a circle of victories that touched the boundaries of Europe.

"It is enough to sicken the heart with shame and vexation that now, when, of all times, it is most important to convince the enemy of our resolution—now, when such a course, for peculiar reasons, will insure our success—there are men who not only whine on the streets about making terms with the enemy, but intrude their cowardice into the official places of the Government, and, sheltered by secret sessions and confidential conversations, roll the word 'reconstruction' under the tongue. Shame upon the Congress that closed its doors that it might better consult of dishonorable things! Shame upon those leaders who should encourage the people, and yet have broken down their confidence by private conversations; and who, while putting in newspapers some cheap words of patriotism, yet in the same breath express their despair by a suspicious cant about trusting in Providence, and go off to talk submission with their intimates in a corner! Shame upon those of the people who have now no other feeling in the war than an exasperated selfishness! who are ready to sink, if they can carry down in their hands some little trash of *property*! who will give their sons to the army, but not their precious negro slaves! who are for hurrying off embassies to the enemy to know at what price of dishonor they may purchase some paltry remnants of their possessions! Do these men ever think of the retributions of history?

"When Cato the Younger was pursued to Utica by the victorious arms of Cæsar, Plutarch relates of him on this occasion certain conversations and sentiments which singularly apply to our own condition in a besieged city, and may almost be taken as repeated in the streets of Richmond :

"'One of the Council,' writes Plutarch, 'observed the expediency of a decree for enfranchising the slaves, and many commended the motion. Cato,

racy at the time of which we write, are to be summed up, they are simply these:

1. A want of confidence in the administration of Mr. Davis

however, said: 'He would not do that, because it was neither just nor lawful; but such as their masters would voluntarily discharge, he would receive, provided they were of proper age to bear arms.' This many promised to do; and Cato withdrew, after having ordered lists to be made out of all that should offer.

All of the patrician order with great readiness enfranchised and armed their slaves; but as for the three hundred, who dealt in traffic and loans of money at high interest, and whose slaves were a considerable part of their fortune, the impression which Cato's speech had made upon them did not last long. As some bodies readily receive heat, and as easily grow cold again when the fire is removed, so the sight of Cato warmed and liberalized these traders; but when they came to consider the matter among themselves, the dread of Cæsar soon put to flight their reverence for Cato and for virtue. For thus they talked: 'What are we, and what is the man whose orders we refuse to receive? Is it not Cæsar, into whose hands the whole power of the Roman empire is fallen? And surely none of us is a Scipio, a Pompey, or a Cato. Shall we, at a time when their fears make all men entertain sentiments beneath their dignity—shall we, in Utica, fight for the liberty of Rome with a man against whom Cato and Pompey the Great durst not make a stand in Italy? Shall we enfranchise our slaves to oppose Cæsar, who have no more liberty ourselves than that conqueror is pleased to leave us? Ah! wretches that we are! Let us at last know ourselves, and send deputies to intercede with him for mercy.' They told Cato that they had resolved to send deputies to Cæsar to intercede first and principally for him. If that request should not be granted, they would have no obligation to him for any favor to themselves, but as long as they had breath would fight for Cato. Cato made his acknowledgments for their regard, and advised them to send immediately to intercede for themselves. 'For me,' said he, 'intercede not. It is for the conquered to turn suppliants, and for those who have done an injury to beg pardon. For my part, I have been unconquered through life, and superior in the things I wished to be; for in justice and honor I am Cæsar's superior.'

"The arguments of the traders and time servers in Utica are not unknown in Richmond. But shall we not also find in this city something of the aspirations of Cato—a determination, even if we are overcome by force, to be unconquered in spirit, and, in any and all events, to remain superior to the enemy—in honor.

"I do not speak to you, my countrymen, idle sentimentalism. I firmly believe that the great commonwealth of Virginia, and this city, which has a peculiar title to whatever there is of good and illustrious report in this war, have been recently, and are yet in some measure on the verge of questions which involve an interest immeasurably greater than has yet been disclosed in this contest—that of their historical and immortal honor.

"I know—I have had opportunities of informing myself—that there are influences at work to place the State of Virginia, in certain contingencies, in

—such as was never before exhibited between a people and its rulers in a time of revolution.

communication with the public enemy, for terms of peace, which cannot be otherwise than coupled with the condition of her submission to the Federal authority. The extent of this conspiracy against the honor of Virginia has been screened by secret sessions, and been covered up by half-mouthing suggestions, and the *ifs* and *ands* of men who are not yet ready to disclose their corruption, and to spit from their lips the rottenness in their hearts. I know the fashionable arguments of these men. 'If there is to be a wreck,' say they, 'why not save what we can from it?' 'Honor,' they say, 'is a mere rhetorical laurel;' 'General Lee talks like a school-girl when he speaks of preferring to die on the battle-field to getting the best terms of submission he can;' 'let us be done with this sentimental rubbish, and look to the care of our substantial interests.'

"My friends, this is not rubbish. The glory of history is indifferent to events; it is simply honor. The name of Virginia in this war is historically and absolutely more important to us than any other element of the contest; and the coarse time-server who would sell an immortal title of honor as a trifling sentimentalism, and who has constantly in his mouth the phrase of 'substantial interests,' is the inglorious wretch who laughs at history and grovels in the calculations of the brute.

"Those who have lived entirely in the South since the commencement of this war have little idea of the measure of honor which Virginia has obtained in it, and the consideration she has secured in the eyes of the world. One away from home, finds even in intercourse with our enemies, that the name of Virginian is an ornament to him, and that the story of this her heroic capital—the record of Richmond—is universally accepted in two hemispheres as the most illustrious episode of the war. Honor such as this is not a piece of rhetoric or a figure of speech; it is something to be cherished under all circumstances, and to be preserved in all events.

"It is scarcely necessary to say that I regard subjugation but as the vapor of our fears. But if remote possibilities are to be regarded, I have simply to say, that in all events and extremities, all chances and catastrophes, I am for Virginia going down to history, proudly and starkly, with the title of a subjugated people—a title not inseparable from true glory, and which has often claimed the admiration of the world—rather than as a people who ever submitted, and bartered their honor for the mercy of an enemy—in our case a mercy whose *pittance* would be as a mess of pottage weighed against an immortal patrimony!

"The issue I would put before you is: No submission; no State negotiations with the enemy; no conventions for such objects, however proper for others. Let Virginia stand or fall by the fortunes of the Confederate arms, with her spotless honor in her hands.

"If Virginia accepts the virtuous and noble alternative, she saves, in all events, her honor, and by the resolution which it implies, may hope to secure a positive and glorious victory; and I, among the humblest of her citizens, will be proud to associate myself with a fate which, if not happy, at least can

2. And as main consequence of that want of confidence, when all measures to repair it had failed, a general breaking down of the public virtue, and the debasement of a people who, having lost hope in the existing order—rather the existing disorder—and having no heart for a new experiment, or thinking it too late, descend to the condition of time-servers, and those who tamely and infamously submit to fortune.

THE FORTRESS MONROE COMMISSION.

But another and last appeal was to be made to the resolution of the South.

In January, 1865, Mr. Francis P. Blair, of Maryland, made several visits to Richmond, which were the occasion of much speculation and curiosity in the public mind. He had gone to Richmond with Mr. Lincoln's pass; but the objects of his mission were not committed to paper. However, they were soon developed. On his return to Washington, Mr. Blair showed Mr. Lincoln a letter which President Davis had written, stating that Mr. Blair was at liberty to say to Mr. Lincoln that Mr. Davis was now, as he always had been, willing to send commissioners, if assured they would be received, or to receive any that should be sent; that he was not disposed to find obstacles in forms. He would send commissioners to confer with the Northern President with a view to the restoration of peace between the two countries, if he could be assured they would be received.

Mr. Lincoln, therefore, on the 18th day of January, addressed a note to Mr. Blair, in which, after acknowledging that he had read the note of Mr. Davis, he said that he was, and always should be, willing to receive any agent that Mr. Davis, or any other influential person now actually resisting the authority of the Government, might send to confer in-

never be ignoble. But, if she chooses to submit, and make terms for Yankee clemency, the satisfaction will at least remain to me of not sharing in the dishonor of my native State, and of going to other parts of the world, where I may say: 'I, too, was a Virginian, but not of those who sold the jewels of her history for the baubles and cheats of her conquerors.' "

formally with him, with a view to the restoration of peace to the people of "our common country."

In consequence of this notification President Davis requested Vice-President Stephens, Senator Hunter, and Judge John A. Campbell, to proceed through the lines to hold a conference with Mr. Lincoln, or such persons as he might depute to represent him. The following report, made by the Confederate commissioners, gives the official narrative of the affair :

RICHMOND, February 6th.

To the President of the Confederate States :

SIR—Under your letter of appointment of commissioners, of the 8th, we proceeded to seek an informal conference with Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, upon the subject mentioned in the letter. A conference was granted, and took place on the 30th, on board the steamer anchored in Hampton Roads, where we met President Lincoln and Hon. Mr. Seward, secretary of State of the United States. It continued for several hours, and was both full and explicit. We learned from them that the message of President Lincoln to the Congress of the United States, in December last, explains clearly his sentiments as to the terms, conditions, and mode of proceeding by which peace can be secured to the people ; and we were not informed that they would be modified or altered to obtain that end. We understood from him that no terms or proposals of any treaty or agreements looking to an ultimate settlement would be entertained or made by him with the authorities of the Confederate States, because that would be recognition of their existence as a separate power, which, under no circumstances, would be done; and for like reasons, that no such terms would be entertained by him from the States separately ; that no extended truce or armistice, as at present advised, would be granted or allowed, without the satisfaction or assurance in advance, of the complete restoration of the authority of the constitution and laws of the United States over all places within the States of the Confederacy ; that whatever consequence may follow from the re-establishment of that authority, it must be accepted ; but all individuals subject to the pains and penalties under the laws of the United States, might rely upon a very liberal use of the power confided to him to remit those pains and penalties if peace be restored. During the conference, the proposed amendments to the constitution of the United States, adopted by Congress on the 31st, was brought to our notice. These amendments provide that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except for crime, should exist within the United States or any place within its jurisdiction, and Congress should have power to enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation. Of all the correspondence that preceded the conference herein mentioned, and leading to the same, you have heretofore been informed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servants.

A. H. STEPHENS,
R. M. T. HUNTER,
J. A. CAMPBELL.

Of the conference Mr. Seward testified that "the Richmond

party approached the discussion rather indirectly, and at no time did they make categorical demands, or tender formal stipulations or absolute refusals; nevertheless, during the conference, which lasted four hours, the several points at issue between the Government and the insurgents were distinctly raised and discussed fully, intelligently, and in an amicable spirit. What the insurgent party seemed chiefly to favor was a postponement of the question of separation upon which the war was waged, and a mutual direction of the efforts of the Government, as well as those of the insurgents, to some extraneous policy or scheme for a season, during which passions might be expected to subside, and the armies be reduced, and trade and intercourse between the people of both sections be resumed."

The proposition which looked to an armistice or truce was distinctly answered by Mr. Lincoln, who stated that he would agree to no cessation or suspension of hostilities unless on the basis of the disbandment of the Confederate forces. There were no notes of the conference. There was no attendance of clerks or secretaries; and nothing was written or read. But the result of the whole conversation, which was earnest and free, may be summarily stated to have shown that the enemy refused to enter into negotiations with the Confederate States, or any of them separately, or give to their people any other terms or guarantees than those which Congress might grant; or to permit the Southern people to have a vote on any other basis than unconditional submission to their rule, coupled with the acceptance of the recent legislation at Washington, including an amendment to the Constitution for the emancipation of all negro slaves.

The failure of the Fortress Monroe commission was made the occasion in the South of a new attempt to rally the spirit of its people, and to infuse into the war a new element of desperate passion. The people were told that the result of the conference at Fortress Monroe showed plainly enough that every avenue to peace was closed, except such as might be carved out by the sword. It was calculated ingeniously enough that the party in the South which had so long clamored for negotiations with Washington would now abandon its visions of reconciliation and generosity, and give in their adhesion to a renewed and even desperate prosecution of the war.

These expectations were not realized. The attempt to raise the drooping spirits of the South, and to introduce, as some of the public men in Richmond fondly imagined, a new era of resolution and devotion in the war, shamefully failed. The Fortress Monroe affair produced in the Confederacy a feeble flare of excitement which was soon extinguished. A mass-meeting was called at the African church in Richmond, that the people might renew their testimony of devotion to the Confederacy. The meeting was held at high noon; all business in the city of Richmond was suspended, as if to give extraordinary solemnity to the occasion; fiery addresses were made, and tokens of enthusiasm were said in the newspapers to have been abundant. But speeches and hurrahs are cheap things. The public mind of the South made but a sickly response to what was undoubtedly, in all its circumstances, one of the most powerful appeals ever calculated to stir the heart and nerve the resolution of a people fighting for liberty; and in its relapse into the abject and timid counsels of the submissionists, exhibited a want of spirit which, it must be confessed, must ever make a painful and humiliating page in the history of the Confederacy.

Mr. Davis also spoke at the African church. He did not omit the occasion of exhorting the people. But he unfortunately fell into that style of boastful prediction and bombastic speech which was characteristic of all his public addresses; which was evidence of his weak mind; and which furnished the grave ground of accusation against him that in his public declarations he never dealt with the people in a proper spirit of candor. He declared that the military affairs of the Confederacy were in excellent condition; he hinted at great victories which were about to be accomplished; he boasted that "Sherman's march through Georgia would be his last;" he completed his rhetorical flourish with the strange prediction that before the summer solstice fell upon the country it would be the Yankees who would be asking for terms of peace and the grace of conferences in which the Confederates might make known their demands.

But in this unfortunate address of the President there was one just and remarkable sentiment. He referred to the judgment of history upon Kossuth, who had been so weak as to

abandon the cause of Hungary with an army of *thirty thousand* men in the field ; and spoke of the disgrace of surrender, if the Confederates should abandon their cause with an army on our side and actually in the field more numerous than those which had made the most brilliant pages in European history ; an army more numerous than that with which Napoleon achieved his reputation ; an army standing among its homesteads ; an army in which each individual man was superior in every martial quality to each individual man in the ranks of the invader, and reared with ideas of independence, and in the habits of command !

It was very clear that the Confederacy was very far from the historical necessity of subjugation. But it was at any time near the catastrophe of a panic. If the cause was to be lost, it was to be so by weak despair ; by the cowardice of suicide ; by the distress of weak minds.

PROPOSITION TO ARM THE SLAVES OF THE SOUTH.

A measure indicative of the desperate condition of the Southern mind was that to extend the conscription to the slaves. A proposition to arm the negroes of the South, and use them as soldiers in the Confederate Army, had been debated in the Richmond press as early as the fall of 1864. It was favored by General Lee, but variously received by the general public. There were many persons who argued that the negro might be effectively used in this new department of service ; that military experience had shown that a soldier could be made of any thing that had arms and legs ; that the United States had formerly recruited its regular army from the dregs of humanity ; that the experience of the North with the negro had shown him to be a serviceable soldier ; and that the South could offer him superior inducements to good service, by making him a freeman in his own home, and could give him officers who could better understand his nature, and better prompt his good qualities, than his Yankee military taskmasters. These views were encouraged by General Lee. Indeed, this distinguished officer made no secret of his opinion, that the military service of the slave should be secured on the basis of

general emancipation; arguing, with no little ingenuity, that the institution of slavery had been so shaken by the invasions and raids of the enemy, which had penetrated every portion of the country, that its practical value had become but a small consideration in view of the insecure tenure of the property; that it might, eventually, be broken up if the war continued; and that, by a decree of emancipation, the South might make a virtue of necessity, remove a cause of estrangement, however unjust, between it and the Christian world, and possibly neutralize that large party in the North, whose sympathy and interest in the war were mainly employed with the negro.

The question divided the country. The slaveholding interest, in its usual narrow spirit—in its old character of a greedy, vulgar, insolent aristocracy—took the alarm, and in Congress and in the newspapers, proclaimed that the use of negroes as soldiers was the entering wedge of Abolition; that it would stultify the whole cause of the Confederacy; that it would give up what they falsely imagined to be the leading object of the war—the protection of the interests of less than a quarter of a million of people who owned slaves in the South. The *Charleston Mercury* declared that if the slaves were armed, South Carolina could no longer have any interest in prosecuting the war.

But beyond the opposition of the slaveholders and the cotton aristocrats, there were many intelligent men in the South who seriously doubted both the capacity and fidelity of the negro as a Confederate soldier. General Lee and many of his distinguished officers were not among these.

A majority of the Confederate Army were probably in favor of the experiment of negro soldiers; and many who doubted their efficiency at the front were persuaded that they might be made useful in other parts of the military field. General Ewell, who commanded in the Department of Henrico, declared that the employment of the negroes in the trenches, around Richmond, would relieve fifteen thousand white soldiers, who might be used on the enemy's front, and thus make an important accession to our forces actually in the field.

The action of the Confederate Congress with reference to the military employment of the negro was characteristic of that body. The subject was debated threadbare, discussed

and dissected in open and secret session ; but no practical action could be obtained on the matter, but what was too late in respect of time, and absurdly small with reference to the measure of the necessities by which legislation on the subject had been invoked.

Congress took no action on the subject until at the heel of its session. A bill was passed on the 7th of March authorizing the President to ask and accept from the owners of negro slaves as many able-bodied negroes as he might deem expedient, to perform military service in any capacity he might direct, and providing that nothing in the act should be construed to alter the existing relation between master and slaves.

The entire results of this ridiculously small and visionary legislation, which proposed to obtain negro soldiers from such volunteers as their masters might patriotically dedicate to the Confederate service, and was ominously silent on the subject of their freedom, were two fancy companies raised in the city of Richmond, who were allowed to give balls at the Libby, and to parade in Capitol Square, and were scarcely intended to be more than decoys to obtain sable recruits. But they served not even this purpose. The measure passed by Congress may be taken, indeed, as an indication of that vague desperation in the Confederacy which caught at straws, and had not nerve enough to make a practical and persistent effort at safety.

The Congress of the Confederate States was a weak, spasmodic body. There was no organization of opinion in it ; no leaders ; plenty of idle debate, capricious measures, weak re- crimination, and but little of the sense and order of legislative assemblies. It went in and out of secret session almost every twenty-four hours ; it was fruitful of propositions without results ; and it finally adjourned on the 18th of March, after a session of four months, in which it had failed to enact any effective measure to recruit the army, to improve the finances, to mobilize the subsistence of the country, or, in fact, to serve one single important interest in the Confederacy.

CHAPTER XI.

The last address and appeal of the Confederate Congress.--The war in a geographical point of view.--THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS AND PRESIDENT DAVIS.--THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS.--A sharp reprimand.--A committee of the Senate reply to President Davis.--Misadministration in the War Department.--Two-thirds of the Confederate Army absentees.--Lee loses nearly half his army by desertions.--The other half threatened with starvation.--Ample supply of food in the country.--The fault in the Commissary Department.--Commissary Northrop a "pepper-doctor" as the favorite of Davis.--Analysis of President Davis' character for firmness.--How Northrop starved Richmond.--HISTORY OF THE CONFEDERATE COMMISSARIAT.--Secret testimony in Congress.--President Davis' refusal to trade cotton for meat.--Persistent delusion about "king cotton."--Venality of the enemy.--Davis takes no advantage of it.--Record of the rations in Lee's army.--Startling statistics.--Attempts to get meat from Europe.--General Lee's army without meat.--His telegram to President Davis.--The necessities of the Commissary Department summed up in secret session of Congress.--But little done to meet them.--How the cause of the Confederacy would have failed without a catastrophe of arms.--The military narrative resumed.--MILITARY EVENTS IN VIRGINIA IN THE WINTER OF 1864-5.--SHERIDAN'S RAID.--Thirteen counties traversed.--Amount of destruction accomplished by the enemy.--THE RICHMOND LINES.--HATCHER'S RUN.--Extension of Grant's line.--BATTLE OF HARES HILL.--Gallantry of Gordon's command.--Vigor and brilliancy of the fighting of the Confederates.--No decisive results.

On the occasion of what was to be its final adjournment, Congress published an address to the people of the Confederate States. It was more prolix than other documents of this sort. But it contained one just and admirable reflection, to which we have already referred in the pages of the preceding chapter.

It said: "The extent of our territory, the food-producing capacity of our soil, the amount and character of our population, are elements of strength which, carefully husbanded and wisely employed, are amply sufficient to insure our final triumph. The passage of hostile armies through our country, though productive of cruel suffering to our people, and great pecuniary loss, gives the enemy no permanent advantage or foothold. To subjugate a country, its civil government must be suppressed by a continuing military force, or supplanted by another, to which the inhabitants yield a voluntary or forced

obedience. The passage of hostile armies through our territory cannot produce this result. Permanent garrisons would have to be stationed at a sufficient number of points to strangle all civil government before it could be pretended, even by the United States Government itself, that its authority was extended over these States. How many garrisons would it require? How many hundred thousand soldiers would suffice to suppress the civil government of all the States of the Confederacy, and to establish over them, even in name and form, the authority of the United States? *In a geographical point of view, therefore, it may be asserted that the conquest of these Confederate States is impracticable."*

THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS AND PRESIDENT DAVIS.—THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS.

The last Confederate Congress concluded with a sharp re-primination between it and President Davis as to the responsibility for the low state to which the public defence had lapsed. The President had charged, in a public message, that the measures of Congress for recruiting the army were insufficient, and that it had generally neglected to supply the urgent need of men and supplies for the army.

A committee of the Senate made an elaborate reply to this accusation. It declared that all the measures recommended by the President, to promote the efficiency of the army, had been adopted, except the entire repeal of class exemption; and that some measures not suggested by him—such as the creation of general-in-chief—were originated and passed by Congress, with a view to the restoration of public confidence and the energetic administration of military affairs.

The committee retorted upon the executive the charge that by a system of details, in which corruption and favor were dominant, the Conscription Law had been robbed of its legitimate fruits, and the army enfeebled. They said that in remarkable contrast to the number of persons relieved from military service by the exemptions enacted by Congress, the report of the Conscript Bureau exhibited the fact, that east of the Mississippi River, twenty-two thousand and thirty-five men

had been *detailed* by executive authority. It was, they declared, in consequence of this abuse of the power of detail, that Congress had passed an act revoking all details, and limiting the exercise of that power in the future.

We shall not go at large into the merits of this recrimination between the Confederate Congress and the executive. Each, undoubtedly, had its share of responsibility for the general improvidence and mismanagement that had fatally involved the fortunes of the Confederacy. But the mal-administration in the War Department was even greater than Congress chose to indicate. From that department the confession had repeatedly gone forth, that two-thirds of our army were absentees; and yet nothing was done to enforce discipline or to punish desertions, and the *morale* of the Confederate Army was left entirely to the regulation of loose patriotic sentiment among those who composed it. No more forcible commentary can be made on the feeble execution of the military laws of the Confederacy, and the omission of the most ordinary discipline in the army, than to state the simple and indisputable fact that in the winter of 1864-5 Lee lost *nearly half his army* by desertions alone.

And that half was frequently in a condition bordering on starvation. There was really no lack of supplies in the country. It is needless to go into details, or to adduce statistics in proof of this. It is obvious to every well-informed mind. Although the occupation by the enemy, and his ruthless policy of destroying the harvests, granaries, and agricultural implements of the people, wherever he moved, had, undoubtedly, diminished the amount of cereals in the South, still, in view of the fact that in every State of the Confederacy without exception, its agricultural labor had been devoted almost exclusively to the raising of breadstuffs (while before the war it was mainly devoted to the production of cotton, tobacco, and other exports), it was impossible to doubt that there was ample supply of food in the country.

The fault was in the Commissary Department at Richmond; where a man flagrantly incompetent, appointed to the most important post in the country, on no other ground of selection than that many years ago he had been the college chum of the President, seemed busy for almost four years in bearing down

all common sense and advice, practising the most ridiculous quackeries, and stifling the very life of the Confederacy.

It is a remarkable fact in history that many famous men who have prided themselves on their firmness and resolution in public affairs, and indeed have displayed these qualities to the generality of mankind, have yet been discovered to be under the dominion of the most paltry influences—in many instances governed by women, court-jesters, and the smallest of favorites. Such an apparent contradiction of character was to be found in President Davis. He could brace his mind and set his face against Congressmen and counsellors generally. But he was absurdly uxorious; he was surrounded by adventurers and “confidence-men;” and some old West Point or Washington acquaintance might readily obtain his ear and favor when they were denied to the first men of the Confederacy.

Commissary Northrop, whose profession Mr. Foote declared in Congress had been that of a “pepper doctor,” was one of the small favorites of President Davis. This old man was an extraordinary combination of ignorance and obstinacy; and it was remarked of him that such was his perversity, that whenever advice or suggestion was offered to him, he instantly and invariably took the precisely opposite course.

Richmond was now almost destitute of supplies, through the mismanagement and conceit of this man. His latest fancy had been to prohibit to the general public the importation of any supplies whatever into the Confederate capital. The farmer could not bring a bushel of corn or a pound of meat into Richmond without running the gauntlet of impressment agents. Permits to get flour into Richmond were valued at high figures, and obtained only through special favors. The consequences of Mr. Northrop’s folly were, that large stocks of supplies were kept at home in different parts of the interior of Virginia; that they were thus exposed to Yankee devastation, and, in time, became an easy prey of the enemy’s raids. It was through such mismanagement that the rich harvests of the Shenandoah were lost to the Confederacy. There had been ample time to have gathered into Richmond at least a large portion of these rich and accessible supplies. Numerous persons had gone to Commissary Northrop with the proposition

to bring into Richmond grain and flour from the Valley, and were willing to make the condition that any part of their stocks would be given up to the Government, whenever there was any occasion for it to encroach upon the private store-houses of Richmond. But Mr. Northrop closed the door to all such applications, and the commission houses and provision stores of Richmond were left almost empty; while the law of supply and demand was sending prices up far beyond the reach of the general customer.

HISTORY OF THE CONFEDERATE COMMISSARIAT.

In the last Congress of the Confederate States, a secret commission was appointed to investigate the affairs of the Commissary Department. There was thus obtained within closed doors a mass of testimony which covered the whole history of the commissariat, and contains, indeed, subjects of the greatest interest in the war. This testimony was never permitted to see the light in the Confederacy; probably because it so deeply involved President Davis and his associates in the charge of maladministration.

It appeared before the secret commission that as early as the second year of the war, the meat supplies of the Confederacy were discovered to be largely deficient. This became evident enough on the successive captures of Forts Donelson and Henry. The subsequent campaign lost us Kentucky and much of Tennessee, and left us comparatively bare of meat.

At this time a number of propositions were made to the Richmond authorities, by responsible parties, to exchange through the enemy's lines meat for cotton. One man, whose ability to meet his engagements was never questioned, offered to deliver thirty thousand hogsheads of bacon through the lines in exchange for cotton. It was urged that there was enough cotton to feed and clothe our army, in a section tributary to Memphis—which city was then, and had been for some time previous, in the secure possession of the enemy; that such cotton must otherwise probably be destroyed, to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy; but that the owners, as a general rule, though willing to let the Government have

their crops, were averse, if not stubbornly opposed, to having them destroyed.

Against every proposition to get meat through the inland military lines, President Davis set his face as flint. He had got an idea into his head that the enemy's finances were about to collapse, and that if a little cotton might be kept from them they would be unable to pay the January interest of 1863. It appears, indeed, to have been impossible for him and his associates to rid themselves of their early conceit of the power of cotton; and it was this wretched delusion in hoarding this inert wealth of the South, that did more than any thing else to wreck the finances of the Confederacy, and eventually to reduce the rations of its armies to one-quarter of a pound of meat a day per man.

The venality of the enemy afforded full opportunity to the Richmond authorities to use the Mississippi from Memphis to New Orleans, until all their needed supplies should be obtained. But no advantage was ever taken of this ample and obvious opportunity. The arguments used against trade in cotton through the lines were :

First—That the Federal finances were in such a condition that if they could not obtain cotton, upon which to draw bills wherewith to pay their then accruing interest, their credit would explode, and the war would speedily cease from the bankrupting of our assailants. Hence they wanted cotton.

Second—That they did not want cotton, but only sought, under cover of a contract for supply, to find out the channels of navigable streams, to ascertain the location and condition of certain defences, and otherwise to spy out the land.

Third—That the trade on the part of the Government would demoralize the people among whom it might be conducted.

Fourth—That to trade through New Orleans, and let cotton clear from that port, "would make Europe think we had caved, who thereupon would decline to recognize us, or to intervene."

The reader will recognize for himself the little value of these arguments—some of them childish—by the side of the great necessity of feeding the armies of the South.

The record of the narrow escapes of Lee's army alone from starvation, is sufficient commentary upon the management at Richmond. In consequence of the refusal to be allowed to

purchase on the Mississippi, the army, especially in Virginia, was put upon short rations. First, they were reduced to one-half pound of meat per day,—which, if it could have been kept up at that, would have been sufficient; then to one-third of a pound—though this allowance was not agreed to or adhered to by several of the generals commanding; and then to one-quarter of a pound. Upon this last allowance the Army of Northern Virginia wintered in 1864–5.

On the 18th of October, 1864, a memorandum was communicated to President Davis, showing that there were on hand in the Confederate States 4,105,048 rations of fresh meat, and 3,426,519 rations of bacon and pork, which would subsist three hundred thousand men twenty-five days. The authorities were now compelled to subsist, independent of the armies of the Confederacy, many thousand prisoners of war who were collected in different camps throughout the country.

In 1863 a feeble and badly organized attempt had been made to get meat from Europe through the blockade. Much of it was allowed to remain at Nassau and Bermuda until it spoiled. Contracts for supplies, payable in cotton in our Atlantic ports, were made with several parties; but in no instance with success. Either the amount involved was too small, to tempt the venality of those who could control or purchase an evasion of the blockade; or the engagement to deliver meat alone, was found to be too small an inducement to those engaged in blockade-running.

In the winter of 1864 the subsistence of the Confederate armies appeared to be in the last stages of exhaustion. Major Ruffin, assistant-commissary-general, testifies before a secret committee of Congress:

“On the 5th of December I brought the condition of things to the attention of the Secretary of War, coupling it with a statement of subsistence on hand, which showed nine days’ rations on hand for General Lee’s army; and, quoting his letter to the commissary-general, that day received, stating that his men were deserting on account of short rations, I urged prompt action; but none was taken. On the 14th of December, nine days afterwards, General Lee telegraphed Mr. Davis that his army was without meat.”

In January, 1865, the following points were presented in secret session of Congress:

First—That there was not meat enough in the Southern Confederacy for the armies it had in the field.

Second—That there was not in Virginia either meat or bread enough for the armies within her limits.

Third—That the bread supply from other places depended absolutely upon the keeping open the railroad connections of the South.

Fourth—That the meat must be obtained from abroad through a seaport, and by a different system from that which has heretofore prevailed.

Fifth—That the bread could not be had by impressment, but must be paid for in market rates.

Sixth—That the payment must be made in cash, which, so far, had not been furnished; and, if possible, in a better medium than treasury scrip.

Seventh—That the transportation was not adequate, from whatever cause, to meet the necessary demands of the service.

Eighth—That the supply of fresh meat to General Lee's army was precarious; and if the army fell back from Richmond and Petersburg, there was every probability that it would cease altogether.

Nothing was done by the Confederate Government commensurate with the necessities indicated above—nothing, in fact, done to meet them beyond a visionary scheme, enacted in the last days of Congress, to raise three millions in specie to purchase supplies from those producers of the Confederacy who were no longer willing to take scrip for their commodities. But few persons outside of official circles in the Confederacy were acquainted with the true state of affairs; so hedged in with secrecy was the weak and recluse government of Mr. Davis. To the well-informed and intelligent the appalling fact was manifest—that *the whole system of Confederate defence was bound to break down by sheer mismanagement in the commissariat, even without a catastrophe of arms.*

Before we reach the final and sudden catastrophe that was to befall the arms of the Confederacy, there is a slight space in our military narrative which we have to cover by a brief relation of the events of the war in Virginia in the winter of

1864-5. This record is a very slender one. But it is the preface, in point of time at least, to those great events which, in April, 1865, were to bring the war to a singularly abrupt close, and with a precipitation heretofore but little known in the history of great contests.

MILITARY EVENTS IN VIRGINIA IN THE WINTER OF 1864-5—
SHERIDAN'S RAID.

Our last reference to the campaign in the Valley of Virginia was, when the forces there had been much reduced and the scale of operations had become inconsiderable; the bulk of Early's troops having been withdrawn to General Lee's lines. Sheridan, too, had sent most of his infantry to Grant. In December, the Sixth Corps was returned to the Army of the Potomac; and the Army of the Shenandoah for nearly two months acted principally as an army of observation.

Towards the last of February, 1865, Sheridan began to "ride" again up the Valley of the Shenandoah, leaving Hancock in command of his department at Winchester. On reaching Waynesboro' a battle occurred between Early and Custer's divisions, which resulted in the rout of the Confederates. Sheridan captured about thirteen hundred prisoners—nearly all of Early's little command; which indeed fell an easy prey to the magnificent Yankee cavalry. Early himself escaped with difficulty, some of his staff-officers and his personal baggage being captured.

Charlottesville was surrendered the next day. From this point, on the 6th of March, Sheridan moved in two columns southward towards the James. One division, under General Deven, took a directly southern route to Scottsville, destroying all mills, merchandise, and bridges on the line of march, and along the Rivanna River to Columbia. The other division proceeded down on the railroad to Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst—a distance of over forty miles. From Scottsville, Deven's division proceeded westward along the banks of the James, destroying every lock on the canal as far as Dugaldsville, twenty miles from Lynchburg. Not being able to cross the James on account of the high water, Sheridan

moved around the north side of Richmond, and, crossing at Deep Bottom, joined General Meade's army south of Petersburg.

The destruction accomplished by this raid was serious enough. The country through which it passed was devastated, and a Yankee correspondent, who accompanied the expedition, boasted that two million dollars worth of provisions and war material were destroyed in a single day. The damage to the Kanawha and James River Canal was almost irreparable; as to the railroads between Waynesboro' and Charlottesville, Charlottesville and Amherst Court-house, and Louisa Court-house, and the South Anna, and between Chesterfield Station and the Chickahominy River, every bridge, nearly every culvert, and scores of miles of the rail itself, had been completely destroyed; and in thirteen counties traversed by the expedition, mills of various kinds, tobacco warehouses, manufactured and leaf tobacco, and various other descriptions of private property were pillaged or destroyed.

THE RICHMOND LINES—HATCHER'S RUN.*

On the lines around Richmond and Petersburg, during the winter of 1864-5, there were no very important events. Two very considerable engagements were fought on them in this time; but they were wholly indecisive and strangely barren of results commensurate with the scale of fighting. Pegram's division, of Lee's army, whilst reconnoitring on the morning of the 6th of February, was attacked by cavalry and infantry in heavy force. The enemy's cavalry at one time broke through one of his brigades, but the men fought them all the while. Capturing some in rear of our lines, driving the others off, the division was pressed slowly back, occupying a very long line, but fighting obstinately, under the direction of its gallant commander.

Evans, commanding Gordon's division, arrived, and was formed on the left. The two divisions now charged, and drove the enemy back. They were finally overpowered, and driven back a short distance; but reforming, charged again and again.

The battle raged fiercely for hours over a space of ground not more than five hundred yards in width. Every effort of the Yankees to break through the Confederate lines was repulsed. Mahone's division came up and reported late in the afternoon, and was formed between the other two, when the three divisions made a most spirited advance and drove the enemy in the greatest disorder from the field to his fortifications on Hatcher's Run. The pursuit was continued until after dark. General Pegram fell in the last charge, just before Mahone's division came up.

The enemy kept his position on Hatcher's Run, which prolonged his line, but did not advance it in the direction of Petersburg. The advantage of this extension was even questionable; and after this important movement quiet was resumed on the Richmond lines, unbroken by any remarkable incident for several weeks.

BATTLE OF HARE'S HILL.

At daylight, on the 25th of March, General Lee suddenly attacked Grant's lines south of the Appomattox. The attack was immediately directed by General Gordon on the enemy's works at Hare's Hill. But there is no doubt that General Lee's plan was more extensive; that his design was to follow up the first success by the capture of the neighboring works, and then making the line a part of his own, to command Grant's military railroad. If his success should be all that he hoped, he might even venture to cut Grant's entire left from its base at City Point and from the army north of the James.

About four o'clock in the morning, every thing being in readiness, the corps of sharpshooters, about two hundred and fifty strong, left our works, and, with empty guns, advanced stealthily but rapidly upon the enemy's positions. They fell like a thunder-clap upon the Yankees, behind the first line of works they struck, clubbing such as they found awake with their muskets, taking a good many prisoners, and capturing several hundred yards of breastworks. Not a musket was fired, and not a man injured on our side. Meantime the

several brigades massed, both to support and assist them, came up, and the formidable force on Hare's Hill, with a considerable portion of the heavy line of works adjoining and connecting with it, were charged and captured, additional prisoners and numerous mortars and guns falling into our hands. Unfortunately some of the Yankees, who had escaped in the darkness, fled and aroused the men in the rear line of works; and the alarm was quickly spread throughout the reserve camps behind, so that a formidable force was soon alert. By the time our troops had formed into line on either side of the captured fort the enemy was thoroughly aroused, and was prepared for further offensive operations on our side; otherwise the advance of our troops would have been irresistible and successful beyond anticipation. As it was, they came into a position subject to an enfilading fire on either side, and confronted by heavy forts and breastworks. The Yankees were not slow to take advantage of the opportunity thus afforded them, and they quickly massed artillery in the neighboring forts and infantry in our front. They made several fierce assaults upon our columns in heavy lines, which were repulsed with great coolness and vigor; and in which, it is believed, the enemy sustained much loss. Finding it impossible to dislodge the Confederates by their infantry attacks, the enemy opened upon them with their artillery. A battery on the river, and Fort Steadman on the right, both so situated as thoroughly to command and enfilade the captured fort and works, belched forth their terrible discharges of shell, grape, and canister into our ranks, and rendered the position almost untenable. Further advance by our troops, in the face of the terrible obstacles that presented themselves, was deemed impracticable, and General Gordon gave the command to retire.

The success of the day was incomplete, and of but little value, although Gordon had shown the greatest gallantry, and the Confederates had fought with a vigor and brilliancy that reminded one of Lee's old campaigns. They had swept the enemy's lines for a distance of four or five hundred yards to the right and left, and two efforts made to recover the captured works had been handsomely repulsed. It was only when it was found that the inclosed works in rear, commanding the enemy's main line, could only be taken at a great

sacrifice, that our troops were withdrawn to their original position.

Gordon captured nine pieces of artillery, eight mortars, and between five and six hundred prisoners, amongst them one brigadier-general and a number of officers of lower grade. It being impracticable to bring off the captured guns, owing to the nature of the ground, they were disabled and left.

CHAPTER XII.

THE BATTLES AROUND PETERSBURG.—The movement of Sheridan's cavalry.—The Five Forks.—General Lee's counter-movement.—Repulse of Sheridan.—Re-enforced by Grant.—The Confederates flanked at the Five Forks.—The situation in front of Petersburg.—Lee's lines broken in three places.—Capture of Fort Mahone by the enemy.—General Lee loses his entire line of defence, and the Southside Railroad.—THE EVACUATION OF RICHMOND.—Great surprise in the Confederate capital.—The news in the churches.—Dr. Hoge's address.—Consternation and uproar in the streets.—The city on fire.—A reckless military order.—Scenes of horror.—Mobs of plunderers.—The scene at the commissary depot.—Weitzel's entry into Richmond.—Suffering of the people.—Scene on Capitol Square.—Devastations of the fire.—The burnt district.—Weitzel's and Shepley's general orders.—Yankee rejoicings over the fall of Richmond.—Bell-rings, hymns, and dancing in the streets of New York.—A grand illumination in Washington.—Yankee mottoes.—A memorable speech.

GRANT was quick in retaliating for General Lee's attempt on his lines, which, as we have seen, drove the enemy at Hare's Hill, but did not hold the ground it traversed, or accomplish any decisive results.

THE BATTLES AROUND PETERSBURG.

On the 29th of March, Grant began a heavy movement towards the Southside Railroad. The cavalry command, consisting of General Crook's division and Sheridan's cavalry, moved out on the Jerusalem plankroad, about three and a half miles from Hancock Station, where they took the country road leading across the Weldon Railroad at Ream's Station, and into the Vaughn road one mile from the Dinwiddie Court-house, General Crook's division going in advance. They reached Dinwiddie Court-house about four o'clock in the evening.

In the mean time the Fifth and Second corps of infantry had been moving in a parallel line on the Vaughn road. Gen-

eral Grant's headquarters on the night of the 29th were on the Boydtown Plankroad, in the neighborhood of Gravelly Run.

The next day heavy rains impeded operations ; but the force of the enemy pressed on towards the Five Forks, the extreme right of Lee's line on the Southside Railroad.

General Lee had not been idle in meeting this movement. On the 31st of March, the enemy found on his front, prepared to contest the prize of the railroad, Pickett's division of infantry, and General Fitzhugh Lee's and General William H. Lee's divisions of cavalry. In the afternoon of the day, the Confederates made a determined and gallant charge upon the whole cavalry line of the Yankees, forced it back, and drove the enemy to a point within two miles of Dinwiddie Courthouse.

But the news of Sheridan's repulse had no sooner reached General Grant, than the Fifth Corps was moved rapidly to his relief. The re-enforcement arrived in time to retrieve the fortunes of the enemy. The next day, April 1st, the combined forces of Yankee cavalry and Warren's infantry advanced against the Confederates. Overpowered by numbers, the Confederates retreated to the Five Forks, where they were flanked by a part of the Fifth Corps, which had moved down the White Oak road. It was here that several thousand prisoners were taken.

On the night of Saturday, April 1st, the prospect was a most discouraging one for General Lee. Grant had held all his lines in front of Petersburg, had manœuvred troops far to his left, had turned Lee's right, and was now evidently prepared to strike a blow upon the thin lines in front of Petersburg.

By daylight, on Sunday, April 2d, these lines were assaulted in three different places by as many different Yankee corps. They were pierced in every place. The Sixth Corps went through first, at a point about opposite the western extremity of Petersburg ; the Twenty-fourth, a little way further west ; and the Ninth Corps further east, near to the Jerusalem plankroad, capturing Fort Mahone, one of the largest forts in the Petersburg defences. The Confederates made a desperate struggle for Fort Mahone, which was protracted through the day, but

without success. At dark the position of the contending parties was the same as during the day.

The Yankees had congratulated themselves that, by the success of the Sixth Corps, they had cut Lee's army in two—cutting off the troops that were not in Petersburg. As that place was supposed to be the Confederate point of manœuvre—as it was supposed that troops could not cross the Appomattox except through the city—their capture was taken as certain by the enemy, since they were hemmed in between Sheridan, the Sixth Corps, and the river. But in this they were mistaken. The Confederates easily forded the river; and the close of the day found Lee's army brought together within the inner line of the Petersburg defences.*

* Among the Confederate killed was the brave General A. P. Hill, whose name had been illustriously connected with the Army of Northern Virginia all during the war. He had desired to obtain a nearer view of a portion of the Yankee line during the attack of the 2d of April, and leaving his staff behind in a place of safety, rode forward, accompanied by a single orderly, and soon came upon a squad of Yankees, who had advanced along ravines far beyond their lines. He immediately ordered them to surrender, which they were on the point of doing, under the supposition that a column of troops were at his heels. They soon discovered he was nearly unattended, and shot him through the heart.

General Hill was a native of Culpepper County, Virginia, and descended from an ancient family, famous in the political annals of that portion of the commonwealth; although he himself had had nothing to do with civil or political life. He appeared to be about thirty-six or thirty-seven years of age, and was a soldier by profession. He was graduated at West Point, entered the army, and served in the Mexican war, and made arms not only his profession, but an enthusiastic study, to which he was prompted by the natural tastes and disposition of his mind.

General Hill was, undoubtedly, a commander of remarkable talents and qualities. He had risen rapidly in the war by the force of personal merit. At the famous field of Manassas he was colonel of the Thirteenth Virginia regiment, in General Johnston's army, which, it will be recollected, arrived on the field in time to secure and complete the great victory of that memorable day. At the battle of Williamsburg he had risen to the rank of brigadier-general; and in that fight he exhibited an extraordinary spirit and energy, which were recognized by all who observed his behavior on that field, and drew the eyes of the public upon him.

General Hill made his greatest reputation by his conspicuous part in the seven days' battles around Richmond, in the summer of 1862. Having then been made major-general, he occupied, with his division, the extreme left of our position in the neighborhood of Meadow Bridge. He was put in command of one of the largest divisions of the Army of Richmond, his division being com

But the disasters which had already occurred were, in General Lee's opinion, irretrievable. In killed and wounded his loss had been small—two thousand would probably cover it in the entire series of engagements; but he had lost an entire line of defence around Petersburg, and with it the Southside Railroad, so important to Richmond as an avenue of supply.

THE EVACUATION OF RICHMOND.

The morning of Sunday, the 2d of April, broke calmly and pleasantly over the city of Richmond. The usual crowds were collected at the Post-office and the War Department, asking for news, discussing common-places, and idling away the irksome hours of the Sabbath in Richmond. There was not a breath of excitement in the general community. It is a remarkable circumstance that, outside of official circles, not half a dozen persons in Richmond knew, on that Sunday morning, of the three days' fighting that had taken place around Petersburg, and at the distance of only a few hours' ride from the capital. For months past, the Government had been reticent of all military news whatever; the newspapers had been warned not to publish any military matters, but what should be dictated to them from the War Department; and the public was left to imagine pretty much what it pleased concerning the progress of the war. Indeed, the idea current in the streets on this Sunday morning was rather pleasant and reassuring than

posed of the brigades of Anderson, Branch, Pender, Gregg, Field, and perhaps some others. He rapidly brought his division to perfection in organization. It was made his duty to cross at Meadow Bridge, and make the first attack upon McClellan's forces. He performed this duty alone, without waiting for other movements; and, unassisted by a portion of his command (for Generals Branch and Gregg did not come up until late in the evening), he sustained a terrible conflict with the enemy, encouraging his troops by examples of personal audacity, which kept him constantly exposed to the enemy's fire. That position of the enemy being gained, the division of General Hill followed his subsequent movements, being placed first in the line of our advance, and bearing the brunt of the action to Frazier's farm, where occurred the memorable engagement in which the command of General Hill, composed of his own division and one division of General Longstreet's two, fought the whole Yankee force, and achieved a success which broke the spirit of the enemy, and completed the circuit of our famous victories around Richmond in 1862.

otherwise ; for there was a general impression that Johnston was moving to Lee's lines, and that the combined force was to take the offensive against the enemy. Beyond this general anticipation, the Richmond public had on the day referred to not the slightest inkling of the situation. The news which a few hours later was to overwhelm them, of the reverse of Lee and the forced evacuation of Richmond, was to burst upon them like a thunderclap from clear skies.

The first breath of the report was obtained in the churches. While President Davis was seated in his pew in St. Paul's church, the services were interrupted by a messenger handing him a dispatch. It was from General Lee ; it stated that his lines had been broken in three places, and that preparations should be made to evacuate Richmond by eight o'clock the ensuing night, in the event that he should be unable to re-establish his lines. The President left the church with a measured, but nervous step. It was the constrained calmness of despair. No one but himself knew the exact contents of the dispatch ; but an uneasy whisper ran through the congregation, and, as they were hastily dismissed, the rumor was caught up in the streets that Richmond was to be evacuated, and was soon carried to the ends of the city.

In another of the churches, the news was more plainly told. Dr. Hoge, the beloved pastor of the Presbyterian church, than whom there was no brighter Christian or nobler patriot within the limits of Richmond, had, at the conclusion of his sermon, given out a beautiful hymn to be sung by his congregation. Before they raised their voices, he told them, with his own voice broken with emotion, that he had sad news to communicate ; that our army had "met with a reverse;" that without being exactly apprised of the extent and nature of the reverse, he was convinced that it was probable that they might never again meet in that house of God ; and then he spoke to those who had so long known and loved him a tender farewell, in such beautiful and plaintive words that there was not a dry eye among all those dismayed faces which hung upon his words.

Men, women, and children rushed from the churches, passing from lip to lip news of the impending fall of Richmond. And yet it was difficult to believe it. To look up to the calm,

beautiful sky of the spring day unassailed by one single noise of battle, to watch the streets unvexed by artillery or troops, stretching away into the quiet hazy atmosphere, and believe that the capital of the Confederacy, so peaceful, so apparently secure, was in a few hours to be the prey of the enemy, and to be wrapped in the infernal horrors of a conflagration!

It was late in the afternoon when the signs of evacuation became apparent to the incredulous. Wagons on the streets were being hastily loaded at the departments with boxes, trunks, etc., and driven to the Danville depot. Those who had determined to evacuate with the fugitive Government looked on with amazement; then, convinced of the fact, rushed to follow the Government's example. Vehicles suddenly rose to a premium value that was astounding; and ten, fifteen, and even a hundred dollars in gold or federal currency was offered for a conveyance. Suddenly, as if by magic, the streets became filled with men, walking as though for a wager, and behind them excited negroes with trunks, bundles, and luggage of every description. All over the city it was the same—wagons, trunks, handboxes, and their owners, a mass of hurrying fugitives, filling the streets. The banks were all open, and depositors were as busy as bees removing their specie deposits; and the directors were equally active in getting off their bullion. Hundreds of thousands of dollars of paper money was destroyed, both State and Confederate. Night came, and with it came confusion worse confounded. There was no sleep for human eyes in Richmond that night.

The city council had met in the evening, and resolved to destroy all the liquor in the city, to avoid the disorder consequent on the temptation to drink at such a time. About the hour of midnight the work commenced, under the direction of committees of citizens in all the wards. Hundreds of barrels of liquor were rolled into the street and the heads knocked in. The gutters ran with a liquor freshet, and the fumes filled and impregnated the air. Fine cases of bottled liquors were tossed into the street from third story windows, and wrecked into a thousand pieces. As the work progressed, some straggling soldiers, retreating through the city, managed to get hold of a quantity of the liquor. From that moment law and order ceased to exist. Many of the stores were pillaged, and the

sidewalks were encumbered with broken glass, where the thieves had smashed the windows in their reckless haste to get their hands on the plunder within. The air was filled with the wild cries of distress, or the yells of roving pillagers.

But a more terrible element was to appear upon the scene. An order had been issued from General Ewell's headquarters to fire the four principal tobacco warehouses of the city—namely, the public warehouse, situated at the head of the basin, near the Petersburg Railroad depot; Shockoe warehouse, situated near the centre of the city, side by side with the Gallego flour-mills; Mayo's warehouse, and Dibrell's warehouse, on Cary-street, a square below the Libby prison.

Late in the night, Mayor Mayo had dispatched, by a committee of citizens, a remonstrance against this reckless military order, which plainly put in jeopardy the whole business portion of Richmond. It was not heeded. Nothing was left for the citizens but to submit to the destruction of their property. The warehouses were fired. The rams in the James River were blown up. The Richmond, Virginia, and another one, were all blown to the four winds of heaven. The Patrick Henry, a receiving ship, was scuttled. Such shipping, very little in amount, as was lying at the Richmond wharves, was also fired, save the flag-of-truce steamer Allison.

The bridges leading out of the city—namely, the Danville Railroad bridge, the Petersburg Railroad bridge, Mayo's bridge, leading to Manchester and the opposite side of the James, were also fired, and were soon wrapped in flames.

Morning broke upon a scene such as those who witnessed it can never forget. The roar of an immense conflagration sounded in the ears; tongues of flame leaped from street to street; and in this baleful glare were to be seen, as of demons, the figures of busy plunderers, moving, pushing, rioting, through the black smoke and into the open street, bearing away every conceivable sort of plunder.

The scene at the commissary depot, at the head of the dock, begged description. Hundreds of government wagons were loaded with bacon, flour, and whiskey, and driven off in hot haste to join the retreating army. Thronged about the depot were hundreds of men, women, and children, black and white, provided with capacious bags, baskets, tubs, buckets, tin pans

and aprons; cursing, pushing, and crowding, awaiting the throwing open of the doors, and the order for each to help himself.

About sunrise the doors were opened to the populace, and a rush, that almost seemed to carry the building off its foundation, was made, and hundreds of thousands of pounds of bacon, flour, etc., were soon swept away by a clamorous crowd.

In the mean time, let us see what was passing on the Yankee lines. When General Ord withdrew to the lines investing Petersburg, he carried with him exactly one-half of his army. On the north side, occupying his entire line, he left Weitzel, with Kantz's division of the Twenty-fourth Corps, and Ashborne's and Thomas' divisions of the Twenty-fifth Corps.

While the fighting was in progress around Petersburg, Weitzel's entire line was perfectly quiet, not a shot anywhere. His command had orders to make as great a show as possible. At night he set all his bands to work upon national airs, and the night was filled with melodious strains.

Towards midnight this musical entertainment ceased, and a silence, complete and absolute, brooded over the contending lines. At this hour, the enemy's camps were startled into life again, by explosions heard in Richmond.

To Weitzel's brain the full meaning of the event came home at once, and he did not need the confirmatory lurid light he saw hanging over the Confederate capital to tell him that the hour had come. His orders were to push on, whenever satisfied of his ability to enter the city.

Day had no sooner broke than Weitzel dispatched Major A. H. Stevens, of the Fourth Massachusetts cavalry, and Major E. E. Graves, of his staff, with forty cavalry, to investigate the condition of affairs. The troops rode steadily into Richmond. On a trot they proceeded to the Capitol, and creeping to its summit, planted the stars and stripes. The symbols of the United States thus hoisted by the halyards, consisted of two guidons from companies E and H of the Fourth Massachusetts cavalry, of which Stevens was one of the field-officers. The colors of the enemy fluttered in the early morning light over the Capitol of the Confederacy.

As the day advanced, Weitzel's troops poured through the

streets of the city. Long lines of negro cavalry swept by the Exchange Hotel, brandishing their swords and uttering savage shouts. These shouts, the roar of devouring flames, the endless processions of plunderers passing from street to street, tugging away the prizes they had drawn from the hellish circle of the fire, made up an indescribable horror. Here were the garish Yankee troops sweeping up towards the Capitol Square, with music and wild cheers; everywhere, almost, the pandemonium of fire and pillage; and in the midst of all the wild agony, the fugitive distress of women and children rushing towards the open square for a breath of pure air, all that was now left them in heaven's great hollowness. And even that was not to be obtained there. The air, even in the square of the Capitol, was almost choking; and one traversed it blinded by cinders and struggling for breath. Beneath the trees, on the sward, were piles of furniture, dragged from the ruins of burning homes; and on carpets, stretched on the slopes of the hill, were family groups, making all sorts of uncouth arrangements to protect their little ones, and to patch up, with broken tables and bureaus, some sort of home in the open air.

In the afternoon, the fire had burned itself out. It had consumed the very heart of the city. A surveyor could scarcely have designated more exactly the business portion of the city, than did the boundaries of the fire. Commencing at the Shockoe warehouse, the fire radiated front and rear, and on two wings, burning down to, but not destroying, the store No. 77 Main-street, south side, half way between Fourteenth and Fifteenth streets, and back to the river, through Cary and all the intermediate streets. Westward, on Main, the fire was stayed at Ninth-street, sweeping back to the river. On the north side of Main the flames were stayed between Thirteenth and Fourteenth streets. From this point the flames raged on the north side of Main up to Eighth-street, and back to Bank-street.

Among some of the most prominent buildings destroyed were, the Bank of Richmond, Traders' Bank, Bank of the Commonwealth, Bank of Virginia, Farmers' Bank, all the banking houses, the American Hotel, the Columbian Hotel, the Enquirer building on Twelfth-street, the Dispatch office and job rooms, corner of Thirteenth and Main-streets; all that block of buildings known as Belvin's Block; the Examiner office,

engine, and machinery rooms ; the Confederate Post-office Department building ; the State Courthouse, a fine old building situated on Capitol Square at its Franklin-street entrance ; the Mechanics' Institute, vacated by the Confederate War Department, and all the buildings on that square up to Eighth-street and back to Main-street ; the Confederate arsenal and laboratory, Seventh-street.

The streets were crowded with furniture and every description of wares, dashed down to be trampled in the mud or burned up where it lay. All the government storehouses were thrown open, and what could not be gotten off by the Government was left to the people.

Next to the river the destruction of property was fearfully complete. The Danville and Petersburg Railroad depots, and the buildings and shedding attached, for the distance of half a mile from the north side of Main-street to the river, and between Eighth and Fifteenth streets, embracing upwards of twenty blocks, presented one waste of smoking ruins, blackened walls, and solitary chimneys.

On the occupation of Richmond, General Weitzel established his headquarters in the State Capitol, in the hall lately occupied by the Virginia House of Delegates, and instituted measures to restore order. He immediately issued the following order :

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT ARMY OF THE JAMES,
Richmond, Va., April 3, 1865.

Major-General Godfrey Weitzel, commanding detachment of the Army of the James, announces the occupation of the city of Richmond by the Armies of the United States, under command of Lieutenant-General Grant. The people of Richmond are assured that we come to restore to them the blessings of peace, prosperity, and freedom, under the flag of the Union.

The citizens of Richmond are requested to remain, for the present, quietly within their houses, and to avoid all public assemblages or meetings in the public streets. An efficient provost-guard will immediately re-establish order and tranquillity within the city.

Martial law is, for the present, proclaimed.

Brigadier-General George F. Shepley, United States Volunteers, is hereby appointed military governor of Richmond.

Lieutenant-Colonel Fred. L. Maming, provost-marshal-general, Army of the James, will act as provost-marshal of Richmond. Commanders of detachments doing guard-duty in the city will report to him for instructions.

By command of

MAJOR-GENERAL WEITZEL.

D. D. WHEELER, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Brigadier-General G. F. Shepley, having been announced as military governor of Richmond, issued the following order :

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY GOVERNOR OF RICHMOND,
Richmond, Va., April 3, 1865.

I. The armies of the rebellion having abandoned their effort to enslave the people of Virginia, have endeavored to destroy by fire the capital which they could not longer occupy by their arms. Lieutenant-Colonel Manning, provost-marshal-general of the Army of the James and provost-marshal of Richmond, will immediately send a sufficient detachment of the provost-guard to arrest, if possible, the progress of the flames. The fire department of the city of Richmond, and all the citizens interested in the preservation of their beautiful city, will immediately report to him for duty, and render every possible assistance in staying the progress of the conflagration. The first duty of the Armies of the Union will be to save the city doomed to destruction by the armies of the rebellion.

II. No person will leave the city of Richmond, without a pass from the office of the provost-marshal.

III. Any citizen, soldier, or any person whatever, who shall hereafter plunder, destroy, or remove any public or private property of any description whatever, will be arrested and summarily punished.

IV. The soldiers of the command will abstain from any offensive or insulting words or gestures towards the citizens.

V. No treasonable or offensive expressions, insulting to the flag, the cause, or the Armies of the Union, will hereafter be allowed.

VI. For an exposition of their rights, duties, and privileges, the citizens of Richmond are respectfully referred to the proclamations of the President of the United States in relation to the existing rebellion.

VII. All persons having in their possession, or under their control, any property whatever of the so-called Confederate States, or of any officer thereof, or the records or archives of any public officer whatever, will immediately report the same to Colonel Manning, provost-marshal.

In conclusion, the citizens of Richmond are assured that, with the restoration of the flag of the Union, they may expect the restoration of that peace, prosperity, and happiness which they enjoyed under the Union, of which that flag is the glorious symbol.

G. F. SHEPLEY, Brigadier-General U. S. V.,
and Military Governor of Richmond.

While the scenes of terror and destruction we have narrated were taking place in Richmond, the North was celebrating, with those fervors and shows known only to the Yankee, the fall of the Confederate capital. In New York and in Washington were the most swollen exhibitions of the popular triumph.

In the former city there was an unlimited display of flags; bells were rung; impromptu meetings were gotten up, and

wild and enthusiastic congratulations were exchanged on the streets. The New York Herald said: "People fairly danced in the excess of enthusiasm. To state that they howled would sound harsh and flat, but it would nevertheless be the simple truth. Huzzaing and cheering were heard, as never they were heard before. Singing also formed part of the popular mode of letting off the exuberant feelings of the masses. Down in Wall-street, a chorus, which Maretzek could never hope to rival, almost made the ancient piles of stone and brick tremble in sympathy."

The rage for flags was immense. Half an hour after the receipt of the news of the capture of the Confederate capital, there was, says a New York paper, not a single large flag of a national character in the whole city left unpurchased. Every housekeeper showed his loyalty and satisfaction, by exhibiting the stars and stripes from some portion of his establishment. The railway cars and horses were decorated with miniature flags. Carts, stages, and wagons, all over the city, displayed the same symbol of loyalty; and every spot, where a piece of bunting could properly be fastened, was so decorated.

At noon, the bells of Trinity and St. Paul churches were rung. The chimes of Trinity resounded melodiously through the air, above the din of rumbling stages and heavy vehicles of every description. The example of these two churches was speedily followed by almost every church in the city; and for half an hour or more the ringing was heard from Trinity to Harlem—a distance of six miles.

A large meeting of leading merchants, and other prominent citizens, was held at the custom-house, to make arrangements for a suitable celebration of the great victory. A number of speeches were made on the occasion. At the conclusion of one of the speeches, some persons present, with a grand chorus, began the hymn, to the tune of "Old Hundred," generally known in churches as the Doxology:

"Praise God, from whom all blessings flow;
Praise Him, all creatures here below;
Praise Him above, ye heavenly host;
Praise Father, Son, and Holy Ghost."

The whole crowd joined in. The chimes of Trinity came in

at the proper time with good effect ; and, as the voices of over twenty thousand singers subsided, the echoes of the chimes from the towers of Trinity came floating on the breeze, and repeating in musical accord—

“ Praise Him, all creatures here below.” *

* From the appearance of the New York papers one would suppose that the general excitement, produced by the capture of Richmond, had culminated in the commercial metropolis of the North.

The Tribune occupied one-half of its first page with an enormous spread eagle, and the eighth page with a map of Richmond. The editor, while congratulating his readers on the fall of Richmond, could not avoid saying, that “ it might have been ours long ago.” An Irish drinking song, prepared for the occasion, and beginning, “ Bad luck to the man who is sober to-night,” was published on the inside, and proposed a good health to every official who had been connected with the military department of the Government, not excepting “ Shtanton.”

The World's columns were chiefly occupied with a brilliant and lengthy account of the battles, but the displayed heads of the news were jubilant and expressive; and the editor declared, that “ the taking of Richmond was a greater event, and more fully justified exuberant rejoicing, than any previous achievement in the history of the war.”

The New York Herald declared, that the taking of Richmond was “ one of the grandest triumphs that had crowned human efforts for centuries.”

The following specimen of Yankee poetry on the occasion was published in a New York paper :

RICHMOND IS OURS !

Richmond is ours ! Richmond is ours !

Hark ! to the jubilant chorus !

Up, through the lips that no longer repress it,

Up, from the Heart of the People ! God bless it !

Swelling with loyal emotion,

Leapeth our joy, like an ocean !—

Richmond is ours ! Richmond is ours !

Babylon falls, and her temples and towers

Crumble to ashes before us !

Glory to Grant ! Glory to Grant !

Hark ! to the shout of our Nation !

Up, from the Irish heart, up from the German—

Glory to Sheridan ! Glory to Sherman !

Up, from all peoples uniting—

Freedom's high loyalty plighting—

Glory to all ! Glory to all !—

Heroes who combat, and martyrs who fall !

Lift we our joyous ovation !

The people of Washington vied with those of New York in demonstrations of joy over the fall of Richmond and Petersburg. In accordance with the recommendation of the Secretary of State, the Executive Mansion, the Capitol, and all the departments and other public buildings, and the City Hall, were at night illuminated, and each in a blaze of light was exhibited in its beautiful proportions. The National flag was a prominent adornment, and appropriate mottoes were conspicuously displayed. Pennsylvania Avenue and the principal streets were thronged with pedestrians. Bonfires were kindled in various parts of the city, and rockets ignited. Washington was, in short, ablaze with lights. The residences of the heads of the departments, and other officers of the Government, were also adorned and illuminated.

The Capitol made a splendid appearance. It was the centre of attraction, and from basement to dome was a blaze of light. Over the main entrance, fronting on Pennsylvania Avenue, was a large transparency, on which was inscribed, "This is the Lord's doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes."

Over the main entrance to the War Department was the motto, "The Union must and shall be preserved," and underneath an eagle, the word, "Richmond."

Over the main entrance to the Patent Office building was an immense gas-jet, displaying the word, "Union." Over the

Fling out the Flag! Flash out the Flag!
 Up from each turret and steeple!
 Up from the cottage, and over the mansion,
 Fling out the symbol of Freedom's expansion!
 Victory crowneth endeavor!
 Liberty seals us forever!
 Up from each valley, and out from each crag,
 Fling out the Flag! Flash out the Flag!
 Borne on the breath of the People!

Richmond is ours! Richmond is ours!
 Hark! how the welkin is riven!
 Hark! to the joy that our Nation convulses,
 Timing all hearts to the cannon's loud pulses;
 Voices of heroes ascending,
 Voices of martyred ones blending:
 Mingling like watchwords on Liberty's towers,
 "Richmond is ours! Richmond is ours!"
Freedom rejoiceth in Heaven!

lower entrance of the Treasury building, on Fifteenth-street, was a huge transparency representing a ten-dollar Treasury note, over which was the motto, "U. S. greenbacks and U. S. Grant—Grant gives the greenbacks a metallic ring."

Over the front entrance of the State Department was displayed the motto, "At home, union is order, and order is strength; abroad, union is strength, and strength is peace." Over the Fifteenth-street entrance was the following motto, "Peace and good-will to all nations; but no entangling alliances, and no foreign intervention."

Thousands of persons of both sexes attended a public meeting at the southern portico of the Patent Office, where the word "Union" was largely prominent in flaming gas-jets. Speeches were delivered by a number of persons, among them Vice-President Johnson. He made a long and intensely Union speech, in the course of which he said he could live down all the slanders which had been uttered against him. He was particularly severe on "the rebels," at the head of whom he placed Jefferson Davis, and he asked, what should be done with him. The response from many voices was, "Hang him! hang him!" To this he agreed, and applause succeeded his remark that Davis ought to be hanged twenty times higher than Haman.

The following are passages from Vice-President Johnson's speech:

"At the time that the traitors in the Senate of the United States plotted against the Government, and entered into a conspiracy more foul, more execrable, and more odious than that of Catiline against the Romans, I happened to be a member of that body. I was then and there called upon to know what I would do with such traitors, and I want to repeat my reply here. I said, if we had an Andrew Jackson, he would hang them as high as Haman. Humble as I am, when you ask me what I would do, my reply is, I would arrest them; I would try them; I would convict them; and I would hang them. I say this: 'The halter to intelligent, influential traitors.' But to the honest boy, to the deluded man, who has been deceived into the rebel ranks, I would extend leniency; I would say, return to your allegiance, renew your support to the Government, and become a good citizen; but the leaders I would hang. . . . It is not my intention to make any imprudent remarks or allusions, but the hour will come when those nations that exhibited towards us such insolence and improper interference in the midst of our adversity, and, as they supposed, of our weakness, will learn that this is a Government of the people, possessing power enough to make itself felt and respected."

The passages of this speech, quoted above, as we must presume correctly, from the columns of a New York paper, obtained a most important significance in view of the tragical death of Mr. Lincoln, on the 14th day of April, and the succession of Mr. Johnson to the office of President of the United States, and that of dictator of the programme of subjugation consequent upon the war. But these events lie beyond the period and purpose of our narrative of the war, and we make only this brief and passing reference to them.

CHAPTER XIII.

What the Confederates anticipated on the fall of Richmond.—Two opinions.—Prophetic words of the Richmond Examiner.—Disintegration of Lee's army.—The line of his retreat.—Grant's pursuit.—Sheridan captures prisoners, guns, and wagons.—Sheridan's dispatch.—Change in the movements of both armies.—The situation at Appomattox Court-house.—How Lee was surrounded.—SURRENDER OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.—A frightful demoralization of the army.—More than two-thirds of the men deserted.—Pickett's division.—Reasons to suppose that General Lee had predetermined a surrender on moving from Richmond and Petersburg.—Straggling of his soldiers.—Official correspondence concerning the surrender.—Interview between General Lee and General Grant at McLean's house.—How General Lee looked.—Grant's generous conduct.—Scenes between the lines of the two armies.—An informal conference of officers.—How the news of surrender was received in the Yankee army.—How received at Washington.—Secretary Stanton's dispatch.—President Lincoln's speech.—"Dixie" in Washington.—General Lee's farewell address to his army.—His return to Richmond.—Effect of Lee's surrender.—General Johnston's department.—MOVEMENTS IN THE SOUTHWEST.—FALL OF MOBILE.—Wilson's cavalry expedition through Alabama and Georgia.—SURRENDER OF JOHNSTON'S ARMY.—Sherman's "basis of negotiations" repudiated at Washington.—The policy of the Northern Government unmasked.—Sherman's reply.—SURRENDER OF TAYLOR'S ARMY.—SURRENDER OF KIRBY'S SMITH'S ARMY.—"War meetings" in Texas.—Want of public resolution.—The last act of the war.—A sudden peace, and what it implied.

For a long time there had been two opinions in the Confederacy, as to the effect the fall of Richmond would have upon the war. Many intelligent persons considered that Richmond was not a vital point in the Confederacy; and now that it had been evacuated, there were not a few persons who still indulged the hope of the supremacy of the Southern arms and the dream of independence. There were found sanguine persons in Richmond the day after the evacuation, who pleased themselves with the imagination that that event was only about to date a new era in the Confederate defence; that the Government would re-establish itself, perhaps, in Georgia, and with advantages and under auspices it had never had before; that it might reopen Georgia and the Carolinas, and thus place itself nearer its resources of subsistence, and have the control of a territory practically much larger than that in the Richmond jurisdiction. But these hopeful and ingenious persons wholly failed to take

into account the moral effect of the loss of the Confederate capital, and to calculate the easy transition in such circumstances from despondency to despair.

Several weeks before the catastrophe the Richmond Examiner had used the following almost prophetic language: "The evacuation of Richmond would be the loss of all respect and authority towards the Confederate Government, the disintegration of the army, and the abandonment of the scheme of an independent Southern Confederation. Each contestant in the war has made Richmond the central object of all its plans and all its exertions. It has become the symbol of the Confederacy. Its loss would be material ruin to the cause, and, in a moral point of view, absolutely destructive, crushing the heart and extinguishing the last hope of the country. Our armies would lose the incentive inspired by a great and worthy object of defence. Our military policy would be totally at sea; we should be without a hope or an object; without civil or military organization; without a treasury or a commissariat; without the means of keeping alive a wholesome and active public sentiment; without any of the appliances for supporting a cause depending upon a popular faith and enthusiasm; without the emblems or the semblance of nationality."

These sad but intelligent anticipations were now to be vividly realized. The disintegration of Lee's army commenced with its withdrawal from the Richmond and Petersburg lines.

In his last telegram to Richmond from Petersburg, Sunday evening, the 2d of April, General Lee stated that some time during the night he would fall back behind the Appomattox—that is, to the north bank of that stream, to prevent being flanked. The Appomattox rises in Appomattox County, eighty miles west of Petersburg, flows northeast to Matoax Station, on the Danville Railroad, twenty-seven miles from Richmond, and thence southeast to City Point. When Lee sent his telegram above alluded to, his troops were holding a semicircular line south of the river, and including Petersburg; his left resting on the Appomattox, his right on the Southside Railroad, some fifteen miles west of the town. The Yankee armies were pressing his whole line, Sheridan being on his extreme right. During Sunday night he got across the Appomattox, and com

menced to push up the north bank of that stream. The Yankee forces were hurried up the Southside Railroad to Burkesville Junction to cut him off. Sheridan made direct pursuit, with the double object of harassing the rear of the retreating columns, and cutting off such troops as were retreating from Richmond and attempting to join Lee.

Grant was possessed of the interior or shorter lines to Burkesville. He might thus hope to cut off Lee's retreat from Danville or from Lynchburg. Indeed, there appeared but one way for Lee to escape—namely, a tremendous run up the bank of the Appomattox, to reach the Southside Railroad at Farmville, destroying the bridges in his rear. Even this chance Sheridan was sanguine of cutting off.

On the 5th of April, Sheridan made an important capture of prisoners, guns, and wagons. It appears that Lee's army was moving as rapidly west as his limited transportation and the demoralized condition of his troops would permit, on the road between Amelia Court-house and Jetersville. The Yankee cavalry having gained possession of the Danville Railroad some time previous, were not long in discovering his whereabouts. Sheridan immediately sent Davies' brigade around on his left flank; and although they were repulsed and driven back upon the infantry, it was not until they had taken several hundred prisoners, five guns, and a number of wagons.

On the evening of the 5th of April, a portion of the advance of Grant's army was at Burkesville Station (the junction of the Southside and Danville railroads). Sheridan, with the main body of his cavalry, at three p. m. of that day, was at Jetersville, on the Danville road, a station forty-three miles from Richmond. Lee, at the same date, with the remnants of his army, was at Amelia Court-house, a point thirty-six miles from Richmond, and seven miles north of Sheridan's advance.

In this situation Sheridan telegraphed to Grant: "I feel confident of capturing the entire Army of Northern Virginia, if we exert ourselves. I see no escape for Lee."

On the 6th, at daylight, General Meade, with the Second, Fifth, and Sixth corps, was at Burkesville Station, Lee being near Amelia Court-house; the Yankee forces were south and west of him. Sheridan's advance was at Jetersville; and, as it moved towards Amelia Court-house, its left stretched well out

towards Painesville, a point about ten miles northwest of Amelia Court-house, and directly on the line of Lee's retreat towards the Appomattox.

It seemed as if Sheridan's position at Jetersville, with his left across the line of Lee's westward march to the Appomattox, would compel Lee to stand still. Hence the enemy's movement towards the Appomattox was given up, and the men were faced about and moved northeast, towards Amelia Court-house, expecting to fight Lee there. Lee, however, was already on his way from the court-house towards the river; and when this became known, the direction of the enemy's movement was changed once more.

On the evening of the 6th, two divisions of the Sixth Army Corps came up with Lee's retreating columns at the intersection of the Burkesville Station road with the road upon which they were moving. Some desultory fighting ensued. Sheridan telegraphed: "If the thing is pressed, I think Lee will surrender." He claimed already to have captured Generals Ewell, Kershaw, Button, Corse, De Bare, and Custis Lee, several thousand prisoners, fourteen pieces of artillery, with caissons, and a large number of wagons.

The position into which the remnant of Lee's army had now been forced was one from which it was impossible to extricate it without a battle, which it was no longer capable of fighting. His army lay massed a short distance west of Appomattox Court-house; his last avenue of escape towards Danville, on the southwest, was gone; he was completely hemmed in. Meade was in his rear on the east, and on his right flank north of Appomattox Court-house; Sheridan had headed him off completely, by getting between him and Lynchburg; General Ord was on the south of the court-house, near the railroad; the Yankee troops were in the most enthusiastic spirits, and what remained of the Army of Northern Virginia was plainly doomed.

SURRENDER OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

The line of Lee's retreat afforded ample evidence of the excessive, frightful demoralization of his army. It was strewn

with arms and accoutrements, with abandoned caissons, with knapsacks, blankets, and clothing—in short, with whatever could be most readily cast away in flight. The whole intervening country was tracked by deserters returning in squads to their homes; and who, anticipating a surrender of the army, were anxious to avoid what they supposed would be the conditions of such an event. The extent of this desertion was without precedent. Lee's whole army had almost ran through his fingers. He had had on the lines he had abandoned between twenty-seven and twenty-eight thousand men; at Appomattox Court-house he had scarcely ten thousand men for a battle, and actually surrendered less than eight thousand.* On the Petersburg lines Pickett's division had been roughly estimated at eight thousand men. It surrendered only forty-five muskets. Such were the moral effects of the fall of Richmond, and such the necessities which brought with it the terrible consequence of the surrender of what had been by far the most formidable army the Confederates had ever had in the field.

There can be no doubt in history that General Lee, in taking his army away from Richmond and Petersburg, had decided, in his own mind, upon the hopelessness of the war, and had predetermined its surrender. The most striking proof of this is, that on his retreat there was no order published against straggling—a thing unprecedented in all deliberate and strategic retreats—and nothing whatever done to maintain discipline. The men were not animated by the style of general orders usual on such occasions. They straggled and deserted almost at will. An idea ran through the Virginia troops that with the abandonment of Richmond the war was hopeless, and that they would be justified in refusing to fight outside the limits of their State. Nothing was done to check the notorious

* The looseness of historical statement in the North with reference to the war is very remarkable. We must expect exaggeration and brag in Yankee newspapers; but in the magazine, pamphlet, report, and those deliberate forms of literature, which stand between the daily paper and the bound volume, some effort at accuracy of statement is to be expected. Yet we see in the columns of a popular Northern magazine that Lee surrendered at Appomattox Court-house *fifty thousand men!* And this absurd statement is quite as likely to go into Yankee history as any other absurd piece of statistics about the extent and glory of Yankee conquests.

circulation of this notion in the army. The Virginia troops scattered off to their homes at almost every mile of the route. We have seen that Pickett was left with only a handful of men. Some of the brigade commanders had not hesitated to advise their men that the war was virtually over, and that they had better go home and "make crops."

But there are other proofs, besides the omission of the measures against straggling usual on retreats, that General Lee had prevised a surrender of his army. He carried off from Petersburg and Richmond all the transportation of his army, sufficient, perhaps, for one hundred thousand men, certainly largely in excess of the actual needs of the retreat. The excessive number of Virginia troops who were permitted to drop out of the ranks and return to their homes, shows very well that there was no firm purpose to carry the war out of the limits of that State. Prisoners taken on the retreat invariably reported that the army was soon to be halted for a surrender; and General Custis Lee, when captured by the enemy, is alleged to have made the same revelation of his father's designs.

While the pursuit of Lee's army by Grant's overwhelming forces was still in progress, the following correspondence ensued between the two commanders:

I.

APRIL 7, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, *Commanding C. S. A.*:

GENERAL—The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate Southern army, known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-Gen. commanding Armies of the United States.

II.

APRIL 7, 1865.

GENERAL—I have received your note of this day. Though not entirely of the opinion you express of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid needless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

R. E. LEE, General.

TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT,
Commanding Armies of the United States.

III.

APRIL 8, 1865.

TO GENERAL R. E. LEE, *Commanding C. S. A.* :

GENERAL—Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of the same date, asking the conditions on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia is just received.

In reply, I would say, that peace being my first desire, there is but one condition that I insist upon, viz. :

That the men surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged.

I will meet you, or designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General,
Commanding Armies of the United States.

IV.

APRIL 8, 1865.

GENERAL—I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day in answer to mine of yesterday.

I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition.

To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender.

But as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desire to know whether your proposals would tend to that end.

I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia; but so far as your proposition may affect the Confederate States forces under my command and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten A. M. to-morrow, on the old stage-road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, General C. S. A.

TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT,

Commanding Armies of the United States.

V.

APRIL 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, *Commanding C. S. A.*:

GENERAL—Your note of yesterday is received. As I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten A. M. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself; and the whole North entertain the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed.

Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General United States Army.

VI.

APRIL 9, 1865.

GENERAL—I received your note of this morning on the picket-line, whither I had come to meet you and ascertain

definitely what terms were embraced in your proposition of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army.

I now request an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, General.

To LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT,

Commanding Armies of the United States.

VII.

APRIL 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, *Commanding C. S. A.*:

Your note of this date is but this moment, 11.50 A. M., received.

In consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and Lynchburg road to the Farmville and Lynchburg road, I am, at this writing, about four miles west of Walter's Church, and will push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you.

Notice sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take place, will meet me.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

VIII.

APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, April 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, *Commanding C. S. A.*:

In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th inst., I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit:

Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officers as you may designate.

The officers to give their individual parole not to take arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander to sign a like parole for the men of their commands.

The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them.

This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage.

This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their parole and the laws in force where they may reside.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

IX.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, *Commanding U. S. A.*:

GENERAL—I have received your letter of this date, containing the terms of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, General.

Thus in two days time, and by means of nine short letters, was accomplished the decisive event of the war, and what in fact was to prove its complete conclusion.

General Lee and General Grant had met at the house of Mr. Wilmer McLean. The interview was very simple, and unattended by any ceremony. General Lee was attended only by Colonel Marshal, one of his aids, while with Grant there were several of his staff-officers; and a number of Yankee generals entered the room during the interview. The two commanders greeted each other with courtesy, and without idle words or dramatic flourishes proceeded at once and simply to business.

General Lee immediately alluded to the conditions of the surrender, characterized them as lenient, and said he would leave the details to General Grant's own discretion. General Grant stated the terms of the parole; that the arms should be stacked, the artillery parked, and the supplies and munitions turned over to him, the officers retaining their side-arms,

horses, and personal effects. General Lee promptly assented to the conditions, and the agreement of surrender was engrossed and signed by General Lee at half-past three o'clock in the afternoon.

A Yankee correspondent thus described the appearance of General Lee in this memorable interview: "General Lee looked very much jaded and worn, but, nevertheless, presented the same magnificent *physique* for which he has always been noted. He was neatly dressed in gray cloth, without embroidery or any insignia of rank, except three stars worn on the turned portion of his coat-collar. His cheeks were very much bronzed by exposure, but still shone ruddy underneath it all. He is growing quite bald, and wears one of the side locks of his hair thrown across the upper portion of his forehead, which is as white and fair as a woman's. He stands fully six feet one inch in height, and weighs something over two hundred pounds, without being burdened with a pound of superfluous flesh. During the whole interview he was retired and dignified to a degree bordering on taciturnity, but was free from all exhibition of temper or mortification. His demeanor was that of a thoroughly possessed gentleman who had a very disagreeable duty to perform, but was determined to get through it as well and as soon as he could."

It is to be fairly and cheerfully admitted that General Grant's conduct, with respect to all the circumstances of the surrender, exhibited some extraordinary traits of magnanimity. He had not dramatized the affair. He had conducted it with as much simplicity as possible, avoided "sensation," and spared every thing that might wound the feelings or imply the humiliation of a vanquished foe. Such conduct was noble. Before the surrender, General Grant had expressed to his own officers his intention not to require the same formalities as are required in a surrender between the forces of two foreign nations or belligerent powers, and to exact no conditions for the mere purpose of humiliation.

While the interview with reference to the surrender was taking place between the commanders, a strange scene was transpiring between the lines of the two armies, and occupied the period of the armistice. An informal conference and mingling of officers of both armies gave to the streets of the

village of Appomattox Court-house a strange appearance. On the Yankee side were Generals Ord, Sheridan, Crook, Gibbon, Griffin, Merritt, Ayres, Bartlett, Chamberlain, Forsyth, and Michie. On the Confederate side were Generals Longstreet, Gordon, Heth, Wilcox, and others. The conference lasted some hour and a half. None but general officers were allowed to pass through the skirmish line. There were mutual introductions and shaking of hands; and soon was passed about some whiskey, and mutual healths were drank. Gradually the area of the conference widened. The parties filled the streets, and before this singular conference closed, some were seated on the steps, and others, for lack of more comfortable accommodations, chatted cosily, seated on a contiguous fence.

Between the skirmish lines of the two armies there was a great suspense, for it was felt that great interests were at stake between them. Skirmish line confronted skirmish line, lines of battle confronted lines of battle, cannon confronted cannon. Eager hopes hung on the interview between the opposing great commanders of the two armies. Peace might follow this interview. It might end in resumption of hostilities, in fiercest battle, in terrible carnage. The two armies were plainly visible to one another. The Confederates skirted a strip of woods in rear of the town. Through the vistas of the streets might be seen their wagon-trains. The minutes passed but slowly. The approach of every horseman attracted an eager look. Two o'clock had been appointed by Grant for the resumption of hostilities. It arrived, and the Yankee skirmish line commenced to advance. The Confederate pickets were in plain sight, and stationary. A moment more, and the crack of the rifle would indicate the resumption of carnage. But a clatter of hoofs is heard, and a flag of truce appears upon the scene, with an order from General Grant that hostilities should cease until further orders.

After the interview at McLean's house, General Lee returned to his own camp, about half a mile distant, where his leading officers were assembled awaiting his return. He announced the result, and the terms. They then approached him in order of rank, shook hands, expressing satisfaction at his course and their regret at parting, all shedding tears on the occasion. The fact of surrender and the terms were then announced to the troops,

and when General Lee appeared among them he was loudly cheered.

At four o'clock it was announced in Grant's army that the surrender had been consummated, and the articles signed. And now the enthusiasm which had been restrained by uncertainty broke loose. The various brigade commanders announced the joyful news to their commands, and cheers of the wildest description followed. The men threw their hats high in the air, leaped, ran, jumped, threw themselves into each other's arms, and seemed mad with joy.

But this scene of joy was but slight in comparison with what was taking place in distant parts of the North, where the news of the surrender had been carried by the telegraph. Secretary Stanton, in Washington, immediately telegraphed an order to the headquarters of every army and department, and to every fort and arsenal in the United States, to fire a salute of two hundred guns in celebration of the event. To Grant he dispatched: "Thanks be to Almighty God for the great victory with which He has this day crowned you and the gallant armies under your command. The thanks of this department, and of the Government, and of the people of the United States—their reverence and honor have been deserved—will be rendered to you and the brave and gallant officers and soldiers of your army for all time."

The clerks of the departments, in Washington, went in procession to the President's house, and entertained him with the "Star Spangled Banner" and "Old Hundred." A crowd of several thousands were soon assembled in front of the executive mansion. They shouted for Mr. Lincoln. The President testified his participation in the joy by calling for the once popular *secession* song of "Dixie." He said: "I have always thought that 'Dixie' was one of the best songs I ever heard. Our adversaries over the way, I know, have attempted to appropriate it; but I insist that on yesterday we fairly captured it. I referred the question to the attorney-general, and he gave it as his legal opinion that it is now our property. (Laughter and loud applause.) I now ask the band to give us a good turn upon it."

The day after the surrender General Lee bid farewell to his army in the following simple address, so characteristic of his plain and manly style of writing:

GENERAL ORDER NO. 9.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
April 10, 1865.

After four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.

I need not tell the survivors of so many hard-fought battles, who have remained steadfast to the last, that I have consented to this result from no distrust of them; but feeling that valor and devotion could accomplish nothing that could compensate for the loss that would have attended the continuation of the contest, I have determined to avoid the useless sacrifice of those whose past services have endeared them to their countrymen.

By the terms of agreement, officers and men can return to their homes and remain there until exchanged.

You will take with you the satisfaction that proceeds from the consciousness of duty faithfully performed; and I earnestly pray that a merciful God will extend to you his blessing and protection.

With an unceasing admiration of your constancy and devotion to your country, and a grateful remembrance of your kind and generous consideration of myself, I bid you an affectionate farewell.

R. E. LEE, General.

A few days after the surrender, General Lee, attended by five members of his staff, rode into Richmond over the pontoon bridge at the foot of Seventeenth-street, and thence up Main-street to his residence on Franklin-street between Seventh and Eighth streets.

Passing rapidly through the city he was recognized by but few citizens, who raised their hats, a compliment which was in every case returned; but on nearing his residence, the fact of his presence having spread quickly, a great crowd rushed to see him, and set up a loud cheering, to which he replied by simply raising his hat. As he descended from his horse, a large number of persons pressed forward and shook hands with him. In a few moments the General made his way into his house, the crowd dispersed, and thus quietly passed from the theatre of action and public observation the great and famous commander of the Army of Northern Virginia.

The surrender of General Lee drew after it important and rapid consequences, and, in effect, terminated the war.

It left Johnston with no alternative but surrender. On the 26th of April, by the official returns of the Army of Tennessee,

the number of infantry and artillery, present and absent, was seventy thousand five hundred and ten; the total present, eighteen thousand five hundred and seventy-eight; the effective fighting force, fourteen thousand one hundred and seventy-nine. The effective total of the cavalry was only a little over five thousand. These statistics afford a startling exhibition of the demoralization of the Confederates, and of the amount of that offence in our armies mildly called "absenteeism;" but for which, in military language, there could be no name but desertion.

The limits of Johnston's command included North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. In the distant districts of his department the situation was even more deplorable and desperate than in the vicinity of Raleigh. In South Carolina the Confederates had only a division of cavalry, less than one thousand, and in Florida they were as weak.

In General Dick Taylor's department there had been disastrous events. Mobile had fallen, and there were no means of opposing the formidable Yankee army under General Canby.

MOVEMENTS IN THE SOUTHWEST.—FALL OF MOBILE, ETC.

The operations against this city had been renewed late in March, when two corps of Canby's army invested the Spanish Fort, one of the principal defences on the east side of the bay. The design of this renewal of operations against Mobile was to give the crowning stroke to the system of Confederate defence in the Southwest. After Hood's defeat before Nashville, General Thomas indicated to the Washington authorities that he would not, on account of the state of the roads and for other reasons, be able to enter immediately upon another campaign. But he offered to co-operate with General Canby by sending to the latter one-half of his infantry force, and almost all his cavalry, the former under the command of General A. J. Smith, the latter under General Wilson.

In addition to these movements, another column of Yankee troops under Steele had left Pensacola, Florida, on the 20th of March, arrived in front of Mobile, and opened communication with General Canby's force. On his march General Steele had

considerable skirmishing, but met with no serious opposition. His command arrived on the 22d of April, having cut the Mobile and Montgomery Railroad near Pollard.

On the 8th of April, an extraordinary force was brought to bear upon Spanish Fort. Twenty-two Parrott guns were got within half a mile of the work, while other powerful batteries were still nearer. Two gunboats joined in the tremendous cannonade. The result was, that the fort surrendered a little after midnight. Fort Alexandria followed, and the guns of these two were turned against Forts Tracy and Huger, in the harbor, at the mouth of the Blakely and Appalachee rivers. But these had already been abandoned. The monitors then went busily to work removing torpedoes, and ran up to within shelling distance of the city. On the 12th of April the city of Mobile was occupied by the Yankee forces, General Maury, the Confederate commander, having evacuated the city with the bulk of his army.

In the mean time Wilson's movements were completing the plan of subjugation in the Southwest. His cavalry force had moved almost unresisted through the Southwest, captured Selma, in Alabama, were already in the vicinity of Macon, Georgia, and might easily calculate upon the capture of every place of importance west of Augusta.

Selma was occupied by the Yankee forces on the 2d of April. The first resistance met by the enemy's forces was at Monticello, where, after a short engagement, they continued to advance. On the 1st of April, Forrest, Lyon, and Chalmers having formed a junction, the first named took command, and the Confederates again made a stand, and were driven back with loss. They then retreated to Selma, where an obstinate defence was prepared for. On the next day, the 2d of April, Wilson moved to the attack of the place, and after about an hour of severe fighting, the fortifications were carried by assault, and his troops entered the town, capturing over two thousand prisoners, one hundred cannon, large numbers of horses and mules, and immense quantities of supplies, ammunition, etc. Besides these, there fell into the enemy's possession millions of dollars worth of cotton, a large arsenal, naval iron-works and other manufactories, all of which were destroyed.

Montgomery, the first Confederate capital, was peaceably surrendered on the 12th. Columbus, Georgia, was captured on the 16th. Macon was approached on the 21st. Here Wilson was met by a flag of truce from Howell Cobb, announcing an armistice between Sherman and Johnston.

The survey of the situation south of Virginia leads to the conclusion that to carry on the war east of the Mississippi the Confederacy had to depend on Johnston's army alone. The enemy could have brought against it twelve or fifteen times its number in the armies of Generals Grant, Sherman, and Canby. With such odds against us, without the means of procuring ammunition or repairing arms, without money or credit to provide food, it was thought by Johnston impossible to continue the war with any reasonable hope of success.

SURRENDER OF JOHNSTON'S ARMY.

This conclusion the Confederate commander announced to the governors of the States within his department by telegraph as follows :

"The disaster in Virginia, the capture by the enemy of all our workshops for the preparation of ammunition and repairing of arms, the impossibility of recruiting our little army, opposed to more than ten times its number, or supplying it except by robbing our own citizens, destroyed all hope of successful war. I have, therefore, made a military convention with Major-General Sherman to terminate hostilities in North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. I made this convention to spare the blood of this gallant little army, to prevent further suffering of our people by the devastation and ruin inevitable from the marches of invading armies, and to avoid the crime of waging a hopeless war."

Johnston had at first made an attempt to obtain terms to give security to citizens as well as to his own soldiers. The first result of his negotiations with Sherman was a basis of agreement, which that Yankee commander declared in a circular address was to secure instant peace in all parts of the country, and would involve the surrender of every battalion of Confederates within the limits of the United States. The following is a copy of the important paper signed by the commanders of the two armies :

MEMORANDUM, OR BASIS OF AGREEMENT, made this eighteenth day of April, A. D., 1865, near Durham Station, in the State of North Carolina, by and between General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding Confederate Army, and Major-General W. T. Sherman, commanding Army of the United States, in North Carolina, both being present :

1. The contending armies now in the field to maintain the *status quo*, until notice is given by the commanding general of any one to its opponent, and reasonable time, say forty-eight hours, allowed.

2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded, and conducted to their several state capitals, therein to deposit their arms and public property in the state arsenal, and each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and to abide the action of both State and Federal authorities. The number of arms and munitions of war to be reported to the chief of ordnance at Washington City, subject to the future action of the Congress of the United States, and in the mean time to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States respectively.

3. The recognition by the Executive of the United States of the several State governments, on their officers and legislatures taking the oath prescribed by the constitution of the United States ; and where conflicting State governments have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.

4. The re-establishment of all federal courts in the several States, with powers as defined by the constitution and laws of Congress.

5. The people and inhabitants of all these States to be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, their political rights and franchises, as well as their rights of person and property, as defined by the constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

6. The executive authority of the Government of the United States not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace and quiet and abstain from acts of armed hostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their residence.

7. In general terms, the war to cease—a general amnesty, so far as the Executive of the United States can command, on the condition of the disbandment of the Confederate armies, distribution of the arms, and the resumption of peaceable pursuits by the officers and men hitherto composing said armies.

Not being duly empowered by our respective principals to fulfil these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain an answer thereto, and to carry out the above programme.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General,

Commanding Army U. S. in N. C.

J. E. JOHNSTON, General,

Commanding C. S. A. in N. C.

Sherman's vivid vision of restoring "peace to the banks of the Rio Grande" did not take at Washington. The announcement there of the nature and terms of his conference with Johnston was the signal for the outpouring of such censure and denunciation as required all his military reputation to

withstand. In fact, Sherman had committed the unpardonable offence of attempting to substitute for the idea of subjugation that of a restored Union; and it was easy enough now to see that the profession of the latter purpose had all along been nothing more than the mask of the real designs of the Washington Government, which would be content with nothing short of the abolition of slavery in the South, the extinction of the State governments, or their reduction to provisional establishments, and the programme of a general confiscation of property. The President rejected Sherman's terms; the department disallowed them, and General Grant, although a warm personal friend of Sherman, disapproved them.

It was fiercely argued by the Washington authorities that the terms proposed by Sherman would bring the war to naught; that if the State governments were re-established in the South, they might re-enact slavery, and set up a power in defiance of the General Government; and that it was the madness of generosity to abolish the confiscation laws, and relieve "rebels" from all pains and penalties for their crimes.

General Sherman replied to the censures uttered or instigated at Washington, by including in the official report of his campaign an elaborate justification of his course in entering upon the convention with Johnston which was disavowed by the Government. The substance of his defence was, that General Johnston wished, in addition to the terms granted to General Lee, some general concessions that would enable him to control his followers until they could be got back to the neighborhood of their homes, thereby saving North Carolina from the devastation which would result from turning the men loose and unprovided for, and by the pursuit of these scattered bodies through the State. All of Sherman's generals were in favor of his granting, as far as lay in his power, such concessions. At the next meeting Sherman stated that Johnston satisfied him that he had power to disband all the Confederate armies, as well as those under his own immediate command. What the Confederate commander especially dreaded was, that the States would be dismembered and deprived of any political existence, and that the absolute disarming of his men would leave the South powerless and exposed to the depredations of assassins and robbers. "In any case," concluded Sherman,

“the memorandum was a mere basis for reference to the President, to enable him, if he chose, at one blow to dissipate the power of the Confederacy, which had threatened the national safety for years. It admitted of modification, alteration, and change. It had no appearance of an ultimatum, and by no false reasoning can it be construed into a usurpation of powers on my part.”

The dissatisfaction at Washington with Sherman's conduct was so extreme, that Grant was ordered to proceed at once to North Carolina, to take control of Sherman's army, and to force Johnston to an immediate and unconditional surrender. In this instance, Grant again showed that magnanimity which seems to have been largely developed in the hours of his triumph, and in the last scenes of the war—at a time, indeed, when the true character of the popular hero is most surely tested. In the most fortunate period of the life of any living man in America, Grant was not intoxicated by vanity or conceit. He was incapable of an attempt upon the reputation of a rival. He went to North Carolina, but he kept the operations in the hands of Sherman. He insisted upon giving him the honor of concluding the final negotiations with Johnston, and receiving his surrender. It was concluded on the same terms as had been conceded to General Lee.

SURRENDER OF TAYLOR'S ARMY.

On the 4th of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to General Canby all “the forces, munitions of war, etc., in the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana.” The negotiations for this surrender took place at Citronville, Alabama. The terms were essentially the same as those accorded to Johnston: officers and men to be paroled until duly exchanged or otherwise released by the United States; officers to give their individual paroles; commanders of regiments and companies to sign paroles for their men; arms and munitions to be given up to the United States; officers and men to be allowed to return to their homes, and not to be molested so long as they kept their paroles, and obeyed the laws where they reside, but persons resident in Northern States not to

return without permission; officers to be allowed to retain their side arms, private horses, and baggage; horses, the private property of enlisted men, not to be taken from them, but they to be allowed to retain them for private purposes only. This surrender virtually involved that of the Confederate vessels blockaded in the Tombigbee River.

SURRENDER OF KIRBY SMITH'S ARMY.

In the first days of May, 1865, all the Confederate forces east of the Mississippi River had been surrendered. But west of that stream, in Western Louisiana and Texas, there remained a considerable force of Confederates, under command of General E. Kirby Smith. There was yet a prospect that the war might be continued there for some indefinite period. The country was ill adapted for the advance of an invading army. The fortune of the Confederate arms in the Trans-Mississippi had been superior, in the average of successes, to that east of the river; because there our forces, not tied down to any particular cities or forts, or any particular line of defence—which indeed had been the cardinal error in the general system of the Confederate warfare—had fought as opportunity occurred, and generally on ground of their own selection.

When the news of Lee's surrender first reached Kirby Smith, he issued, from his headquarters at Shreveport, a stirring general order to his troops. He reminded them that they had the means of long resisting invasion; he declared that they had hopes of succor from abroad; he promised them that if they protracted the struggle, they would surely receive the aid of nations who already deeply sympathized with them. He said:

"The great resources of the department, its vast extent, the numbers, discipline, and the efficiency of the army, will secure to our country terms that a proud people can with honor accept, and may, under the providence of God, be the means of checking the triumph of our enemy, and securing the final success of our cause."

War meetings were held in different parts of Texas. At Houston, General Magruder addressed the citizens; he declared

that he was not at all discouraged by the position of affairs; and he ended by protesting that he had rather be a "Comanche Indian" than bow the knee to the Yankees. In Washington County, the citizens submitted to the military authorities a proposition that every white male over the age of thirteen years should be called into the army; that every male slave should be brought in with his master; and that every white female should be provided with arms. Resolutions and plans of this sort were rife for some weeks in Texas.

But these were but spasmodic expressions of the public mind in the first moments of disappointment and rage; they lacked resolution and steadiness. When Kirby Smith published his address at Shreveport, the extent of the disasters east of the Mississippi River was not fully known. When it was fully known, a demoralization, which it was impossible to check, quickly ensued in Smith's army, and involved most of the people of Texas. His force was daily wasting away by desertions, and it had received but few accessions from across the Mississippi. On the 23d of May, he sent officers to General Canby, at Baton Rouge, to negotiate terms of surrender. These were agreed upon on the 26th of May, and were such as had been conceded to the other Confederate forces.*

With this act there passed from the great stage of the war the last armed Confederate. The last action of the war had been a skirmish near Brazos, in Texas. Peace now reigned from the Potomac to Rio Grande.

Contrary to the plausible expectations of those who supposed that if the war went adverse to the South, it would drag out its last terms in irregular fighting in mountain warfare, and such desultory contests, complete and profound peace fell

* On the 1st of June, General Brown, commanding the Yankee forces, occupied and garrisoned Brownsville. On the 2d of June, Generals Kirby Smith and Magruder met, in the harbor of Galveston, General A. J. Smith, representing Major-General Canby, and General Kirby Smith then and there signed the terms of surrender previously agreed on at New Orleans. On the 5th of June, full and formal possession of Galveston was delivered up to the Yankee forces, and the flag of the Union raised. On the 8th of June, Admiral Thatcher went ashore, and was received by the Confederate naval and military authorities, who requested a part of the United States naval force to remain there for their protection. General Sheridan was subsequently assigned to command in Texas, and the blockade of Galveston raised.

upon the Confederacy as the calm after the hurricane. "Surrender" was the word, as the news of Lee's disaster travelled from point to point, from camp to camp, in the Confederacy. The quick succession of these surrenders—the suddenness and completeness of the catastrophe—show plainly enough that there was a widely spread rottenness in the affairs of the Confederacy, and that its cause went down in a general demoralization of the arm^y and people.

APPENDIX.



APPENDIX No. I.

AMERICAN IDEAS: THE KEYS TO THE HISTORY OF THE WAR.

I.

Political Iconoclasm in America.—The two idols of “the Constitution” and “the Union.”—Extravagant praises of the Constitution.—Its true value.—It contained a noble principle and glaring defects.—Character of the founders of the Constitution.—Hamilton.—Franklin.—His cookery-book philosophy.—His absurdities in the Convention.—The call for the Convention that formed the Constitution.—Three parties in the Convention.—The idea of a “national” government.—Conflict between the small and large States.—The result of this, the distinguishing feature of the Constitution.—That feature an accident, and not an *a priori* discovery.—Enumeration of defects in the Constitution.—The weakness and ignorance of its framers.—Its one conspicuous virtue and original principle.—Combination of State-rights with a common authority.—How involved in the construction of the Senate.—How made more precise in the Amendments.—Particulars in which the element of *the States* was recognized.—A new rule of construction applied to the American Union.—The necessity which originated it.—The Constitution of the United States not a political revolution.—The creature of the States.—True interpretation of its moral grandeur.—The bond of the Union a voluntary one.—No mission apart from the States.—Why coercion of the States was not necessary.—How the Union stood for an American nationality.—Its power to reach *individuals*.—The Union, in practice, rather a rough companionship than a national identity.—Right of secession.—Not necessary to dis-ens it.—The development of the Union a North and South, and not disintegrated States.—Profound invention of Calhoun of South Carolina.—How it was a Union measure, and not “Nullification.”

An effect of great civil commotions in the history of a people is to liberate reason, and to give to intelligence the opportunity to assert itself against the traditions and political idolatries of the past. Such a period is essentially one of political iconoclasm—the breaking of idols which we find we have heretofore unduly cherished, and with it the recovery from the delusions of an unworthy and traditional worship. When there is little in the present to interest men, and their

lives are passed in an established routine, it is natural for them to exaggerate and to adorn the past. But when the present has its own historical convulsion, it is then that men find new standards with which to judge the past, and a period in which rightly to estimate it,—destroying or dwarfing, it is true, much that before claimed their admiration or enchained their worship; but, on the other hand, oftentimes exalting what before had had an obscure and degraded place in popular estimation. It is in such periods that the native historian of his country finds the justest time for determining the correct value of the past, and distinguishing between what were its mere idols, and what should have been its true aspirations.

It is thus, from the stand-point of the recent great war in America, that one may justly contemplate the true value of its past history, measure correctly its great men of a former period, and master the delusions of an old political idolatry. The world knows how before this war the people of North America had, for nearly three-quarters of a century, worshipped, as its two political idols, the Federal constitution and the Union of States formed under it. Looking back at these from the present period in American history, which has freed us from the restraints of mere sentiment and tradition, he who thus makes the calm and intelligent retrospect is astonished to find what extravagance and delusion were in the minds of these worshippers, and what acts of devotion were made to what were oftentimes but gilded images of clay.

For two generations of men, the almost miraculous wisdom of the Federal constitution of America has been preached and exclaimed, until it was thought to be political blasphemy to impugn it. Its praises were hymned by poets. The public orator was listened to with impatience who had not some exaggerated tribute to pay to the sacred virtues of what Daniel Webster called the *consti-tew-tion*, and the almost angelic excellence of “the forefathers” who had framed it. It was seriously asserted, that in this instrument had been combined the political wisdom of all ages, and that it was the epitome of the human science of government. The insolent heights to which this extravagance arose were astounding. The world’s last hopes of good government were said to be contained in these dozen pages of printed matter.

Unhappily for such hopes, or for such boasts, we are now at a period when we may estimate the right value of this wonderful constitution, and take the severe judgment of history upon it. We may now dare to state that judgment briefly: it is, that never did a political instrument contain, from the necessity of its circumstances, a nobler principle, or present the folly and ignorance of men in more glaring defects, than did the Federal constitution of the United States.

It is no longer required, by the political fashion of the times, for an American to say, that the men who formed this constitution were either intellectual giants or wonderful scholars. Beyond a few names—such as Randolph and Patrick Henry, “the forest-born Demosthenes,” of Virginia, Pinckney and Luther Martin, of Maryland, Hamilton, of New York, and Franklin, of Pennsylvania—the Convention which formed this instrument may be described as a company of very plain men, but little instructed in political science, who, in their debates, showed sometimes the crudities and chimeras of ignorant reform, and exhibited more frequently a loose ransacking of history for precedents and lessons, such as rather might have been expected in a club of college sophomores than in a council of statesmen.

The two last names mentioned on the list of distinction in the Convention—Hamilton and Franklin—may be taken as examples of the American exaggeration of their public men, which, indeed, more peculiarly belonged to the people of the Northern States—that division of the American people which after-events have classified as *Yankees*. Hamilton, who had a school of his own in the Convention, was readily exalted as an idol by the party which he so early begot in the history of his country. The man who was honored by pageants and processions in the streets of New York, at the close of the Convention, must be declared, by the just and unimpassioned historian, to have been superficial as a statesman, and defective as a scholar. He had, indeed, neither the intuition of genius, nor the power of analysis. He was a man of little mind. But he had studied a peculiar style in writing, which Washington was weak enough to take for a model, and, it is said, sometimes appropriated. There was no point or sharp edges in the style either of Alexander Hamilton or George Washington. Both

wrote and spoke in those long sentences in which common-places are pompously dressed up, and in which the sense is so overlaid with qualifications that it is almost impossible to probe it. But Washington made no pretensions to literature and scholarship, while Hamilton had no titles to fame other than these. And in these it must be confessed that he had scarcely any other merit than that of a smooth constructor of words, a character which with the vulgar often passes for both orator and statesman. *On the whole, however, the result is not very different from that of the other two.*

Benjamin Franklin was thoroughly a representative Yankee, the first clear-cut type we recognize in history of that materialism, coarse selfishness, pelf, low cunning, and commercial smartness, which passes with the contemporary Yankee as the truest philosophy and highest aim of life. It is alike curious and amusing to examine the grounds of estimation in the minds of his countrymen, which conferred the high-sounding title of *philosopher* on an old gentleman in blue stockings, who, in France, was the butt of the Parisian wits, and who left a legacy of wisdom to posterity in the "*Maxims of Poor Richard*." How many modern Yankees have been educated in the school of the "Maxims" of Franklin it would be difficult to over-estimate. If a gross and materialistic value of things is to pass as "philosophy;" if the hard maxims of selfishness, and the parings of penuriousness, such as "Poor Richard" dins to American youth, do really contain the true lessons and meaning of life, then we may declare, in the phrases of Yankee admiration, that Benjamin Franklin was a philosopher and a sage, who eclipsed all other lights in the world, and "whipped the universe." But really, after all, may we not doubt the value of this cookery-book philosophy of smart things; think it doubtful whether the mighty problem of how pence make pounds, be the largest or best part of human wisdom; and conclude that Benjamin Franklin, though not the greatest celebrity America has ever produced, was neither worse nor better than a representative Yankee.

We are almost inclined to laugh at the part which this queer figure acted in the Convention which formed the constitution of the United States. No member had more clap-traps in the way of political inventions. His ignorance of political science and of popular motives was alike profound; and we find him

proposing to govern the country after a fashion scarcely less beautiful and less practicable than the Republic of Plato and the Arcadia of Sydney. He thought that magistrates might serve the public from patriarchal affection or for the honor of titles. He quoted in the Convention a maxim that sounds curiously enough to American ears : that "in all cases of public service, the less profit, the greater honor." He was in favor of the nonsense of a plural executive. He insisted in the Convention on the practicability of "finding three or four men in all the United States with public spirit enough to bear sitting in peaceful council, for perhaps an equal term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that our laws were duly executed." Such was the political sagacity of this person, who, it must be confessed, made what reputation he had rather in the handbooks of Yankee economy than in monuments of statesmanship.

But we shall find a better key to the real value of the constitution in a summary review of its debates, than in a portraiture, however interesting, of the men who composed it. The Convention of delegates assembled from the different States at Philadelphia, on the second Monday in May, 1787, had met on a blind errand. They had been called by Congress, "for the sole and express purpose of *revising* the Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such *alterations* and provisions therein, as shall, when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States, render the Federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union."

This singularly confused language, in the call of the Convention, naturally gave rise to differences of opinion. One party in the Convention—representing what was known as the New Jersey proposition—took the ground that its power was limited to a mere revision and amendment of the existing Articles of Confederation : that it was, therefore, necessary to take the present federal system as the basis of action, to proceed upon terms of the federal equality of the States ; in short, to remedy the defects of the existing government, not to supplant it. Hamilton and his party were for a new and violent system of reform. They were said to favor the establishment of a monarchy. The extent to which this was true is, that they were in

favor of the annihilation of the State governments and the permanent tenure of public offices. A third party in the Convention avoided both extremes, insisted upon a change of the federal principle, and proposed a "national" government, in the sense of a supreme power with respect to certain objects common between the States, and committed to it, and which would have some kind of direct compulsory action upon *individuals*. The word "national" was used only in this limited sense. The great defect of the existing Confederation was, that it had no power to reach individuals, and thus enforce its decrees. The proposed Union, or "national" government, was to be a league of States, but with power to reach individuals; and yet these only in certain severely defined respects, and through powers expressly delegated by the States. In the nature of things, this power could not act upon the States collectively; that is, not in the usual and peaceful mode in which governments are conducted. All that was claimed for it, and all that could be claimed for it, was to reach individuals in those specifications of authority that the States should make to it.

The plan of this party was no sooner developed in the Convention than it met the furious opposition of the smaller States. It was declared by Luther Martin, that those who advocated it "wished to establish such a system as could give their own States undue power and influence in the government over the other States." Both Mr. Randolph, of Virginia, and Mr. Pinckney, of Maryland, who had brought before the Convention drafts of the plan referred to, agreed that the members of the Senate should be elected by the House of Representatives; thus, in effect, giving to the larger States power to construct the Senate as they chose. Mr. Randolph had given additional offence to the smaller States. He proposed that, instead of an equal vote by States, "the right of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants."

There was thus excited in the Convention a jealousy between the larger and smaller States; the former insisting upon a preponderating influence in both houses of the National Legislature, and the latter insisting on an equality of representation in each house. This jealous controversy is tracked

through the debates of the Convention. It proceeded to a degree of warmth and anger in which the Convention was on the point of dissolution. When the vote was taken, five States were for an equality of representation and five against it. At this critical period, a conference committee was appointed. It resulted in a compromise; the opponents of an unequal representation agreeing to yield their objections to it in the lower House, provided its advocates would pledge themselves to support an equal representation in the Senate: and on this basis of agreement was reared the constitution of the United States of America.

The reader must observe here, that the great distinguishing feature of this constitution, the peculiar virtue of the American system—namely, the mixed representation of *the people* and *the States*—was purely the result of a jealousy between the larger and the smaller States, the fruit of an accident. It contained the true virtue of a political instrument, which, as we shall see, was otherwise full of faults and glaring with defects. It was that in which it was original. But it was not an *a priori* discovery. It was not the result of the wisdom of our ancestors. History abounds in instances where accidental or empirical settlements have afterwards been discovered to contain great elements of wisdom and virtue; and it has been natural and pleasing for succeeding generations to account these rather as the result of human reason and prescience, than as the product of blind circumstances. But we are forced to confess, that in that great political novelty of the American system—in which the world was to see, for the first time combined and harmonized, the principle of geographical sovereignties with that of a confederate unity, which, for certain purposes, was to stand for national identity—the “wisdom” of our forefathers had no part, but acted unconsciously under the pressure of circumstances, or the direction of divine Providence.

This statement is not pleasant to American vanity. But it is due to the truth of history. It is highly probable that the framers of the constitution did not fully comprehend the importance of the principles of the combination of State sovereignty with that of the simple republic on which they had stumbled. If they had, it might be supposed that they

would have defined with a much severer accuracy the political relations of the States and the General Government ; for it has been for the want of such accuracy that room has been found, at least for disputation, and the creation of two political parties, which have run through the whole of American history.

And here it is we must turn from the consideration of that principle in the constitution which was its distinctive feature and its saving virtue, to view briefly the enormous defects and omissions of an instrument that has shared so much of the undue admiration of mankind.

It is impossible to resist the thought, that the framers of the constitution were so much occupied with the controversy of jealousy between the large and the small States that they overlooked many great and obvious questions of government, which have since been fearfully developed in the political history of America. Beyond the results and compromises of that jealousy, the debates and the work of the Convention show one of the most wonderful blanks that has, perhaps, ever occurred in the political inventions of civilized mankind. They left behind them a list of imperfections in political prudence, a want of provision for the exigencies of their country, such as has seldom been known in the history of mankind.

A system of negro servitude existed in some of the States. It was an object of no solicitude in the Convention. The only references in the constitution to it are to be found in a provision in relation to the rendition of fugitives "held to service or labor," and in a mixed and empirical rule of popular representation. However these provisions may imply the true status of slavery, how much is it to be regretted that the Convention did not make (what might have been made so easily) an explicit declaration on the subject, that would have put it beyond the possibility of dispute, and removed it from even the plausibilities of party controversy !

For many years the very obvious question of the power of the General Government to make "internal improvements" has agitated the councils of America ; and yet there is no text in the constitution to regulate a matter which should have stared its authors in the face, but what may be derived, by

the most forced and distant construction, from the powers of Congress "to regulate commerce," and to "declare war," and "raise and support armies."

For a longer period, and with a fierceness once almost fatal to the Union, has figured in the politics of America, "the tariff question," a contest between a party for revenue and a party for protective prohibitions. Both parties have fought over that vague platitude of the constitution, the power of Congress "to regulate commerce;" and in the want of a more distinct language on a subject of such vast concern, there has been engendered a controversy which has progressed from the threshold of the history of the Union up to the period of its dissolution.

With the territorial possessions of America, even at the date of the Convention, and with all that the future promised in the expansion of a system that yet scarcely occupied more than the water-slopes of a continent, it might be supposed that the men who formed the constitution would have prepared a full and explicit article for the government of the territories. That vast and intricate subject—the power of the General Government over the territories, the true nature of these establishments, the status and political privileges of their inhabitants—is absolutely dismissed with this bald provision in the constitution of the United States :

"New States may be admitted by Congress into this Union."—ART. iv., SEC. 3.

But however flagrant these omissions of the constitution, and however through them sprung up much that was serious and deplorable in party controversy, we must lose neither sight nor appreciation of the one conspicuous and characteristic virtue of this instrument. That was the combination of State rights with an authority which should administer the common concerns of the States. This principle was involved in the construction of the Senate. It was again more fully and perfectly developed in the amendments of the constitution; these amendments having a peculiarity and significance as parts of the instrument, since they were, in a certain sense,

conditions precedent made by the States to their ratification of it. They provide :

"The enumeration in the constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."*

It may be said, that whereas the element of the States was recognized in the construction of the Senate, that element was precisely adjusted and admeasured in the amendments which we have just quoted. In the debates in the legislatures of the different States on the ratification of the constitution, it was never doubted that their original existence was already recognized in it; not only in the text of the instrument, but in the composition *by States* of the convention that framed it, and in the ratification *by States* which was necessary to promulgate it, and give it force and existence. The design of the amendments referred to, was simply to adjust in more precise language a vital and important element in the new system, and to declare formally what sense the States had of it, and with what understanding they approved it.

* These amendments, which were the fruit of the legislative wisdom of the States, not of that of the Convention, and were designed to give a full development and a proper accuracy to what was certainly ill-performed work in it, will be found embodied in the official declarations of at least six of the States, coupled with their ratification of the constitution.

MASSACHUSETTS.—"That it be explicitly declared, that all powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid constitution, are reserved to the several States, to be by them exercised."

NEW HAMPSHIRE.—"That it be explicitly declared, that all powers not expressly and particularly delegated by the aforesaid constitution, are reserved to the several States, to be by them exercised."

SOUTH CAROLINA.—"This convention doth also declare, that no section or paragraph of the said constitution warrants a construction that the States do not retain every power not expressly relinquished by them, and vested in the General Government of the Union."

VIRGINIA.—"We, the delegates of the people of Virginia, etc., do, in the name and in behalf of the people of Virginia, declare and make known that the powers granted under the constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them, whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression, and that every power not granted thereby remains with them, and at their will; that, therefore, no right, of any denomination, can be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified, by the Con-

But even if these official texts are—as a party in America has long contended—insufficient to establish the political element of the States, and to measure it as the depository of sovereignty by the rule of reserved rights, we are left a rule of construction as to the true nature of the American Union, which is completely out of the reach of any ingenious torture of language, and far above any art of quibble on words.*

gress, by the Senate, or House of Representatives, acting in any capacity, by the President, or any department or officer of the United States, except in those instances in which power is given by the constitution for those purposes; and that, among other essential rights, the liberty of conscience, and of the press, cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified, by any authority of the United States."

NEW YORK.—"That the powers of government may be resumed by the people whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness; that every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the said constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the departments of the Government thereof, remains to the people of the several States, or to their respective State governments, to whom they may have granted the same; and that those clauses in the said constitution, which declare that Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said constitution; but such clauses are to be construed either as exceptions to certain specified powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution."

RHODE ISLAND.—"That those clauses in the constitution which declare that Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said constitution; but such clauses are to be construed as exceptions to certain specified powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution."

* It is curious to notice to what lengths of verbal torture that party in America that denied the sovereignty of the States, and represented the Union as a popular consolidated government, have gone.

Thus it has been fashionable to quote in the school of consolidation a declaration in the letter of George Washington, president of the Convention, submitting the constitution to the States for their ratification, in which he says:

"It is obviously impracticable in the Federal Government of these States to secure ALL the rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all."—*Eliot's Debates*, Vol. I., p. 17.

Yet the word "ALL," which we have capitalized for emphasis, and which a hasty reader might lose in the context, is directly opposed to the theory of consolidation, and directly implies the residuum of sovereignty in the States.

Again, the word "United States" has been used as a popular argument for a consolidated government. Yet we find in the history of America that the same words designated all the former associations of the colonies and of the States; that the first assembly of delegates to take into consideration the grievances that led to the revolt from the British crown were known as the

That rule is found in the historical circumstances and exigencies in which the constitution of the United States was formed. It is decisive. For surely there is no juster measure of a grant of political powers than the necessity which originated it, if that necessity be at once intelligible and precise.

Such was the necessity which originated the constitution of the United States. It was a necessity for purely economical purposes. It could not have been intended as a revolution in the sense of a proclamation of new civil polity; for the civil institutions of the States, as derived from the common law of England, were already perfect and satisfactory, and have remained without material change for nearly a century. The constitution of the United States was thus not a political revolution. It was a convenience of the States, growing out of their wants of a system by which they might have a common agent and a uniform code on concerns common between themselves. Is it too much to conclude, therefore, that the new Union had no mission apart from the States; that it was the government of the States; that, in short, it could not have been intended to destroy the very bodies which invoked it as a benefactor to each as well as to all?

It is in this sense that the moral grandeur of the American Union is interpreted: in this sense that its great political virtue was contained. There was put before the eye of man-

Congress of delegates of the *United States*; that the Declaration of Independence emanated from "the representatives of the *United States of America*," and that the style of the subsequent confederation was declared in its first article to be, "The United States of America." So, if the words "United States" are at all to be considered, their natural force and their precedent use are alike in direct opposition to the dogma of consolidation.

Of a similar style of puerile argument for this dogma is this: Whereas, the preamble of the constitution recites, "We, the people of the United States," the people are, therefore, represented as one corporation. Daniel Webster, who was always ready to catch at sophomorial crudities, actually descended to an argument so absurd. The explanation of this phraseology is simple to the last degree. The names of the contracting States were first inserted in the preamble of the constitution. They were suppressed because it was still uncertain what States would adopt it; and as it was impossible to know which might be the first nine States of the Union—that number being necessary to establish the constitution as between themselves—it was agreed to use the corporate style we have quoted in the preamble, that it might include those only who adhered to it.

kind, not a consolidated nationality ; not a simple republic, with an anomalous and indefinable appendage of "States," which were not provinces, or cantons, or territories, and yet subordinate ; not some undefined and misshapen political mongrel ; but a spectacle such as it had never seen—an association of coequal and sovereign States, with a common authority, the subjects of which were yet sufficient enough to give it the effect of an American and national identity ; "a republic of republics ;" a government which derived its entire life from the good-will, the mutual interests, and the unconstrained devotion of the States which at once originated and composed it.

It may be said that the admission of the sovereignty of the States breaks at once the bond of their association. Yet, this can be said only in a low and narrow sense. The wants and hopes of men operate with the same effect in political bodies as in the social community. Men will scarcely withdraw from a society in which they are alike happy and fortunate. Nor was it to be supposed that any of the American States would be so mad as to withdraw from a Union through which they were to be profited and to ascend, as long as it fulfilled its designs of affording them protection against foreign powers, commercial interchanges, justice and welcome among themselves, the charms and benefits of social intercourse ; or that after these, its essential designs might have, within the exigencies of history or the possibilities of human depravity, ceased to be fulfilled, any State could be held in it without violating quite as well the spirit of republican institutions, and the obligations of public morals, as the written text of a compact.

Such undoubtedly were the designs and the law of the American Union. It was a compact which covered only the interests which it specified ; yet quite large enough to stand as an American nationality for all practical purposes. It had no dynastic element ; it had no mission separate from the States ; it had no independent authority over *individuals*, except within the scope of the powers delegated to it by the States. The States retained the power to control their own soil, their own domestic institutions, and their own morals. In respect to the powers which they *prohibited* to the General Government, they retained, *of necessity*, the right of exclusive

judgment. That Government was not a mere league; it did have the power to reach *individuals* within the scope of powers delegated by the States; and as to *these* powers, its own courts—the Federal judiciary—were made the exclusive judge. In this sense—only in this sense—it had the qualities of a government; but a government founded exclusively on the good of the States, resting in their consent, and to which the law of force was as foreign in respect of its maintenance, as it had been in respect of its ordination.

The Union was beautiful in theory. It might have been beautiful in practice. If it did prove in the history of America rather a rough companionship, scarcely ever a national identity in the common concerns intrusted to it, such was not the result of inherent defects, but of that party abuse and usurpation, in which have been wrecked so many of the political fabrics of mankind.

The right of secession, whether involved or not by the principle of State sovereignty, was not necessarily the weak point of the Union. We shall see hereafter that the development of this Union was two hostile sections—a political North and a political South—and not disintegration of States; that the Union was sacrificed, not to the dogma of secession, but to the overruling event of a sectional rupture. In view of, and in connection with, these events, it will be wholly unnecessary to discuss “the right of secession.”

Forty years after the ordination of the constitution of the United States, we shall see how there sprung up the profound invention of the greatest political scholar of America—John C. Calhoun, of South Carolina—to avoid this very issue of secession; how it was designed to erect over the Union a council of States, and to submit it to their angust guardianship; how it represented the true and sublime theory of the association of the States; and how, avoiding the issue of secession, it proposed a measure that would have perpetuated the Union, carried the constitution of the United States to the highest point of development, perfected the American system, introduced into it the principle of adaptability to all circumstances, and given it that elasticity which is the first virtue of wise governments, and the best element of their endurance. We shall see how this scheme of the South Carolina statesmen

—emphatically a *Union measure*—was rejected by the Northern States under a shallow clamor and the coarsest and most ignorant of all party libels in America—“Nullification;” and how this rejection left no other resource to dissatisfied States than what Mr. Calhoun of all men most deplored, and most sought to avoid—disunion. These assertions may already sound strange to those who have got their political history of America from Northern sources. But we must not anticipate too much here what is undoubtedly the most interesting period in American history, between the dates of Union and Disunion—the era of Calhoun.

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II.

What the American colonies contended for.—Burke's idea.—The first American Congress.—Its demands.—How the question of independence was developed.—Virginia the first to move for independence.—The Declaration of Independence.—The Articles of Confederation.—Diverse character and circumstances of the colonies.—The gentry of Virginia and the Carolinas.—Early type of the *Yankee*.—Difference of races.—Its value in historical inquiries.—Commercial spirit of New England in the revolution.—The nature and the value of "the Confederation."—John Adams' idea.—"Perpetual Union."—The Confederation a makeshift of the war.—"State-rights" in the treaty of 1783.—How the revolution succeeded.—Its illustration of the value of endurance.—Liberty invariably the fruit of rebellion.—The two conditions of all history.

In their dissatisfaction with the British government, the American colonies did not at first propose the experiment of independence. They only claimed equality with Englishmen at home in respect of rights; contending that the ancient and existing charters of Englishmen—the guaranties of Magna Charta, and the later muniments acquired under the Stuarts—were theirs by birthright; and resenting the idea that they were an inferior class of British subjects, to be governed as Charles I. proposed, and as even that luminary of the law—Blackstone—with curious obtuseness justified, as the denizens of a *conquered* country.

No man in England better understood the temper of the colonists, or better divined the future as containing the question of peace and war between Great Britain and America, than did Edmund Burke. This illustrious man, who was not only a superb artist of words, but an orator in action, defended the cause of the colonies with a happiness of expression, and a measure of zeal, that have since confirmed to the world his reputation as the most acute and eloquent of English statesmen. "Freedom," said he, "and not servitude, is the cure of anarchy." He declared in the House of Commons a plan of pacification alike simple, generous, and effective. "My idea," he said, "without considering whether we yield as matter of right, or grant as matter of favor, is, to admit the people of our colonies into an interest in our constitution."

The pacific counsels did not prevail. The "day-star of the English constitution," as Burke termed it—*alba stella*—was not decreed to arise over the troubled waters and shed its influence of peace. The colonists were left to contest as best they might their claim of equality with other subjects of the British crown.

They did nothing more than this on the very threshold of the revolution. In 1774, the first American Congress of delegates met at Philadelphia. On the 14th of October it made a declaration and adopted resolutions relative to the rights and grievances of the colonies. It was unanimously resolved, "that the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law;" "that they were entitled to the benefit of such statutes as existed at the time of their colonization, and which they have, by experience, respectively found to be applicable to their several and local circumstances;" and that their ancestors, at the time of their immigration, were "entitled to all the rights, liberties, and immunities of free and natural-born subjects within the realms of England."

But with actual hostilities came the full development of the question, the opportunity to compromise which had been lost. It was the assertion of *independence*. Such was the reply of the colonies, provoked by the insolence of power that had too long disdained all means of peace, but what it supposed the easy compulsion of three millions of people by the arms of an empire, upon which it was boasted the sun never set.

To Virginia belongs the honor of the first motion for independence. In Congress, on the 7th of June, 1776, the delegates from Virginia moved, in obedience to instructions from their constituents, that the Congress should declare that "these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown; that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved; and that measures should be immediately taken for procuring the assistance of foreign powers, and a confederation formed to bind the colonies more closely together."

The proposition aroused a deep anxiety, and was received

with no little opposition. Other colonies had not kept pace with the spirit of Virginia. The middle colonies—Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, the Jerseys, and New York—were not ripe for the dissolution of the British connection. Their delegates declared that it would be improper for Congress to take such a capital step until the voice of the people *drove* them into it.

The final decision was postponed to the 1st of July. It was taken on the original motion made by the delegates of Virginia; but the ultimate question was postponed for a day, in order to obtain unanimity; and on the *second* of July twelve colonies gave their voice for it,—New York withdrawing from the question for instructions, but subsequently adhering to the others through the decision of her convention. But the hesitation of Congress was not yet entirely over. The motion of Virginia has been triumphantly carried; but it remained to pass upon the text of the “declaration” of independence. “The pusillanimous idea,” said Thomas Jefferson, the author of this famous paper, “that we had friends in England worth keeping terms with, still haunted the minds of many.” But the declaration was at last and substantially agreed to on the evening of the *fourth* of July, and subscribed by the autographs of the members present; and thus from this paper, which introduced as it were the august ceremony of personal pledges, rather than from the official act of Congress on the motion of Virginia, concluded on the *second* of July, dates the natal day of American Independence.

The natural companion of the act of independence—“the Unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen United States of America”—was the confederation of the States, to enable them to conduct the war with a common and effective purpose. It had been proposed on the motion of Virginia. Eight days after the declaration of independence, articles of confederation were reported. It was an obvious necessity of the war. The average population of the colonies was less than two hundred and thirty thousand inhabitants; and it would have been absurd for any one of them to attempt to measure arms singly with the British power, and for each to conduct the war on its own responsibility.

It was fortunate indeed that a common military necessity had supplied what scarcely any thing else could have sup-

plied—a political bond between colonies suddenly erected into sovereign States. There had been no similarity of natural circumstances to unite the colonies. They had been planted at different times, from 1606 to 1732, and by different stocks of population. Differences of government, the sharpest antagonism of religious faith, the natural difficulties of intercourse, and the obstructions of trade between them, as the effect of the navigation laws, which hindered the development of their marine, had not only separated the colonies, but drawn through them lines of exasperated division.

The New England colonies were settled by a people very different from those who laid the foundations of empire in Virginia and the Carolinas. In those latter countries the notions of chivalry were early planted by the Cavaliers; and in Virginia especially, the British gentry founded many families whose names have become illustrious in American history.* With such a stock of ancestors in the South the

* Dr. Randall, in his *Life of Jefferson* (Vol. I., pp. 3, 4, and 5), has drawn a strong and graphic picture of the early lowland aristocracy of Virginia, which we reproduce here for its historical interest, especially with reference to its contrast to the Puritan stock of population in America:

“In the early settlement of Virginia, the inhabitants found the river-bottoms of the tide-water region more fertile than the intervening sandy ridges; and the rivers themselves for a long period furnished the only convenient means for transporting heavy products to or from the seaboard. The population, therefore, clung to their banks, each new wave of foreign emigration, or younger and spreading generation of the inhabitants, advancing higher towards their sources. Lands were obtained on easy conditions from the government and otherwise; and provident individuals secured vast estates. This was particularly the case on James River, where the most enterprising and wealthy of the earlier emigrants established themselves. Some of these, men of particular mark and energy, acquired possessions vying in extent with those of the proudest nobles of their native land. These were perpetuated in their families by entails, the laws regulating which were ultimately rendered more stringent in Virginia than in England itself. As their lands rose gradually in value, the great lowland proprietors began to vie with English nobles in wealth as well as in territory. Many of them lived in baronial splendor. Their abodes, it is true, were comparatively mean, as the country did not yet furnish permanent building materials, except at vast cost, nor did it furnish architects to make use of them; but their tables were loaded with plate and with the luxuries of the old and new world; numerous slaves, and white persons whose times they owned for a term of years, served them in every capacity which use, luxury, or ostentation could dictate; and when they travelled in state, their cumbrous and richly appointed coaches were dragged by

Roundhead regicide of the New England settlements had but little sympathy, and few points of agreement. The religion of the Puritan settler; his fierce and relentless persecution, even to the extremity of death, of those who dissented from *dissent*; his hypocritical and canting selfishness, with which he robbed the Indians of their lands for "the Lord's people," and sold some of them into West Indian slavery; his pious formulas of selfish aggrandizement, were a detestable barrier between him and the Episcopalian of Virginia and the Carolinas; and a diversity prominent in religion naturally ran through the manners, morals, and politics of the two early stocks of population in America.

six horses, driven by three postillions. But usually the mistress of the household, with her children and maids, appropriated this vehicle. The Virginia gentleman of that day, with much of the feeling of earlier feudal times, when the spur was the badge of knighthood, esteemed the saddle the most manly, if not the only manly way of making use of the noblest of brutes. He accordingly performed all his ordinary journeys on horseback. When he went forth with his whole household, the cavalcade consisted of the mounted white males of his family, the coach-and-six lumbering through the sands, and a retinue of mounted body-servants, grooms with spare led horses, etc., in the rear.

"In their general tone of character, the lowland aristocracy of Virginia resembled the cultivated landed gentry of the mother country. Numbers of them were highly educated and accomplished by foreign study and travel; and nearly all, or certainly much the largest portion, obtained an excellent education at William and Mary College, after its establishment, or respectable acquirements in the classical schools kept in nearly every parish by the learned clergy of the established Church. As a class, they were intelligent, polished in manner, high-toned, and hospitable—and sturdy in their loyalty and in their adherence to the national Church. Their winters were often spent in the gayeties and festivities of the provincial capital; their summers, when not connected with the public service, principally in supervising their immense estates, in visiting each other, and in such amusements as country life afforded. Among the latter the chase held a prominent place. Born almost to the saddle and to the use of firearms, they were keen hunters; and when the chase was over they sat round groaning boards, and drank confusion to Spaniard and Frenchman abroad, and to Roundhead and Prelatist at home. When the lurking and predatory Indian became the object of pursuit, no strength of the red-man could withstand, no speed of his elude this fiery and gallantly mounted cavalry. The social gulf which separated this from the common class of colonists became about as deep and wide, and as difficult to overleap in marriage and other social arrangements, as that which divided the gentry and peasantry of England. Such were the Carters, the Carys, the Burwells, the Byrds, the Fairfaxes, the Harrisons, the Lees, the Randolphs, and many other families of early Virginia."

It is certainly not a mere speculation which has thought to discover in the history of the New England settlements some of the elements of the character of the modern *Yankee*. We must, however, take care not to push the speculation too far. It has been often an over-refinement in the treatment of history to trace up the character of nations to differences in race and blood; forgetting how much of that character is due to those developments of events and interests which have taken place between the first beginnings of a people and the period of historical retrospect. We are not disposed to risk the analysis of the modern Yankee character on those elements of race and blood which were involved in the early settlement of America. We shall see, in the progress of this inquiry, how much of this character was due to subsequent development and education in the crooked paths of their political history, and what a large and various addition of meanness was thus made to the nature and habit of the original New England colonist.

But in that early type of the colonist we certainly do discover some traits, more or less imperfect, of the Yankee of a later period. We would only warn the reader from expecting to discover too much here, reminding him that the character of a people, although undoubtedly deriving some elements from its ancestry, takes, as does the individual life, additions and modifications from the school of events and influences; that, in short, the geometrical accuracy of ethnology is an imperfect and sophistical guide to the truth of history.

Modern events have most largely produced the Yankee of our day. Yet in the sniffing Puritan, with his stock of pious excuses for every ferocious scheme of selfishness, and in the Massachusetts "trader," with his early code of *commercial* politics, which, in fact, he carried into the revolution of 1776, we find no slight likeness to the present generation of their Northern descendants. It is not overstating the case to say, that the New England colonies went into the revolution rather resenting the restraints upon their commerce than animated by the pure love of liberty. Their commercial casuistry had long defied the laws and authority of the mother country. Sir William Berkeley, the Governor of Virginia, when remonstrating, in 1671, against the Navigation Act cutting off all trade with foreign countries, made it the subject of particular

complaint that, while the Virginians were "most obedient to all laws, the New England men break through, and men trade to any place that their interest leads them." He had already discovered two different rules of public morals in the beginnings of American history.

It is no wonder that the confederation, despite the plain military necessity which demanded it, was an achievement of no little difficulty, and a bond of very partial and imperfect effect. It was debated for nearly five years. It was not consummated until the 1st of March, 1781. It lasted nominally about eight years, but, practically, not more than two. It was distinctly founded on the sovereignty of the States; was ratified by the State legislatures, and gave Congress the power of determining questions only by the vote of the States. True, it was something more than a military alliance. It was intended to unite the resources of the States, and to establish a foundation for public credit for the purposes of the war. It was intended for nothing more. In the circular letter of Congress, urging the reluctant States to accede to the confederation, they were urged "to conclude the glorious compact, which, by uniting the wealth, strength, and councils of the whole, might bid defiance to external violence and internal dissensions, whilst it secured the public credit at home and abroad."

The compact had been ostentatiously styled in its title a "perpetual Union," and Mr. John Adams, of Massachusetts, had really desired to incorporate into it the features of a consolidated government. These, however, were the fancies of ignorance, and the dreams of extravagance. The confederation, indeed, even as an association to give a common direction to, and create a common fund for, the war, was very imperfect and lamentably loose. It had no power to reach *individuals*, and to enforce the common will of the States. It could only apportion the quota to be paid by each State, but had no way of compelling the payment. It could make commercial treaties with foreign States, but, unless the legislatures of the States chose to adopt such commercial regulations in their ports as might be necessary, the treaties might be utterly inoperative. Such an anomaly, such a weak pretence of a common government, could scarcely be expected to last beyond the war, of which it was the makeshift. At the peace, it naturally went

to pieces. "Each State," says Madison, "yielding to the voice of immediate interest or convenience, withdrew its support from the confederation, till the frail and tottering edifice was ready to fall upon our heads and crush us beneath its ruins." The "perpetual Union" was practically terminated by the uninterrupted free will of the States which composed it.

The treaty of 1783, which crowned the success of the American revolution, contained the only description which had ever been made, on the part of Great Britain, of the nature of the new power which was recognized in recognizing American independence. What was recognized, was the independence severally of the thirteen States formerly colonies. And it is especially to be remarked that these States were recognized severally, and not jointly, in the treaty.

The revolution was thus crowned with success. But it is doubtful whether there was any merit in obtaining it other than *endurance*. The American armies were generally unsuccessful; the American troops—however American vanity may proclaim the contrary—fought no better than the British veterans. George Washington was not a military genius. The diplomacy of the revolution was neither a monument of wisdom nor of letters.* The result of the war was the triumph of the endurance of a people resolved to be free, over the less determined wishes and interests of those who desired merely an addition of empire.

The war of the American States added another illustration to a curious fact in all history. This fact is, that no system of liberty ever yet emanated from the generosity or wisdom of human rulers; it has invariably been the fruit of rebellion—the result of a contest between the natural tendency of power to centralize and exaggerate its authority, and the opposition of its subjects, naturally intermittent, in its checks on usurpation.

* It is true that the American States, in their war with Great Britain, made connections and some advantageous arrangements in Europe; but these were natural results, rather than skilful achievements. The diplomacy of the revolution was a botch. In the beginning of the revolution the foreign correspondence was intrusted to a committee. The confederation included a department of foreign affairs; but the secretary had no power to perform any thing but the specific acts authorized by Congress, which, at that time, was at once the executive and the legislative power.

We embrace here the two conditions of history : the tendency of all political power, and the disposition of its subjects. So true are these of man, everywhere, that they have passed into two general declarations, which have the force of maxims. The first is, that "tyranny, when possible, is always certain." The second is found in the text of the American Declaration of Independence: "All experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed."

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III.

The times of Thomas Jefferson.—Manners and appearance of the man.—His Democracy.—Its application to the relations of the States and Federal Government.—Origin of the Republican or Democratic party.—The idea of consolidation.—New York, and the New England States.—Early political preaching in New England.—The Alien and Sedition laws.—How the latter infringed the rights of the States.—The Kentucky Resolutions.—A fact not in the record.—Mr. Jefferson on “nullification.”—Why the Kentucky Resolutions were modified.—The Virginia Resolutions.—The replies of the New England States, and of New York.—Jefferson’s triumph.—A new era at Washington.

It has been fashionable for two generations to entitle Thomas Jefferson, of Virginia, the father of the Democratic party of America. Unlike most of the party phrases of tradition, this is strictly true.

The name of Jefferson fills a large space in American history; it is identified with an important and enraged political crisis; it is connected with much of party controversy; and for more than sixty years his name has been, on the one hand, adorned with titles of popular adulation, and on the other, coupled with the very same terms which Hamilton, his contemporary enemy, and the best representative of Federalist rancor, applied to him—“an atheist in religion, and a fanatic in politics.”

Thomas Jefferson was a remarkable man. He was thoroughly a Virginian; and he was by nature a Democrat. Born of a moderate family in Chesterfield County, he carried, through all the honors and illustrious passages of his life, the plain, unostentatious, and kindly manners of a Virginia farmer. His sandy hair, and strong features, and large bones, were Virginian. His dress had always the quaintness of a countryman; he wore under-waistcoats and woollen tippets; and his manners, unaffected as his dress, invited all classes of persons to approach him.

We have said that Thomas Jefferson was a Democrat by nature. His official residence in France, as minister to that court from 1784 to 1789, is reported to have been the occasion

of contracting peculiar views on the subject of popular rights. It, no doubt, added something to them ; but he had contracted his king-phobia in the Revolution, in his own country, and before there was such a thing as a Democrat in France. His hatred of monarchy was expressed in such intense words, as could only have come from ideas identified with the constitution of the mind. There was a savage sincerity in all he ever said or wrote of monarchies. The people who lived under them, he divided into two classes,—“wolves and sheep.” Among the lessons which he recommended to those of his countrymen, who were, in 1787, debating the idea of a new constitution, were “never to call on foreign powers to settle their differences ; to guard against hereditary magistrates ; to prevent their citizens from becoming so established in wealth and power, as to be thought worthy of alliance, by marriage, with the nieces, sisters, etc., of kings ; and, in short, to besiege the throne of Heaven with eternal prayers, to extirpate from creation that class of human lions, tigers, and mammoths, called kings.” There is an unpleasant excess in these views. But we may certainly pardon something to the rhetorical fervor of strong convictions.

When Jefferson returned to America, the name of Democrat was not popular there. His most careful biographer, Dr. Randall says : “In 1786, and for some period later, there were few, if any, prominent Americans who avowed themselves in favor of a broadly Democratic system. In the Federal Convention of 1787 (which framed our constitution), not a man could be found who advocated such systems, or was willing to be suspected of, at heart, favoring them. There were gentlemen in that Convention who avowed themselves monarchists in theory ; but not one could be found who would take the name of Democrat ! Jefferson was the first, and for a long time the only very prominent American we know of, who was willing persistently to avow that Democracy constituted the essence of his system, or the rule of construction which he would apply to the mixed forms of the State and Federal Governments.”

It is in its application to the relations subsisting between the State and Federal authority that we find the technical meaning of that broad nomenclature—the Democratic party

of America. The application of the general principle of Democracy—the doctrine of popular rights—to this relation was obvious. Mr. Jefferson was, to the end of his life, persuaded that there was a monarchical party, more or less disguised, in America. It is probable that he fought nothing more than a shadow in this, and mistook a fondness of the Federalists for the traditions and fashions of the ante-revolutionary period—a depraved appetite for social ceremonies in New York and Philadelphia—as a desire for the substance as well as the trappings of monarchy.

But Jefferson had a real substance to fight in the *consolidation* school of politics, which was early established in New York, and in the New England States. It is true that the propositions of this school bordered on the monarchical idea; but it is extravagant to say that they fully implied it. They suggested no change in the republican forms of the General Government. But the idea of the Federalists was to accumulate power in that Government at the expense of the States; to impair these original political institutions of America; and to strike down, in the States, that principle of local sovereignty which had been interposed between the general authority and people, and which, in fact, from the days of the Saxon Octorchy to those of the American Union, may be taken as constituting the most important bulwark of popular liberty.

The idea of consolidation had obtained early popularity and rapid growth in the Northern States. Mr. Jefferson found his most powerful enemies in the compact masses of Federalists in New England. It was during his party contests with Mr. Adams' administration, and his subsequent campaign for the presidency, that we may find the development of the peculiar spirit of hierocracy in New England—a disposition of the clergy to control in secular affairs—and date that era of *political preaching*, which has had so much to do with Yankee politics, and the party education of Northern mobs. Mr. Jefferson was never pelted from the hustings and ward-rooms with viler abuse, than from the pulpits of New England. Rev. Cotton Mather Smith, of Shena, declared that he had been guilty of "fraud and robbery;" and with that usual decent and Christian weapon of New England—an attack on private life—deluged him with vituperations from the pulpit,

and pronounced stern maranatha on the man. Another New England divine made an elaborate parallel between the distinguished Virginian and the wicked Rehoboam, printed his "sermon," and distributed it through the land. This Puritanical rancor mingled largely in the party conflicts of Mr. Jefferson's time; but probably disturbed him less than any other element of enmity. He had a greater contempt for religious fanaticism than for any other form of error; he was inclined to jest on it; he was never disposed to appease attacks on his private character; he was satisfied to trust himself to the tests of reason, and to do his work faithfully and patiently for history. That work was the foundation of the Republican party, known long after him as the Democratic, or State-rights party of America.

The administration of John Adams was distinguished by two important assaults on the liberties of the country—one of them involving an obvious infringement of the principle of State sovereignty. These were the Alien and the Sedition laws. The first, passed Congress on the 22d day of June, 1798, authorized the President to deport at pleasure, aliens whom he might judge "dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States." The second, passed the 14th of July, 1798, abridged the freedom of the press, by an odious bill of penalties, and assumed to punish, by fine and imprisonment, "false, scandalous, and malicious writings" against the Government. It did more than aim a blow at civil liberty: it conveyed an attack against the structure of the Government, and the vital principle of the Federal compact. It was inferred, from the existence of State laws on the subject, that Congress had a similar power of legislation; that its authority might thus be deduced from implication; violating the cardinal principle of the Democratic or Republican school, that the State sovereignties were only diminished by the powers specifically enumerated, and that the Federal agency had no power whatever to intrude upon the reserved ground. It is easily seen that the extent of the pretension was to endow Congress with a power of legislation in all cases whatsoever, to strip the States of their sovereignty, and to despoil them of all the rights they had reserved to themselves.

Against this tremendous pretension, Jefferson raised the

standard of party revolt. The leading republicans in Congress formed a plan of action, which was, "to retire from that field, and take a stand in the State legislatures" against Federalist enterprises on the constitution. The co-operation of Kentucky with Virginia was assured. Mr. Jefferson was consulted, and from his pen emanated the famous Kentucky Resolutions, which were passed almost unanimously by the Legislature of that State, in November, 1798, and which have since constituted the most august text of the principles of American Democracy, and for two generations have been the exacting standard of party authority.

The first of these resolutions was in the nature of a general declaration of principles, while others of the series practically applied to the Alien and Sedition laws and other excesses of the Federalists. It is sufficient to quote it :

" *Resolved*, That the several States composing the United States of America, are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their General Government ; but that by compact, under the style and title of a constitution of the United States, and of amendments thereto, they constituted a General Government for special purposes, delegated to that Government certain definite powers, reserving, each State to itself, the residuary mass of right to their own self-government ; and, that whensoever the General Government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthorized, void, and of no force ; that to this compact each State acceded as a State, and is an integral party ; that this Government, created by this compact, was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself ; since that would have made its discretion, and not the constitution, the measure of its powers ; but, that as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress."

But there was something behind this record which is not to be omitted from history. Mr. Jefferson, in the original draft of the resolutions, as it came from his hand, had proposed *the remedy* for an assumption by Congress of powers not delegated to it. He was too logical to state conclusions delicately. He declared the right of *nullification*. In the ninth of the series of resolutions, he wrote : "That in cases of an abuse of the delegated powers, the members of the General Government being chosen by the people, a change by the people would be the constitutional remedy ; but, where powers are assumed which have not been delegated, a nullification of

the act is the rightful remedy ; that every State has a natural right in cases not within the compact (*casus non fœderis*), to nullify, of their own authority, all assumptions of power by others within their limits ; that, without this right, they would be under the dominion, absolute and unlimited, of whosoever might exercise this right of judgment over them ; that, nevertheless, this commonwealth, from motives of regard and respect for its co-states, has wished to communicate with them on the subject."

It remained for another generation of American people to consider the "rightful remedy" of nullification, and for the masterly mind of Mr. Calhoun to develop Mr. Jefferson's idea expressed above ; to modify it, as Mr. Jefferson himself, in another period of his life, did modify it to a *call of convention of States* ; and to draw out of this first crude suggestion of a remedy the most finished and conservative plan that was ever devised in the politics of America, to exorcise the spirit of sectionalism, and to save an imperilled Union.

But the peril of 1798 was not important enough to force a discussion of the remedy which Mr. Jefferson had indicated. He was satisfied to declare the right of it. It was supposed that the repeal of the Alien and Sedition laws might be effected without invoking extraordinary remedies ; and that it was best to accomplish it without unnecessary ferment, and through the forms of polite remonstrance. Mr. Jefferson thought so. He wrote to a friend : " For the present, I shall be for resolving the Alien and Sedition laws to be against the constitution, and merely void, and for addressing the other States to obtain similar declarations ; and I would not do any thing at this moment which should commit us further, but reserve ourselves to shape our future measures, or no measures, by the events which may happen."

It was in a similar conviction, and probably with the concurrence of Mr. Jefferson, that the Kentucky Legislature modified the eighth resolution, so as to omit any allusion to ulterior remedies, simply requiring their representatives to use their best endeavors for the repeal in Congress of the obnoxious legislation referred to. The governor was requested to transmit the resolutions to the other States, and solicit their concurrence in procuring the desired repeal.

Virginia followed the action of Kentucky. In December, 1798, her legislature passed a series of resolutions responsive to those of Kentucky. They were drafted by Mr. Madison. They referred to the spirit of the Federal Government "to enlarge its powers by forced constructions of the constitutional charter," and "so to consolidate the States by degrees into one sovereignty." They peremptorily declared that they viewed "the powers of the Federal Government, as resulting from the compact, to which the States are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact, as no further valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact; and that in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the States, who are parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them."

The resolutions of Virginia and Kentucky were communicated to the other States for council and co-operation. They drew upon them a unanimous burst of Federalist denunciation from all of the New England States. The replies of these States, and that of New York, reveal the extent of the early establishment of the consolidation school in the North, and discover those principles from which have flowed the more modern political principles of the Yankee.

Each of the New England States, confounding judicial cases with political questions, declared that the State legislatures had no power to supervise the acts of the General Government (which, it is scarcely necessary to say, parenthetically, was to nullify the political influence of the States); that the construction of such laws as the Alien and Sedition acts was exclusively vested in the judicial courts of the United States. Yet each of these States went out of the way to affirm, speculatively, the constitutionality and expediency of these acts. Massachusetts declared, that in no circumstances had the State legislatures "the right to denounce the administration of that government to which the people themselves, by a solemn compact, had exclusively committed their national concerns." The State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations declared,

that the resolutions of Virginia were "very unwarrantable," and "hazarded an interruption of the peace of the States by civil discord." Connecticut "explicitly disavowed" the principles contained in these resolutions. New Hampshire thought the State legislatures were not the proper tribunals to pass upon the laws of the General Government. Vermont "highly disapproved" of the Virginia resolutions, and thought them "unconstitutional in their nature, and dangerous in their tendency." New York, then united to New England by the tie of Federalism, and long kept in that bad alliance by the influence of Hamilton, exceeded even the intolerance of her Puritan associates. Her legislature declared that they observed with anxiety and regret "the inflammatory and pernicious sentiments, and doctrines which are contained in the resolutions of Virginia and Kentucky."

On the issues involved in the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, Mr. Jefferson achieved a decisive triumph, and by his election to the presidency in 1800 put the Federalist party almost out of existence. After that event, it may be said to have degenerated into a mere local faction. Mr. Jefferson launched the country into a career of Democratic simplicity, and real substantial prosperity, that ran through many years.

He abolished all the stately ceremonials which had grown up in Washington's administration. He discontinued the *levées* at the Executive Mansion; he dispensed with the pageant of opening Congress; he threw the doors of that assembly open, for the first time, to newspaper reporters, and broke down, as far as possible, every barrier of ceremony and exclusiveness between the Government and the people. The simplicity of his inauguration into office made people stare. An English spectator thus describes his appearance on the occasion: "His dress was of plain cloth, and he rode on horseback to the Capitol, without a single guard, or even servant, in his train; dismounted without assistance, and hitched the bridle of his horse to the palisades."

But Mr. Jefferson marked the administration of his high office with changes much more important than outward tokens of Democratic simplicity. He instituted a rule of rigid economy in every department of the Government. By economy alone, he reduced the public debt twelve millions of dollars.

By the purchase of Louisiana and treaties with the Indians, he doubled the area of the United States. The second census of the United States presented an increase of exports from nineteen to ninety-four millions of dollars. The country was on the high and plain road to prosperity.

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IV.

The slavery question.—A libel on political nomenclature.—A brief moral defence of negro servitude in the South.—The history of its establishment.—Accommodation of the slavery question in the Constitution.—Political history of the question.—The Hartford Convention.—Two blows aimed at the South.—Development of the slavery controversy.—Mr. Jefferson's opinion as to slavery in the territories.—The Missouri restriction.—The initial point of the war of *sections*.—Mr. Jefferson's alarm.—The trace of disunion.—Real causes of conflict between the North and the South.—The slavery question subordinate and yet conspicuous.—Why so?—How it was bound up in the conflict between State-rights and consolidation.—Northern civilization.—An insolent democracy.—Yankee "gentlemen."—Plainness of the South.—A noble type of civilization.—Effect of slavery on the political and social character of the South.—Yankee vulgarity.—Why the South was the nursery of American statesmen.

THE peaceful and fortunate career on which Mr. Jefferson's administration launched the country was to meet with a singular interruption. That interruption was the sectional agitation which finally broke the bonds of the Union and plunged North and South into one of the fiercest wars of modern times. The occasion of that conflict was what the Yankees called—by one of their convenient libels in political nomenclature—*slavery*; but what was in fact nothing more than a system of negro servitude in the South; well guarded by laws, which protected the negro laborer in the rights of humanity; moderated by Christian sentiments which provided for his welfare; and, altogether, one of the mildest and most beneficent systems of servitude in the world.

It is not our purpose here to enter upon a moral defence of slavery in the South (using, as we would remind the reader, that opprobrious term, wherever it occurs in these pages, under a constant protest, and simply because it has become the familiar word in the party controversies of America to describe the peculiar institution of labor in the South). Our object in these pages is simply with the political complications of slavery. But as a problem in morals there are but two principles which decide it; and these we may briefly turn our

pen to announce, candidly believing them to be the summary of the entire ethics of negro servitude in the South :

1. The white being the superior race, and the black the inferior, subordination, with or without law, must be the status of the African in the mixed society of whites and blacks.

2. It thus becomes the interest of both races, especially of the inferior race, that this status should be fixed and protected by law ; and it was simply the declaration and definition of this principle that went by the name of negro slavery in the South.

Slavery (without that moderation of legislative checks and Christian sentiments which were the constant employment of the South) had been planted in America by the direct and persistent action of the British government. It was the common law of the thirteen colonies before their separation from England. The mother country established negro slavery in the colonies. It maintained and protected the institution. It originated and carried on the slave trade. It forbade the colonies permission either to emancipate or export their slaves. It prohibited them from inaugurating any legislation in diminution or discouragement of the institution. Even after the Continental Congress had been assembled, and the battle of Lexington had been fought, the earl of Dartmouth, British Secretary of State, in answer to a remonstrance from the agent of the colonies on the subject of the slave trade, replied : " We cannot allow the colonies to check or discourage in any degree a traffic so beneficial to the nation."

In the constitution of the United States, the slavery question had been singularly accommodated. Two clauses covered it. The first guaranteed to the South its property—it provided for the return of slaves recognized as the property of their Southern masters. Another clause, in the interest of the North, prevented a disturbance of the representative system by an importation of slaves, and provided that the South should not increase her negro population (five of which in the basis of representation were made equal to three white men) by importation after the lapse of twenty years.

The political history of the slavery question in the early periods of the American Union is scarcely more than an enumeration of dates or of measures which were taken as

matters of course. The action of the first Congress, in relation to slavery in the territories, was simply to acquiesce in a government for the Northwest territory, based upon a *pre-existing* anti-slavery ordinance—the ordinance of 1784–87. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was passed without opposition and without a division in the Senate; and in the House, by a vote of forty-eight to seven. The slave trade was declared piracy. Petitions upon the slavery question were at first referred to a committee; and afterwards were rejected, and in one instance returned to the petitioner. Louisiana and Florida, both slaveholding countries, were added to our territories without agitation in Congress. Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama were admitted into the Union, bringing the institution of slavery with them, without a murmur of opposition.

It is to be remarked, however, that that jealousy of Southern domination which was the characteristic and controlling element of the Northern mind, and which afterwards became singularly associated with the slavery discussion, may be dated with the acquisition of Louisiana. The famous Hartford Convention, held in 1814, aimed two remarkable blows at the power of the South. It proposed to strike down the slave representation in Congress, and to have the representation conformed to the number of free persons in the Union; and as a further restriction upon the power of the South—the extension of our territory being then in that direction—it proposed an amendment to the constitution, to the effect that no new States should be admitted into the Union without the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress.

But the slavery question was as yet only incidental to this sectional rivalry, and was scarcely yet developed into a distinct and independent controversy. There was some general discussion as to the policy of the extension of slavery into the new territories; and some political union, without, however, any distinct lines of party organization, had already been occasioned in the North by a proposition to extend the ordinance of 1787 west of the Mississippi River. It is a remarkable circumstance, in connection with these early discussions of the “Free-Soil” school, that Mr. Jefferson, notwithstanding his connection with the ordinance of 1787, was in favor of the free

and unlimited extension of slavery over the new soil acquired by the United States. And he maintained this view on a very singular and ingenious ground: it was that "the diffusion of the slaves over a greater surface would make them individually happier, and proportionably facilitate the accomplishment of their emancipation, by dividing the burden on a greater number of coadjutors."

It may be said generally—notwithstanding the episode of the Hartford Convention—which fell into early disrepute—that there was nothing in the precedents of the Government to betoken that wild and violent controversy nursed in the selfish mind of the North, which, in 1820, was to break through the bonds of secret jealousy and array the country into two sectional parties struggling for supremacy, on opposite convictions, or perhaps on opposite pretences, with regard to the slavery question.

The Missouri legislation—by which the institution of slavery was bounded by a line of latitude—naturally divided the United States into geographical parties, and tore the country in twain. It created for the first time a distinct political North and a distinct political South. It is to be taken as the proper initial point of that war of sections which raged in America for forty years, and at last culminated in an appeal to arms. The discussion of the Missouri matter awoke the anti-slavery sentiment of the country that had for some years past been almost completely dormant. It was the occasion of a call of a convention of abolitionists at Philadelphia. It fired the passions of the populace, and to the serious statesmen of the country gave unbounded alarm. "From the battle of Bunker's Hill to the treaty of Paris we never had so ominous a question," said Mr. Jefferson. To a friend he wrote: "This momentous question, like a fire-bell in the night, awakened and filled me with terror." After the passage of what was called "a compromise" in Congress, he wrote: "The question sleeps for the present, but is not dead." "A geographical line, coinciding with a marked principle, moral and political, once conceived and held up to the angry passions of men will not be obliterated; and every new irritation will make it deeper and deeper." The Sage of Monticello spoke propheti-

cally, and in one of his letters put on record this remarkable declaration :

“I regret that I am now to die in the belief that the useless sacrifice of themselves, by the generation of 1776, to acquire self-government and happiness to their country, is to be thrown away by the unwise and unworthy passions of their sons ; and that my only consolation is to be, I live not to weep over it. If they would but dispassionately weigh the blessings they will throw away, against an abstract principle more likely to be affected by union than by scission, they would pause before they would perpetrate this act of suicide on themselves, and of treason against the hopes of the world.”

Mr. Jefferson was right in designating the Missouri Restriction as the preliminary trace of disunion. Thereafter, the slavery question was developed as a well-defined controversy ; and for forty years the most ingenious attempts to appease it, and to erase the geographical line, which was drawn in 1820, were worse than ineffectual.

But it is to be remarked that the true causes of sectional animosity between the North and the South were beyond the slavery question, although unavoidably and indissolubly connected with it. If we are to analyze that animosity, we shall discover that its deep-lying causes were certain radical antipathies, which discovered slavery as the most prominent ground of distinction between the two sections, and seized upon it as the readiest point of controversy. We must not fall into the common error of taking occasions for original agents, and confounding as one a number of causes, attached to each other, or even grown out of each other, and yet logically distinct. The war between North and South was essentially a war between two great political schools, and what is more, between two distinct civilizations. Yet in both regards, the slavery question was bound up in the conflict, being, in the first place, an inevitable issue between the States-rights and consolidation schools ; and, in the second place, itself being the most prominent cause of the distinction between the civilizations, or social autonomies of North and South.

It is thus that the slavery question, although subordinate—although, so to speak, a smaller question than those with which it was associated—pervaded all of American politics,

and played the conspicuous part in the dissolution of the Union. The two great political tendencies in America—that of consolidation and that of State-rights—naturally joined issue on slavery; for the first school, recognizing the authority at Washington as a national one, could easily presume it responsible for what was denounced as “the plague-spot of the country,” and deplored as a tarnish of the American name. Again, as the North envied the peculiar intellectual civilization of the South, its higher sentimentalism, and its superior refinements of scholarship and manners, it would naturally find the leading cause of these things in the peculiar institution of slavery, and concentrate upon it all the unscrupulous rage of jealousy, and that singularly bitter hate, which is inseparable from a sense of inferiority.

Free labor founded in the North a material civilization, a pestilent system of public schools, and that insolent democracy which went by the phrase, “D—n you, I am as good as you.” That, and “commercial” politics, made the North prosperous; a showy, glittering mass of all the national elements of civilization, by the side of the apparently scanty, but refined, South. Northern men were apt to sneer at the uncultivated aspects of the South; to point to the slight nets of internal improvements that stretched over tracts of wild timber and swamps; to laugh at the plain architecture in the cities of the South; and to talk, with great self-complacency, of “the want of enterprise” in the slaveholding States. Yet after all, the Yankee trader had a sneaking, irrepressible consciousness that the Southern planter, in his homespun garb, was infinitely his superior as a gentleman; that he could not compete with him in courage, in the sentiment of honor, in the refinements of manners, or in any of the solid and meritorious accomplishments of manhood. The sleek business men of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia might be very impressive in their exteriors, but they never had any manners; they were not even accustomed to the words, “Sir” and “gentleman,” in their conversation; they might talk a learned jargon about stocks and markets, but beyond that, in matters of history and literature, many of these well-dressed men were as ignorant as the draymen at their door.

Despite the plainness of the South, and the absence there of

the shows and gauds of material prosperity, and the inseparable companion of such prosperity in a *moneyed* aristocracy, there was recognizable, in this slaveholding country, a noble and singularly pure type of civilization. Slavery introduced elements of order and conservatism in the society of the South; and yet, after all, there was no truer democracy in the world than there: the lower white classes recognizing, it is true, certain distinctions in social intercourse; but outside of these, having a manly sense of equality, and claiming, from the more prosperous orders of society, a consideration and measure of respect that the poor man in the North, where society was made up of browbeating on the one hand, and an insolent assertion of equality on the other, in vain contended for. Slavery trained the white race of the South in habits of command; and though, sometimes, these may have degenerated into cruelty and insolence, yet they were generally the occasions of the revival of the spirit of chivalry in the nineteenth century; of the growth of many noble and generous virtues; and of a knightly polish of manners, that the shopkeeping aristocracy of the North, being unable to emulate, was satisfied to ape in its hotels and caravansaries. Slavery relieved the better classes in the South from many of the demands of physical and manual labor; but although in some instances idle or dissolute lives may have been the consequence of this, yet it afforded opportunity for extraordinary intellectual culture in the South, elevated the standards of scholarship and mental cultivation there, and furnishes some explanation of the extraordinary phenomenon in American history, that the *statesmanship* of the country was peculiarly, and almost exclusively, the production of the slaveholding States.

The vulgar North envied the South, even down to the small hands and feet of its people. For the better civilization and higher refinement of slaveholders, the North retaliated that the South was dull and unenterprising, and had to import all of its luxuries, and many of its comforts from Yankee shops. This was true; but it proved nothing, or it might prove more than the Yankee argument might desire, for with Northern luxuries there came into the South Northern vices. It was said, with a coarse wit, but with not a little meaning, that there were "three things" for which the South would always be depend-

ent upon the North, and never could produce for herself; they were "ice, play-actors, and prostitutes." There is a certain exaggeration in every *bon mot*; but the witticism is a good one, as it gives an indication of that coarse, vulgar measure of superiority which the North applied to itself to compensate for its defects in refinement, and in the nobler attributes of national life by the side of the South.

With reference to the singular point of contrast between the North and the South in the exhibitions of statesmanship and political scholarship, we discover the most remarkable feature of American history. Slavery appears, indeed, to have been the school of American statesmanship, for it is from its domains there came by far the most considerable contribution to the political literature of the country. The smallness of Yankee contribution in this respect has been a subject of remark by every impartial historian of America; and there are but few candid persons who will deny that the quality of Yankee statesmanship was always intensely sophomorical. It may have been that slavery afforded to the statesmen of the South certain fields of observation, and applied certain influences of conservatism that qualified them for their peculiar studies; but it is unquestionably true, that to them we must look for the monuments of political literature in America. It has been acutely remarked by a Yankee writer, in the anonymous pages of a magazine, that the public men of the North were generally actuated by an ambition to make a show on what they imagined the theatre of *national* life; that they neglected the obscure theatres, but noble schools, of *State* politics; and that to this shallow, ostentatious ambition is to be attributed much of the Yankee distaste for the severity and exclusiveness of the States-rights school.

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V.

Contrast between the North and South in material progress.—The times of Andrew Jackson.—The tariff controversy.—Calhoun and Webster as representative men.—The latter a sophomore in American politics.—Mr. Webster's private correspondence and poetry.—His superficial accomplishments.—“Nullification,” another libel of political nomenclature.—A true explanation and analysis of Mr. Calhoun's scheme to save and perpetuate the Union.—Jefferson Davis' defence of Calhoun. New England's regard for the Union.—The veneration of the Union peculiarly a Southern sentiment.—Mr. Calhoun's Fort Hill speech.—The ignorance or hypocrisy of Webster and his party.—How the South was driven to “disunion.”

THE inequality between the North and the South, with respect to material progress, was perhaps never more marked than at the time of the memorable administration of Andrew Jackson. Referring to this period, a Northern biographer of President Jackson writes in the following style of Yankee conceit :

“The North was rushing on like a Western high-pressure steamboat, with resin in the furnace and a man on the safety-valve. All through Western New York, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, the primeval wilderness was vanishing like a mist, and towns were springing into existence with a rapidity that rendered necessary a new map every month, and spoiled the gazetteers as fast as they were printed. The City of New York began already to feel itself the London of the New World, and to calculate how many years must elapse before it would be the London of the World.

“The South, meanwhile, was depressed and anxious. Cotton was down ; tobacco was down ; corn, wheat, and pork were down. For several years the chief products of the South had either been inclining downward, or else had risen in price too slowly to make up for the (alleged) increased price of the commodities which the South was compelled to buy. Few new towns changed the Southern map. Charleston languished, or seemed to languish—certainly did not keep pace with New

York, Boston, and Philadelphia. No Cincinnati of the South became the world's talk by the startling rapidity of its growth. No Southern river exhibited at every bend and coyness a rising village. No Southern mind, distracted with the impossibility of devising suitable names for a thousand new places per annum, fell back in despair upon the map of the Old World, and selected at random any convenient name that presented itself, bestowing upon clusters of log huts such titles as Utica, Rome, Palermo, Naples, Russia, Egypt, Madrid, Paris, Elba, and Berlin. No Southern commissioner, compelled to find names for a hundred streets at once, had seized upon the letters of the alphabet and the figures of arithmetic, and called the avenues A, B, C, and D, and instead of naming his cross streets, numbered them."

The Yankee writer attributes this inequality of conditions to the influence of negro slavery in the South. But it has another interpretation. The tariff measures, which were closely associated with the slavery question—being the *commercial* application of that doctrine of the power of numerical majorities, taught in the consolidation schools, which had attained its *moral and sentimental* development in the war upon slavery—had been used by the North as the stepping-stones to prosperity, and the most profitable expedients of sectional aggrandizement. In 1831 the public debt of the United States was near extinction; and it was calculated that, with the tariff then in force, there would be, in three years thereafter, a surplus in the treasury. The South demanded the repeal of a measure which was no longer necessary for the purposes of public revenue; which had been used to promote the manufacturing and commercial interests of the North; and which, taxing her for the benefit of the Yankees, had restricted and embarrassed her resources, and put upon her the badge of inferiority.

The tariff controversy of 1831–2 introduced on the political stage two of the most remarkable men in America, who more than any others are to be regarded as the representative men of the North and the South, and the clear-cut anti-types of consolidation and State-rights. They were John C. Calhoun, of South Carolina, and Daniel Webster, of Massachusetts. The issue between these men was the broadest and most compre-

hensive ever made in the political history of the country, involving not only the slavery and tariff questions, but going to the very roots of the constitution, and embracing the whole American system of politics.

Mr. Calhoun was a splendid type of the accomplished scholar of the South, and a consummate champion of State-rights. He was the opposite of the shallow and rhetorical Massachusetts man in every respect. He was an ascetic in his private habits and tastes; he was a devotee of "the midnight lamp;" he was the most exact logician that ever figured in political life; he had no *ad captandum* arguments for the vulgar; his phrases were almost syllogisms, and his language as clear-cut as the diamond.

If Daniel Webster, of Massachusetts, can be described by a phrase, he may be briefly designated as a representative of the smattering of New England education and the rhapsody of "spread-eagleism." This may offend the taste of his worshippers; but of that we are careless, as long as we do not offend the truth of history. To the end of his days, Mr. Webster was nothing more than a ready-spoken sophomore in politics—a man who adorned common-places with silken orations—who had an unrivalled "Fourth-of-July" style of public speaking—but who never invented or discovered any thing in politics, and who defended his doctrines much more with frothy sentiments than with sound arguments. There is nothing so injurious to posthumous reputation as the publication of "private correspondence," where the great man is discovered in undress; and the officious friends of Mr. Webster, who published two octavo volumes of his letters, after his death, have exhibited the intellectual hero of Massachusetts as a vapid, sophomorical, shallow statesman, who could not afford to wear his literary court-dress—a tinsel one at that—but on state occasions. Mr. Webster had the weakness of putting scraps of law Latin in his correspondence; and it is doubtful whether his attainments in the dead languages extended beyond this cheap collection from his professional glossary. In his early days he affected a taste for poetry, and wrote tawdry and conceited verses to his friends. In one instance—as a specimen of his muse, some years after his admission to the bar—we are given this bit of the Yankee pastoral:

"Nor health alone—be four more blessings thine!—
CASH, and the Fair One, Friendship, and the Nine."

But it is scarcely just to estimate Mr. Webster's mind from his experiments in Latin or in verse, or from any other of his notoriously weak efforts at scholarship. In his political life—his so-called "statesmanship"—he was an excellent representative of the shallowness and fluency of the New England mind. He had the Yankee tact of showing his little learning to the greatest advantage. In vulgar estimation, he could overwhelm the most logical opponent by the beauty of a peroration. He had an abundance of catch-phrases and brilliant illustrations; his manner was pompous, slow, and sage; his figure, in social life, was that of a good liver—a well-fed and well-drunken Sir Oracle. In short, he was a man who might easily be imposed upon the vulgar as a proficient in eloquence and a pundit in politics. A mind like Mr. Webster's readily seized upon the crude plausibilities of the consolidation school of politics, and was admirably suited to employ, to the best advantage, its superficial though captious arguments.

In connection with the tariff dispute, Mr. Calhoun developed his so-called scheme of "Nullification." This masterly scheme of politics was misrepresented by a Yankee word, so adept were the Northern people in conveying libels in the party nomenclature they imposed upon the world. Mr. Calhoun's proposition was in no sense *nullification*. Strange as it may sound to those who have got American history from the narrow and sophistical pages of Yankee books, it was emphatically a *Union-saving measure*; devised in deference to the Union sentiment of the country; and better calculated, in reality, to maintain the bonds of confederation between the States than any thing ever planned or suggested by the American mind.

A loose impression has gained in the world, that our State institutions were schools of provincialism; that they were a partial and incomplete expression of the nationality of America; and that their logical tendency was to the disruption of the confederate bond. Mr. Calhoun was not the first to conceive, although more than any other he expressed logically and clearly, that the rights of the States were the only

solid foundation of the Union; and that, so far from being antagonistic to it, they constituted its security, realized its perfection, and gave to it all the moral beauty with which it appealed to the affections of the people. It was in this sense that the great South Carolina statesman, so frequently calumniated as "nullifier," agitator, etc., was indeed the real and devoted friend of the American Union. He maintained the rights of the States—the sacred distribution of powers between them and the General Government—as the life of the Union, and its bond of attachment in the hearts of the people. And in this he was right. The State institutions of America, properly regarded, were not discordant; nor were they unfortunate elements in our political life. They gave certain occasions to the divisions of industry; they were instruments of material prosperity; they were schools of pride and emulation; above all, they were the true guardians of the Union, keeping it from degenerating into that vile and short-lived government in which power is consolidated in a mere numerical majority.

Mr. Calhoun's so-called doctrine of Nullification is one of the highest proofs ever given by any American statesman of attachment to the Union. The assertion is not made for paradoxical effect. It is clear enough in history, read in the severe type of facts, without the falsehoods and epithets of that Yankee literature which has so long defamed us, distorted our public men, and misrepresented us, even to ourselves.

The so-called and mis-called doctrine of Nullification marked one of the most critical periods in the controversies of America, and constitutes one of the most curious studies for its philosophic historian. Mr. Calhoun was unwilling to offend the popular idolatry of the Union; he sought a remedy for existing evils short of disunion, and the consequence was what was called, by an ingenious slander, or a contemptible stupidity, Nullification. His doctrine was, in fact, an accommodation of two sentiments: that of Yankee injustice, and that of reverence of the Union. He proposed to save the Union by the simple and august means of an appeal to the sovereign States that composed it. He proposed that should the General Government and a State come into conflict, the power should be invoked that called the General Government into existence,

and gave it all of its authority. "In such a case," said Mr. Calhoun, "the States themselves may be appealed to, three-fourths of which, in fact, form a power whose decrees are the constitution itself, and whose voice can silence all discontent. The utmost extent, then, of the power is, that a State acting in its sovereign capacity, as one of the parties to the constitutional compact, may compel the Government created by that compact to submit a question touching its infraction to the parties who created it." He proposed a peculiar, conservative, and noble tribunal for the controversies that agitated the country and threatened the Union. He was not willing that vital controversies between the sovereign States and the General Government should be submitted to the Supreme Court, which properly excluded political questions, and comprehended those only where there were parties amenable to the process of the court. This was the length and breadth of Nullification. It was intended to reconcile impatience of Yankee injustice, and that sentimental attachment to the Union which colors so much of American politics; it resisted the suggestion of revolution; it clung to the idolatry of the Union, and marked that passage in American history in which there was a combat between reason and that idolatry, and in which that idolatry made a marked conquest.

The doctrine, then, of Mr. Calhoun was this: he proposed only to constitute a conservative and constitutional barrier to Yankee aggression; and, so far from destroying the Union, proposed to erect over it the permanent and august guard or a tribunal of those sovereign powers which had created it. It was this splendid, but hopeless vision of the South Carolina statesmen, which the North slandered with the catch-word of Nullification; which Northern orators made the text of indignation; on which Mr. Webster piped his schoolboy rhetoric; and on which the more modern schools of New England have exhausted the lettered resources of their learned blacksmiths and senatorial shoemakers.

The suggestion of the real safety of the Union, first made by Jefferson,* and reproduced by Calhoun, the North slandered

* At a late period of his life Mr. Jefferson wrote: "With respect to our State and Federal governments, I do not think their relations are correctly

as nullification, insulted as heresy, and branded as treason. "It was," said Jefferson Davis, on occasion of his taking leave of the United States Senate in 1861, "because of his deep-seated attachment to the Union, his determination to find some remedy for existing ills, short of a severance of the ties which bound South Carolina to the other States, that Mr. Calhoun advocated the doctrine of Nullification, which he proclaimed to be peaceful, to be within the limits of State power; not to disturb the Union, but only to be the means of bringing the agent before the tribunal of the States for their judgment." Mr. Davis, on that occasion, publicly confessed that the South was about to resort to another class of remedies than that proposed by the great South Carolinian—SECESSION—and, vindicating the name of Calhoun, suggested that, as the door had been closed to his great and efficient proposition to save the Union, there was no longer any hope for the South but in violent measures.

Daniel Webster had no complicated or nice theory about the American Union. In his eyes, the Government at Washington was nothing more than a central organization of numbers, with scarcely any feature of originality to distinguish it from other rude democracies of the world. "It had," he said, "created direct relations between itself and individuals;" and "no State authority had power to dissolve these relations." He scouted the whole doctrine of State-rights. He spoke as the mouth-piece of manufacturing interests in the North; apostrophized "the glorious Union;" declared its benefits and gains, and easily led the whole North to worship the Union, in the base spirit of commercial idolatry, as a pretty machinery to secure tariffs and bounties, and to aggrandize a section.

Mr. Calhoun and his school worshipped the American Union in a very different sense from the Yankee material-

understood by foreigners. They suppose the former subordinate to the latter. This is not the case. They are co-ordinate departments of one simple and integral whole. But, you may ask, if the two departments should claim each the same subject of power, where is the umpire to decide between them? In cases of little urgency or importance, the prudence of both parties will keep them aloof from the questionable ground; but, if it can neither be avoided nor compromised, a convention of the States must be called to ascribe the doubtful power to that department which they may think best."

ists. The *moral veneration* of the Union was peculiarly a sentiment of the South. The political ideas of the North, as represented by Mr. Webster and his school, excluded that of any peculiar moral character about the Union; the doctrine of State-rights was rejected by them for the prevalent notion that America was a single democracy; thus, the Union to them was nothing more than a geographical name, entitled to no peculiar claims upon the affections of the people. It was different with the South. The doctrine of State-rights gave to the Union its moral dignity; this doctrine was the only really possible source of sentimental attachment to the Union; and this doctrine was the received opinion of the Southern people, and the most marked peculiarity of their politics. The South venerated the Union, because she discovered in it a sublime moral principle; because she regarded it as a peculiar association, in which sovereign States were held by high considerations of good faith; by the exchanges of equity and comity; by the noble attractions of social order; by the enthused sympathies of a common destiny of power, honor, and renown.

In his famous Fort Hill speech, delivered in 1831, Mr. Calhoun said :

“I yield to none, I trust, in a deep and sincere attachment to our political institutions and the Union of these States. I never breathed an opposite sentiment; but, on the contrary, I have ever considered them the great instruments of preserving our liberty, and promoting the happiness of ourselves and of our posterity; and next to these I have ever held them most dear. Nearly half of my life has passed in the service of the Union, and whatever public reputation I have acquired is indissolubly identified with it. With these strong feelings of attachment, I have examined with the utmost care the bearing of the doctrine in question; and so far from anarchical or revolutionary, I solemnly believe it to be the only solid foundation of our system, and of the Union itself; and that the opposite doctrine, which denies to the States the right of protecting their reserved powers, and which would vest in the General Government (it matters not through what department) the right of determining exclusively and finally the powers delegated to it, is incompatible with the sovereignty of the

States and of the Constitution itself, considered as the basis of a Federal Union. * * * To realize the perfection of this Union, we must view the General Government and the States as a whole, each in its proper sphere sovereign and independent; each perfectly adapted to their respective objects; the States acting separately, representing and protecting the local and peculiar interests; acting jointly, through the General Government, with the weight respectively assigned to each by the constitution, representing and protecting the interests of the whole, and thus perfecting, by an admirable but simple arrangement, the great principle of representation and responsibility, without which no government can be free or just. To preserve this sacred distribution as originally settled, by coercing each to move in its prescribed orb, is the great and difficult problem, on the solution of which the duration of our constitution, of our Union, and in all probability, our liberty depends. * * * I must think the fear of weakening the Government too much in this case to be in a great measure unfounded, or at least, that the danger is much less from that than the opposite side. I do not deny that a power of so high a nature," [that of demanding the judgment of a convention of States on questions disputed with the General Government,] "may be abused by a State; but when I reflect that the States unanimously called the General Government into existence, with all of its powers, which they freely surrendered on their part, under the conviction that their common peace, safety, and prosperity required it; that they are bound together by a common origin, and the recollection of common suffering and common triumph in the great and splendid achievement of their independence; and the strongest feelings of our nature, and among the love of national power and distinction, are on the side of the Union; it does seem to me that the fear which would strip the States of their sovereignty, and degrade them, in fact, to mere dependent corporations, lest they should abuse a right indispensable to the peaceable protection of those interests, which they reserved under their own peculiar guardianship, when they created the General Government, is unnatural and unreasonable."

Such were the just views and noble sentiments of the man whom Webster and his party hounded as a traitor, and who

has gone down to history in Yankee books in the utterly false character of a Disunionist.

The failure of Mr. Calhoun's scheme to bind up the rights of the States with the interests and glory of the Union, was to the consolidation school a new and decisive era of power. State-rights fell into a loose disrepute from which they never recovered; the sectional controversy between North and South went on with increased force; and influences were combining to force the South at last to abandon all conservative expedients and to accept the conclusion of Disunion. That conclusion remained as the only possible protection against that Northern party which founded the school of consolidation only to use the Government at Washington as the organ of numerical majorities and the engine of sectional oppression.

* * * * *

VI.

A Fourth of July sentiment in 1851.—Slavery not the Cause of Disunion.—The war of 1861.—What it has decided.—The incense of weak minds to the Yankee.—Last sentiment of President Davis.

ON the Fourth of July, 1851, the foundation was laid for an addition to the Capitol at Washington. Under the cornerstone of the addition, Daniel Webster deposited a paper, in his own handwriting, containing the following sentence: "If therefore, it shall be hereafter the will of God that this structure shall fall from its base, that its foundations be upturned, and the deposit beneath this stone brought to the eyes of men, be it then known that on this day the Union of the United States of America stands firm—that their constitution still exists unimpaired, and with all its original usefulness and glory, growing every day stronger and stronger in the affections of the great body of the American people, and attracting more and more the admiration of the world."

But ten years after this glowing tribute to the permanency of American institutions, the Union was rent in twain, and the States which composed it were ranged in one of the most immense and violent wars of modern times. On the Fourth of July, 1861, a remnant of Congress met at Washington, to raise armies and means for a war upon the Southern States, which having realized the constitution as a farce, and the Union as the penalty of association of the oppressed with the oppressors, were prepared to take their political destinies in their own hands.

The disruption of the Union, in 1861, was by no means the direct or the logical consequence of the slavery discussion. The dispute on that subject had at last narrowed down to a solitary point—whether it was competent for the Congress of the United States, directly or indirectly, to exclude slavery from the territories of the Union; and to this proposition the Supreme Court of the United States had given a negative answer.

The terrible war which ensued on Disunion must be taken as the result of a profound and long-continued conflict between the political and social systems of North and South, with which slavery had a conspicuous connection, but was not indeed an independent controversy; a conflict on which was ranged on one side the party that professed the doctrines of consolidation and numerical majorities; that represented the material civilization of America; that had the commerce and the manufactures, the ships, the workshops, the war-material of the country—on the other side, the party that maintained the doctrines of State-rights, studied government as a system of checks and balances, and cultivated the highest schools of statesmanship in America; that represented a civilization scanty in shows and luxuries, but infinitely superior in the moral and sentimental elements; that devoted itself to agriculture, and had nothing but its fields and brave men to oppose to a people that whitened every sea with their commerce, and by the power of their wealth and under the license of “legitimacy,” put the whole world under tribute for troops and munitions.

It is said that in this war the material civilization of the North has conquered; that the principle of consolidation is supremely triumphant, and that hereafter, under the captivating title of an Imperial Republic, it is to found, without dispute, a new and permanent order of things in America.

The latter part of the proposition we dispute. The principle of State-rights, which for three generations has been harbored in the American mind, cannot be destroyed by an act of war. The just opinions of men are immortal; suppressed or terrified at times, they reassert themselves on opportunity; punished in one instance, although they may never resort again to the fatal experiment, they discover new resources of contest, and find new modes of expression and activity.

Since the close of the war, a newspaper published by Virginians in Virginia has thus attempted to state the issues it decided:

“We accept the verdict; we renounce our theory of the Federal compact; we abandon our ideas of State sovereignty; we abjure our faith in the right of secession. Henceforth, in our conception, the Federal Government is supreme.”

The declaration is gratuitous; it is not even demanded by the enemy; it is the passing and ephemeral incense of weak minds to the Yankee. We shall find in another instance a truer indication of the future of the South, and a better expression of what remains of its spirit. When Jefferson Davis, the President of the Confederate States, was seeking safety in flight, a fellow traveller remarked to him that the cause of the Confederates was lost. He replied :

“ It appears so. But the principle for which we contended is bound to reassert itself, though it may be at another time and in another form.”

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APPENDIX No. II.

RECONSTRUCTION.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENTS.—THE MISSISSIPPI QUESTION.—THE AMNESTY PROCLAMATION.—THE FRANCHISE IN VIRGINIA.—PAROLED PRISONERS.—TRADE.—THE DEFINITION OF "LOYALTY."—MESSAGE OF PROVISIONAL-GOVERNOR JOHNSON OF GEORGIA.—MESSAGE OF PROVISIONAL-GOVERNOR PERRY OF SOUTH CAROLINA.—THE LAST SIX DAYS OF THE CONFEDERACY.

It would exceed the purpose and limits of this volume to discuss the *consequences* of the war, with respect to the political and civil rights of the people of the South. But, as a brief and appropriate appendix, we may make up the record of the official acts of the Washington Government, and those of some of the States, in this regard, which gives the outline of the history of reconstruction, so far as it has progressed, up to the date of this publication.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENTS.

The following proclamation of the President of the United States, issued with reference to the re-establishment of the State authority in North Carolina, was observed literally, or substantially, with reference to the other Southern States, and indicates the general plan of reconstruction :

"Whereas, the fourth section of the fourth article of the constitution of the United States declares, that the United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a repub-

lican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion and domestic violence; and

“Whereas, the President of the United States is, by the constitution, made commander-in-chief of the army and navy, as well as chief executive officer of the United States, and is bound by solemn oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States, and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and

“Whereas, the rebellion, which has been waged by a portion of the people of the United States, against the properly constituted authorities of the Government thereof, in the most violent and revolting form, but whose organized and armed forces have now been almost entirely overcome, has, in its revolutionary progress, deprived the people of the State of North Carolina of all civil government; and

“Whereas, it becomes necessary and proper to carry out and enforce the obligations of the United States to the people of North Carolina, in securing them in the enjoyment of a republican form of government:

“Now, therefore, in obedience to the high and solemn duties imposed upon me by the constitution of the United States, and for the purpose of enabling the loyal people of said State to organize a State government, whereby justice may be established, domestic tranquillity insured, and loyal citizens protected in all their rights of life, liberty, and property; I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, do hereby appoint William W. Holden provisional governor of the State of North Carolina; whose duty it shall be, at the earliest practicable period, to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper for convening a convention, composed of delegates to be chosen by that portion of the people of said State who are loyal to the United States, and no others, for the purpose of altering or amending the constitution thereof, and with authority to exercise, within the limits of said State, all the powers necessary and proper to enable such loyal people of the State of North Carolina to restore said State to its constitutional relations to the Federal Government, and to present such a republican form of State government as will entitle the State to the guarantee of the

United States therefor, and its people to protection by the United States, against invasion, insurrection, and domestic violence: Provided, that, in any election that may be hereafter held for choosing delegates to any State convention, as aforesaid, no person shall be qualified as an elector, or shall be eligible as a member of such convention, unless he shall have previously taken and subscribed to the oath, or amnesty, as set forth in the President's proclamation of May 29, 1865, and is a voter qualified as prescribed by the constitution and laws of the State of North Carolina in force immediately before the 20th day of May, A. D. 1861, the date of the so-called ordinance of secession; and the said convention, when convened, or the legislature that may be thereafter assembled, will prescribe the qualifications of electors, and the eligibility of persons to hold office under the constitution and laws of the State—a power the people of the several States composing the Federal Union have rightfully exercised, from the origin of the Government to the present time. And I do hereby direct:

“*First.* That the military commander of the department, and all officers and persons in the military and naval service, aid and assist the said provisional governor in carrying into effect this proclamation; and they are enjoined to abstain from in any way hindering, impeding, or discouraging the loyal people from the organization of a State government, as herein authorized.

“*Second.* That the Secretary of State proceed to put in force all laws of the United States, the administration whereof belongs to the State Department, applicable to the geographical limits aforesaid.

“*Third.* That the Secretary of the Treasury proceed to nominate for appointment assessors of taxes, and collectors of customs and internal revenue, and such other officers of the Treasury Department as are authorized by law, and put in execution the revenue laws of the United States, within the geographical limits aforesaid.

“In making the appointments, the preference shall be given to qualified, loyal persons residing within the districts where their respective duties are to be performed; but if suitable residents of the districts shall not be found, then persons residing in other States or districts shall be appointed.

Fourth. That the Postmaster-General proceed to establish post-routes, and put into execution the postal laws of the United States, within the said State, giving to loyal residents the preference of appointment; but if suitable residents are not found, then appoint agents from other States.

Fifth. That the district judge, for the judicial district in which North Carolina is included, proceed to hold courts within said State, in accordance with the provisions of the act of Congress.

"The attorney-general will instruct the proper officers to libel and bring to judgment, confiscation, and sale, property subject to confiscation, and enforce the administration of justice within said State, in all matters within the cognizance and jurisdiction of the Federal courts.

Sixth. That the Secretary of the Navy take possession of all public property belonging to the Navy Department within said geographical limits, and put in operation all acts of Congress, in relation to naval affairs, having application to said State.

Seventh. That the Secretary of the Interior put in force all laws relating to the Interior Department, applicable to the geographical limits aforesaid.

"In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

"ANDREW JOHNSON.

"Done at the city of Washington, this 29th day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-five, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-ninth.

"By the President :

"WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State."

THE MISSISSIPPI QUESTION.

In a letter from President Johnson to Governor Sharkey of Mississippi, relative to organizing the militia of that State, he wrote :

"It is believed there can be organized in each county a force of citizen militia to preserve order and enforce the civil

authority of the State, and of the United States, which would enable the Federal Government to reduce the army and withdraw, to a great extent, the forces from the State, thereby reducing the enormous expenses of the Government.

“If there was any danger from an organization of the citizens for the purpose indicated, the military are there to suppress, on the first appearance, any move insurrectionary in its character. One great object is to induce the people to come forward in the defence of the State and Federal Governments. General Washington declared, that the people, or the militia, was the arm of the constitution, or the arm of the United States; and, as soon as it is practicable, the original design of the Government should be resumed under the principles of the great charter of freedom, handed down to the people by the founders of the Republic. The people must be trusted with their government, and, if trusted, my opinion is, that they will act in good faith, and restore their former constitutional relations with all the States composing the Union. The main object of Major-General Carl Schurz’s mission to the South was to aid, as much as practicable, in carrying out the policy adopted by the Government for restoring the States to their former relations with the Federal Government. It is hoped such aid has been given. The proclamation authorizing the restoration of State government requires the military to aid the Provisional Governor in the performance of his duties as prescribed in the proclamation, and in no manner to interfere or throw impediments in the way of the consummation of the object of his appointment, at least without advising the Government of the intended interference.

“ANDREW JOHNSON.”

On September 2d, the President received a dispatch from Governor Sharkey, stating that General Slocum had issued an order preventing the execution of his proclamation of August 19th, to organize the militia of the State for certain purposes of home protection, and acknowledging the receipt of the copy of the dispatch sent to General Schurz on the 30th ultimo, which dispatch Governor Sharkey earnestly requested permission to publish.

To this request, the President replied by telegraph:

"My dispatch was not intended for publication, but you can make such use of it as you deem best."

The same day the following dispatch was sent to General Slocum :

"WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 2.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SLOCUM, &C. :

"Upon the 19th of August, Governor Sharkey issued a proclamation calling for the formation of military companies in each county to detect criminals, prevent crime, and preserve good order in places where the military forces of the United States were insufficient to do so. If you have issued any order countermanding this proclamation, or interfering with its execution, you will at once revoke it. Acknowledge the receipt of this order, and telegraph your action on it.

"By order of the President of the United States.

"T. T. ECKERT,

"Acting Assistant Secretary of War."

THE AMNESTY PROCLAMATION.

Whereas, the President of the United States, on the eighth day of December, A. D. eighteen hundred and sixty-three, and on the twenty-sixth day of March, A. D. eighteen hundred and sixty-four, did, with the object to suppress the existing rebellion, to induce all persons to return to their loyalty, and to restore the authority of the United States, issue proclamations offering amnesty and pardon to certain persons who had directly or by implication participated in the said rebellion ; and

Whereas, many persons who had so engaged in said rebellion have, since the issuance of said proclamation, failed or neglected to take the benefits offered thereby ; and

Whereas, many persons who have been justly deprived of all claim to amnesty and pardon thereunder, by reason of their participation, directly or by implication, in said rebellion and continued hostility to the Government of the United States since the date of said proclamation, now desire to apply for and obtain amnesty and pardon ;

To the end, therefore, that the authority of the Government of the United States may be restored, and that peace, order

and freedom may be established, I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, do proclaim and declare that I hereby grant to all persons who have directly or indirectly participated in the existing rebellion, except as hereinafter excepted, amnesty and pardon, with restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves, and except in cases where legal proceedings, under the laws of the United States providing for the confiscation of property of persons engaged in rebellion, have been instituted ; but on the condition, nevertheless, that every such person shall take and subscribe to the following oath or affirmation, and thenceforward keep and maintain said oath inviolate, and which oath shall be registered for permanent preservation, and shall be of the tenor and effect following, to wit :

I, ———, do solemnly swear (or affirm), in presence of Almighty God, that I will henceforth faithfully support and defend the constitution of the United States and the Union of the States thereunder ; and that I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all laws and proclamations which have been made during the existing rebellion with reference to the emancipation of slaves. So help me God.

The following classes of persons are excepted from the benefits of this proclamation.

First. All who are, or shall have been, pretended civil or diplomatic officers, or otherwise, domestic or foreign agents, of the pretended Confederate Government.

Second. All who left judicial stations under the United States to aid the rebellion.

Third. All who shall have been military or naval officers of said pretended Confederate Government above the rank of colonel in the army and lieutenant in the navy.

Fourth. All who left seats in the Congress of the United States to aid the rebellion.

Fifth. All who resigned or tendered resignations of their commissions in the army or navy of the United States to evade duty in resisting the rebellion.

Sixth. All who have engaged in any way in treating otherwise than lawfully as prisoners of war persons found in the United States service as officers, soldiers, seamen, or in other capacities.

Seventh. All persons who have been or are absentees from the United States for the purpose of aiding the rebellion.

Eighth. All military and naval officers of the rebel service who were educated by the Government in the Military Academy at West Point, or the United States Naval Academy.

Ninth. All persons who held the pretended offices of governors of States in insurrection against the United States.

Tenth. All persons who left their homes within the jurisdiction and protection of the United States, and passed beyond the Federal military lines into the so-called Confederate States for the purpose of aiding the rebellion.

Eleventh. All persons who have been engaged in the destruction of the commerce of the United States upon the high seas, and all persons who have made raids into the United States from Canada, or been engaged in destroying the commerce of the United States upon the lakes and rivers that separate the British provinces from the United States.

Twelfth. All persons who, at the time when they seek to obtain the benefits hereof, by taking the oath herein prescribed, are in military, naval, or civil confinement or custody, or under bonds of the civil, military, or naval authorities or agents of the United States, as prisoners of war or persons detained for offences of any kind either before or after conviction.

Thirteenth. All persons who have voluntarily participated in said rebellion, and the estimated value of whose taxable property is over twenty thousand dollars.

Fourteenth. All persons who have taken the oath of amnesty, as prescribed in the President's proclamation of December 8th, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, or an oath of allegiance to the Government of the United States, since the date of said proclamation, and who have not thenceforward kept and maintained the same inviolate.

Provided, that special application may be made to the President for pardon by any person belonging to the excepted classes, and such clemency will be liberally extended as may be consistent with the facts of the case, and the peace and dignity of the United States.

The Secretary of State will establish rules and regulations for administering and recording the said amnesty oath, so as to in-

sure its benefit to the people, and guard the Government against fraud.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

Done at the city of Washington, the twenty-ninth day of May, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-five, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-ninth.

By the President :

WM. H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

THE FRANCHISE IN VIRGINIA.

To the Justices of the County Courts of Virginia :

GENTLEMEN—I desire to call your attention to the second paragraph of the third article of the State constitution, which is in the following words :

“No person shall vote, or hold office under this constitution, who has held office under the so-called Confederate government, or any rebellious State government, or who has been a member of the so-called Confederate Congress, or a member of any State Legislature in rebellion against the authority of the United States, excepting therefrom county officers.”

I have reliable information that in a number of counties in the State, persons have been elected to the office of Commonwealth's attorney, sheriff, commissioner of the revenue, and clerk of the court, and, in some instances, justices of the peace, who are disqualified by the clause of the constitution above quoted, and who have not been relieved by acts of the General Assembly. Wherever it has come to the knowledge of the executive, that a person elected as a justice of the peace labors under the disability referred to, a commission has been refused. You will also take care that no justice to whom a commission has been issued, and who is disqualified under the said clause, be permitted to qualify ; and you will further take care that no person so disqualified, who has been elected to the offices above referred to, shall qualify or enter upon their duties.

You will consider all offices above referred to, to which persons so disqualified shall have been elected, vacant, and order elections immediately to fill such vacancies.

Judges of the Circuit Courts will observe this order in organizing their respective courts.

I take it for granted that this seeming disrespect for the constitution has arisen from a want of proper consideration. I am loth to believe that it has been done, in any instance, through any disrespect for the constitution and laws of the State; but I feel it incumbent on me to see that the organic law of the State is enforced.

In the elections to fill vacancies, you will be guided by the provisions of the code of 1860.

F. H. PIERPOINT,
Governor of Virginia.

The following is a copy of the franchise bill passed by the General Assembly :

"An act prescribing means by which persons who have been disfranchised by the third article of the constitution may be restored to the rights of voters.
Passed June 22, 1865.

"Whereas, in the opinion of this General Assembly, the time has arrived when it would be safe and expedient to restore to the rights of voters certain persons who are disfranchised by the provisions of the third article of the constitution of Virginia; now, for the purpose of so restoring such persons,

"Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia, That every person possessing, in other respects, the qualification of a voter under the constitution and laws of the State, who has taken, or who shall hereafter take, the oath prescribed by the Amnesty Proclamation of the President of the United States, of the 29th of May, 1865, which oath is in the following words, to wit: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm), in the presence of Almighty God, that I will henceforth faithfully support, protect, and defend the constitution of the United States, and the union of the States thereunder; and that I will in like manner abide by, and faithfully support, all laws and proclamations which have been made during the existing rebellion, with reference to the emancipation of slaves;" and an oath to uphold and defend the government of Virginia, as restored by the convention which assembled at Wheeling, on the 11th day of June, 1861, which oath is in the following words: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will uphold and defend the government of Virginia, as restored by the convention which assembled at Wheeling, on the 11th day of June, 1861,"

shall be entitled and qualified to vote for members of the General Assembly, and all officers elective by the people, subject always to the laws in regard to voters and voting, not inconsistent with this act. Provided, however, that the persons excluded by the terms of the said proclamation from the benefits thereof, excepting those embraced in the thirteenth class of such excluded persons, shall not be entitled or qualified to vote as aforesaid, unless pardoned by the President, as provided for by said proclamation. This act shall be in force from its passage."

PAROLED PRISONERS.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, August 25, 1865.

Paroled prisoners asking passports, as citizens of the United States, and against whom no special charges may be pending, will be furnished with passports upon application therefor to the Department of State, in the usual form. Such passports will, however, be issued upon the condition that the applicants do not return to the United States without leave of the President. Other persons implicated in the rebellion, who may wish to go abroad, will apply to the Department of State for passports, and the applications will be disposed of according to the merits of the several cases.

By the President of the United States,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

TRADE.

By proclamation of the President of the United States of the 29th of April, 1865, all restrictions upon internal, domestic, and commercial intercourse—with the exception of the following articles: arms, ammunition, all articles from which ammunition is made, and gray uniforms and cloth—were removed in such parts of the States of Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and so much of Louisiana as lies east of the Mississippi River as shall be embraced within the lines of national military occupation.

On the 13th of June, a proclamation was published direct-

ing that all restrictions upon internal, domestic, and coastwise intercourse and trade, and upon the removal of products of States heretofore declared in insurrection—reserving and excepting only those relating to contraband of war, and also those which relate to the reservation of rights of the United States to property purchased in the territory of an enemy, heretofore imposed in the territory of the United States, east of the Mississippi River—be forthwith removed; and that, on and after the first day of July next, all restrictions upon foreign commerce with said ports, with the exception and reservation aforesaid, be removed; and that the commerce of said States shall be conducted under the supervision of the regularly appointed officers of the customs provided by law; and such officers of the customs shall receive any captured and abandoned property that may be turned over to them, under the law, by the military or naval forces of the United States, and dispose of such property as shall be directed by the secretary of the treasury.

On the 23d of June, the following proclamation was issued, as to the termination of the blockade:

“Whereas, by the proclamations of the President of the 15th and 27th of April, 1861, a blockade of certain ports of the United States was set on foot; but, whereas, the reasons for that measure have ceased to exist: Now, therefore, be it known, that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, do hereby declare and proclaim the blockade aforesaid to be rescinded, as to all the ports aforesaid, including that of Galveston, and other ports west of the Mississippi River, which ports will be open to foreign commerce on the first of July next, on the terms and conditions set forth in my proclamation of the 22d of May last. It is to be understood, however, that the blockade thus rescinded was an international measure, for the purpose of protecting the sovereign rights of the United States. The greater or less subversion of the civil authority in the region to which it applied, and the impracticability of at once restoring that, in due efficiency, may for a season make it advisable to employ the army and navy of the United States towards carrying the laws into effect, wherever such employment may be necessary.

"In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

"ANDREW JOHNSON.

"Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-third day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-five, and of the independence of the United States of America the eighty-ninth.

"By the President :

"W. HUNTER, Acting Secretary of State."

By proclamation of the 24th of June, the benefits of former proclamations, annulling all restrictions upon internal, domestic, and coastwise intercourse and trade, and upon the purchase and removal of products of States, and parts of States and territories, heretofore declared in insurrection, were extended to the States and territories lying west of the Mississippi River.

The following proclamation appears to have finally accomplished the entire freedom of trade with the Southern States :

"Whereas, by my proclamations of the 13th and 24th of June, 1865, removing restrictions, in part, upon internal, domestic, and coastwise intercourse and trade with those States recently declared in insurrection, certain articles were exempted from the effect of said proclamation as contraband of war; and

"Whereas, the necessity for restricting trade in said articles has now, in great measure, ceased, it is hereby ordered that on and after the 3d day of September, 1865, all restrictions aforesaid be removed, so that articles, declared by the said proclamations to be contraband of war, may be imported into and sold in said States, subject only to such regulations as the secretary of the treasury may prescribe.

"In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

"ANDREW JOHNSON.

"Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-ninth day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-five, and of the independence of the United States of America the eighty-ninth.

"By the President :

"W. H. SEWARD, Secretary of State."

THE DEFINITION OF "LOYALTY."

The following is the text of a communication, dated Washington, October, 28, 1865, and transmitted to his excellency, James Johnson, provisional-governor of Georgia, Milledgeville:

"WASHINGTON, October 29, 1865.

"Your several telegrams have been received. The President of the United States cannot recognize the people of any State as having resumed their relations of loyalty to the Union, that admits, as legal, obligations contracted or debts created in their name to promote the war of the rebellion.

"W. H. SEWARD."

The following has been addressed to his excellency, William Marvin, provisional-governor of Florida, at Tallahassee:

"WASHINGTON, November 1, 1865.

"Your letter of October 7th was read, and submitted to the President. He is gratified with the favorable progress towards reorganization in Florida, and directs me to say that he regards the ratification, by the Legislature, of the congressional amendment of the constitution of the United States, as indispensable to a successful restoration of the true loyal relations between Florida and the other States, and equally indispensable to the return of peace and harmony throughout the Republic.

"WILLIAM H. SEWARD."

MESSAGE OF PROVISIONAL-GOVERNOR JOHNSON OF GEORGIA.

The Georgia Legislature met on the 25th of October, 1865. After organization, the following message was sent in by the governor:

"GENTLEMEN OF THE CONVENTION—The circumstances under which you have assembled, make it proper, in my judgment, that you should have set before you a summary of the financial condition of the State, that you may be the better prepared to give appropriate directions to executive officers touching the

discharge of important duties necessary to be performed before the Legislature will assemble. Upon entering on the duties of my office, I ascertained from a source deemed reliable, that the cotton which had been previously purchased by the State, had either been captured or consumed by fire ; and that all of the assets the State held abroad, had been drawn against to the full extent of their value.

“ The Western and Atlantic Railroad yielded us no income, and the stock belonging to the State in banks and other railroads were entirely unavailable. Our charitable institutions—the Academy for the Blind at the city of Macon and the Lunatic Asylum at this place—were without funds, and are now compelled to resort to such credit as they may obtain to procure supplies necessary for the maintenance of their unfortunate inmates. The penitentiary, with its shops and machinery, has been nearly destroyed, to such an extent as to render it wholly inadequate to accomplish the purpose designed, and nearly all of the convicts have either escaped or been discharged.

“ It will be necessary, therefore, to make some provisions to carry into effect the judgments of the courts against certain criminals for offences committed in violation of existing laws, or which may be committed, until new laws shall be made prescribing new penalties and other modes of inflicting punishment for crime.

“ During the progress of the war, the Western and Atlantic Railroad was alternately destroyed and rebuilt by the contending armies, until by the operations of last spring it finally fell into the possession of the military authorities of the United States. By them it was temporarily repaired and put in running order, and by them retained until about the 25th of last month, when it was turned over to the State upon certain terms and conditions proposed by the United States. Most of the depots on the road and the workshops on it are to be repaired or rebuilt, many cross-ties to be furnished, and much of the iron to be relaid. The bridges over the streams were found to be frail, and liable to be swept off by the first heavy freshets. Such being the case, the superintendent and directors did not hesitate, with my approval, to enter into contracts for the immediate construction of permanent and substantial bridges

They are fourteen in number, and by the terms of the contracts are to be completed by the 15th of December next. The rolling-stock on the road being insufficient, the superintendent and directors purchased of the United States nine engines and about one hundred cars. This outlay cannot be met by the proceeds of the road, but will require, it is estimated, more than half a million of dollars.

“I have caused some repairs to be put upon the State House and Executive Mansion. These will require further appropriations, to replenish and put them in proper order. Having no available assets with which to pay the mileage of the members of the Convention or their per diem, I borrowed on the faith of the State, from citizens of Augusta, about the sum of fifty thousand dollars, to be used by the Convention for that purpose. Special contracts have been made with the citizens lending the money, to which contracts I invite your attention, and respectfully ask that they be approved, and that provision be made to meet them promptly.

“Since our last election for members to the Congress of the United States, a new apportionment of representatives has been made under the census returns of 1860; and by that apportionment the number allotted to the State of Georgia is reduced to seven. It being desirable that representatives should be elected at as early a day as practicable, it will be proper that the Convention shall, by resolution or otherwise, divide the State into the requisite number of districts, and order that the election for members to Congress be held on the same day as that on which the governor and members of the General Assembly may be directed to be holden:

“The changes which the war and its results have made in our property, population, and resources, suggest that some corresponding changes or modifications be made in the organic law, fixing the basis and the mode of representation in each branch of the General Assembly. To approximate perfect justice on this subject, is, under the most favorable circumstances, almost impossible; but with us, at present, it is still more difficult, because of the want of accurate statistical information. For the purpose of aiding you in performing this delicate task, I have procured for the use of the Convention, “Vol. Population” of the census of 1860, and which will be furnished when desired.

“Within the past few years we have made several experiments on our judicial system. These experiments, I think, have demonstrated that the judges should be independent of the executive, and that sound policy, and the wholesome administration of law, require that the governor be deprived of the appointment of all judicial functionaries. The administration of justice will, under the new condition of society, require that the organic law be so made, as to allow the Legislature to establish inferior tribunals, in each county, with jurisdiction over certain classes of civil and criminal causes. The sessions of such courts should be frequent, so as to dispatch business without delay; and should be held, subject to legislation, from time to time, as the public exigencies might require.

“In this connection, I cannot forbear earnestly recommending to your deliberate consideration, the propriety of ordaining that the Supreme Court shall hold its sessions at one place, and that one place shall be the seat of government for the State. The advantages resulting from it will be many and great. It will better secure the convenience of suitors, and approximate more nearly in distributing justice to each man's door. It will add consequence to our capital, give more dignity to the court, and more authority to their decisions.

“The public debt of the State, as reported by the comptroller, amounts to about \$20,813,525. Of this sum, \$2,667,750 were contracted prior to the commencement of the war; the balance, about \$18,135,775, during its existence. On the amount incurred previous to hostilities, there is now due and unpaid about the sum of \$284,000. The liabilities incurred before the war are, in every sense, a debt; and the State is bound, by every consideration of good faith and public morality, so to regard it, and to make provision for the prompt and faithful discharge of such liability. No reasonable doubt can be entertained that such will be her pleasure and her action. But the debt created during the war stands on a very different basis. It is of no legal or moral obligation, because it was created to aid in the prosecution of a war of rebellion against the United States. The purpose sought to be accomplished was unconstitutional; and all who participated, in any wise, in the effort to sever the country, were violators of law, and can, therefore, set up no claim, either legal or equitable, for money advanced, or

for services rendered. Furthermore, these contracts, from which a liability is said to result, were made with Georgia in revolt—with Georgia as a member of the Confederate States government. The government to which she then belonged has been overthrown, and with its overthrow, all Confederate debts became extinct. Georgia, as a component part of it, no longer exists, and her debts then incurred, have, in like manner, been extinguished. She is now no longer in revolt. She is one of the States of the Federal Union; and, in her return to reconciliation, her allegiance to the Government requires that the act of secession be cancelled, and all other acts done and performed in aid of the rebellion be declared void and of no effect. The ultimate redemption of the currency, both State and Confederate, was made dependent, in fact and in terms, upon the result of the fatal struggle. No one expected payment, if finally defeated in our efforts to secure independence; and, therefore, no plighted faith is violated by a refusal on the part of Georgia to assume to pay an indebtedness dependent on the issue. The currency and the cause flourished together, while in life; and now that the cause has no longer a being, the currency that sustained it may well be interred in the same grave.

“To call a refusal on the part of the State to acknowledge or pay these extinct demands repudiation, is but a perversion of the use of language, and presents an appearance of an attempt to sustain and uphold a desperate cause by a resort to odious words and opprobrious epithets. Our burdens are already great, and our strength greatly diminished. The assumption of such a debt will still add to our weakness, impair our credit, increase our taxes, deter immigration, prevent capital from seeking an investment among us, and will embarrass us in a variety of ways for years to come.

“To transfer this great question to the Legislature will be considered as a *quasi* indorsement of its justice. The Legislature will have its own peculiar burdens to bear, and will be pressed with business beyond that of any one that has assembled in our day. It will be charged with framing and passing tax laws, police laws, penal laws, laws relating to contracts and to all the manifold relations of life. Such subjects will be sufficient to consume the time and the talents of the most

able and industrious of men ; and the public welfare will demand that, to these subjects, the members of the Legislature shall give their earnest, best, and undivided efforts. Let not that body, when in session, be besieged, from day to day, by claimants, and their agents and attorneys, urging the assumption, in whole or in part, of these unconstitutional demands. Let the hope of reward in such efforts be entirely cut off ; let this overflowing fountain of corruption be now and forever dried up ; and let the record of your action on this subject discourage, in the future, all premature efforts to overthrow long and well-established government. In a word, ordain solemnly and deliberately that no Legislature, now or hereafter, shall, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, assume to pay, in any manner, these demands, unconstitutional in their creation, and many of them without even the countenance of equity to support them.

“The events of this year will constitute an era in history. Slavery has been abolished in these States. Georgia, in convention, is called upon to put on record an acknowledgment of the accomplished fact, to give assurance to mankind that involuntary servitude shall not hereafter, in any form, or by virtue of any device, exist within her borders ; to enjoin on succeeding legislators that they shall guard by law the community from the evils of sudden emancipation ; shall secure those emerging from bondage in the enjoyment of their legal rights ; and shall protect the humble, the ignorant, and the weak from wrong and aggression. Such are some of the unforeseen and wonderful results of the war. In passing through this revolution our chastisements have been severe and our calamities have been heavy ; but we should do well to remember that this great change is of Him who does all things wisely and “according to the councils of His will.”

“J. JOHNSON,

“Provisional-Governor of Georgia.”

MESSAGE OF PROVISIONAL-GOVERNOR PERRY OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, SOUTH CAROLINA, Oct. 24, 1865.

To the Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives :

* * * * *

After the termination of our recent disastrous and ruinous struggle with the Federal Government, it pleased the President of the United States to select me, without my knowledge or any solicitation on the part of my friends, for the high and responsible position which I now hold, to organize a State government for South Carolina, and have her restored to all her civil and political rights as a member of the Federal Union. I felt deeply the delicate responsibility of the station to which I had been called, and was fearful that, in obeying the orders and carrying out the policy of the Federal Government, I should not be able to protect the State and save the people from unjust exaction and oppression. But, most fortunately, the wise, generous, and magnanimous policy of President Johnson towards the Southern States has enabled me to do both, and rendered my administration pleasant and gratifying to me. I have been greatly sustained, too, by the honor, patriotism, and loyalty of the people.

Though I received my appointment several months after other provisional governors had been commissioned, I have the pleasure of informing you that South Carolina is now as far advanced in her reconstruction as any other Southern State. Instead of wasting time in trying to fill all the civil offices of the State with my personal or political friends and partisans, I determined to restore those who were in office at the suspension of the civil government, and who had been elected by the people or appointed by the Legislature, and were familiar with their official duties. I knew too well the character of South Carolina, to doubt for a moment that her sons would prove loyal and true, after renewing their oaths of allegiance to the United States. In this way I re-established civil government at once in South Carolina, and greatly expedited her reconstruction. An election for members of the convention to reform our State constitution was immediately

ordered. Magistrates were authorized to administer the oath of allegiance, so as to qualify the voters in time for the election. I also restored civil law throughout the State, and ordered the courts to be opened. These measures were objected to by the military authorities, as transcending my powers as provisional governor. But the President sustained me in all that I had done, and ordered the military authorities not to interfere with my policy of reconstruction. Like a wise statesman and patriot, he confides in the people, desires to see them enjoying civil liberty and governing themselves. Washington had the immortal honor of creating the American Republic, and to Andrew Johnson will be assigned, in history, the glory of having reconstructed its broken and dismembered fragments, without marring its civil beauties. Like Washington, too, he is, by his just, wise, and magnanimous policy, uniting and consolidating all parties in the support of his administration.

The State Convention assembled, and, after a most harmonious session of fifteen days, presented a new constitution for the future government of South Carolina. This constitution is more popular and democratic in all of its features than the old one adopted in 1790. The parish system of representation in the Senate, which had become, by the growth of the upper country in wealth and population, unequal and unjust, allowing one judicial district to have ten senators, and others of equal extent in territory but one, was abolished, and all were assigned an equal representation in the Senate. The just, equal, and conservative basis of representation in the House, founded on white population and taxation, was retained. The unequal classification of lands has been changed, and taxes are now to be levied in proportion to the assessed value of all taxable property. A moderate poll-tax is provided for, which will cause all to contribute something towards the support of the government under which they live and are protected. The property qualification of members of the Senate and House of Representatives, which seemed to presume that a man's patriotism depended on his wealth, has been dispensed with. The members of the Legislature are required to vote *viva voce* in all elections, so that their constituents may know for whom they voted. The chief magistrate of the State is to be elected

by the people for four years, and has a qualified veto on the legislation of the two houses. * * * * *

The emancipation of our slaves will, in all probability, abstract greatly from the active labor of the country. Planters and farmers should dispose of a portion of their lands to immigrants and capitalists from Europe and the North. This will increase the wealth and industry of the State, and render more valuable the lands which remain unsold. It will also have a wholesome check on the colored population, and strengthen our security from insurrections and violence. Three-fourths of the State of South Carolina are uncultivated. Instead of a population of seven hundred thousand, our territory is sufficient to support one of seven millions, if properly distributed in manufactures, commerce, and agriculture.

It becomes your urgent duty, gentlemen, to make immediate provision for the protection and government of the freedmen and colored people who have been so suddenly released from slavery in their ignorance and destitution. This is alike due to humanity and justice, as well as the imperative necessities of society. The negro has lost the protection of his master, and he must now be protected by the law. This is expected of you by the President and the Federal Congress, and will remove all pretence for military rule in the State, as well as facilitate your speedy restoration to the Union and self-government. The negro is innocent of all that he has gained, and all that you have lost, and he is entitled to your sympathy and kindness, your protection and guidance. The Convention ordered the provisional-governor to appoint a commission for the purpose of preparing and submitting to the Legislature for their adoption a code of laws for the protection and government of the freedmen and colored persons. In obedience to their order, I have appointed Judge Wardlaw and Mr. Burt, two of the most eminent jurists in the State, to compose this commission. They will, in due time, report to you the result of their labors. The Convention also authorized the Legislature to establish a court in each district, for the trial of all cases in which freedmen are concerned. It becomes your duty to see that these courts are organized. * * * * *

The election of members of Congress should be provided for at as early a day as possible. It is a matter of the highest im-

portance, that our representatives in Congress should be in Washington, ready to take their seats on the first Monday in December. By act of Congress, passed March, 1863, it is made the duty of the clerk of the previous House of Representatives to "make a roll of the representatives elect, and place thereon the names of all persons—and such persons only—whose credentials show that they were regularly elected, in accordance with the laws of their States respectively, or the laws of the United States." It is therefore the imperative duty of the clerk to call the roll of the members of the Southern States, whose credentials have been exhibited to him, and shown that they were regularly elected. He has no more right, under this act, to exclude the members elect from South Carolina than he has to exclude those from Massachusetts. The Federal authorities have maintained that the Union never was dissolved, and that the Southern States have always been, and still are, members of that Union. In July, 1862, Congress passed an act prescribing an oath of office for all persons to take who were elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit under the Government of the United States. This oath requires the party to swear that he has never borne arms against the United States; that he has never held or sought office under any power inimical to the United States; that he has given no aid, counsel, or countenance to persons in hostility to the United States; and that he has not yielded a voluntary support to any authority hostile to the United States. If this oath is to be applied to members of Congress, it will, of course, exclude all from South Carolina. It may, with truth, be said, that no man in South Carolina can take it, without committing perjury. But the constitution of the United States prescribes an oath for members of Congress to take, and they cannot be required to take any other oath constitutionally. There may have been some show of propriety for exacting this oath, when it was enacted, amidst the war between the Southern States and the United States; but there can be none now, unless it be for the purpose of excluding the Southern people from all office within their respective States, and still holding those States in military subjection. I know that this is not the policy of the President, and I cannot believe that it will be the avowed policy of the Federal Con-

gress. If the Southern members are present when the roll is called by States, they will take a part in the organization of the House, and may vote against the oath being tendered to the members when they are sworn.

The Convention divided the State into four congressional districts, which you will respect and recognize as election districts. It will be your duty, also, at some convenient and proper time, during your extra session, to elect two United States Senators to represent the State of South Carolina in the Senate of the United States. There are now two vacancies in that body from South Carolina. * * *

The subject of finance is one of great embarrassment and serious difficulty at this time in South Carolina, and will require great wisdom and sagacity in your legislation. The people are in a most destitute condition, without money and without the means of paying their taxes. Their gold and silver were exported during the war as a species of commerce. The State banks are all broken, and their bills have ceased to circulate. The Confederate money, with which the country was inundated, is utterly worthless. The Federal currency is inaccessible to our people. Their cotton has been destroyed, and their provisions consumed by the armies, and they have nothing to procure money with. Under these circumstances, it would be well for you to consider whether or not it is possible to defray the necessary expenses of the State by issuing and selling State bonds, so as to avoid levying any tax during the ensuing year. The present indebtedness of the State is not large, and her credit ought to be such as to secure the sale of her bonds at fair prices. If you conclude to raise money in this way, you ought to include the payment of the direct tax, and which South Carolina now owes the United States, and which her citizens will soon be called upon to pay.

It is important that the courts of justice in this State should be once more fully opened, civil law restored and properly administered. This cannot be done till you fill the several vacancies on the bench. You will have to elect a chief-justice of the State, two law judges, and one chancellor.

The reorganization of the militia is a measure of the highest importance under existing circumstances. I have received information from the Secretary of State at Washington that, as

soon as our State government is organized, all the Federal troops would be withdrawn from South Carolina. We must then rely on the militia for the protection of the State against insurrection and domestic violence. It is a matter of serious consideration, however, whether we should not desire to retain, for the present, a portion of the Federal troops in the State. The freedmen and colored people look to these troops as their friends and protectors, and would be much less likely to have any collision with them than with the militia. The colored garrisons which were at one time stationed throughout the country, have done infinite mischief, by inducing the negroes to believe that all the lands of their former owners were to be divided out among them. This has made them discontented and unwilling to make contracts for the ensuing year. In many portions of the State there are serious apprehensions of disturbance at the beginning of the next year. Strong garrisons ought to be continued in Charleston, Beaufort, and Georgetown, where there is such a preponderance of the negro population. But these garrisons should not be permitted to exercise any civil jurisdiction, and should be subordinate to civil law. Otherwise their presence would be productive of more mischief than good. You will take such action in this matter as in your judgment shall seem best for the State.

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As soon as the Convention adjourned, I communicated to the President and Secretary of State copies of the new constitution of South Carolina. I have the pleasure of informing you that President Johnson has expressed to me his gratification at the amendments made in our constitution, and his confident hope that we should soon be, once more, "a united, happy, and prosperous people, forgetting the past, and looking only to the future welfare of our common country."

The bank of the State, like all similar institutions, is in a most embarrassed and crippled condition by the loss of its advancements to the late Confederate States. I have not had the pleasure of seeing the report of the President. This document will be submitted to you in proper time, and then you will be able to take such action in reference to the bank as its condition requires. Whatever may be the state of our finances, I am sure South Carolina will never sully her honor

by any act of repudiation. If we have lost every thing else, let us on that account be more careful in maintaining the honor of the State.

In conclusion, I would urge you, gentlemen, to look only to the future in your legislation, and forget, so far as you can, the past. There is much to hope and live for yet in South Carolina. We should congratulate ourselves and the country that civil war has ceased, and peace is restored to the land. No longer are our citizens to be forced from their homes and families and offered a bloody sacrifice on the field of battle. No longer is our beloved State to be ravaged and desolated, and our towns and villages committed to the flames. A merciful Providence has once more blessed our land with an abundant crop, and no longer have we any apprehensions of want and starvation. We are in the enjoyment of health. Our young men, noble and gallant soldiers, are peaceably resuming their former vocations, and exerting themselves in restoring the State to her wonted prosperity and happiness. No civil broils or deadly feuds are disgracing our people as in other States. We have no political divisions. South Carolina presented a unit after her act of secession, and she is now united as one man in returning to the Union, and will be as true and loyal to her plighted faith as any State north of Mason and Dixon's line. In this respect there is no difference between former secessionists and old Union men. They all have equally at heart the peace, honor, glory, and prosperity of the American republic. And I earnestly pray that all your legislation and deliberations may tend to this great purpose, under the guidance and protection of Almighty God.

B. F. PERRY.

THE LAST SIX DAYS OF THE CONFEDERACY.

It is said by Coleridge, that no man thrown to the surface of human affairs ever succeeded in simultaneously gaining distinction and affection, unless he possessed something of an epicene nature—that is to say, a mixture of masculine and feminine qualities. Without claiming for General Lee, in the highest sense, the title of “great,” it is impossible to

deny that his memory will be cherished by those who, in the crisis of his three years of trial, stood and suffered by his side, as an exceptionally dear and precious possession. Few soldiers, if asked whether they would rather have served under Lee, on the one hand, or under Cromwell, Frederic the Great, Marlborough, or Napoleon, on the other, would hesitate to prefer the four famous generals to the discomfited Confederate. Yet it is doubtful whether any of the four, after they had passed away, and had ceased to communicate the electric shock of their presence and contact—of eye, voice, character, and influence—to others, possessed such hold on the affections and esteem as were inspired by Robert E. Lee.

The truth seems to be, that the greatest men *de par le monde* are necessarily and intensely selfish. All great men are monsters, says a German proverb; and it may, I think, be conceded, that when a man is playing a conspicuous rôle in life, and is generally loved, he is not, in the world's highest sense, great. He is probably something far better. He has the thoughtfulness about others, the unobtrusiveness and renunciation of self, the truthfulness, purity, modesty, charity, guilelessness, which cannot long be unnoticed by those around him, and which lay firm hold upon their hearts. But to be great, to fill a very large space in the world's eye, during a man's few brief years upon earth, he must throw modesty and unobtrusiveness overboard; he must be grasping, aggressive, discreetly greedy of praise, covetous of a large share of honor, judiciously envious; he must know how to undermine troublesome rivals without being found out, and to help useful friends without being supplanted. Heartily agreeing with Coleridge, that where distinction and affection have been won coincidentally, there must be the epicene element in their winner, I venture to doubt, whether man's affection is ever won by the greatest; or, in other words, whether in the greatest any of the woman is to be found. It is the nature of man to love woman; and thus if A., being a man, love B., who is also man, it has always seemed to me, that in proportion to the womanly qualities of B. (wisely interspersed, of course, with the best manly qualities) will be the love which A. bears him. The upright, earnest, energetic men, in whom there is little or no womanliness—such men as the incomparably drawn character

of Tom, in "The Mill on the Floss"—win confidence, admiration, esteem; but from their brother-man they win little love. Be this as it may, that there was a large streak of the woman both in Washington and Lee admits of no doubt. The men who are brave from tenderness, are braver than the men who are brave from pride. But the men who, to encourage or spare others, are gratuitously brave, are not selfish enough to be great. The calm judgment of posterity, especially if assisted by the pen of Mr. Carlisle (who is said to hold that Washington stands too high, and who, if I am rightly informed, contemplates lowering his pedestal), will, I think, reverse the verdict of Mr. Everett's well-known lecture, and will pronounce that Washington was not greater than Peter, or Frederic, or Marlborough, as Mr. Everett contends, but was simply more estimable.

The exceeding lovableness of Lee became more patent as your consciousness that, as a politician, he lacked vigor and self-assertion became more irresistible. This lovableness was based on a never-tiring unselfishness, a contagious endurance of hardship and danger, a shrinking modesty, an unbounded tenderness. The child and the young girl, who had never seen him before, ran to him instinctively, as to a friend. His look spoke of honesty, directness, kindness, courage—his smile was irresistibly winning. But the stuff which made Cromwell, Napoleon, William the Silent, greater as politicians than as soldiers, was lacking in Lee. All that there was of true and brave in the people whom he so nearly made into a nation, called on him, by signs that he who ran might have read, to put Congress aside, to control the press, to be Dictator, indeed; and yet he would not! Nevertheless, in the belief that there is no more powerful stimulant to a noble ambition than the study of such a character as Lee's, I desire to throw my stone upon the cairn by gathering together a few notes, for the general accuracy of which I can entirely vouch, exhibiting the main features of those eventful six days which intervened between the evacuation of the Confederate lines around Petersburg and Richmond, on the night of April 2d, and the surrender of Lee's army, on the morning of April 9th.

In order rightly to understand these six days, it should be premised that the Federal cavalry, massed under General

Sheridan, numbering about fifteen thousand sabres, splendidly equipped, and converted by their able commander into a body of military horsemen upon whom an Austrian or French *sabreur* might have looked without disdain, moved southwards down the valley of Virginia between the 1st and 10th of March, and encountered a scratch Confederate army, of about three thousand men under General Early, at Waynesboro'. General Early, distrustful of his men, who were equally distrustful of him, planted them with their backs to a deep river, in order to make retreat impossible. The result is easily foreseen. General Sheridan bagged two-thirds of his enemy's force, and most of his enemy's artillery. In the previous summer I remember that, as General Early kept losing gun after gun, great efforts were made to resupply his losses by sending up fresh guns from Richmond. Upon one of these guns some wag of a Confederate soldier had chalked, "General Sheridan, care of General Early." The transfer was probably effected at Waynesboro'. Sweeping rapidly onwards towards the James River, between Richmond and Lynchburg, Sheridan found himself confronted by a swollen and impassable stream. He fell back, rounded the left wing of Lee's army, crossed the Pamunkey River at the White House (where he recruited his strength by picking up twelve hundred fresh horses which awaited him there), and upon the 25th of March joined General Grant in the lines before Petersburg. To Sheridan's untiring and sagacious activity in the subsequent operations, more than to the agency of any other man, is due the completeness of the Federal triumph—the seemingly inexplicable collapse of the Confederacy.

It was not long before Grant's accession of strength was felt by Lee. Upon the evening of Saturday, April 1st, General Longstreet, who had long defended Richmond, by commanding the Confederate forces to the north of James River, received information from Lee that Grant had detached Sheridan's cavalry and two corps of infantry (about twenty-five thousand men in all) to act against the Southside Railroad. Before communicating with Longstreet, Lee had dispatched Pickett's and Bushrod Johnson's divisions, Wise's and Ransom's brigades, Huger's battalion of artillery, and Fitzhugh Lee's division of cavalry (in all about seventeen thousand men),

to meet the attack with which the Southside Railroad was menaced. But in sending away these seventeen thousand men, Lee had so weakened his lines before Petersburg, that there was but one Confederate left to every fifty yards. Under these circumstances, Lee called upon Longstreet for men. But at dawn, upon the 2d of April, before Longstreet had had time to obey Lee's orders, Grant descried from his wooden tower of observation the weakness of the Confederate lines. Immediately he threw a very heavy column, consisting, I believe, chiefly of Gibbon's corps, upon the weakest spot. The Federals carried, with very slight loss, the outer line, thinly held by Heth's division of Confederates, and bulged inwards until they struck two of the detached forts, whereof a string or system ran behind the whole length of the Confederate outer works. These two detached forts, which were of course designed to cover each other, were named Forts Gregg and Alexander. The officer in command of Fort Alexander, which was furthest away from the on-coming Federals, deemed it more important to save his guns than to try and help Fort Gregg. Receiving no assistance from its twin brother, Fort Gregg, manned by Harris's Mississippi brigade, numbering two hundred and fifty undaunted men, breasted intrepidly the tide of its multitudinous assailants. Five times Gibbon's corps surged up and around the work—five times, with dreadful carnage, they were driven back. I am told that it was subsequently admitted by General Gibbon, that in carrying Fort Gregg he lost from five hundred to six hundred men; or in other words, that each Mississippian inside the works struck down at least two assailants. When at last the work was carried, there remained out of its two hundred and fifty defenders but thirty survivors. In those nine memorable April days there was no episode more glorious to the Confederate arms than the heroic self-immolation of the Mississippians in Fort Gregg to gain time for their comrades.

Fort Gregg fell about seven o'clock in the morning of the 2d. After a delay of two or three hours, the Federals swept onwards in the direction of Petersburg, taking the Confederate lines *en revers*. At this moment, Longstreet, accompanied by Benning's brigade of Field's division, about one hundred and seventy bayonets strong, met the on-pouring flood, and checked

it long enough to enable fresh troops to hurry up in his rear, and to form a fresh line in front of Petersburg. Simultaneously, in an attempt of Heth's division to re-establish their lines, General A. P. Hill (who commanded the corps to which Heth's division belonged) lost a life which for nearly four years he had unflinchingly exposed in a hundred of his country's battles. About the same moment was dispatched the memorable telegram which surprised President Davis in church, and announced that the last day of that heroic resistance which had made Richmond the most notable of beleaguered cities had at length arrived. The delay purchased by the obstinate defence of Fort Gregg, and by Longstreet's bold handling of Benning's brigade, saved Petersburg until the tobacco and cotton stored in the filthy little town could be burnt, and until leisurely preparation for its evacuation could be made. It is remarkable that no further onslaught was made by the Federals throughout the day or during the evening, although the flames springing up in many parts of the town must have told their own tale. At nightfall, on the 2d, all the Confederate troops, about four thousand strong, which remained under the command of General Ewell, to the north of James River, fell back from their lines, and passed through the bewildered streets of Richmond, traversing before daybreak the bridges over the James River, which were so soon to be given to the flames, and pushing in the direction of Amelia Court-house.

About ten, on the night of the same 2d, the Confederate troops also commenced leaving Petersburg, their retreat being covered by Field's division under Longstreet. Pursuit there was none. It is probable that already Grant was bending all his energies to get round, and cut off Lee's retreat. The Petersburg section of the Confederate troops, full of vigor and *elan*, crossed to the north of the Appomattox River on a pontoon bridge four or five miles from Petersburg, and made sixteen miles during their first night of retreat. It would be difficult to conceive any thing brighter or more hopeful than the tone of General Lee's spirits on the morning of the 3d. "I have got my army safe out of its breastworks," he said, "and, in order to follow me, my enemy must abandon his lines, and can derive no further benefit from his railroads, or the James River." There can be little doubt that Lee's design

was to recruit his army with rations, which he hoped to find in abundance at Amelia Court-house, and to fall in detail upon the Federals, who, breaking up into bodies of one or two army corps, were scattering all over the country with a view to a vigorous pursuit. Two days' rations at Amelia Court-house for forty thousand men would possibly have made a great difference in the immediate, though, as I believe, none in the ultimate, history of the continent of North America.

There is little satisfaction in dwelling in detail upon the five subsequent days, for which a parallel must be sought on the banks of the Beresina, or in other similar passages of military anguish. It is hardly necessary to state, that at Amelia Court-house Lee found not a ration. I shall not pause now to distribute blame, or to investigate who was at fault. All that I have to state is, that the fault was not Lee's, whose orders on this subject, for a fortnight past, had been urgent and precise. It became necessary for Lee to break nearly half his army up into foraging parties, to get food. The country through which he was passing was a tract of straggling woods and pine barrens, with occasional little patches of clearings. The foraging parties had to go so far a-field in quest of food that they were taken prisoners by wholesale. In the face of such suffering as they left behind, it cannot be wondered if some of the poor fellows courted capture. Those foragers who returned to Lee brought little or nothing with them. The suffering of the men from the pangs of hunger has not been approached in the military annals of the last fifty years. But the suffering of the mules and horses must have been even keener; for the men assuaged their craving by plucking the buds and twigs of trees just shooting in the early spring, whereas the grass had not yet started from its winter sleep, and food for the unhappy quadrupeds there was none. As early as the morning of the 4th, Lee sent off half his artillery towards the railroad, to relieve the famished horses. This artillery making slow progress, thanks to the exhaustion of the horses, was captured by the Federals on the 8th, but not until Colonel Lindsay Walker had buried many of his guns, which were of course subsequently exhumed (seventy of them at one haul) by their captors.

It is easy to see that the locomotion of an army in such a

plight must have been slow and slower. The retreat was conducted in the following fashion: About midnight the Confederates slipped out of the hasty fieldworks which they had thrown up and held during the previous day, and fell back until ten or eleven o'clock the next morning. They then halted, and immediately threw up earthworks for protection during the day. It was not long before the wolves were again on their heels, and from their earthworks the Confederates exchanged a heavy fire with their pursuers throughout the day. Delayed by the necessity of guarding an ammunition train of from thirty-five to forty miles in length, enfeebled by hunger and sleeplessness, the retreating army was able to make only ten miles each night. This delay enabled the active Sheridan to get ahead with his cavalry, and to destroy the depots of provisions along the railroad between Burksville (fifty miles South of Richmond) and Danville. Upon the 5th, many of the mules and horses ceased to struggle. It became necessary to burn hundreds of wagons. At intervals the enemy's cavalry dashed in and struck the interminable ammunition train here or there, capturing and burning dozens upon dozens of wagons. Towards evening of the 5th, and all day long upon the 6th, hundreds of men dropped from exhaustion, and thousands let fall their muskets from inability to carry them any further. The scenes of the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th were of a nature which can be apprehended in its vivid reality only by men who are thoroughly familiar with the harrowing details of war. Behind and on either flank a ubiquitous and increasingly adventurous enemy—every mud-hole and every rise in the road choked with blazing wagons—the air filled with the deafening reports of ammunition exploding, and shells bursting when touched by the flames—dense columns of smoke ascending to heaven from the burning and exploding vehicles—exhausted men, worn-out mules and horses, lying down side by side—gaunt famine glaring hopelessly from sunken, lack-lustre eyes—dead mules, dead horses, dead men everywhere—death, many times welcomed as God's blessing in disguise—who can wonder if many hearts, tried in the fiery furnace of four unparalleled years, and never hitherto found wanting, should have quailed in presence of starvation, fatigue, sleeplessness, misery, unintermitted for five or six days, and culminating in hopelessness?

Yet there were not wanting occasional episodes which recalled something of the old pride of former memories, and reminded men that this hunted, famishing crowd was still the same army which had won two Bull Runs, which had twice (in pursuit of a fatal policy) trodden its enemy's soil, and had written Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and a dozen other glorious names upon its banners. On the 6th, a large body of Federal cavalry, having got ahead of Lee's army, and occupied Rice's station, was attacked by some Confederate horse, under General Rosser, who drove them off, capturing six hundred and eighty prisoners. On the 7th, a heavy attack was made upon Mahone's division; and the prowess of this active Confederate general, so frequently exhibited during the last twelve months of the war, was maintained to the end, inasmuch as a Federal brigade, getting entangled in a ravine, was surrounded by Mahone's men, and literally disappeared. On the evening of the 7th, General Gregg, with six or seven thousand Federal cavalry, made a desperate effort to capture all the wagon-trains. He was gallantly met by two thousand horsemen, under Fitzhugh Lee, and defeated. Gregg himself was captured. Throughout these gloomy days, as an offset to the countless Confederates captured, while foraging, by the Federals, numerous Federal prisoners were taken by the Confederates, and became participants of a hunger and suffering of which they had no previous conception. I may as well mention now, that as the surrender became more inevitable, Generals Fitzhugh Lee and Rosser, with about two thousand Confederate cavalry, tacitly determined not to be included in it, and started off towards Lynchburg. On their road, they fell in with a Federal supply-train, and burned eight hundred and sixty wagons. The scanty and partial rations which, after the surrender, were issued on the night of the 9th to the starving Confederates by their captors, were apologized for by the Federals, on the ground of the destruction of these eight hundred and sixty wagons by Fitzhugh Lee.

The reader will have gathered, that when Lee found his depots along the Danville road destroyed by Sheridan, he had no alternative but to make for Lynchburg. He still hoped to get rations, and to turn suddenly upon Grant, whose army was dispersed into many columns. The fatigue of the pursuit,

though unaggravated by famine, was beginning to tell upon the pursuers. But, in pressing for Lynchburg, Lee found himself in a dangerous predicament. He was on a strip of land not more than seven or eight miles broad, between the James and Appomattox rivers. On the afternoon of the 7th, Lee's situation seemed so unpromising, that Grant, for the first time, sent to propose surrender. Lee at once replied that his circumstances did not seem to him such as to justify his entertaining such a proposal. On the morning of the 8th, Grant renewed his solicitations. Lee did not decline, but debated the matter, calling a council of war in the evening. No determination was arrived at on the 8th, and at midnight, the usual dreary retreat was resumed. The springs of energy and will, unstrung by long want of food, had run down in the men, like the machinery of a broken clock. Hitherto, the retreat had been covered alternately by Longstreet and Gordon; but now, the Federal force, which had got ahead of Lee, and was obstructing his retreat, had become so considerable, that Gordon was thrown out with two thousand men in front, while the "old bull-dog," Longstreet, whose pluck neither hunger, nor fatigue, nor depression could abate or subdue, still covered the rear. At daybreak, on the 9th, a courier from Gordon announced to Lee, that a large body of Federal cavalry (in other words, Sheridan's army) was across the road at Appomattox Court-house. At the same moment, a heavy force of infantry, under Grant, was pushing Longstreet vigorously in the rear. Between Gordon and Longstreet were the remaining wagons, and, clinging to them, thousands of unarmed and famished stragglers, too weak to carry their muskets. Lee sent orders to Gordon to cut his way through, *coute qu'il coute*. Presently came another courier from Gordon, announcing that the enemy was driving him back. Lee had, at this moment, less than eight thousand men with muskets in their hands. The fatal moment had indisputably come. Hastily donning his best uniform, and buckling on his sword, which it was never his fashion to wear, General Lee turned sadly to the rear, to seek the final interview with General Grant.

There is no passage of history in this heart-breaking war which will, for years to come, be more honorably mentioned and gratefully remembered than the demeanor, on the 9th of

April, 1865, of General Grant towards General Lee. I do not so much allude to the facility with which honorable terms were accorded to the Confederates, as to the bearing of General Grant, and of the officers about him, towards General Lee. The interview was brief. Three commissioners, upon either side, were immediately appointed. The agreement to which these six commissioners acceded was as follows :

“ APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, VA., April 10, 1865.

“ Agreement entered into this day, in regard to the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia to the United States authorities.

“ First. The troops shall march by brigades and detachments to a designated point ; stack their arms, deposit their flags, sabres, pistols, etc., and from thence march to their homes, under charge of their officers, superintended by their respective division and corps commanders, officers retaining their side-arms and the authorized number of private horses.

“ Second. All public horses, and public property of all kinds, to be turned over to staff-officers, to be designated by the United States authorities.

“ Third. Such transportation as may be agreed upon as necessary for the transportation of the private baggage of officers will be allowed to accompany the officers, to be turned over, at the end of the trip, to the nearest United States quartermaster, receipts being taken for the same.

“ Fourth. Couriers and mounted men of the artillery and cavalry, whose horses are their own private property, will be allowed to retain them.

“ Fifth. The surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia shall be construed to include all the forces operating with that army on the 8th instant, the date of the commencement of the negotiations for surrender, except such bodies of cavalry as actually made their escape previous to the surrender, and except, also, such pieces of artillery as were more than twenty miles from Appomattox Court-house at the time of surrender on the 9th instant.

“(Signed) JOHN GIBBON, Major-General Volunteers.

CHARLES GRIFFIN, Brevet Major-General U. S. Vols.

W. MERRITT, Brevet Major-General.

J. LONGSTREET, Lieutenant-General.

J. B. GIBBON, Major-General.

W. N. PENDLETON, Brig.-Gen. and Chief of Artillery.”

In the mean time, immediately that General Lee was seen riding to the rear, dressed more gayly than usual, and begirt with his sword, the rumor of imminent surrender flew like wildfire through the Confederates. It might be imagined, that an army which had drawn its last regular rations on the 1st of April, and harassed incessantly by night and day, had been marching and fighting until the morning of the 9th, would have welcomed any thing like a termination of its suffer-

ings, let it come in what form it might. Let those who idly imagine that the finer feelings are the prerogative of what are called the "upper classes," learn from this, and similar scenes, to appreciate "common men." As the great Confederate captain rode back from his interview with General Grant, the news of the surrender acquired shape and consistency, and could no longer be denied. The effect on the worn and battered troops—some of whom had fought since April, 1861, and (sparse survivors of hecatombs of fallen comrades) had passed unscathed through such hurricanes of shot as, within four years, no other men had ever experienced—passes mortal description. Whole lines of battle rushed up to their beloved old chief, and, choking with emotion, broke ranks and struggled with each other to wring him once more by the hand. Men who had fought throughout the war, and knew what the agony and humiliation of that moment must be to him, strove, with a refinement of unselfishness and tenderness which he alone could fully appreciate, to lighten his burden and mitigate his pain. With tears pouring down both cheeks, General Lee at length commanded voice enough to say: "Men, we have fought through the war together. I have done the best that I could for you." Not an eye that looked on that scene was dry. Nor was this the emotion of sickly sentimentalists, but of rough and rugged men, familiar with hardship, danger, and death in a thousand shapes, mastered by sympathy and feeling for another, which they had never experienced on their own account. I know of no other passage of military history so touching, unless, in spite of the melodramatic coloring which French historians have loved to shed over the scene, it can be found in the *Adieux de Fontainebleau*.

It remains for me briefly to notice the last parade of an army whereof the exploits will be read with pride, so long as the English tongue is spoken. In pursuance of an arrangement of the six commissioners, the Confederate army marched by divisions, on the morning of April the 12th, to a spot in the neighborhood of Appomattox Court-house, where they stacked arms and deposited accoutrements. Upon this solemn occasion, Major-General Gibbon represented the United States authorities. With the same conspicuous and exalted delicacy which he had exhibited throughout these closing scenes, Gen-

eral Grant was not again visible after his final interview with General Lee. About seven thousand eight hundred Confederates marched up, with muskets in their hands, and they were followed by about eighteen thousand unarmed stragglers, who claimed to be included in the capitulation. Each Confederate soldier was furnished with a printed form of parol, which was filled up for him by his own officers, and a duplicate handed to a designated Federal officer. By the evening of the 12th, the paroles were generally distributed, and the disbanded men began to scatter through the country. Hardly one of them had a farthing of money. Some of them had from one thousand five hundred to two thousand miles to travel, over a country of which the scanty railroads were utterly annihilated. Many an interesting diary of the adventures of these individuals, as they journeyed from Eastern Virginia to Western Texas, or possibly to Mexico, may well have been written. It is to be hoped that one or two such narratives will yet be given to the world.

Shortly after noon, on the 12th, General Lee, escorted by a guard of honor of Federal cavalry, mounted his horse, as a soldier for the last time, and started for the city of Richmond. On his road, he arrived about evening at the headquarters of his "old war-horse," General Longstreet; and the last and saddest of their many interviews took place. There are scenes which are too sacred and affecting for description, even though the pen were guided by a Macaulay or a Hoffmann. If ever there were two genuine, simple-minded men upon earth, to whom any thing melodramatic or theatrical is utterly abhorrent, they are the men of whom I am now writing. I close this brief chronicle with the remark that, in proportion to the reader's estimate of the sustained heroism with which Lee and Longstreet, for four years, bore up and stood erect under such a burden as never yet was laid upon man, will be his appreciation of the circumstances and emotions under which their parting interview took place.

OFFICIAL REPORTS.

REPORT OF GENERAL LONGSTREET.

HEADQUARTERS NEAR WINCHESTER, VA., Oct. 10, 1862.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. H. CHILTON,

Adjutant and Inspector-General:

GENERAL—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command in the late campaign:

In obedience to the orders of the commanding general, the command marched from Gordonsville on the 16th August, crossing the Rapidan on the 20th, at Raccoon Ford.

The next day, at Kelly's Ford, I received orders to move up the Rappahannock to Rappahannock Station. As we were withdrawing from Kelly's Ford, the enemy crossed the river and made an attack upon the rear brigade (Featherston's) under the command of Colonel Posey. After a sharp skirmish, Colonel Posey drove him back with considerable loss.

Arriving at Rappahannock Station, General Hood, with his own and Whiting's brigade, was detached to relieve a portion of General Jackson's command at Freeman's Ford. About the moment that General Hood reached this ford, the enemy crossed in considerable force, and made an attack upon the commands of Brigadier-Generals Trimble and Hood. They, however, drove him back across the river in much confusion and with heavy loss. Meanwhile, I had ordered Colonel Walton to place his batteries in position at Rappahannock Station, and to drive the enemy from his positions on both sides of the river.

The batteries were opened at sunrise on the 23d, and a severe cannonade continued for several hours. In about two hours, however, the enemy was driven across the river, aban-

doning his *tête-de-pont*. The brigades of Brigadier-Generals Evans and D. R. Jones, the latter under Colonel G. T. Anderson, moved forward to occupy this position. It was found untenable, however, being exposed to a cross-fire of artillery from the other bank. The troops were, therefore, partially withdrawn, and Colonel S. D. Lee was ordered to select positions for his batteries, and joined in the combat. The enemy's position was soon rendered too warm for him, and he took advantage of a severe rain-storm to retreat in haste, after firing the bridge and the private dwellings in its vicinity. Colonel Walton deserves much credit for skill in the management of his batteries, and Colonel Lee got into position in time for some good practice.

The next day, August 24th, the command, continuing the march up the Rappahannock, crossed Hazel River, and bivouacked at Jeffersonton.

On the 25th we relieved a portion of General Jackson's command at Waterloo Bridge. There was more or less skirmishing at this point until the afternoon of the 26th, when the march was resumed, crossing the Rappahannock at Hinson's Mill Ford, six miles above Waterloo. A dash of several squadrons of Federal cavalry into Salem, in front of us, on the 27th, delayed our march about an hour. Not having cavalry, I was unable to ascertain the meaning of this movement, hence the delay. This cavalry retired, and the march was resumed, resting for the night at White Plains. The head of my column reached Thoroughfare Gap about three o'clock P. M. On the 28th a small party of infantry was sent into the mountains to reconnoitre. Passing through the Gap, Colonel Beck, of the Ninth Georgia regiment, met the enemy; but was obliged to retire before a greatly superior force. The enemy held a strong position on the opposite gorge, and succeeded in getting his sharp-shooters in position on the mountain. Brigadier-General D. R. Jones advanced two of his brigades rapidly, and soon drove the enemy from his position on the mountain. Brigadier-General Hood, with his own and General Whiting's brigade, was ordered, by a footpath over the mountain, to turn the enemy's right; and Brigadier-General Wilcox, with his own and Brigadier-Generals Featherston's and Pryor's brigades, was ordered through Hopewell

Gap, three miles to our left, to turn the right and attack the enemy in rear. The enemy made his attack upon Jones, however, before these troops could get into their position, and, after being repulsed with severe loss, commenced his retreat just before night. In this affair, the conduct of the First Georgia regulars, under Major Walker, was dashing and gallant.

Early on the 29th the columns were united, and the advance, to join General Jackson, was resumed. The noise of battle was heard before we reached Gainesville. The march was quickened to the extent of our capacity. The excitement of battle seemed to give new life and strength to our jaded men, and the head of my column soon reached a position in rear of the enemy's left flank, and within easy cannon-shot. On approaching the field, some of Brigadier-General Hood's batteries were ordered into position, and his division was deployed on the right and left of the turnpike, at right-angles with it, and supported by Brigadier-General Evans' brigade. Before these batteries could open, the enemy discovered our movements and withdrew his left. Another battery (Captain Stribling's) was placed upon a commanding position to my right, which played upon the rear of the enemy's left, and drove him entirely from that part of the field. He changed his front rapidly, so as to meet the advance of Hood and Evans.

Three brigades, under General Wilcox, were thrown forward to the support of the left, and three others, under General Kemper, to the support of the right of these commands. General D. R. Jones' division was placed upon the Manassas Gap Railroad, to the right and in echelon with regard to the three last brigades. Colonel Walton placed his batteries in a commanding position between my line and that of General Jackson, and engaged the enemy for several hours in a severe and successful artillery duel. At a late hour in the day, Major-General Stuart reported the approach of the enemy in heavy columns against my extreme right. I withdrew General Wilcox, with his three brigades, from the left, and placed his command in position to support Jones in case of an attack against my right. After some few shots, the enemy withdrew his forces, moving them around towards his front, and, about

four o'clock in the afternoon, began to press forward against General Jackson's position. Wilcox's brigades were moved back to their former position, and Hood's two brigades, supported by Evans, were quickly pressed forward to the attack. At the same time, Wilcox's three brigades made a like advance, as also Hunton's brigade, of Kemper's command.

These movements were executed with commendable zeal and ability. Hood, supported by Evans, made a gallant attack, driving the enemy back till nine o'clock at night. One piece of artillery, several regimental standards, and a number of prisoners were taken. The enemy's entire force was found to be massed directly in my front, and in so strong a position that it was not deemed advisable to move on against his immediate front; so the troops were quietly withdrawn at one o'clock the following morning. The wheels of the captured piece were cut down, and it was left on the ground. The enemy seized that opportunity to claim a victory, and the Federal commander was so impudent as to dispatch to his Government, by telegraph, tidings to that effect. After withdrawing from the attack, my troops were placed in the line first occupied, and in the original order.

During the day, Colonel S. D. Lee, with his reserve artillery, was placed in the position occupied the day previous by Colonel Walton, and engaged the enemy in a very severe artillery combat. The result was, as the day previous, a success. At half-past three o'clock in the afternoon, I rode to the front for the purpose of completing arrangements for making a diversion in favor of a flank movement, then under contemplation. Just after reaching my front line, I received a message for re-enforcements for General Jackson, who was said to be severely pressed. From an eminence near by, one portion of the enemy's masses attacking General Jackson were immediately within my view, and in easy range of batteries in that position. It gave me an advantage that I had not expected to have, and I made haste to use it. Two batteries were ordered for the purpose, and one placed in position immediately and opened. Just as this fire began, I received a message from the commanding general, informing me of General Jackson's condition and his wants. As it was evident that the attack against General Jackson could not be continued ten

minutes under the fire of these batteries, I made no movement with my troops. Before the second battery could be placed in position, the enemy began to retire, and, in less than ten minutes, the ranks were broken, and that portion of his army put to flight. A fair opportunity was offered me, and the intended diversion was changed into an attack. My whole line was rushed forward at a charge. The troops sprang to their work, and moved forward with all the steadiness and firmness that characterize war-worn veterans. The batteries continuing their play upon the confused masses, completed the work of this portion of the enemy's line, and my attack was, therefore, made against the forces in my front. The order for the advance had scarcely been given, when I received a message from the commanding general, anticipating some such emergency, and ordering the move which was then going on, at the same time offering me Major-General Anderson's division. The commanding general soon joined me, and, a few moments after, Major-General Anderson arrived with his division. The attack was led by Hood's brigade, closely supported by Evans. These were rapidly re-enforced by Anderson's division from the rear, Kemper's three brigades, and D. R. Jones' division from the right, and Wilcox's brigade from the left. The brigades of Brigadier-Generals Featherston and Pryor became detached, and operated with a portion of General Jackson's command. The attacking columns moved steadily forward, driving the enemy from his different positions as rapidly as he took them. My batteries were thrown forward from point to point, following the movements of the general line. These, however, were somewhat detained by an enfilade fire from a battery on my left. This threw more than its proper share of fighting upon the infantry, retarded our rapid progress, and enabled the enemy to escape with many of his batteries, which should have fallen into our hands. The battle continued until ten o'clock at night, when utter darkness put a stop to our progress. The enemy made his escape across Bull Run before daylight. Three batteries, a large number of prisoners, many stands of regimental colors, and twelve thousand stands of arms, besides some wagons, ambulances, etc., were taken.

The next day, like the day after the first battle of Manassas

Plains, was stormy and excessively disagreeable. Orders were given early in the day for caring for the wounded, burying the dead, and collecting arms and other supplies.

About noon, General Pryor, with his brigade, was thrown across Bull Run, to occupy the heights between that and Cub Run, and, at two o'clock in the afternoon, the balance of the command marched to cross Bull Run at Sudley Ford. Crossing the run on the following day, the command marched for Chantilly, via the Little River turnpike. The enemy was reported in position in our front, as we reached Chantilly, and he made an attack upon General Jackson before my troops arrived. He was repulsed, however, before my re-enforcements got up, and disappeared during the night.

On the 2d of September the command marched via Drainsville, Leesburg, and across the Potomac, at White's Ford, to Frederick City, Maryland, arriving there on the 7th. I moved from Frederick for Hagerstown on the 10th, and reached there, with part of my command, on the 11th, sending six brigades, under Major-General Anderson, to co-operate with Major-General McLaws in the assault upon Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry. During the operations against this garrison, the approach of a large army from Washington City for its relief was reported. We were obliged to make a forced march in order to reach Boonsboro' Pass to assist Major-General D. H. Hill's division in holding this army in check, so as to give time for the reduction of Harper's Ferry. I reached Boonsboro' about three o'clock in the afternoon, and, upon ascending the mountain, found General Hill heavily engaged. My troops were hurried to his assistance as rapidly as their exhausted condition would admit of. The brigades of Brigadier-General Evans, Pickett (under Garnett), Kemper, and Jenkins (under Colonel Walker), were extended along the mountain to our left. Brigadier-General Hood, with his own and Whiting's brigade (under Colonel Law), Drayton's, and D. R. Jones' (under Colonel G. T. Anderson), were extended to the right. Major-General Hill had already placed such batteries in position as he could find ground for, except one position on the extreme left. It was my intention to have placed a battery in this position, but I was so much occupied in front, that I could find no time to do so before nightfall.

We succeeded in repulsing the repeated and powerful attacks of the enemy, and in holding our position till night put an end to the battle. It was short, but very fierce. Some of our most gallant officers and men fell in this struggle, among them the brave Colonel J. B. Strange, of the Nineteenth Virginia regiment.

Had the command reached the mountain pass in time to have gotten into position before the attack was made, I believe that the direct assaults of the enemy could have been repulsed with comparative ease. Hurried into action, however, we arrived at our position more exhausted than the enemy. It became manifest that our forces were not sufficient to resist the renewed attacks of the entire army of General McClellan. He would require but little time to turn either flank, and our command must then be at his mercy. In view of this, the commanding general ordered the withdrawal of our troops to the village of Sharpsburg. This position was regarded as a strong defensive one, besides being one from which we could threaten the enemy's flank or rear, in case he should attempt to relieve the garrison at Harper's Ferry.

Crossing the Antietam, on the morning of the 15th, Major-General D. H. Hill's division and my own command were placed in line of battle between the stream and the village of Sharpsburg. Soon after getting into position, we heard of the surrender of Harper's Ferry. This left the portions of the army engaged in the reduction of that garrison free to join us. After much shelling at one point and another of our line, which extended more than a mile on each side of Sharpsburg, the enemy finally attacked General Hood, on my extreme left, late Tuesday evening, September 16th. Hood drove him back, but not without severe loss, including that of Colonel Liddell, of the Eleventh Mississippi, an officer of great merit, modesty, and promise. During the night, the enemy threw his forces across the Antietam, in front of Hood's position, and renewed his attack at daylight the next morning. Hood was not strong enough to resist the masses thrown against him. Several of Major-General D. H. Hill's brigades re-enforced the position, but, even with these, our forces seemed but a handful when compared with the hosts thrown against us. The commands engaged the enemy, however, with great courage and

determination, and, retiring very slowly, delayed him until the forces of Generals Jackson and Walker came to our relief. D. R. Jones' brigade, under Colonel G. T. Anderson, came up about the same moment, and, soon after this, the divisions of Major-Generals McLaws and R. H. Anderson. Colonel S. D. Lee's reserve artillery was with General Hood, and took a distinguished part in the attack, on the evening of the 16th, and in delaying that of the 17th. General Jackson soon moved off to our left, for the purpose of turning the enemy's right flank, and the other divisions, except Walker's, were distributed at other points of the line. As these movements were made, the enemy again threw forward his masses against my left. This attack was met by Walker's division, two pieces of Captain Miller's battery of the Washington Artillery, and two pieces of Captain Bryce's battery, and was driven back in some confusion. An effort was made to pursue, but our line was too weak. Colonel Cooke, of the Twenty-seventh North Carolina, very gallantly charged with his own regiment; but, his supply of ammunition being exhausted, and he being unsupported, he was obliged to return to his original position in the line.

From this moment our centre was extremely weak, being defended by but part of Walker's division, and four pieces of artillery, Cooke's regiment of that division being without a cartridge. In this condition, again the enemy's masses moved forward against us. Cooke stood with his empty guns, and waved his colors to show that his troops were in position. The artillery played upon their ranks with canister. Their lines began to hesitate, soon halted, and, after an hour and a half, retired.

Another attack was quickly made, a little to the right of the last. Captain Miller, turning his pieces upon these lines, and playing upon them with round shot (over the heads of R. H. Anderson's men), checked the advance; and Anderson's division, with the artillery, held the enemy in check until night. This attack was followed by the final assault, about four o'clock p. m., when the enemy crossed the bridge in front of Sharpsburg, and made his desperate attack upon my right. Brigadier-General Toombs held the bridge, and defended it most gallantly, driving back repeated attacks, and only yielded

it after the forces brought against him became overwhelming and threatened his flank and rear.

The enemy was then met by Brigadier-General D. R. Jones, with six brigades. He drove back our right several times, and was himself made to retire several times, badly crippled; but his strong re-enforcements finally enabled him to drive in my right, and occupy this part of my ground. Thus advanced, the enemy's line was placed in such a position as to enable General Toombs to move his brigade directly against his flank. General Jones seized the opportunity, and threw Toombs down against the enemy's flank, drove him back, and recovered our lost ground.

Two of the brigades of Major-General A. P. Hill's division advanced against the enemy's front, as General Toombs made his flank attack.

The display of this force was of great value, and it assisted us in holding our position.

The enemy took shelter behind a stone wall, and another line was advanced to the crest of a hill, in support of his first line.

Captain Richardson's, Brown's, and Moody's batteries were placed in position to play upon the second line, and both lines were eventually driven back by these batteries. Before it was entirely dark, the hundred thousand men, that had been threatening our destruction for twelve hours, had melted away into a few stragglers.

The battle over, orders were sent around for ammunition-chests and cartridge-boxes to be refilled. Early on the morning of the 18th a few sharp-shooters began to exchange shots. I observed that the enemy had massed his artillery on the opposite side of the Antietam, with a view, apparently, to meet an attack from us. Our ranks were too much thinned to warrant a renewal of the conflict, with the chances of being drawn under the fire of this artillery. The effort to make a flank movement by our left, the day previous, developed the fact that the enemy had extended his right, so as to rest it upon the Potomac, and thus envelop our left flank. From our position, it was impossible to make any move, except a direct assault upon some portion of the enemy's line. I, therefore, took the liberty to address a note to the commanding general,

about two o'clock in the afternoon, suggesting a withdrawal to the south side of the Potomac. Before my note reached him, however, he rode to my bivouac, and expressed the same views. Arrangements to move across the Potomac were completed by dark. My command, moving first, crossed about two o'clock in the morning, and part of it was placed in position, in case it should be needed at the ford. The entire army crossed, however, without molestation; and, as directed by the commanding general, I proceeded to form his line. As this was completed, it became evident that the enemy was not pursuing, except with some of his batteries and some small force. The various commands were then marched off to their points of bivouac.

The name of every officer, non-commissioned officer, and private, who has shared in the toils and privations of this campaign, should be mentioned.

In one month, these troops had marched over two hundred miles, upon little more than half rations, and fought nine battles and skirmishes, killed, wounded, and captured nearly as many men as we had in our ranks, besides taking arms, and other munitions of war, in large quantities. I would that I could do justice to all of these gallant officers and men in this report. As that is impossible, I shall only mention those most prominently distinguished. These were: Major-General R. H. Anderson, on the Plains of Manassas, at Harper's Ferry, and at Sharpsburg, where he was wounded severely. Brigadier-General D. R. Jones, at Thoroughfare Gap, Manassas Plains, Boonsboro', and Sharpsburg. Brigadier-General R. Toombs, at Manassas Plains, in his gallant defence of the bridge at Antietam, and in his vigorous charge against the enemy's flank; he was severely wounded at the close of the engagement. Brigadier-General Wilcox, at Manassas Plains, on the 29th and 30th of August, afterwards absent sick. Brigadier-General Garnett, at Boonsboro' and Sharpsburg. Brigadier-General Evans, on the Plains of Manassas, both on the 29th and 30th of August, and at Sharpsburg. Brigadier-General Kemper, at Manassas Plains, Boonsboro', and Sharpsburg. Brigadier-General Hood, and Colonels Law and Wofford, at Manassas Plains, and on the 29th and 30th of August, Boonsboro', and at Sharpsburg, on the 16th and 17th. Col-

onel G. T. Anderson, commanding D. R. Jones' brigade, at Thoroughfare Gap, Manassas Plains, Boonsboro', and Sharpsburg. Brigadier-General Mahone, at Manassas Plains, where he received a severe wound. Brigadier-General R. A. Pryor, at Sharpsburg. Brigadier-General Jenkins, at Manassas Plains, on the 29th and 30th of August; on the last day severely wounded. Colonels Hunton, Corse, Stuart, Stevens, Hatley (severely wounded), and Walker (commanding Jenkins' brigade, after the latter was wounded), at Manassas Plains, Boonsboro', and Sharpsburg. Colonel Posey, at Manassas Plains and Sharpsburg, where he commanded Featherston's brigade. Colonel Benning, at Manassas Plains and Sharpsburg. At Sharpsburg, Captain Miller, of the Washington Artillery, was particularly distinguished. Colonel Walton, of the Washington Artillery, at Rappahannock Station, Manassas Plains (August 29th), and Sharpsburg. Major Garnett, at Rappahannock Station. Lieutenant-Colonels Skinner and Marye, at Manassas Plains, where they were both severely wounded. Major Walker, at Thoroughfare Gap and Manassas Plains; in the latter engagement, this gallant officer was mortally wounded.

It is with no common feeling that I recount the loss, at Manassas Plains, of Colonels Gadbury, Eighteenth South Carolina, Means, Seventeenth South Carolina, Moore, Second South Carolina, Glover, First South Carolina, Nelson, Seventh Georgia, and Lieutenant-Colonel Upton, Fifth Texas. At Boonsboro', Colonel J. B. Strange, Nineteenth Virginia volunteers, and Lieutenant-Colonel McLemore, Fourth Alabama; and, at Sharpsburg, Colonel Liddell, Eleventh Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel Coppens, and Lieutenant-Colonel Holmes, Second Georgia volunteers. These valuable and gallant officers fell in the unflinching performance of their duty, bravely and successfully heading their commands in the thickest of the fight.

To my staff-officers, Major G. M. Sorrell, assistant adjutant-general, who was wounded at Sharpsburg, Lieutenant-Colonel P. T. Manning, chief of ordnance, Major J. W. Fairfax, Major Thomas Walton, who was also wounded at Sharpsburg, Captain Thomas Goree, and Lieutenant R. W. Blackwell, I am under renewed and lasting obligations. These officers, full

of courage, intelligence, patience, and experience, were able to give directions to commands such as they thought proper, which were at once approved, and commanded my admiration. Lieutenant-Colonel Blunt volunteered his services to me at Boonsboro', and was, both there and at Sharpsburg, of material service to me. The medical department, in charge of Surgeon Cullen, were active and unremitting in the care of the wounded, and have my thanks for their humane efforts.

My party of couriers were zealous, active, and brave. They are justly entitled to praise for the manly fortitude and courageous conduct shown by them in the trying scenes of the campaign. The cavalry escort, commanded by Captain Doby, have my thanks for meritorious conduct and valuable aid. Captain Doby, Lieutenants Bonny and Matthieson, Sergeants Lee and Haile, and Corporals Whitaker and Salmond, were distinguished in the active and fearless performance of their arduous duties.

I am indebted to Colonel R. H. Chilton, Colonel Long, Majors Taylor, Marshall, Venable, and Talcott, and Captains Mason and Johnson, of the staff of the commanding general, for great courtesy and kindness in assisting me on the different battle-fields.

I respectfully ask the attention of the commanding general to the reports of division, brigade, and other commanders, and approve their high encomiums of their officers and men.

Reports of killed, wounded, and missing have already been forwarded.

I remain, sir, with respect, your obedient servant,

J. LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General Commanding.



REPORTS OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JACKSON.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, A. N. V., April 27, 1863.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. H. CHILTON,

A. A. A. General, Headquarters Department, A. N. V.:

GENERAL—I have the honor herewith to submit to you a report of the operations of my command from the 15th of August to the 5th day of September, 1862, embracing the several engagements of Manassas Junction, Bristoe Station, Ox Hill, and so much of the battle of Groveton, on the 28th, 29th, and 30th of August, as was fought by the troops under my command:

On the 15th of August, in obedience to instructions from the commanding general, I left my encampment near Gordonsville, and, passing Orange Courthouse, encamped in the evening near Mount Pisgah church, where I remained until the 20th, when, in accordance with my instructions, whilst General Longstreet was crossing at Raccoon Ford, I crossed the same river at Somerville Ford. The command encamped for the night near Stevensburg. My command at this time comprised Ewell's, A. P. Hill's, and Jackson's divisions. Ewell's was composed of the brigades of Generals Lawton, Early, Hays (Colonel Farno commanding), and Trimble, with the batteries of Brown, Dement, Latimer, Balthis, and D'Aquin. A. P. Hill's division was composed of the brigades of Generals Branch, Gregg, Field, Pender, Archer, and Colonel Thomas, with the batteries of Braxton, Latham, Orenshaw, McIntosh, Davidson, and Pegram. Jackson's division, commanded by Brigadier-General William B. Taliaferro, was composed of Winder's brigade (Colonel Baylor commanding), Colonel Campbell's brigade (Major John Seddon commanding), Brigadier-General William B. Taliaferro's brigade (Colonel A. G. Taliaferro commanding), and Starke's brigade, with the batteries of Brockenbrough, Wooding, Poague, Carpenter, Caskie, and Raines. Major-General Stuart, with his cavalry, co-operated during the expedition; and I shall more than once

have to acknowledge my obligations for the valuable and efficient aid which he rendered.

Early on the morning of the 21st, the command left its encampment and moved in the direction of Beverly's Ford, on the Rappahannock, General Taliaferro's command in the lead. On approaching the ford, the enemy was seen on the opposite bank. Batteries of that division, under the direction of Major Shumaker, chief of artillery, were placed in position, which, after a short resistance (as reported by General Taliaferro), silenced the enemy's guns, and dispersed his infantry. Major-General Stuart had crossed with a portion of his cavalry, supported by some pieces of artillery, and, after skirmishing with the enemy a few hours, taking some prisoners and arms, returned with the information that the Federal forces were moving in strength upon his position, and were close at hand. The enemy soon appeared on the opposite bank, and an animated firing was opened, and, to a considerable extent, kept up across the river for the rest of the day, between the Federal artillery and the batteries of Taliaferro's command.

On the following morning (22d), the three divisions continued their march up the bank of the Rappahannock, General Ewell in the advance, and crossed Hazel River, one of its tributaries, at Wellford's Mill, near which General Trimble was left with his brigade to protect the flank of our wagon-train from the enemy, who was moving up the north side of the Rappahannock, simultaneously with the advance of our troops on the south side.

About twelve m., a small party surprised part of the train, and captured some ambulances and mules, which were, however, soon recovered, and some prisoners taken, who gave information that a more considerable Federal force had crossed the river.

About four p. m., General Trimble, supported by General Hood (who was the advance of Longstreet's command), had a sharp engagement with this force, in which, after gallantly charging and taking a number of prisoners, they drove the residue, with severe loss, across the river, under the protection of the guns of the main body of the Federal army, on the opposite side. In the mean time the command passed Freeman's Ford, which it found strongly guarded, and moved on

to a point opposite the Fauquier White Sulphur Springs, where we found the bridge destroyed, and other evidence that the enemy was in close proximity.

In the afternoon of the 22d, the Thirteenth Georgia, Colonel Douglas, Brown's and Dement's batteries of four guns each, and Early's brigade, crossing over, took possession of the springs and adjacent heights, and taking some prisoners, and incurring some risk from the rain and sudden rise of the water, which for a few hours cut off communication with the main body. In this critical situation, the skill and presence of mind of General Early was favorably displayed. It was deemed advisable not to attempt a passage at that point, but to proceed higher up the river.

By dawn, on the morning of the 24th, General Early, by means of a temporary bridge, which had been constructed for his relief, had his troops and artillery safe on the southern side.

On the 24th, there was a fierce cannonade between General Hill's artillery and that of the enemy across the river. At the same time, General Stuart, who had preceded me, crossed the Rappahannock, striking the enemy in his rear, making his brilliant night attack upon his camp at Catlett's Station, capturing many prisoners, personal baggage of General Pope, and his dispatch-book, containing information of value to us in this expedition. In the evening we moved near Jeffersonton, pursuing the instructions of the commanding general. On Jeffersonton on the morning of the 25th, to throw my command between Washington City and the army of General Pope, and to break up his railroad communication with the Federal capital. Taking the route by Amisville, crossing Hedgepeth's River, one of the tributaries of the Rappahannock, at Benson's Mill, and moving via Orlean, we reached the vicinity of Salem, after a severe day's march, and bivouacked there for the night.

On the next day (26th), the march was continued, diverging to the right at Salem, crossing the Bull Run mountain through Thoroughfare Gap, and, passing Gainesville, we reached Astor Station on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad before sunset.

At Gainesville I was joined by General Stuart, with his

leaving the vicinity of Waterloo Bridge, about two o'clock A. M., had, by a rapid march, come up in time to render all useful assistance. He kept upon my right flank during the residue of the day. My command was now in rear of General Pope's army, separating it from the Federal capital and its base of supply. As we approached Bristoe Station, the sound of cars coming from the direction of Warrenton Junction was heard, and General Ewell divided his force so as to take simultaneous possession of the two points of the railroad. Colonel Munford, with the Second Virginia Cavalry, co-operated in this movement. Two trains of cars and some prisoners were captured, the largest portion of the small Federal force at that point making its escape. Learning that the enemy had collected at Manassas Junction, a station about seven miles distant, stores of great value, I deemed it important that no time should be lost in securing them. Notwithstanding the darkness of the night, and the fatiguing march which would, since dawn, be over thirty miles, before reaching the junction, Brigadier-General Trimble volunteered to proceed there forthwith, with the Twenty-first North Carolina (Lientenant-Colonel Fulton commanding), and the Twenty-first Georgia (Major Glover commanding), in all, about five hundred men, and capture the place. I accepted the gallant offer, and gave him orders to move without delay. In order to increase the prospect of success, Major-General Stuart, with a portion of his cavalry, was subsequently directed to move forward, and, as the ranking officer, to take command of the expedition. The duty was cheerfully undertaken by all who were assigned to it, and most promptly and successfully executed. Notwithstanding the Federal fire of musketry and artillery, our infantry dispersed the troops placed there for the defence of the place, and captured eight guns, with seventy-two horses, equipments, and ammunition complete, immense supplies of commissary and quartermaster stores, upwards of two hundred new tents; and General Trimble also reports the capture of over three hundred prisoners, and one hundred and seventy-five horses, exclusive of those belonging to the artillery, besides recovering over two hundred negroes. The next morning, the divisions under command of Generals Hill and Taliaferro, moved to Manassas Junction, the division of General Ewell remaining

at Bristoe Station. About a mile before reaching the junction, Colonel Baylor encountered and dispersed a regiment of Federal cavalry. Soon after the advance of the troops from Bristoe Station reached the junction, they were fired upon by a distant battery of the enemy posted in the direction of the battle-field of Manassas. This artillery was soon driven off, and retreated in the direction of Centreville. Soon after, a considerable body of Federal infantry, under Brigadier-General Taylor, of New Jersey, came in sight, having, it is believed, that morning left Alexandria in the cars, and boldly pushed forward to recover the position and stores which had been lost the previous night. The advance was made with great spirit and determination, and under a leader worthy of a better cause. Assailed by the batteries of Poague and Carpenter, and some of General Hill's division, and apparently seeing that there was danger of its retreat being cut off by our other troops if it continued to move forward, it soon commenced retreating, and, being subjected to a heavy fire from our batteries, was soon routed, leaving its killed and wounded upon the field. Several brigades of General Hill's division pressed forward in pursuit. In this conflict the Federal commander, General Taylor, was mortally wounded.

Our loss was small. In the afternoon of the same day, heavy columns of the enemy were seen approaching Bristoe Station from the direction of Warrenton Junction, and on the right of the railroad. General Ewell promptly made dispositions to meet them. So soon as the enemy came within range, the batteries of his division opened upon them from their several positions, as did also the Sixth and Eighth Louisiana and Sixtieth Georgia regiments. By this combined fire, two columns of the enemy, of not less than a brigade each, were driven back. But fresh columns soon supplied their places, and it was obvious that the enemy was advancing in heavy force. General Ewell's instructions were, if hard pressed, to fall back and join the main command at Manassas Junction, and orders were accordingly given for the withdrawal of his forces north of Broad Run. At the moment of issuing this order, a portion of the troops were actively engaged, and the enemy advancing; and yet the withdrawal of the infantry and artillery was conducted with perfect order, General Early

closing up the rear. The Federals halted near Bristoe Station, and General Ewell moved without further molestation, Colonel Munford, of the Second, and Colonel Rosser, of the Fifth Virginia Cavalry, bringing up his rear to Manassas. The destruction of the railroad-bridge across Broad Run was intrusted to Lieutenant (now Captain) Boswell, of the engineer corps, under whose superintendence the duty was promptly and efficiently executed. Orders were given to supply the troops with rations and other articles which they could properly make subservient to their use from the captured property. It was vast in quantity and of great value, comprising fifty thousand pounds of bacon, one thousand barrels of corn-beef, two thousand barrels of salt pork, two thousand barrels of flour, quartermasters' ordnance, and sutlers' stores, deposited in buildings and filling two trains of cars. Having appropriated all that we could use, and unwilling that the residue should again fall into the hands of the enemy, who took possession of the place the following day, orders were given to destroy all that remained after supplying the immediate wants of the army. This was done during the night.

General Taliaferro moved his division that night across to the Warrenton and Alexandria turnpike, pursuing the road to Sudley Mill, and crossing the turnpike in the vicinity of Groveton, halted near the battle-field on the 21st of July, 1861. Ewell's and Hill's divisions joined Jackson's on the 28th. My command had hardly concentrated north of the turnpike before the enemy's advance reached the vicinity of Groveton from the direction of Warrenton. General Stuart kept me advised of the general movements of the enemy, whilst Colonel Rosser, of the cavalry, with his command, and Colonel Bradley T. Johnson, commanding Campbell's brigade, remained in front of the Federals and operated against their advance. Dispositions were promptly made to attack the enemy, based upon the idea that he would continue to press forward upon the turnpike towards Alexandria. But as he did not appear to advance in force, and there was reason to believe his main body was leaving the road, and inclining towards Manassas Junction, my command was advanced through the woods, leaving Groveton on the left, until it reached a commanding position near Brawner's house. By this time it was near sun-

set, but his column appeared to be moving by with its flank exposed. I determined to attack at once, which was vigorously done by the divisions of Taliaferro and Ewell. The batteries of Wooding, Poague, and Carpenter were placed in position in front of Starke's brigade, and above the village of Groveton, and firing over the heads of our skirmishers, poured a heavy fire of shot and shell upon the enemy. This was responded to by a very heavy fire from the enemy, forcing our batteries to select another position. By this time, Taliaferro's command, with Lawton's and Trimble's brigades on his left, were advanced from the woods to the open field, and were now moving in gallant style until they reached an orchard on the right of our line, and were less than a hundred yards from a large force of the enemy. The conflict here was fierce and sanguinary. Although largely re-enforced, the Federals did not attempt to advance, but maintained their ground with obstinate determination. Both lines stood exposed to the discharge of musketry and artillery, until about nine o'clock, when the enemy slowly fell back, yielding the field to our troops. The loss on both sides was heavy, and among our wounded were Major-General Ewell and Brigadier-General Taliaferro; the latter, after a few months, was able to assume his duties; the former, I regret to say, is still disabled by his wound, and the army thus deprived of his valuable services.

This obstinate resistance of the enemy appears to have been for the purpose of protecting the flank of his column until it should pass the position occupied by our troops. Owing to the difficulty of getting artillery through the woods, I did not have so much of that arm as I desired at the opening of the engagement; but this want was met by Major Pelham, with the Stuart Horse Artillery, who dashed forward on my right and opened upon the enemy at a moment when his services were much needed. Although the enemy moved off under cover of the night, and left us in quiet possession of the field, he did not long permit us to remain inactive, or in doubt as to his intention to renew the conflict. The next morning I found that he had abandoned the ground occupied as the battle-field the evening before, and had moved further to the east, and to my left, placing himself between my command and the Federal capital. My troops on this day were distributed along,

and in the vicinity of, the cut of an unfinished railroad (intended as a part of the track to connect the Manassas road directly with Alexandria) stretching from the Warrenton turnpike in the direction of Sudley Mill. It was mainly along the excavation of this unfinished road that my line of battle was formed on the 29th: Jackson's division under Brigadier-General Starke, on the right; Ewell's division, under Brigadier-General Lawton, in the centre, and Hill's division on the left. In the morning, about ten o'clock, the Federal artillery opened with spirit and animation upon our right, which was soon replied to by the batteries of Poagne, Carpenter, Dement, Brockenbrough and Latimer, under Major Shumaker. This lasted for some time, when the enemy moved around more to our left to another point of attack. His next effort was directed against our left. This was vigorously repulsed by the batteries of Braxton, Crenshaw, and Pegram. About two o'clock P. M., the Federal infantry, in large force, advanced to the attack of our left, occupied by the division of General Hill. It pressed forward in defiance of our fatal and destructive fire with great determination, a portion of it crossing a deep cut in the railroad-track, and penetrating in heavy force an interval of near a hundred and seventy-five yards, which separated the right of Gregg's from the left of Thomas's brigade. For a short time Gregg's brigade, on the extreme left, was isolated from the main body of the command. But the Fourteenth South Carolina regiment, then in reserve, with the Forty-ninth Georgia, left of Colonel Thomas's, attacked the exultant enemy with vigor, and drove them back across the railroad-track with great slaughter. General McGowan reports that the opposing forces, at one time, delivered their volleys into each other at the distance of ten paces. Assault after assault was made on the left, exhibiting, on the part of the enemy, great pertinacity and determination, but every advance was most successfully and gallantly driven back. General Hill reports that six separate and distinct assaults were thus met and repulsed by his division, assisted by Hay's brigade, Colonel Forno commanding. By this time the brigade of General Gregg, which, from its position on the extreme left, was most exposed to the enemy's attack, had nearly expended its ammunition. It had suffered severely in its men, and all its field-officers, except

two, were killed or wounded. About four o'clock it had been assisted by Hay's brigade (Colonel Forno). It was now retired to the rear to take some repose after seven hours of severe service and General Early's brigade, of Ewell's division, with the Eighth Louisiana regiment, took its place. On reaching his position, General Early found that the enemy had obtained possession of the railroad and a piece of wood in front, there being at this point a deep cut, which furnished a strong defence. Moving through a field, he advanced upon the enemy, drove them from the wood and railroad-cut with great slaughter, and followed in pursuit some two hundred yards. The Thirteenth Georgia at the same time advanced to the railroad and crossed with Early's brigade. As it was not desirable to bring on a general engagement that evening, General Early was recalled to the railroad, where Thomas, Pender, and Archer had firmly maintained their positions during the day. Early kept his position there until the following morning. Brigadier-General Field and Colonel Forno (commanding Hay's brigade) were severely wounded. Brigadier-General Trimble was also seriously wounded. During the day, a force of the enemy penetrated the wood in my rear, endangering the safety of my ambulances and train. Upon being advised of this, by General Stuart, I sent a body of infantry to drive them from the wood. But, in the mean time, the vigilant Pelham had unlimbered his battery and dispersed that portion of them which had reached the wood. At a later period, Major Patrick, of the cavalry, who was by General Stuart intrusted with guarding the train, was attacked, and although it was promptly and effectually repulsed, it was not without the loss of that intrepid officer, who fell in the attack, whilst setting an example of gallantry to his men well worthy of imitation. During the day, the commanding general arrived, and also General Longstreet, with his command. On the following day (30th), my command occupied the ground, and the divisions the same relative position to each other, and to the field, which they held the day before, forming the left wing of the army. General Longstreet's command formed the right wing. A large quantity of artillery was posted upon a commanding eminence in the centre.

After some desultory skirmishing and heavy cannonading

during the day, the Federal infantry, about four o'clock in the evening, moved from under cover of the wood and advanced in several lines, first engaging the right, but soon extending its attack to the centre and left. In a few moments our entire line was engaged in a fierce and sanguinary struggle with the enemy. As one line was repulsed, another took its place and pressed forward as if determined, by force of numbers and fury of assault, to drive us from our positions. So impetuous and well sustained were these onsets as to induce me to send to the commanding general for re-enforcements, but the timely and gallant advance of General Longstreet, on the right, relieved my troops from the pressure of overwhelming numbers, and gave to those brave men the chances of a more equal conflict. As Longstreet pressed upon the right, the Federal advance was checked, and soon a general advance of my whole line was ordered. Eagerly and fiercely did each brigade press forward, exhibiting in parts of the field scenes of close encounter and murderous strife not witnessed often in the turmoil of battle. The Federals gave way before our troops, fell back in disorder, and fled precipitately, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. During their retreat the artillery opened with destructive power upon the fugitive masses. The infantry followed until darkness put an end to the pursuit.

Our loss was heavy; that of the enemy, as shown by the battle-field, of which we were in possession, much heavier. Among the losses was Colonel Baylor, commanding Winder's brigade, who fell in front of his brigade, whilst nobly leading it on to the charge. We captured eight pieces of artillery, with their caissons, and six thousand five hundred and twenty small arms were collected from the battle-field.

It being ascertained next morning that the Federal army had retreated in the direction of Centreville, I was ordered by the commanding general to turn that position. Crossing Bull Run at Sudley Ford, thence pursuing a country road until we reached the Little River turnpike, which we followed in the direction of Fairfax Courthouse until the troops halted for the night. Early next morning, September 1st, we moved forward, and late in the evening, after reaching Ox Hill, came in contact with the enemy, who were in position on our right and front, covering his line of retreat from Centreville to Fair-

fax Courthouse. Our line of battle was formed—General Hill's division on the right; Ewell's division, General Lawton commanding, in the centre; and Jackson's division, General Starke commanding, on the left—all on the right of the turn-pike road. Artillery was posted on an eminence to the left of the road. The brigades of Branch and Field, Colonel Brockenbrough commanding the latter, were sent forward to feel and engage the enemy. A cold and drenching thunder shower swept over the field at this time, striking directly into the faces of our troops. These two brigades gallantly engaged the enemy, but so severe was the fire in front and flank of Branch's brigade, as to produce in it some disorder and falling back. The brigades of Gregg, Thomas, and Pender were then thrown into the fight. Soon a portion of Ewell's division became engaged. The conflict now raged with great fury, the enemy obstinately and desperately contesting the ground until their Generals Kearney and Stephens fell in front of Thomas's brigade, after which they retired from the field.

By the following morning the Federal army had entirely disappeared from our view, and it soon appeared, by a report from General Stuart, that it had passed Fairfax Courthouse, and had moved in the direction of Washington City.

On the 3d of September we left Ox Hill, taking the road by Dranesville and Leesburg, and on the 4th bivouacked near the Big Spring, between Leesburg and the Potomac.

The official reports of the casualties of my command, in its operations from the Rappahannock to the Potomac, will show a loss of seventy-five officers killed and two hundred and seventy-three wounded, seven hundred and thirty non-commissioned officers and officers and privates killed, three thousand two hundred and seventy-four wounded, and thirty-five missing, making a total loss of four thousand three hundred and eighty-seven.

Colonel S. Crutchfield, chief of artillery, discharged his duties well. The conduct of officers and men during the various engagements described was such as to entitle them to great praise. The wounded were skilfully cared for by medical director, Dr. Hunter McGuire. In the transmission of orders I was greatly assisted, during the expedition, by the following members of my staff: Colonel A. Smead, assistant inspector-

general; Major E. F. Paxton, acting assistant adjutant-general; Captain R. E. Wilbourn, chief signal officer; First-Lieutenant H. R. Douglas, assistant inspector-general; First-Lieutenant J. G. Morrison, aid-de-camp, and Colonel William L. Jackson, volunteer aid-de-camp. Captain Wilbourn was so severely wounded at the battle of Groveton as to be unable to go further with the army. The ordnance, quartermaster, and commissary departments were well managed by their respective chiefs, Majors G. H. Baer, J. A. Harman, and W. J. Hawks.

For further information, respecting the detailed movements of troops and the conduct of individuals, I would respectfully refer you to the accompanying reports.

For these great and signal victories our sincere and humble thanks are due unto Almighty God. We should in all things acknowledge the hand of Him who reigns in heaven and rules among the armies of men. In view of the arduous labors and great privations the troops were called to endure, and the isolated and perilous position which the command occupied, while engaged with greatly superior numbers of the enemy, we can but express the grateful conviction of our mind, that God was with us and gave to us the victory, and unto His holy name be the praise.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. J. JACKSON, Lieutenant-General.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, A. N. V., April 23, 1863.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. H. CHILTON, *A. A. General*:

GENERAL—I have the honor, herewith, to submit a report of the operations of my command from the 5th to the 27th of September, 1862, embracing the capture of Harper's Ferry, the engagement at Shepherdstown, and so much of the battle of Sharpsburg as was fought by the troops under my command:

My command comprised A. P. Hill's division, consisting of the brigades of Branch, Gregg, Field (Colonel Brockenbrough, commanding), Pender, Archer, and Colonel Thomas, with the batteries of the division, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. L.

Walker; Ewell's division, under Brigadier-General Lawton, consisting of the brigades of Early, Hays (Colonel Strong), Trimble (Colonel Walker), and Lawton (Colonel Douglas), with the artillery, under Major Courtney, and Jackson's division, under Brigadier-General Starke, consisting of the brigades of Winder (Colonel Grigsby), Jones (Colonel B. T. Johnson), Taliaferro (Colonel Warren), and Starke (Colonel Stafford), with the artillery under Major Shumaker, chief of artillery.

On the 5th of September my command crossed the Potomac at White's Ford, and bivouacked that night near the Three Springs, in the State of Maryland. Not having any cavalry with me except the Black Horse, under Captain Randolph, I directed him, after crossing the Potomac, to take part of his company and scout to the right, in order to avoid a surprise of the column from that direction. For the thorough and efficient manner in which this duty was discharged, and for the valuable service rendered generally, whilst attached to my headquarters, I desire to make special mention of this company and its officers, Captain Randolph and Lieutenants Paine, Tyler, and Smith, who frequently transmitted orders in the absence of staff-officers.

The next day we arrived in the vicinity of Frederick City. Jackson's division encamped near its suburbs, except the brigade of General Jones (Colonel Bradley T. Johnson commanding), which was posted in the city as a provost-guard. Ewell's and Hill's divisions occupied positions near the railroad-bridge over the Monocacy, guarding the approaches from Washington City.

In obedience to instructions from the commanding general, and for the purpose of capturing the Federal forces and stores then at Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, my command left the vicinity of Frederick City on the 10th, and passing rapidly through Middletown, Boonsborough, and Williamsport, re-crossed the Potomac into Virginia, at Light's Ford, on the 11th. General Hill moved with his division on the turnpike, direct from Williamsport to Martinsburg. The divisions of Jackson and Ewell proceeded towards the North Mountain depot, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, about seven miles northwest of Martinsburg. They bivouacked that night in the vicinity of the depot in order to prevent the Federal forces,

then at Martinsburg, from escaping westward unobserved. Major Myers, commanding the cavalry, sent part of his troops as far south as the Berkeley and Hampshire turnpike. Brigadier-General White, who was in command of the Federal forces at Martinsburg, becoming advised of our approach, evacuated the place on the night of the 11th, and retreated to Harper's Ferry.

On the morning of the 12th our cavalry entered the town, as, in the course of the day, did the main body of my command. At this point, abandoned quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance stores fell into our hands. Proceeding thence towards Harper's Ferry, about eleven o'clock A. M., on the following morning (13th), the head of our column came in view of the enemy, drawn up in force upon Bolivar Heights. General Hill, who was in the advance, went into camp near Hulttown, about two miles from the enemy's position. The two other divisions encamped near by.

The commanding general having directed Major-General McLaws to move with his own and General R. H. Anderson's divisions to take possession of the Maryland Heights overlooking Harper's Ferry, and Brigadier-General J. G. Walker, pursuing a different route, to cross the Potomac and move up that river on the Virginia side and occupy the London Heights, both for the purpose of co-operating with me, it became necessary before making the attack to ascertain whether they were in position. Failing to learn the fact by signals, a courier was dispatched to each of those points for the required information. During the night the courier to the London Heights returned with a message from General Walker that he was in position. In the mean time, General McLaws had attacked the Federal force posted to defend the Maryland Heights, had routed it, and taken possession of that commanding position. The Potomac River flowed between the positions respectively occupied by General McLaws and myself, and the Shenandoah separated me from General Walker, and it became advisable, as the speediest mode of communication, to resort to signals. Before the necessary orders were thus transmitted, the day was far advanced.

The enemy had, by fortifications, strengthened the naturally strong position he occupied along Bolivar Heights, extending

from near the Shenandoah to the Potomac. McLaws and Walker, being thus separated from the enemy, by intervening rivers, would afford no assistance beyond the fire of their artillery and guarding certain avenues of escape to the enemy. And from the reports received from them, by signals, in consequence of the distance and range of their guns, not much could be expected from their artillery, so long as the enemy retained his advanced position on Bolivar Heights.

In the afternoon, General Hill was ordered to move along the left bank of the Shenandoah, turn the enemy's left, and enter Harper's Ferry. General Lawton, commanding Ewell's division, was directed to move along the turnpike for the purpose of supporting General Hill, and of otherwise operating against the enemy to his left. General J. R. Jones, commanding Jackson's division, was directed, with one of his brigades and a battery of artillery, to make a demonstration against the enemy's right, whilst the remaining part of his command, as a reserve, moved along the turnpike. Major Massie, commanding the cavalry, was directed to keep upon our left flank for the purpose of preventing the enemy from escaping. Brigadier-General Walker guarded against an escape across the Shenandoah River. Fearing lest the enemy should attempt to escape across the Potomac, by means of signals I called the attention of Major-General McLaws, commanding on the Maryland Heights, to the propriety of guarding against such an attempt. The demonstration on the left against the enemy's right was made by Winder's brigade (Colonel Grigsby commanding). It was ordered to secure a commanding hill to the left of the heights, near the Potomac. Promptly dispersing some cavalry, this eminence, from which the batteries of Poague and Carpenter subsequently did such admirable execution, was secured without difficulty. In execution of the order given Major-General Hill, he moved obliquely to the right until he struck the Shenandoah River. Observing an eminence crowning the extreme left of the enemy's line, occupied by infantry, but without artillery, and protected only by an abatis of fallen timber, Pender, Archer, and Brockenbrough were directed to gain the crest of that hill, while Branch and Gregg were directed to march along the river, and, during the night, to take advantage of the ravines, cutting the precipitous banks

of the river, and establish themselves on the plain to the left and rear of the enemy's works. Thomas followed as a reserve. The execution of the first movement was intrusted to Brigadier-General Pender, who accomplished it with slight resistance; and during the night, Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, chief of artillery of Hill's division, brought up the batteries of Captains Pegram, McIntosh, Davidson, Braxton, and Crenshaw, and established them upon the position thus gained. Branch and Gregg also gained the positions indicated for them, and day-break found them in rear of the enemy's line of defence.

As directed, Brigadier-General Lawton, commanding Ewell's division, moved on the turnpike in three columns—one on the road, and another on each side of it—until he reached Hulltown, when he formed line of battle, and advanced to the woods on School-house Hill. The division laid on their arms during the night, Lawton and Trimble being in line on the right of the road, and Hays on the left, with Early immediately in his rear. During the night, Colonel Crutchfield, my chief of artillery, crossed ten guns of Ewell's division over the Shenandoah, and established them on its right bank, so as to enfilade the enemy's position on Bolivar Heights, and take his nearest and most formidable fortifications in reverse. The other batteries of Ewell's division were placed in position on School-house Hill, on each side of the road.

At dawn, September 15th, General Lawton advanced his division to the front of the woods, Lawton's brigade (Colonel Douglas commanding) moved by flank to the bottom between School-house Hill and Bolivar Heights, to support the advance of Major-General Hill. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker opened a rapid enfilade fire from all his batteries at about one thousand yards range. The batteries on School-house Hill attacked the enemy's lines in front. In a short time the guns of Captains Brown, Garber, Latimer, and Dement, under the direction of Colonel Crutchfield, opened from the rear. The batteries of Poague and Carpenter opened fire upon the enemy's right. The artillery upon the London Heights, of Brigadier-General Walker's command, under Captain French, which had silenced the enemy's artillery near the superintendent's house on the preceding afternoon, again opened upon Harper's Ferry, and also some guns of Major-General McLaws

from the Maryland Heights. In an hour the enemy's fire seemed to be silenced, and the batteries of General Hill were ordered to cease their fire, which was the signal for storming the works. General Pender had commenced his advance, when the enemy again opening, Pegram and Crenshaw moved forward their batteries, and poured a rapid fire into the enemy. The white flag was now displayed, and shortly afterwards, Brigadier-General White (the commanding officer, Colonel D. S. Miles, having been mortally wounded), with a garrison of about eleven thousand men, surrendered as prisoners of war. Under this capitulation, we took possession of seventy-three pieces of artillery, some thirteen thousand small arms, and other stores. Liberal terms were granted to General White, and the officers under his command, in the surrender, which, I regret to say, do not seem, from subsequent events, to have been properly appreciated by their government.

Leaving General Hill to receive the surrender of the Federal troops, and take the requisite steps for securing the captured stores, I moved, in obedience to orders from the commanding general, to rejoin him in Maryland, with the remaining divisions of my command. By a severe night march, we reached the vicinity of Sharpsburg on the morning of the 16th.

By direction of the commanding general, I advanced on the enemy, leaving Sharpsburg to the right, and took position to the left of General Longstreet, near Dunkard church, Ewell's division (General Lawton commanding) forming the right, and Jackson's division (General J. R. Jones commanding) forming the left of my command. Major-General Stuart, with the cavalry, was on my left. Jackson's division (General Jones commanding) was formed partly in an open field, and partly in the woods, with its right resting upon the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpikes; Winder's and Jones' brigades being in front, and Taliaferro's and Starke's brigades a short distance in their rear, and Poague's battery on a knoll in front.

Ewell's division followed that of Jackson to the woods on the left of the road near the church. Early's brigade was then formed on the left of the line of Jackson's division, to guard its flank, and Hay's brigade was formed in its rear. Lawton's and Trimble's brigades remained during the evening, with arms stacked, near the church.

A battery of the enemy, some five hundred yards to the front of Jackson's division, opening fire upon a battery to the right, was silenced in twenty minutes by a rapid and well-directed fire from Poague's battery. Other batteries of the enemy opened soon after upon our lines, and the firing continued until after dark.

About ten P. M., Lawton's and Trimble's brigades advanced to the front to relieve the command of Brigadier-General Hood (on the left of Major-General D. H. Hill), which had been more or less engaged during the evening. Trimble's brigade was posted on the right, next to Ripley's, of D. H. Hill's division, and Lawton's on the left.

The troops slept that night upon their arms, disturbed by the occasional fire of the pickets of the two armies, who were in close proximity to each other. At the first dawn of day skirmishing commenced in front, and in a short time the Federal batteries, so posted on the opposite side of the Antietam as to enfilade my line, opened a severe and damaging fire. This was vigorously replied to by the batteries of Poague, Carpenter, Brockenbrough, Raines, Caskie, and Wooding. About sunrise, the Federal infantry advanced in heavy force to the edge of the wood, on the eastern side of the turnpike, driving in our skirmishers. Batteries were opened in front from the wood with shell and canister, and our troops became exposed, for near an hour, to a terrific storm of shell, canister, and musketry. General Jones having been compelled to leave the field, the command of Jackson's division devolved upon General Starke. With heroic spirit, our lines advanced to the conflict, and maintained their position in the face of superior numbers with stubborn resolution, sometimes driving the enemy before them, and sometimes compelled to fall back before their well-sustained and destructive fire. Fresh troops from time to time relieved the enemy's ranks, and the carnage on both sides was terrific. At this early hour, General Starke was killed, Colonel Douglas (commanding Lawton's brigade) was also killed. General Lawton, commanding division, and Colonel Walker, commanding brigade, were severely wounded. More than half of the brigades of Lawton and Hays were either killed or wounded, and more than a third of Trimble's, and all the regimental commanders in those brigades, except two, were

killed or wounded. Thinned in their ranks, and exhausted of their ammunition, Jackson's division and the brigades of Lawton, Hays, and Trimble retired to the rear, and Hood, of Longstreet's command, again took the position from which he had been before relieved. In the mean time, General Stuart moved his artillery to a position nearer to the main command, and more in our rear. Early being now directed, in consequence of the disability of General Lawton, to take command of Ewell's division, returned with his brigade (with the exception of the Thirteenth Virginia regiment, which remained with General Stuart) to the piece of wood where he had left the other brigades of his division when he was separated from them. Here he found that the enemy had advanced his infantry near the wood, in which was the Dunkard church, and had planted a battery across the turnpike, near the edge of the wood and an open field, and that the brigades of Lawton, Hays, and Trimble had fallen back some distance to the rear. Finding here Colonels Grigsby and Stafford, with a portion of Jackson's division, which formed on his left, he determined to maintain his position there if re-enforcements could be sent to his support, of which he was promptly assured. Colonel Grigsby, with his small command, kept in check the advance of the enemy on the left flank, while General Early attacked, with great vigor and gallantry, the column on his right and front. The force in front was giving way under this attack, when another heavy column of Federal troops were seen moving across the plateau on his left flank. By this time the expected re-enforcements, consisting of Semmes' and Anderson's brigades and a part of Barksdale's, of McLaw's division, arrived, and the whole, including Grigsby's command, now united, charged upon the enemy, checking his advance, then driving him back, with great slaughter, entirely from and beyond this wood, and gaining possession of our original position. No further advance, beyond demonstrations, was made by the enemy on the left. In the afternoon, in obedience to instructions from the commanding general, I moved to the left with a view to turning the Federal right; but I found his numerous artillery so judiciously established in their front and extending so near to the Potomac, which here makes a remarkable bend, as will be seen by reference to the map herewith

annexed, as to render it inexpedient to hazard the attempt. In this movement, Major-General Stuart had the advance, and acted his part well. This officer rendered valuable service throughout the day. His bold use of artillery secured for us an important position, which, had the enemy possessed, might have commanded our left. At the close of the day, my troops held the ground which they had occupied in the morning. The next day we remained in position awaiting another attack. The enemy continued in heavy force west of the Antietam on our left, but made no further movement to the attack.

I refer you to the report of Major-General A. P. Hill for the operations of his command in the battle of Sharpsburg. Arriving upon the battle-field from Harper's Ferry at half-past two o'clock of the 17th, he reported to the commanding general, and was by him directed to take position on the right. I have not embraced the movements of his division, nor his killed and wounded of that action, in my report.

Early in the morning of the 19th we recrossed the Potomac River into Virginia near Shepherdstown. The promptitude and success with which this movement was effected reflects the highest credit upon the skill and energy of Major Harman, chief quartermaster. In the evening, the command moved on the road leading to Martinsburg, except Lawton's brigade, (Colonel Lamar, of the Sixty-first Georgia, commanding,) which was left on the Potomac Heights.

On the same day the enemy appeared in considerable force on the northern side of the Potomac, and commenced planting heavy batteries on its heights. In the evening, the Federals commenced crossing under the protection of their guns, driving off Lawton's brigade and General Pendleton's artillery. By morning, a considerable force had crossed over. Orders were dispatched to Generals Early and Hill, who had advanced some four miles on the Martinsburg road, to return and drive back the enemy. General Hill, who was in the advance, as he approached the town, formed his line of battle in two lines, the first composed of the brigades of Pender, Gregg, and Thomas, under the command of General Gregg, and the second of Lane's, Archer's, and Brockenbrough's brigades, under command of General Archer. General Early, with the brigades of Early, Trimble, and Hays, took position in the wood on the

right and left of the road leading to the ford. The Federal infantry lined the high banks of the Virginia shore, while their artillery, formidable in numbers and weight of metal, crowned the opposite heights of the Potomac. General Hill's division advanced with great gallantry against the Federal infantry, in the face of a continuous discharge of shot and shell from their batteries. The Federals, massing in front of Pender, poured a heavy fire into his ranks, and then extending with a view to turn his left, Archer promptly formed on Pender's left, when a simultaneous charge was made, which drove the enemy into the river, followed by an appalling scene of the destruction of human life. Two hundred prisoners were taken. This position, on the bank of the river, we continued to hold that day, although exposed to the enemy's guns and within range of his sharp-shooters, posted near the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. Our infantry remained at the river until relieved by cavalry, under General Fitzhugh Lee.

On the evening of the 20th the command moved from Shepherdstown and encamped near the Opequon, in the vicinity of Martinsburg. We remained near Martinsburg until the 27th, when we moved to Bunker Hill, in the county of Berkeley.

The official list of casualties of my command, during the period embraced in this report, will show that we sustained a loss of thirty-eight officers killed and one hundred and seventy-one wounded, of three hundred and thirteen non-commissioned officers and privates killed, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-nine wounded, and fifty-seven missing; making a total of two thousand four hundred and thirty-eight killed, wounded, and missing.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. J. JACKSON, Lieutenant-General.

Official :

CHARLES J. FAULKNER, Lieut.-Col. and A. A. G.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL LONGSTREET.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS, A. N. V.,
Near Fredericksburg, Va., Dec. 20, 1865.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. H. CHILTON,

Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General :

GENERAL—Upon my arrival at Fredericksburg, on the 19th of November, the troops of this command were assigned to positions as follows—viz., McLaws' division upon the heights immediately behind the city and south of the Telegraph road ; Anderson's division on McLaws' left and occupying the heights as far as Taylor's Hill on the Rappahannock ; Pickett's division on McLaws' right, and extending to the rear along the margin of the wood which skirts Deep Run Valley ; Hood's division near Hamilton's Crossing of the railroad ; Ransom's division in reserve, near my headquarters. Our batteries were assigned positions along the heights by General Pendleton, Colonel Cabell, Colonel Alexander, and Captain Johnson (Colonel Walton being absent sick). Pits were made for the protection of these batteries, under the supervision of those officers. A portion of General Pendleton's reserve artillery was assigned to the heights with Major-General McLaws' division. Colonel Walton's (Washington Artillery) occupied the heights at Marye's Hill, and a portion of Colonel Alexander's reserve occupied the other portion of Anderson's front, extending to the Taylor House on our left. The brigade batteries that were not assigned to positions on the heights were held in readiness to co-operate with their commands, or for any other service that might be required of them. Our picket-line was established along the river-bank, extending from Bank's Ford to Talcott battery, the most important portion of it under the immediate orders of Major-General McLaws. Upon the approach of General Jackson's army, Hood's division was closed in upon the right of Pickett, and put in position upon the heights on the opposite side of Deep Run Valley. In addition to the natural strength of the position, ditches, stone-fences, and road-

cuts were found along different portions of the line, and parts of General McLaws' line were further strengthened by rifle trenches and abatis.

The enemy held quiet possession of the Stafford Heights until three o'clock on the morning of the 11th, when our signal guns gave notice of his approach. The troops, being at their different camp grounds, were formed immediately and marched to their positions along the line. Ransom's division was ordered to take a sheltered position in easy supporting distance of the batteries on the Marye Hill. Before the troops got to their positions, McLaws' pickets (Barksdale's brigade) engaged the enemy at the river, and from time to time, drove back different working-parties engaged in laying the bridges. The enemy was compelled, eventually, to abandon his plan of laying the bridges, and began to throw his troops across the river in boats, under cover of the fire of his sharp-shooters, and an hundred and fifty odd pieces of artillery.

At many points along the river-bank our troops could get no protection from the artillery fire. This was particularly the case at the mouth of Deep Run, where the enemy succeeded in completing his bridge early in the afternoon. Later in the afternoon he succeeded in throwing large bodies of troops across, at the city, by using his boats. Barksdale, however, engaged them fiercely at every point, and with remarkable success. Soon after dark, General McLaws ordered Barksdale's brigade to retire. The general was so confident of his position that a second order was sent him before he would yield the field. His brigade was then relieved by that of Brigadier-General T. R. R. Cobb, which was placed by General McLaws along the Telegraph road, in front of Marye's House (a stone fence and cut along this road gave good protection against infantry). When Cobb's brigade got into position, Ransom's division was withdrawn and placed in reserve. During the night the enemy finished his bridges and began to throw his troops across.

His movements, early on the 12th, seemed to be directly against our right; but when the fog lifted, columns were seen opposite Fredericksburg, the head of them then crossing at the bridges opposite the city. Ransom's division was moved back to the Marye Hill. Featherston's brigade of Anderson's

division (previously occupying this hill) was closed in upon the other brigades of Anderson. The entire day was occupied by the enemy in throwing his forces across the river, and deploying his columns. Our batteries were opened upon the masses of infantry whenever they were in certain range. Our fire invariably drew that of the enemy's on the opposite heights, and they generally kept up the fire long after our batteries had ceased.

Early on the morning of the 13th I rode to the right of my position, Hood's division. The dense fog in the early twilight concealed the enemy from view; but his commands, "Forward, guide centre, march!" were distinctly heard at different points near my right. From the direction of the sound, and the position of his troops the day before, I concluded that his attack would be upon General Jackson, at some point beyond my right. I therefore rode back to a point near the centre of my forces, giving notice to General Hood that the enemy would attack General Jackson beyond his right, that he should watch carefully the movements, and when an opportunity offered, he should move forward and attack the enemy's flank. Similar instructions were given to General Pickett, with orders to co-operate with General Hood. The attack was made as had been anticipated. It did not appear to have all the force of a real attack, however, and General Hood did not feel authorized to make more than a partial advance. Where he did move out, he drove the enemy back in handsome style.

About eleven o'clock A. M., I sent orders for the batteries to play upon the streets and bridges beyond the city, by way of diversion in favor of our right. The batteries had hardly opened, when the enemy's infantry began to move out towards my line. Our pickets in front of the Marye House were soon driven in, and the enemy began to deploy his forces in front of that point. Our artillery being in position, opened fire as soon as the masses became dense enough to warrant it. This fire was very destructive and demoralizing in its effects, and frequently made gaps in the enemy's ranks that could be seen at the distance of a mile. The enemy continued his advance and made his attack at the Marye Hill in handsome style. He did not meet the fire of our infantry with any heart, however, and was therefore readily repulsed. Another effort was speed-

ily made; but with little more success. The attack was again renewed, and again repulsed. Other forces were seen preparing for another attack, when I suggested to General McLaws the propriety of re-enforcing his advanced line with a brigade. He had previously re-enforced with part of Kershaw's brigade and ordered forward the balance. About this time, Brigadier-General T. R. R. Cobb fell, mortally wounded, and almost simultaneously Brigadier-General J. R. Cooke was severely wounded.

General Kershaw dashed to the front to take the command. General Ransom, on the Marye Hill, was charged with the immediate care of the point attacked, with orders to send forward additional re-enforcements, if it should become necessary, and to use Featherston's brigade (Anderson's division) if he should require it.

The attack upon our right seemed to subside about two o'clock, when I directed Major-General Pickett to send me two of his brigades. One (Kemper's) was sent to General Ransom, to be placed in some secure position to be ready in case it should be wanted. The other (Jenkins') was ordered to General McLaws, to replace that of Kershaw in his line.

The enemy soon completed his arrangements for a renewed attack, and moved forward with much determination. He met with no better success than he had on the previous occasions. These efforts were repeated and continued from time to time till after night, when he left the field literally strewn with his dead and wounded.

Colonel's Walton's ammunition was exhausted about sunset, and his batteries were relieved by Colonel Alexander's. Orders were given for fresh supplies of ammunition, and for every thing to be prepared for a renewal of the battle at daylight.

On the 14th there was little firing between the sharp-shooters. The enemy screening his forces under a slight descent in the ground, held a position about four hundred yards in front of us. In the afternoon, I sent Captain Latrobe, of my staff, to the left to place artillery in position to play along the enemy's line, with instructions to Colonel Alexander to use such artillery there as he might think proper. The point was selected and the pits made by light the following morning. General Ransom was also ordered to strengthen his position on the

Marye Hill by rifle trenches. Similar instructions were sent along the entire line. These preparations were made to meet the grand attack of the enemy, *confidently expected* on Monday morning. As the attack was not made, the artillery and General Ransom's sharp-shooters opened upon the enemy and drove him back to cover in the city.

During the night, the enemy recrossed the river. His retreat was not discovered till he had crossed the river and cut his bridges at this end. Our sharp-shooters were moved forward, and our old positions resumed.

Four hundred prisoners, fifty-five hundred stands of small arms, and two hundred and fifty thousand rounds of small-arm ammunition were captured.

Our loss, for the number engaged, was quite heavy. Brigadier-General T. R. R. Cobb fell, mortally wounded, in the heat of the battle of the 13th. He defended his position with great gallantry and ability. In him we have lost one of our most promising officers and statesmen. A tabular statement and lists of the killed, wounded, and missing accompany this report.

Much credit is due Major-General McLaws for his untiring zeal and ability in preparing his troops and his position for a successful resistance, and the ability with which he handled his troops after the attack. I would also mention, as particularly distinguished in the engagement of the 13th, Brigadier-Generals Ransom, Kershaw, and Cooke (severely wounded), and Colonel McMillan, who succeeded to the command of Cobb's brigade, and Colonel Walton (Washington Artillery), and Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander (reserve artillery).

Brigadier General Barksdale, with his brigade, held the enemy's entire army at the river-bank for sixteen hours, giving us abundance of time to complete our arrangements for battle. A more gallant and worthy service is rarely accomplished by so small a force.

I refer you to the reports of these officers for more detailed accounts of the engagements. I desire to call the attention of the government to the gallant officers and men mentioned in their reports.

Major-Generals Anderson, Pickett, and Hood, with their gallant divisions, were deprived of their opportunity by the

unexpected and hasty retreat of the enemy. A portion of General Anderson's command was engaged in defending the passage of the river; a portion of General Hood's in driving back the attack against our right; and a portion of Pickett's did important service near the Marye Hill. I refer you to their reports for particular accounts.

Major Garnett held three batteries in reserve, in the Valley, between the positions of Generals Pickett and Hood, and was much disappointed not to have the opportunity to use them.

My staff-officers, Major Sorrell, Lieutenant-Colonel Manning, Major Fairfax, Captain Latrobe, Captain Goree, and Lieutenant Blackwell, gave me their usual intelligent, willing aid. Major Haskell, Captain Young, and Captain Rodgers volunteered their assistance, and rendered important services.

My thanks are also due to Surgeon Cullen, chief surgeon; Major Mitchell, chief quartermaster; Major Moses, chief of the subsistence department; and Captain Manning, signal officer, for valuable services in their respective departments.

I have the honor to be, General,

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General Commanding.

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